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ABSTRACT
STRATEGIC AIR WARFARE AND NUCLEAR STRATEGY: THE FORMULATION
OF MILITARY POLICY IN THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION, 1945-1950

Patrick W. Steele. B.A., M.A.
Marquette University, 2010

This work analyzes the military decision making within the Truman
administration that culminated in the purchases of aircraft and the establishment of a
virtual nuclear only strategy. When Harry S. Truman became President in April 1945, the
United States Army Air Force (USAAF) was in the formative stage of a firebombing
campaign that attempted to burn the Japanese out of the war by targeting the civilian
population. Four months later, the use of nuclear bombs ushered in the atomic age and
completely altered the military and political decision-making processes within the
administration. Despite evidence to the contrary about the efficacy of strategic bombing,
the military view of the atomic bomb as an ultimate arbiter of warfare whose use virtually
guaranteed victory on American terms was immediately embraced across all the armed
forces.
The chapters of the dissertation describe the evolution of airpower as a strategy
and the fundamental differences between the branches of the armed forces regarding
funding, missions, and responsibilities in the new atomic age. These substantive and
structural problems manifested in arguments over Unification and the subsequent creation
of the National Military Establishment. Truman attempted to provide direction to the
services through the creation of the President’s Air Policy Commission but unfortunately,
civilian and military leadership within the Air Force and the Navy brought their strategic
disputes into the public arena. These culminated in a congressional investigation over
weapon systems, strategies, and the supposed “Revolt of the Admirals” in October 1949.
To secure funding and a critical role in the American defense during this era, the Air
Force and the Navy supported a respective series of weapons and strategies that were ill
prepared to adjust to changing American policies in any war short of a global nuclear
war. Funding for a single-weapon strategy remained even as other conventional weapons
were being removed in the spirit of austerity that were the hallmark of the defense
spending of the Truman Administration from 1945 until 1950.
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INTRODUCTION

Air warfare has passed through a period of adolescence to find maturity in a new
concept of strategic air bombardment. Thus the threat of instant retaliation through an
air offensive has become one of the greatest deterrents to war today. Secretary of
Defense Louis A. Johnson, 1949.1
Air power, like every other weapon, has gaping limitations for war as we shall know it
for many years to come . . . Ultimately a war between nations is reduced to one man
defending his land while another tries to invade it. Whatever the devastation in his cities
and the disorder in his existence, man will not be conquered until you fight him for his
life. General Omar N. Bradley, 1949.2

When the Republic of Vietnam collapsed in the spring of 1975 and North
Vietnamese tanks rolled into Saigon, countless questions were raised about how the
United States, with its overwhelming military superiority, and its allies, could have lost
the war in Vietnam. Tens of thousands of lives had been lost and billions of dollars of
ordnance expended across Southeast Asia, yet questions remained as to whom, or what,
do we affix the culpability for the Vietnamese debacle. Critics of the Vietnam War
blamed the military, political restriction, hostile press coverage, and the lack of will from
both the South Vietnamese and the American population to win the war. Perhaps one of
the greatest debates concerning the war in Vietnam then and now is, what was the role of
airpower in Vietnam, and why did it fail to bring about an American victory? Even more,
during the longest air campaign of the war, Operation Rolling Thunder (1965-1968), the
United States destroyed roughly $600 million worth of North Vietnamese war material at

1

Address by Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, June 21, 1949, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President’s
Secretary Files, Subject File, Cabinet (Commerce-2)- Defense-1) Box 156, Harry S. Truman Library.
2
Address by General Omar N. Bradley, Chief of Staff, United States Army, at the Third National Industry
Army Day Conference, Boston Massachusetts, February 4, 1948. Papers of Stuart Symington 1946-1950, B
General (Folder 2), Harry S. Truman Presidential Library. (hereafter HST)
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the cost of $6 billion in destroyed American aircraft alone.3 By the conclusion of the
American war effort in Southeast Asia, the United States alone littered the landscape with
the wreckage of over 3,300 aircraft, with the loss of the lives of 3,265 airmen and almost
500 prisoners of war, which further entangled negotiations to get out of the war.4 More
frightening, these statistics do not include those losses inflicted upon the South
Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) or the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF).5 Therefore,
because of these losses and the defeat of South Vietnam, critics of airpower justifiably
implied that bombing did not work. Strategic air proponents countered that position by
suggesting that it was not a failure of airpower in and of itself that doomed South
Vietnam. Rather, they proposed that it was political restrictions on the military, which
did not allow the aviation assets of the United States Air Force, the United States Navy
(USN), and the United States Marine Corps (USMC), to achieve a victory in Vietnam
prior to 1972. Furthermore the advocates claimed that it was only after President Richard
M. Nixon removed the political restraints on the air campaign in 1972 that North
Vietnam buckled and agreed to a peace settlement in January 1973. In addition,
supporters of airpower have continued to suggest that the recent unrestricted air
campaigns over Iraq (1991 and 2003), the Balkans (1992-2000) and Afghanistan (2002)
clearly show that decisive airpower can win a war. Consequently, they contend that
unrestricted strategic air warfare could have worked in Vietnam if it had only been given

3

John T. Smith, Rolling Thunder: The American Strategic Bombing Campaign Against North Vietnam,
1964-68 (Surrey: Air Research Publications, 1995), 231.
4
Chris Hobson, Vietnam Air Losses: United States Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps Fixed-Wing Aircraft
Losses in Southeast Asia 1961-1973 (Hinkley: Midland Publishing, 2001), 268.
5
The RAAF lost fourteen airmen, suffered 56 wounded, and thirteen aircraft destroyed in support of
315,000 combat sorties. Chris Coulthard-Clark, The RAAF In Vietnam: Australian Air Involvement in the
Vietnam War 1962-1975, The Official History of Australia’s Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts
1948-1975 (St. Leonards: Commonwealth of Australia, 1995), 332-333.
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a chance. Arguably, however, the reality remains that both the cynics and saints of
airpower are wrong.
It is clear that the principal reason airpower was unsuccessful was because in the
two decades prior to the war, the United States armed forces focused almost exclusively
upon nuclear weapons delivery as the means to win all wars and accepted the
effectiveness of strategic bombing as dogma. Moreover, limited peacetime budgets prior
to the Korean War led to severe inter-service rivalries as the newly independent Air Force
and the Navy fought for funding to support their different applications of strategic air
warfare. This resulted in a lack of cooperation in the development of air weapons,
strategy, and delivery procedures prior to the Vietnam War. Primarily, the resulting
differences and arguments between the USAF and the Navy meant that the Pentagon was
ill suited to fight the expanding war in Vietnam. The weapons, tactics, and technology
that were used in the limited war over North and South Vietnam had been designed for
total war with the Soviet Union (USSR). As a result the Air Force and Navy attempted to
attack the North Vietnamese with tactics and equipment that were primarily designed to
carry nuclear weapons against Soviet targets.
Since 1945, the Air Force and the Navy spent almost as much time fighting each
other over their respective strategic air roles as they did preparing to fight the Soviet
Union. This continued virtually unabated into the years of the Vietnam War. Even after
the near disaster of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, and the Kennedy administration’s
touting of flexible response rather than total nuclear war, the reality was that the air
weapons and training remained from previous administrations. It would take years for
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new weapons and tactics to be developed and introduced into the American military.6
Therefore, both the USAF and the USN had lost virtually all flexibility to change and
adapt to the war that developed in Southeast Asia.
Within many accounts of the Cold War era in general, or the Vietnam War in
particular, historians and other writers tend to place the blame for the disaster on either
Lyndon B. Johnson and his Administration, or the leadership within the military of the
1960s. However, it must be noted that since August 1945, the Executive and Legislative
branches, both Republicans and Democrats, had concurred with an all or nothing strategy
for nuclear war that had emanated from the American military. Not only did the
politicians choose sides in the battle for the delivery of nuclear weapons by a particular
service, they also funded these strategies and procurements. Also, the press that was so
quick to point out the flaws in the American military strategy often conveniently looked
past the role of many reporters and newspapers that chose sides in the Air Force versus
Navy debates of the 1940s, and supported the “nuclear only option.” It became difficult
consequently for anybody in Washington D.C. to escape the failure of the air war because
they had chosen sides during the critical debates of the 1940s.
What follows in this dissertation is a description of the military and political
decision-making processes within the Truman administration that created an inflated
belief in the efficacy of strategic air warfare. This produced an over-reliance upon
nuclear-armed strategic bombers and led to the establishment of a force structure that
6

An example of this was one of the budget priorities of the Kennedy administration, a new tactical aircraft
(TFX) that could serve the needs of the Army, Navy and Air Force. The original concept for the TFX, later
designated the F-111, began in the late 1950s, but was revamped and modified by McNamara’s office in
1961 to include a carrier-based and a strategic bombing version. Eventually the Navy dropped out of the
program and the Army never participated. The first combat missions for the F-111 were flown in 1968 and
three of the first eight deployed were lost. Don Logan, General Dynamics F-111 Aardvark (Atglen, PA:
Schiffer Publishing, 1998), 7-9, 282.
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ultimately failed in Vietnam. The formative years of the early Cold War created an
environment within the Air Force and Navy command that supported a series of weapons
and strategies that were ill prepared to adjust to changing American policies in any war
short of a global nuclear war. This defense strategy, premised upon the delivery of
atomic weapons, was believed to not only win any future war, it also could deter or curb
global anti-American aggression and, theoretically, prevent World War III. The overall
perception of these weapons included a belief in the cost savings during the post-World
War II military budget reductions, and the assumption that they could always be
delivered on target when required. As such, this dissertation is not about the Vietnam
War nor does it attempt to evaluate or judge American participation in its longest war of
the twentieth century. Moreover, there will not be an appraisal of the morality of the
atomic bomb or its application in war beyond what the military or the politicians
publically or privately stated. Instead, the readers will be presented with a thorough
examination of the development and doctrine of American air policy between 1945 and
1950. The American view of strategic air warfare evolved from the condemnation of
strategic bombing during the early years of World War II to one that later embraced it in
the Cold War. This transition of policy developed to the point that the President, the
Congress, and the Pentagon were willing to fund inferior bombers solely because they
could carry more nuclear weapons, or because they were supposed to have the range to
bomb Soviet cities from bases in the United States or allied nations.
Even when it became apparent that American policy, vis-à-vis the Soviet Union,
could not be attained through the use of stately bombers and powerful bombs destroying
the cities of the USSR, funding for a single-weapon strategy still remained. This
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continued even as other conventional weapons were being removed in the spirit of
austerity that was the hallmark of the defense spending of the Truman Administration
from 1945 until the Korean War. Finally, Harry S. Truman7 is described in a different
light than his previous historical works. Rather than being decisive and opinionated on
issues pertaining to foreign and domestic policy, Truman was very indecisive about many
aspects relating to the use of the atomic bomb. This included many of the discussions
about the roles and missions of the Armed Forces and strong-willed individuals could
sway the President to a particular position. At a time when it was critical for the
President to take a stand, he did not, and instead allowed Secretary of Defense Louis A.
Johnson to position the Pentagon squarely behind strategic bombing, even when it was
apparent after the outbreak of war in Korea that a more flexible defense plan was needed
for the future.

BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM TO BE ADDRESSED

To fully understand the limitations of airpower, one must understand the three
primary forms of it that are used in modern warfare. The first is strategic bombing, which
attacked “fixed military, industrial, or civilian targets in and near political or economic
centers.”8 Strategic air warfare was often conducted through either “precision” or “area”
bombing. The use of precision bombing attempted to eliminate the means of production
by carefully targeting bombs on a specific target, such as a factory. In contrast, area
7

Throughout this dissertation, the author uses a period after the S in President Truman’s full name. The S
is his middle name and Truman himself placed a period after it. Also, the Harry S. Truman Presidential
Library and Museum also uses the period. The one exception to this rule is reference to the USS Harry S
Truman (CVN-75), which does not have a period. Please consult "Use of the period after the "S" in Harry
S. Truman's name," Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and Museum,
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/speriod.htm (accessed February 14, 2010).
8
Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 46.

7
bombing was used to destroy the work force and surrounding community with little
regard to where the bombs actually fell. It was hoped that this would limit the amount of
industrial production because the workers would be eliminated, or in no condition to
work. After all, a factory without workers is effectively eliminated as a strategic target.
The second major form of airpower was interdiction bombing, which attacked supply
lines, transportation hubs, bridges and logistical support bases. It was used primarily to
deprive enemy armies of necessary logistical support and materials in the field.
Interdiction strikes also linked strategic bombing to the third form of airpower, tactical
bombing. This application of airpower directly targeted the enemy’s army, fortifications,
and command centers, and was often directly linked to ground operations.9 Tactical and
interdiction missions were typically flown during World War II, the Korean War and
over South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Often, they were directly linked to combat
operations of American, South Vietnamese, Australian, South Korean, or other allied
troops.
Strategic, interdiction, and tactical airpower are not mutually exclusive, and they
represent three different approaches to air warfare. The former wins the war by
destroying an enemy’s ability to wage war, attacks his means of production and
transportation, and attempts to devastate the morale of the noncombatants by
systematically eliminating their urban areas and important production centers.
Interdiction bombing prevented materials that escaped the strategic bombing from
reaching the front, and tactical airpower, finally, annihilates the enemy army in the field.
Combined, they theoretically chart a course to win a modern war with minimal costs and
maximum rewards for the attacker. Touted by its proponents, strategic airpower was
9

Ibid, 6.
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characterized as the ultimate arbiter of any war or even, according to United States Air
Force (USAF) Chief of Staff Carl Spaatz, it was a “power for peace.”10 Some airpower
advocates even suggested that strategic bombing that targeted primarily cities and
civilians alone could achieve an ultimate victory while others were not so sure.11 General
John C. Meyer, Commander in Chief of Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC) during the
1972 Linebacker operations, once wrote that airpower could not solely win a war.
Instead, Meyer argued in a thesis at the Air War College years earlier that it could be
successful with “a strategy in which air power is the principal weapon, supported as may
be necessary by surface forces, and employed so as to reap maximum benefit from the
capabilities of the air weapon.”12
The reasons for the failure of airpower in Vietnam, however, can be traced
directly to the Second World War when the United States participated in two major
strategic bombing campaigns, the first against Germany, and the other against the Empire
of Japan. In both cases, strategic bombing was conducted under the standards of total
war, and they had a clear objective: the unconditional surrender of the enemy state.
Against Germany, the British Royal Air Force’s (RAF) Bomber Command attempted the
precision bombing of war production facilities in German cities very early in the war.
Unfortunately, heavy losses to these bombers forced the British into less accurate area
bombing by night in an effort to reduce casualties. The RAF eventually fully embraced
incendiary attacks that struck right at the morale of the citizenry as an avenue to quickly
10

Statement of General Carl Spaatz, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, before the President’s Air
Policy Commission, November 17, 1947, President’s Air Policy Commission, RG 220, July 1947-January
1948, Box 15, Harry S. Truman Library.
11
See books written by or about Giulio Douhet, William Mitchell, Curtis LeMay, or Sir Hugh Trenchard to
gather a feeling about how airpower was viewed in the formative years between 1920 and 1939, and for
LeMay, the early Cold War years.
12
John C. Meyer, Air Strategy in the Cold War, Thesis, Air War College (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air
University, 1956), 5.
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win the war. In 1942 the RAF was joined by the United States in the effort to crush
Germany, and heavy pressure was placed upon the Americans to join the RAF in night
raids. However, the United States Army Air Force (USAAF) instead attempted to use
daytime raids to increase the results of its “precision bombing” that could achieve greater
results with fewer casualties. The Americans appeared to be more comfortable with
saying their bombing was precise, and they believed that the American bombers were
better prepared to defend themselves against German airborne defenses than equivalent
British planes. With the RAF bombing at night, and the Americans by day, the German
home front had few reprieves. The Western allies were not united in strategy or tactics,
but were unified in their respective goals of using strategic and terror bombing to achieve
the final defeat of Germany. As a result, airpower was fully unleashed against the
citizens of the Third Reich at work and at home.
Against Japan, however, the strategic bombing campaign was entirely an
American effort, and in order to achieve greater results and force the Japanese into a
rapid surrender, the Americans eventually replaced precision bombing with a crippling
incendiary campaign. Japanese casualties were exchanged for an expedient capitulation
and fewer American losses. This strategy ultimately became the pattern of American
nuclear strategy for the following five decades as the leadership in the United States came
to view citizens and urban areas as legitimate targets in a total war, and its geopolitical
policy was directly linked to military action. As American demands to end the war were
increasingly clarified during the summer of 1945, incendiary attacks continued, and
Japanese fatalities mounted. This campaign seemed to offer the perfect combination of
weapon and strategy as the revolutionary Boeing B-29 Superfortress and its incendiary
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bombs turned city after city into piles of ash and rubble. The Japanese attempted to stop
the raids, but their efforts were futile against the growing number of American and Allied
bombers that were available in late 1944 and early 1945. These would increase
dramatically if the war continued on into 1946 and beyond. Truman had no public
qualms about the bombing and had even announced that the bombs would continue until
Japan either surrendered unconditionally or was physically destroyed as a nation.
In a last ditch attempt to avoid a costly invasion of Japan and end the horrific
firebombing, the Truman administration unleashed the first nuclear weapons used against
a civilian population. The Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were destroyed in
an attempt to convince the Japanese that the war was finally over. Even more, the bombs
signaled to the world the power of the United States, which now had the ability to destroy
cities with a single bomb, and would continue to do so until the Japanese agreed to end
the war on American terms. The results appeared to be immediate and dramatic; the
Japanese surrendered. The announcement of capitulation had followed months of
intransigence by the government of Japan. To the Americans, it became apparent that it
was only after the atomic bombs were detonated that the Japanese finally realized that
they could not win the war nor prolong it any more. To many in the American defense
structure, there was a clear link between nuclear weapons and rapid victory in total war.
With enough special weapons, the United States could deter future aggression simply
through the threat of nuclear annihilation.
The reality of the atomic bomb and the destruction it wrought fundamentally
altered the strategic direction of the United States military as early as 1945. In particular,
the USN and its naval aviation arm were considered obsolete by many because it lacked
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the tools and the means to utilize atomic weapons. In other words, the Navy did not have
an operational strategic bomber or an aircraft carrier that could handle nuclear weapons
and therefore they did not have a strategy for the application of nuclear weapons. In
essence, it meant that during the formative years of American nuclear and Cold War
strategies, 1945-1950, the USAF was projected as the only service that could handle the
new weapons. This preconception was further cemented after the establishment of the
Strategic Air Command (SAC) in 1946.
With a defense strategy built around an atomic, and later, thermonuclear arsenal,
each of the Armed Services developed aircraft or other weapons that were specifically
designed to deliver these weapons of mass destruction. This, combined with unification
of the American Armed Forces in 1947, and reduced federal budgets, created a chasm
between the newly created Air Force and the Navy on strategy and weapons. The
financing and strategy disputes first went public in 1947, and exploded in 1949 with the
infamous ‘Revolt of the Admirals’ that resulted in the Navy being relegated to a
secondary role in America’s strategic operations. The Air Force and its long-range
strategic bombers were now the first line of American offense and through its perceived
deterrent effect, also its defense. Even the Air Defense Command (ADC) and the
Tactical Air Command (TAC) missions of air defense and ground support, respectively,
were not considered as essential as SAC. As a result, TAC’s mission evolved to include
nuclear air-to-ground strikes that were considered essential to achieving air superiority.
More importantly for the TAC commanders, the nuclear weapons delivery capability
allowed it to maintain a significant portion of the defense budget.13 In fact, because of its

13

James O. Stevenson, The Pentagon Paradox: The Development of the F-18 Hornet (Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 1993), 32.
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devotion to nuclear strike missions, jokes were circulated in the 1950s that “Tactical Air
Command had been ‘SACumcized.’”14
The dedication to nuclear weapons and their delivery against Soviet targets
remained well into the 1950s, even after the Korean War displayed the problems of
limited war against non-Soviet objectives. Aircraft procured in the 1940s and 1950s,
such as the incredibly large B-36 Peacemaker strategic bomber, reflected the total war
lessons of Hiroshima and Nagasaki rather than the possibilities of a limited war.15 Some
effort was made to integrate tactical strikes into the training syllabi of the Air Force,
however, nuclear weapons remained the major focus of USAF strategy, budgeting, and
aircraft purchases after 1945. Like its counterparts in the Air Force, leadership in the
Navy pursued carrier-based nuclear bombers and large deck aircraft carriers to operate
squadrons of nuclear-armed attack aircraft. Smaller carrier-based aircraft were designed
or modified to allow for atomic weapons delivery in addition to conventional bombing.
For the Air Force and the Navy, these decisions made the most sense in the age of total
war, but anything short of World War III would present grave problems for the Pentagon
in execution of a war strategy and results.
Political support for this nuclear strategy was bipartisan and was not dependent
upon political control of the White House or the Congress. Through a series of public
hearings, commissions, and significant pieces of legislation, including the National
Security Act of 1947, the President’s Air Policy Commission and the GOP controlled
Congressional Aviation Policy Board, it was evident that Republicans and Democrats
14

Eduard Mark, Aerial Interdiction: Air Power and the Land Battle in Three American Wars (Washington
D.C.: Center For Air Force History, 1994), 324-325.
15
Jack Raymond, "Debate over Air Power: Attacks Revive Pentagon Controversy on Value of Bombing in
Limited Wars," New York Times, March 3, 1965.
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supported a virtual “nuclear only” option for American defense, and national security
became synonymous with fleets of large bombers lumbering their way to the Soviet
Union to bomb them into submission. Therefore arguments opposed to that strategy were
viewed as obstructionist to service unification or even insubordination against the policy
supported by President Truman. The end result was that political and military leadership
in Washington D.C. supported a flawed defense policy that emphasized land and carrierbased bombers that flew faster, higher, and farther than her enemy’s defenses, and
dropped large atomic bombs. Despite ample evidence to the contrary, this was believed
to be the most rapid avenue to an ultimate military victory, or to convince American
enemies to bend to American will.

LITERATURE REVIEW

In the years since Harry S. Truman assumed the presidency in 1945, volumes of
books, journal articles, and editorials have been written about the President and his
administration. Often these manuscripts focus on the entirety of Truman’s life and work
or simply on one aspect of the former Missouri Senator. Specific traits, such as his
obstinate personality, his relationship with his wife, his devotion to the New Deal
programs of his predecessor, and his fiscal conservatism have become legendary to the
historical impression of Truman. However, in the pursuit of my dissertation manuscript,
entitled “Strategic Air Warfare and Nuclear Strategy: The Formulation of Military
Policy in the Truman Administration” it has become apparent that there is still a great
amount of material within the historiography of the Truman administration to be
examined. While some of the secondary source material deals with airpower or nuclear

14
weapons and strategy, they do not place the debate within the greater context of the
Truman administration.
Some interpretations argue that the drive to protect American capital at home and
abroad was the fundamental driving force of American post-war strategy, and not
necessarily the desire of the military to protect the nation’s most valuable resource, its
people. Other works focus on the bureaucracy of the administration without truly
understanding the military problems that were faced by professional officers and ranking
civilian authorities within the Pentagon. A number of books attempt to frame the postwar
debate as simple inter-service rivalries and antiquated strategies that stood in the way of a
unified defense and a strategic direction for the nation as espoused by NSC-68.
Enthusiasts of naval aviation or perhaps the Strategic Air Command have argued the
righteousness of their cause at the expense of the other service. Finally, many books deal
with key individuals within the administration, such as George C. Marshall, James V.
Forrestal, Louis A. Johnson, or Dean Acheson, but do not completely place their subjects
within the context of the debates over strategic air policy. Therefore, it has become
apparent that a new interpretation of the Truman administration and its pursuit of
airpower is necessary. While no list can be truly complete, this one has been certainly
exhaustive and any errors of interpretation are my own.
The first genre of Truman books to be evaluated are the memoirs and biographies
that have been published since the former President returned to private life in
Independence, MO in 1953. The President’s own works, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman:
Volume One: Year of Decisions and Volume Two: Years of Trial and Hope are an attempt
by Truman to place the best possible interpretation on his administration. The first
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volume addresses the problems faced by Truman as he inherited an office he was not
prepared to run and the subsequent problems of peace and the postwar political
environment. The second volume does delve into the problems of strategic defense
during the late 1940s and early 1950s. Truman argued that the passage of new
amendments to the National Security Act of 1947 as one of the “most outstanding
achievements of my administration.”16 This was after one of the greatest public battles
between the armed forces, which caused the firing of the Chief of Naval Operations, and
the resignation of the Secretary of the Navy. While memoirs are usually self-serving, yet,
they do allow for a level of inspection into the mindset of the former President.
While not considered a memoir or autobiography, Off the Record: The Private
Papers of Harry S. Truman, edited by Robert Ferrell, still provides a useful insight into
the President’s administration. Collected papers from his diary, letters, and memos
drafted during Truman’s life. It provides a thoughtful introspection into many of the
actions that were undertaken during the Truman White House. It also included personal
information about key figures of the administration. Louis Johnson was described by the
President as having “an inordinate egotistical desire to run the whole government. He
offended every member of the cabinet.”17 Adding to the Truman legend is a collection of
Truman’s oral histories, published in Talking with Harry: Candid Conversations with
President Truman. Edited by Ralph E. Weber, this work started as an examination of the
intelligence gathering agencies that existed or were created during the Truman years. As
Weber went through the files at the Truman Library, he found volumes of transcripts and
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notes about Truman and put them together in this tome. While insightful into the mind of
President Truman, it does not include information about the Revolt of the Admirals,
Secretary of the Navy and later Secretary of Defense James Forrestal. While this may
seem like a simple omission, it should be noted that it was Forrestal who first raised
possible issues with the USSR in the postwar period and was instrumental in postwar
national security.18 Margaret Truman, who also wrote a biography of her father,
contributed to Truman scholarship with Where the Buck Stops: The Personal and Private
Writings of Harry S. Truman. Ms. Truman edited the collection of her father’s writings
that were to be published after the death of the President and the first lady. In it, the
elder Truman described leadership and what it took to be a great leader. While providing
little information about his own administration, it does address the estrangement between
Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower in a chapter entitled “Why I Don’t Like Ike.”19
David McCullough’s Pulitzer Prize winning volume entitled Truman follows
Truman from the settlement of his grandparents around Independence, his early life to the
death of his wife Bess Truman, ten years after his own. Portrayed in a positive and
familiar light, McCullough’s Truman is witty, resolute, strong-willed, and demanding.
However, McCullough does not deal with the strategic air warfare debates and internal
friction in great detail. He does note, however, that even when Truman was forced to
make changes within the administration, he was extremely loyal to those who had been to
him first. For example, when Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson was fired in 1950, the
President first demanded his resignation and “felt dreadful” and while the event took a
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turn for the dramatic the following day as Johnson cried in front of the President,
McCullough noted that Truman “had seldom been so miserably uncomfortable” after
removing a man whom he had known for thirty years.20
In Roy Jenkins’ Truman, (1987) the President’s foresight paved the way for longterm economic growth in Western Europe both under the Marshall Plan and then
indigenous investment. The long-term strategic planning in Jenkins’ book is primarily
limited to the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which is of major
importance to the author. Robert H. Ferrell’s Harry S. Truman: A Life, continues the
trend of admiring biographies of the former President. Ferrell, who had published eight
books on Truman, is considered by many to be the epitome of Truman scholarship.
Published in 1994, it covers Truman’s life from the beginning of his life to his burial at
the Truman Library grounds. While it covers the changing of the military in the late
1940s, it does not cover new territory over the internal military disputes over tactics,
strategy, planning, and expenditures. It does, however, highlight a classic Truman
moment with Air Force Chief of Staff General Hoyt S. Vandenberg concerning the entry
of the Chinese into the Korean War. Vandenberg stated that as part of Air Force
doctrine, the USAF would deliver nuclear weapons against them to which Truman
replied “you are not going to put me in that position. You better go back and get yourself
some more strategic doctrine.”21
Donald R. McCoy also views Truman in a favorable light. In The Presidency of
Harry S. Truman, the entirety of Truman’s two terms is addressed, but not in real great
detail. The tumultuous year of 1949, when internal friction within the Pentagon went
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public, is described in the context of Truman’s federal frugality. McCoy suggests that
while he pursued domestic expenditures at the expense of defense dollars, he placed loyal
bureaucrats into positions within the Pentagon to follow the President’s directives.
McCoy referred to Secretary of the Navy Francis Matthews, as “something of an
advocate of preventative war” does not portray the dismal reputation that Matthews had
within the Department of the Navy.22 Robert J. Donovan is also sympathetic to the
President. His two volumes entitled, Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S.
Truman, 1945-1948 and “Tumultuous Years: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 19491953, are fairly uncritical and even supportive of the initiatives undertaken during the
Truman years. Donovan articulates some of the problems between the strategic vision of
the United States Air Force and the United States Navy, but he does not really describe
exactly what the weapons and weapon systems were nor does he discuss why they were
so important to their respective services.
Positive views of Truman were also apparent in Cabell Phillip’s The Truman
Presidency, published in 1966. Written during the heart of the Cold War, Phillips was an
advocate of the dropping of the atomic bombs and argued that the President was justified
based on the relevant information that he had to make that decision.23 From War to Cold
War: The Education of Harry S. Truman by Robert James Maddox continues the trend of
portraying Truman as decisive and as a quick learner, yet one with a limited view of the
world around him. However, Maddox also argues that Truman was extremely pragmatic
when it came to the atomic bomb, its use, and the threat of its deployment during the late
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1940s. Harold F. Gosnell’s 1980 Truman’s Crises: A Political Biography of Harry S.
Truman takes a very measured approach to dealing with Truman. In general, it is a
sympathetic portrayal of the Truman presidency and the man who judged each crisis on
its own merit. Gosnell addresses many of the facets of the Truman presidency in detail
but does not focus on the issues of the long-term benefits of strategic air warfare and its
place within the legacy of the Truman administration. While Gosnell is critical of the
containment policy as practiced by Truman, he does extol the virtues of the European
Recovery Act.
Historians have debated Truman’s decisiveness and the decision to drop the
atomic bombs against Japan since August 1945. J. Samuel Walker argues that despite
information that it might not be necessary to drop the bombs, Truman made the decision
to do so, not out of revenge, or sending a message to the Soviets, but rather for military
reasons. Walker also notes that in making the decision, he “did not ask for position
papers on the advantages and disadvantages of using or not using the weapon. He did not
seek advice on its potential impact of forcing a quick Japanese surrender or on affecting
the postwar world.”24 Walker further noted that he did seek others opinions from his
military staff arguably because he was more concerned with quickly ending the war.
Tsuyoshi Hasegawa also raised issues with Truman’s decision to drop the bomb.
In his work entitled, Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan,
Hasegawa argued that Truman in fact had never actually made the decision to drop the
bomb. Rather, despite what Truman later said, Hasegawa suggested, “the president never
issued such an order. The fact is that the atomic bomb was dropped without Truman’s
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explicit order.”25 It was only after the dropping of the bomb on Nagasaki that the
President actually used “his personal authority on decisions about the atomic bomb.”26
In other words, Truman made his decision by deciding not to interfere with the existing
plan to drop the bombs. This is far different from other interpretations that give Truman
more of an active role in the authorization to drop the bomb. However, the end result is
whether Truman approved it overtly and signed off on it or if he merely chose not to stop
the operations, the end result was still his consent.
The revision of Truman’s positive legacy is varied and often extremely critical of
the President and his administration. Arnold A. Offner argued in Another Such Victory:
President Truman and the Cold War, 1945-1953. Specifically written to counter the
positive impression of McCullough and others, Offner argues that Truman lacked the
necessary skills of a leader and was often dependent upon his staff, advisors, and other
policy makers within the administration. Offner does not focus on the debates over
strategic air warfare, the Revolt of the Admirals, or the B-36 hearings. The description of
the removal of Louis Johnson was because he had been a “hawkish ally of MacArthur”
and a vocal opponent of Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, who had “maneuvered deftly
during the crisis to underscore” Truman’s authority.27 Offner also argues that Truman’s
policies significantly reduced American options in the Cold War era diplomacy. Robert
H. Ferrell, while generally supportive of the President, is somewhat critical about
Truman’s handling of the Cold War and its related problems. When discussing the
Soviet explosion of their first atomic bomb and the American reaction, Ferrell notes that
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here “again, in the decision to go ahead with the H-bomb, the President probably made a
mistake.”28 Ferrell argued that this decision, like others, was made when there were only
two options presented. That is, make the bomb or let the Soviets do it first. However, as
Ferrell points out, a third option could have been made to attempt to ban the H-bomb
through international coercion or diplomatic efforts. However, there is no guarantee that
this could have worked and the end result was an escalating arms race. Yet, despite this
critique, Ferrell adds that in the end, Truman acted on his beliefs and did not back down
from them.
Truman is portrayed as an honest but marginal President in William Pemberton’s
“Harry S. Truman: Fair Dealer and Cold Warrior.” Pemberton argues that it was
Truman’s humble background that limited his ability to be a great leader in foreign
policy, an area where Truman had been praised in the past. Pemberton further suggested
that Truman’s reputation as a decisive leader is historically overplayed as he was often
manipulated by those he trusted the most and also by those he distrusted. Truman is also
criticized for having a Europe-first approach to an American expansionist diplomacy at
the expense of Asia and even Africa. Additionally, Truman is criticized, perhaps
unfairly, for the rise of McCarthyism in the early 1950s. Gabriel and Joyce Kolko, in
their work entitled, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy,
1945-1954, take a very grim view of the Truman Administration. Attributing the security
of Western Europe against a Soviet aggression as a virtual myth, the Kolkos contend that
Truman almost single handedly moved Eastern Europe into the sphere of Soviet control
through the implementation of the European Recovery program. The Kolkos also argue
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that military planning and diplomacy were designed primarily to extend American
capitalism and curtail the expansion of Left leaning political movements.
Overviews of the administration are important to two authors in particular, Mark
S. Byrnes in The Truman Years, 1945-1953 and Bert Cochran’s Harry Truman and the
Crisis Presidency. The former book is a small overview of the administration, but its
small size limits its effectiveness. Published in 2000, it does make use of much of the
secondary source material that had been printed since the President’s death in 1972. The
latter book is much larger and published in 1973. Both works attempt to frame Truman
in the context of his times and his administration. Neither work references the difficulties
over service unification, strategic planning, and the public debates that captivated the
Washington press corps in 1949. In both, Secretaries of Defense Forrestal and Johnson
are bit players in the administration. Taking a different approach, Raymond P. Ojserkis’s
work, entitled Beginnings of the Cold War Arms Race: The Truman Administration and
the U.S. Arms Build-Up, argues that while the arms race began after the outbreak of the
Korean War, there were attempts to convince Truman that it was necessary to outspend
his self-imposed budget restrictions to confront the Soviet Union. Thoroughly
researched and full of relevant information, Ojserkis’s work, however, does not shed any
new light on the inter-service rivalries that caused Truman so much grief. He does
include information on the problems between Dean Acheson and Louis Johnson and also
between the Secretary of Defense and his Service secretaries, but does not expand upon
strategic air warfare and why it was believed to be essential for the long-term security of
the United States. He does note that “Admiral Louis Denfeld, chief of naval operations,
resigned at the end of October 1949 as part of the campaign against Johnson, but it was to
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no avail.”29 In addition, the main focus of the book is in the years 1951-52, after the
outbreak of the Korean War and the implementation of NSC-68.
Arguably, the most important element of Truman historiography in relation to my
dissertation, is the relationship of the President to the military planners who attempted to
chart a course for American strategic air warfare.

Michael Hogan in his Cross of Iron:

Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954, argues that
the need for national security created a situation that threatened traditional American
freedoms. Hogan maps out the administration’s attempt to create Universal Military
Training and how this helped to create a national security state. Again, when it came to
strategic planning, Hogan does not go into detail about the B-36 issues or problems that
beset Secretary of Defense Johnson when he attempted to reign in spending. While he
spoke of the Revolt of the Admirals, which took place in October, 1949, he does not
describe in detail why so many naval officers were willing to risk their careers through
public insubordination over strategic planning and military expenditures.30 Daniel
Yergin also worked through some of this territory in Shattered Peace: The Origins of the
Cold War and the National Security State in 1977. In Yergin’s view, the Truman
administration was often reactionary, impulsive, and prone to miscalculations about
Soviet intentions. Yergin is critical of the administration and their attempt to contain the
expansion of Soviet-style communism and suggests that too often, avenues for peace
were bypassed by ideologues that populated the administration.
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Published thirty-seven years before Hogan, Paul Y. Hammond wrote about the
relationship between the military and respective administrations in his classic,
Organizing for Defense: The American Military Establishment in the Twentieth Century.
Charting the rise of the military organization since the Spanish American War, the book
is limited in its understanding of the long-term post World War II issues because it was
published before the release of materials relevant to strategic air warfare. However,
Hammond spends quite a bit of time on the development of the National Security Act of
1947 and the maturation of the policy aspects of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Department of Defense. Hammond also focused on the relationship between the
President, the congress, and the military in the political arena of the early Cold War
years. While not definitive, Hammond certainly adds important insight into the interservice rivalries of the late 1940s.
1973 saw the publication of The Awesome Power: Harry S. Truman As
Commander in Chief by Richard F. Haynes. This work charts the rise of the power of the
President in the postwar era. Truman is credited with many of the changes in the
presidency with his pursuit of service unification, the coordination of federal agencies
regarding national security, and the waging of an unpopular war without Congressional
support. Haynes does provide some information about the inter-service rivalry, however,
like others before and after, he does not provide enough information about why the
rivalry existed and was sustained after the passage of the National Security Act of 1947
and the subsequent amendments that changed the focus of the Pentagon. Haynes added
that the “revolt had revealed not only a fundamental failing of unification, it also pointed
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up a lack of a fixed military strategy.”31 While this was the case, it did not prevent the
President from acting decisively in foreign policy whereas he could not often do that with
domestic policy. Even more, it was the exigencies of the Cold War that necessitated the
rise of presidential power as commander-in-chief.
Sara L. Sale ventured into the political debates over the containment of the Soviet
Union and the expansion of communism with her work The Shaping of Containment:
Harry S. Truman, The National Security Council and the Cold War. Sale’s work focuses
on the formation of the National Security Council, its relationship in the planning and
prosecution of American policy under the Truman administration. She further discusses
the evolution of Truman’s view of the NSC from an advisory board to an agency that
could at times arbitrate the differences between the State Department and the Pentagon.
As the Cold War progressed, the NSC developed policy on a case-by-case basis.
However, while Sale does not address the inter-service rivalry that created multiple
versions of a strategic air warfare plan, she does focus on the differences between Louis
Johnson’s Defense Department and Dean Acheson’s state.32
The role of the Truman administration’s policymakers is one of the main focuses
of Melvyn P. Leffler’s A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman
Administration, and the Cold War, published in 1992. Leffler had previously described
national security as a policy that “encompasses the decisions and actions deemed
imperative to protect core values from external threats.”33 In his book, Leffler contended
that the Administration, the Pentagon, and the State Department worked to economically
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and militarily expand American power in the world to bring about national security. He
further argued that while that was the case, there was not much effort directed at creating
or sustaining long-term industrial development or support of the domestic infrastructure.
Both sides of the Iron Curtain shared the blame for the rise in Cold War tensions as both
acted in reaction to the other’s intentions, real or imagined. Again, the relationship
between the Navy and the Air Force are not discussed in detail nor are they essential to
Leffler’s thesis. However, he does contend that Johnson’s decision to cancel the Navy’s
first supercarrier and allegedly allocate the funds for B-36s confirmed the rumor that
Johnson “was a champion of air power and atomic weapons.”34

This placed Johnson

with the supporters of the USAF and their vision of strategic air warfare despite the
setbacks of the Korean War.
The Korean War is an important part of the Truman historiography. Many books
have been written over the years concerning the role of the United States in that limited
war. Many focus on the military actions, battle histories, naval engagements, or air
warfare as written by the pilots and naval aviators who fought the war. However, there is
more to the story than just the military history of the Korean War. William Stueck’s
2002 book entitled Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History
challenges many of the traditional and revisionist interpretations of the war. While
involving more sources of Chinese and Soviet origin, Stueck’s interpretation of Truman
remains a Europe-first focused President, cautious about Soviet global intentions during
the crisis in Asia. Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.’s Truman and Korea: The Political Culture of the
Early Cold War follows the administration’s attempts to transition from the post-World
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War II peace dividend through the post-Korean War permanent mobilization. This had a
tremendous impact on the economic and political infrastructure of the United States
during this era. It is as though the Korean War eclipsed the President’s ability to control
military spending in perpetuity and created other problems on the home front, including
industrialization, political retrenchment away from New Deal legislation, and splits
between the administration and congress.
Joseph Goulden’s Korea: The Untold Story of the War attempted to use new
materials accessed through the Freedom of Information Act, to understand the Truman
Administration’s role in the Korean War. While the book does not deal with the 1940s
inter-service problems, it does address a common theme, the removal of Louis Johnson as
Secretary of Defense. While noted in many other works previously mentioned, this one
mentions insubordination, problems with the state department, and disloyalty to the
President on the part of Johnson as the primary reason for his dismissal.35 The Korean
War by Max Hastings also addresses the view of Johnson from inside the administration.
Hastings suggests that among “the glittering cluster of intellects around the President, by
far the least impressive figure” was Johnson and that he was merely a “political operator,
a fund raiser, an electoral grandstander” who bragged of his accomplishments and
support of the President.36 According to Hastings, it was Johnson who left the American
military at home and in Japan at levels that left them woefully unprepared to fight on the
Korean peninsula. However, Hastings does not explain why Johnson pursued policies
that seemed to bankrupt the Pentagon at the very time the Cold War was heating up. A
critical view of Johnson is also demonstrated in Richard Whelan’s Drawing the Line: The
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Korean War, 1950-1953. In it, Johnson is described as a “hulking man who frequently
resorted to bluster and temper tantrums in order to get his way” and was not above the
“strategy of attacking his colleagues in the administration until (he hoped) he could
emerge in the public eye as the only one who was competent and anti-Communist.”37
While most books on the Korean War make at least a passing reference to
Johnson, only one major biography has been published to date. Keith D. McFarland and
David L. Roll collaborated on Louis Johnson and the Arming of America: The Roosevelt
and Truman Years, (2005). In their work, Johnson was an extremely hard working and
competent lawyer and civil servant. Motivated by a fear that the United States would be
unprepared for war, Johnson used his position in the War Department and later the
Department of Defense to build up American defenses. It is in the latter role that we see
Johnson advocating a position of a Cold Warrior and a hawk but following the
President’s initiatives in budget reductions at the expense of conventional army and naval
forces. These policies were eventually exposed with the dawning of the Korean War and
the poor performance of American forces exhibited during the early stages of the war.
The authors do delve into the arguments on airpower , but it is not an essential element to
their thesis.
Like Johnson, James Vincent Forrestal, former Secretary of the Navy and the first
Secretary of Defense, has an intriguing history and was a key player in the Truman
Administration. Unlike Johnson, however, there are a couple of biographies that have
been published over the decades since his tragic death. His role in the Truman
Administration is critical to understanding the inter-service rivalry that destroyed
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Forrestal and paved the way for the disaster in Korea and eventually led to Johnson’s
replacement by George C. Marshall. The first publication dealing directly with Forrestal
after his untimely death on May 22, 1949 was the edited copies of his diaries. Forrestal
began to keep daily journal after his appointment as Undersecretary of the Navy in 1944
until shortly after his forced removal from the administration. Edited by Walter Millis
and E.S. Duffield, The Forrestal Diaries were pieced together from scraps, journals, and
other pieces of paper that were dropped off at the White House by Forrestal shortly
before his death. Given that they were published in 1951, there is much information that
was classified or of personal nature that were kept out of the print edition. The personal
observations of different historical characters in and around the Truman administration
make this work still valuable today.
Arnold A. Rogow’s James Forrestal: A Study in Personality, Politics, and Policy,
published in 1963, was the first attempt to place Forrestal in historical context. It
followed his life from his youth until this tragic end, Rogow attempted to understand
what drove Forrestal to his untimely death. Based on published sources, the book merely
reiterates the legend of Forrestal and his role in the administration. While he was an
advocate of a strong national defense and a tough foreign policy, he was also influential
and successful, particularly through 1948. Rogow suggests that Truman had requested
that Forrestal stay in the administration long before Forrestal was asked to resign. In
retrospect, Truman said “I realized later that I should have let him quit when he
wanted.”38 The Forrestal history was updated and enhanced in 1992 with the publication
of Townsend Hoopes and David Brinkley’s Driven Patriot: The Life and Times of James
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Forrestal. Hoopes and Brinkley dive deep into the psyche of Forrestal and what made
him such an ardent nationalist, a workaholic, and in their mind, the architect of Truman’s
containment policy. A loyal supporter of the Navy, Forrestal was destroyed by the
unification battle and his own attempt to make the position of Secretary of Defense a very
weak position.

Sympathetic to Forrestal, Hoopes and Brinkley portray him as a vital

character in Truman’s creation of the postwar Pentagon.
Forrestal’s role in the administration is also examined in Jeffery M. Dowart’s,
Eberstadt and Forrestal: A National Security Partnership, 1909-1949. One of the
primary purposes of this work is to focus on the civilian role in wartime and postwar
mobilization of resources and the bureaucratization of ideology and politics. Dowart’s
work goes in depth into the battle over unification and why Forrestal fought against the
Truman Administration’s plan for total unification and how he got a compromise that
helped the Navy Department transition into the postwar defense structure. Ferdinand
Eberstadt was the subject of a Robert Cuff article in the “The Public Historian” in 1985.
Cuff examined Eberstadt’s role in the reorganization of the federal government and his
role in the postwar defense policy through integrated “forms of industrial and economic
mobilization planning in the executive branch.”39
Among the practitioners of naval aviation that are essential to the postwar
strategic debate that are to be addressed by my dissertation include Admiral Chester A.
Nimitz, Admiral Marc Mitscher, Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, and Admiral John H.
Towers. Nimitz and Burke served as the Chief of Naval Operations during this time
frame while Towers and Mitscher had long careers as a naval airpower advocates. E.B.
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Potter wrote biographies of both Nimitz (1976) and Admiral Arleigh Burke, (1990) which
develop their respective views of naval power. While the biographies focus primarily on
World War II, both have chapters about the battles that were fought over supercarriers
and nuclear bombers. In the tome on Burke, an entire chapter is dedicated to the Revolt
of the Admirals. Information about the entire affair is included, however, the focus is on
what happened rather than how the revolt affected the Navy and Burke’s role in the
sordid affair rather than why it happened. Burke was also the subject of Ken Jones and
Hubert Kelley Jr.’s Admiral Arleigh (31-Knot) Burke: The Story of a Fighting Sailor,
(1962). Certainly dated compared to Potter’s work, it has the same flaw in its
interpretation concerning the debates over airpower and the role of the navy in the Cold
War. Theodore Taylor’s The Magnificent Mitscher, originally published in 1954 is a
traditional history on one of the architects of naval aviation. The bulk of the text
addresses Mitscher’s service during the Second World War. Taylor, however, laid out the
argument about the divisiveness of naval aviation not only between the services, but also
within the Navy. Admiral John H. Towers: The Struggle for Naval Air Supremacy,
(1991) by Clark G. Reynolds further developed the problems highlighted by Taylor.
Through the role of Towers, we see the battle of naval airpower predate World War II
and even the same protagonists seemed to be in continuous conflict. For example,
Reynolds clearly displayed the problems between the Navy Department and Louis
Johnson in his role as Assistant Secretary of War (Air) and as Secretary of Defense. Like
the other books that deal with naval officers, this book is sympathetic to the concerns of
the sea service and critical of the USAF.
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One of the most important naval officers involved in the early stages of the
American nuclear program was Captain William S. “Deak” Parsons, the weapons officer
for the atomic strike on Hiroshima. Parsons is the subject of Al Christman’s biography
entitled Target Hiroshima: Deak Parsons and the Creation of the Atomic Bomb,(1998).
In Christman’s view, Parsons was extremely critical of the development of the atomic
bomb from a theoretical idea to a functional weapon during the Manhattan project. Even
more, Parsons was instrumental in the push for the Navy’s role in strategic deterrence
with his support of carrier-based heavy attack aircraft including the P2V-3C Neptune and
the AJ-1 Savage bomber.40 Parson’s role in the early atomic program is expanded in
Jonathan M. Weisgal’s Operation Crossroads: The Atomic Tests at Bikini Atoll, (1994).
Weisgal further argued that Crossroads proved that the Navy was not obsolete and there
was a real need to rebalance the air forces of the United States.41 Even more, the tests
confirmed the reality that there was not a good defense against atomic weapons, so
therefore, the Navy began to look at offensive options to defend the fleet and American
interests on the seas.
Richard Rhodes, author of The Making of the Atomic Bomb (1986) and Dark Sun:
The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb (1995) charts the course of the atomic program from
concept to mass production of the weapons. Rhodes addressed the moral debates among
the scientists as well as the arguments concerning the military applications of the new
technologies. The interservice rivalry between the USN and the USAF is discussed
primarily in the latter book as Rhodes highlighted the demands made by both for control
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over the limited bombs that were first available for military application. Even more, as
the production of atomic bombs increased, Edward Teller, the chief proponent of the
hydrogen bomb, transcended Robert Oppenheimer, the scientist most responsible for the
success of the atomic bomb, in importance. Oppenheimer fell from grace and lost his
security clearance. Norman Polmar clarified the types of weapons that were being
developed and their application in his Strategic Weapons: An Introduction, (1982).
Polmar argued that the pursuit of smaller, more efficient nuclear weapons became such a
driving force in the armed forces that even the Navy could boast that most of the aircraft
flown from the decks of carriers in the 1950s could be armed with nuclear bombs.
In a work that is essential to understanding how atomic weapons altered all
aspects of American defense and foreign policy, one must look at James L. Abrahamson
and Paul H. Carew’s Vanguard of American Atomic Deterrence: The Sandia Pioneers,
1946-1949. While these authors cover material that is often implied or impugned in
other historical works, Abrahamson and Carew frame the crisis that many viewed the
emerging Cold War and the perception that atomic weapons were indeed the most
effective counterweight to Soviet intentions. Even more, they also display how the
inevitable improvements to the design of the atomic bomb were initially directed by the
military in the vacuum of civilian authority or international agreements.
David Alan Rosenberg wrote several articles that highlight the role of nuclear
weapons in American strategic planning from several perspectives. In “A Smoking
Radiating Ruin at the End of Two Hours” Rosenberg analyzed two declassified
documents that “shed considerable light on American plans and preparations for nuclear
war in the first years of the Eisenhower Administration.” They highlighted questions
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about an American preemptive strike by SAC and the true size of the American nuclear
stockpile to accomplish any assigned mission.42 This was followed up with an article on
“The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960.” Once
again, this commentary was premised upon recently released classified information.
Rosenberg contended that there was serious consideration for preventative war with the
Soviets and the evolution of American strategy was reflected in the growing nuclear
arsenal and serious consideration for the costs of a nuclear exchange in the mid 1950s.43
In a 1979 article in The Journal of American History Rosenberg highlighted how the
military had analyzed the 1949 Soviet atomic bomb test “in the context of strategies for
war with the Soviet Union developed prior to the Soviet test.” This article synthesized
the how these existing plans “shaped the military’s role in President Truman’s H-Bomb
decision.”44
Limitations on the number of atomic bombs in inventory, lack of nuclear capable
bombers, and doctrine are the subject of William S. Borgiasz’s The Strategic Air
Command: Evolution and Consolidation of Nuclear Forces, 1945-1955, (1996) and
Harry R. Borowski’s A Hollow Threat: Strategic Air Power and Containment Before
Korea, (1982). Borgiasz argues that long-term planning was extremely difficult during
this post war period because of limited budgets and rapid technological advances. While
both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations supported strategic bombing, targeting
intelligence, basing, and support structures were initially hard to attain until the
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introduction of forceful leadership under Curtis LeMay. Written fourteen years earlier,
Borowski’s work contends that the cost savings of atomic weapons was the main driving
force for their increased importance after the Berlin airlift. Therefore, cost drove
doctrine, doctrine drove strategy, and strategy attempted to alter or design aircraft and
weapons that could deliver on the promise of the nuclear age. Borowski further
contended in “Air Force Atomic Capability From V-J Day to the Berlin Blockade - Potential or Real?” that one of the issues missed by many Cold War historians was an
analysis of “how did the atomic monopoly translate into real military power?” His
conclusion suggested that the gap between the potential and reality of American strategic
air warfare was real and the inability to accurately deliver bombs on Soviet targets needs
to be considered in ongoing academic debates regarding these early Cold War years.45
The transition of the United States Navy from conventional battleships to aircraft
carriers with nuclear weapons is addressed in Maritime Strategy and the Balance of
Power: Britain and America in the Twentieth Century, (1989) edited by John B.
Hattendorf and Robert S. Jordon. While the majority of the articles included deal with
earlier years of the last century, there is a clear connection between developments in the
USN and the British Royal Navy. Sean M. Maloney and Joel J. Sokolsky focused their
academic work upon naval strategy in the postwar era in light of nuclear weapons and the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The former’s Securing Command of the Sea: NATO
Naval Planning, 1948-1954 (1995) and the latter’s Seapower in the Nuclear Age: The
United States Navy and NATO 1949-80, (1991) are in depth interpretations about the role
of international alliances and naval strategies. Maloney’s book goes deep into the
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structure of NATO and its command as influenced by American strategy built around sea
lines of communication. While the US Navy was certainly the cornerstone of these
strategies, Maloney clearly states that the there was not unanimity of purpose or direction
among the NATO allies. Sokolsky’s argument transitions the USN’s strategic
contributions from initial ideas, to actual commitments of nuclear-armed aircraft carriers
and finally to ballistic missile submarines.
The capstone of my dissertation deals with the 1949 Revolt of the Admirals and
the differences between the Navy’s view of the postwar period as well as the Air Force’s
command over defense dollars. To date, only one major work has been written on the
revolt, and that is Jeffery G. Barlow’s 1994 Revolt of the Admirals: The Fight for Naval
Aviation, 1945-1950. In this work, Barlow frames the debate over postwar nuclear and
conventional strategy inside the debate over the National Security Act of 1947 and its
subsequent amendments. While most books portray this event as a major defeat for the
Navy and its interests, Barlow contends that it was merely a setback and eventually the
Navy was able to fully participate in the postwar strategic roles, through airpower .
While Barlow attempts to place this as a debate between both the Air Force and Navy
positions, it is evident that Barlow is a subscriber to the naval arguments raised in the
series of congressional hearings. Moreover, while this book deals with naval aviation in
the 1940s and 1950s, it does not address the problems of pursuing carrier-based tactical
nuclear bombers in the 1950s and the problems that they would have during the 1960s.
Arguments over naval strategy in the postwar period are the subject of Michael A.
Palmer’s Origins of the Maritime Strategy: American Naval Strategy in the First Postwar
Decade, and his On Course to Desert Storm: The United States Navy and the Persian
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Gulf. Changes within the Navy department are discussed in Thomas C. Hone’s Power
and Change: The Administrative History of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
All three, published by the Naval Historical Center, focus on the value of the carrier force
and the necessity of naval aviation to preserve American interests in the Cold War era.
Clearly biased in their interpretations, they do not fairly argue the Air Force’s perspective
nor do they look the long-term issues relating to pursuing a nuclear-based defensive
structure.
E.T. Wooldridge edited an impressive collection of essays and articles for a book
entitled Into the Jet Age: Conflict and Change in Naval Aviation, 1945-1975, (1995).
Included within this work are primary source editorials written by some of the Navy’s
key players in the postwar strategy debates including Admirals Arleigh Burke, Gerald
Bogan, Charles Donald Griffin and George Anderson. These aforementioned flag
officers were all critically important to the shape of the postwar USN. While the Truman
administration is not specifically targeted for their arguments, the USAF is and the
authors are very critical of the Air Force and its devotion to strategic air warfare.

This

book, like many others, tends to view the debates and interservice rivalries as battles to
be won at the expense of the other services.
Michael T. Isenberg attempted to deal with the post-World War II in his book,
Shield of the Republic: The United States Navy in an Era of Cold War and Violent Peace,
Volume 1, 1945-1960. Isenberg argues, again, on behalf of the Navy and against the
USAF and, like the previous works, there is not an attempt at synthesis of the airpower
arguments. Jerry Miller, a career naval officer, attempted to place the issue of carrierbased naval aviation and nuclear weapons at the forefront of his work, entitled, Nuclear
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Weapons and Aircraft Carriers. Published by the Smithsonian Institution Press in 2001,
this work is based primarily on Miller’s first-hand observations and training. Miller
references nuclear policy and strategy in different chapters, but these are merely part of
his synthesis of his work and not the main focus of the book.
In The Fast Carriers” The Forging of an Air Navy, (1968) Clark G. Reynolds
created an impressive argument about carrier aviation and its role in winning the Second
World War. Through an impressive narrative, Reynolds described how naval aviation
assumed supremacy in US naval operations during the war and how it eclipsed the
surface and subsurface fleets in mission status. While the book does not deal with the
post-war navy nor nuclear strategy, it is essential to see how the Navy came to understand
naval aviation’s function in modern warfare. Reynolds also addressed the United States
Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) conducted in Japan, which was extremely critical of
strategic bombing and its limited effect on the Japanese war effort. Critics of postwar
strategic air warfare would point to the USSBS as supporting documentation.
Aircraft carriers were also the domain of Andrew Faltum in The Essex Class
Aircraft Carriers, (1996). While the USN worked to develop several classes of new
supercarriers in the 1950s and 1960s, the World War II era Essex class carriers were still
the backbone of fleet well into the 1960s. Faltum focuses on their role in WWII and how
the subsequent postwar developments of nuclear weapons and escalating needs for
tactical air support changed the physical appearance of the twenty-four carriers in this
class. While Faltum discusses the impact of strategic air warfare, it is not developed in
depth.
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Richard P. Hallion, in his classic The Naval Air War in Korea, published in 1986,
focused on the rise of tactical aviation in the aftermath of the Revolt and describes the
vindictiveness of Louis Johnson and his anti-naval bias. Hallion argued that despite a
lack of political support for the Navy in the post-World War II era, outdated equipment
and carriers, the Navy was able to help the United Nations forces in Korea because the
Navy could accomplish missions that were in many cases beyond the range or endurance
of United States Air Force aircraft and crews. Hallion frames the Korean War through
the role of tactical not strategic airpower .
Procurement of naval weapons, carriers and aircraft has been the subject of scores
of books over the last six decades. Many have been written for the general consumer or
veterans who served on particular vessels. Academic interpretations on these subjects are
a bit more atypical. Several examples that are important to the context of my dissertation
are Joel R. Davidson’s The Unsinkable Fleet: The Politics of U.S. Navy Expansion in
World War II, (1996), Edward H. Heinemann and Rosario Rausa’s Ed Heineman:
Combat Aircraft Designer, (1980), Glenn E. Bugos’s Engineering the F-4 Phantom II:
Parts Into Systems, (1996) and the National Defense Research Institute’s The U.S.
Aircraft Carrier Industrial Base: Force Structure, Cost, Schedule, and Technology Issues
for CVN-77, (1998). Davidson tackles the issue of internal and external stimuli on the
design, development, costs, and support of the US fleets during WWII. Important to my
work, Davidson addressed the transition of naval construction and personnel, from the
war to peacetime starting in 1944 as well as problems between the Navy and War
Departments. Even more, Davidson articulates that Secretary of the Navy James
Forrestal and Chief of Naval Operations Ernest King did not agree about the size of the
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fleet. Moreover, congressional funding for construction eclipsed actual expenditures and
Forrestal and supporters in Congress were reluctant to approve additional funding for
ships when it appeared that the Navy already had a surplus of ships.46 Edited by John
Bikier and many others, The U.S. Aircraft Carrier Industrial Base: Force Structure, Cost,
Schedule, and Technology Issues for CVN-77 (1998) was put together by RAND to
determine the overall cost impact of carriers to the United States. While it does not get
into academic arguments surrounding the carrier fleet, it does display the challenges
faced by American ship makers as the purchases of carriers have substantially declined
over the decades since WWII. Moreover, the book reflects how the carrier missions have
evolved and could be negatively impacted by newer weapons including missiles, political
concerns over budgets, and enemy action.
Heinemann and Rausa’s work highlight the career of one of the most influential
aircraft designers in American history. Heinemann’s career at Douglas Aircraft
Corporation transcended the interwar period of the 1930s through the heydays of the
Cold War. Heinemann was responsible for several key aircraft types that were extremely
important to the success of the USN in World War II. However, it is in the postwar era
that Heinemann saw his greatest accomplishments. Heinemann understood the transition
of US defense policy from conventional weapons to nuclear, and began to design aircraft
that reflected this trend. During the late 1940s when many in the Navy were despairing
about the future of naval aviation, Heinemann was designing aircraft that reflected the
inevitability of USN nuclear bombers in spite of a lack of support from the Truman
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Administration and the Department of Defense.47 Glenn Bugos interpreted how an
aircraft company, in this case McDonnell Aircraft Company, took a series of vague
proposals, weapon systems, and theories to build the F-4 Phantom II. While it was
initially procured for the USN, it was modified to meet two requirements, first,
compatibility with the USAF, which was forced by Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara to adopt the Phantom. The other was to adopt a multi-mission role, including
nuclear strike. This corporate interpretation of a weapons system clearly displays how
weapons were designed, produced, modified, and sold to meet the changing requirements
of the Cold War years.
United States naval aviation is only one aspect of my dissertation. To understand
the policies that were so desperately fought over one must understand the decision to
utilize strategic bombers as the first line of offense against American enemies. The rise of
strategic airpower was tied directly to the rise of the bomber as a new offensive weapon.
Many interwar airpower advocates, including the Italian Giulio Douhet, American
General William “Billy” Mitchell, and Soviet émigré Alexander de Seversky went so far
as to advocate that airpower that targeted primarily cities and civilians alone could win
the next war. Douhet’s Command of the Air, (1921) viewed airpower as being
revolutionary toward the conduct of warfare. Written in the years following the Great
War, Douhet saw strategic bombing as being the final arbiter in any war because bombers
demoralized civilian populations and forced them to sue for peace. Mitchell’s collection
of essays and articles entitled Winged Defense: The Development of Possibilities of
Modern Air Power--Economic and Military, (1925). Mitchell argued not only for an
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independent United States Air Force, but he also contended that it would be the primary
means of deterring potential enemies. De Seversky had the fortune of writing his classic
Victory through Air Power (1942) after seeing how bombing had already impacted the
Second World War. In this work, de Seversky argued that strategic bombing was the
essential tool to winning modern wars and would make ground wars obsolete. Like the
previous two works, Victory through Air Power has been debated and interpreted
throughout the ages and while much of it is outdated, it is still a starting point for
discussions on strategic air warfare.
John Buckley argued in Air Power in the Age of Total War (1999) that airpower ,
in bringing war to the home front directly through attack or the fear of attack, was
systemic of the new age of total war in a “physically destructive sense.” Furthermore,
airpower was also “a measure of total war, for more than any other weapon the aircraft
was a product of industrial warfare and the modern era.”48 Buckley went on to argue that
airpower has developed a new level of efficiency based upon the use of modern weapons
and stealth technology as displayed in the first Gulf War. Taking the war to the enemy
was also a key component in Buckley’s work.
One can see how technology shapes the direction of strategic air warfare by
examining the Ronald Schaffer’s Wings of Judgment: American Bombing in World War
II, (1985), Edwin P. Hoyt’s Inferno: The Firebombing of Japan, March 9-August 15,
1945,(2000) and Kenneth P. Werrell’s Blankets of Fire: U.S. Bombers over Japan during
World War II, (1996). While each book covers different aspects of the American
bombing programs of World War II, they have several common themes. Schaffer
focuses on the growing American belief in the concept of strategic bombing.
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Furthermore, Schaffer points out that Franklin Roosevelt was determined to make the
German population feel the retribution of the allies. However, he needed an assessment
tool to accurately gauge the impact of the bombing on the morale and production of war
materials in Germany. This led to the creation of the United States Strategic Bombing
Survey for Europe. Even more, the President made it very clear that he was willing to
support “attacks aimed at terrorizing enemy civilians.49 This carried over into the
postwar era throughout the military and Truman Administration as Schaffer reminds the
readers of the speech that Secretary of the Navy Francis Matthews gave in 1950
endorsing the idea of a preventative war.50
Hoyt concentrated on the impact on the Japanese population base as the
Americans executed a series of devastating firebomb raids during 1945. Many Americans
believed that this was essential to demoralizing the Japanese and forcing them to
surrender. However, Hoyt clearly states that while the raids hampered production at
many factories and many citizens were resigned to dying in the war that did not mean that
they could or would be bombed into surrendering. In fact, many felt that their suffering
was a reflection of the sacrifices Japanese soldiers were making throughout the last
vestiges of the empire. Werrell dives much deeper into the debate over the efficacy of
strategic airpower in the war against Japan. Werrell argued that the theory of airpower
failed to achieve the goals that were promised by airpower zealots. While enemy aircraft
production, oil supplies, weapons procurement, and morale were all negatively impacted
by the air war, the American strategic bombers were never able to successfully eliminate
the Japanese will to resist or produce. Even more, that while the strength and intensity of
49

Ronald Schaffer, Wings of Judgement: American Bombing in World War II (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1985), 89.
50
Ibid, 202.

44
the American attacks had some psychological benefits to the US war effort, the Japanese
were not defeated until the full impact of the US naval blockade of Japan began to starve
out the home population.
Air Force Major General Haywood S. Hansell, Jr., an instrumental officer in the
planning and execution of the air war against Japan, would have staunchly disagreed with
Werrell’s conclusions. In his Strategic Air War Against Japan, Hansell has an eyeopening interpretation about strategic bombing and its successes in World War II.
Hansell clearly wrote the book in the context of the Cold War and with the role of the
Strategic Air Command in mind. For example, in discussing the atomic bomb, Hansell
stated that the bomb “may not have been needed to bring defeat to Japan, but it was
needed to save the Army from its obsession with invasion, and its demonstrated power
would be needed after the war to deter Russian domination of Europe. Additionally,
despite the negligible bombing results as listed in the USSBS, Hansell contended that
“the strategic air offensive against Japan, carried out in the context of the Allied grand
strategy, was a magnificent and decisive accomplishment. 51
Hansell is also one of the reasons for the success of the United States Army Air
Forces XXI according to Daniel L. Haulman’s Hitting Home: The Air Offensive Against
Japan, (1999). Part of the Air Force History and Museums program, this book, like
Hansell’s, argues about the success of the bombing raids. Haulman, however, reminds
the reader that Hansell was relieved of command when the results of the first raids over
Japan did not match with prewar hype. Hansell is also the subject of Charles Griffith’s
The Quest: Haywood Hansell and American Strategic Bombing in World War II, (1999).
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Griffith argues that Hansell was an unapologetic believer in the efficacy of strategic
bombing in World War II and its deterrent value in the decades of the Cold War.
Griffith also furthers the idea that the firebombing was the “result of the technology that
made the firebombing possible, the desire on the part of the air force to end the war
before an invasion, and the perceived desire for vengeance by the American public.”52
An unrepentant believer in strategic air warfare and aerial coercion was Walt W.
Rostow, an Advisor to the Kennedy Administration and the National Security Advisor to
President Lyndon Johnson. Clayton D. Laurie defined Rostow’s views in a 2008 article
in “War & Society” entitled “Rostow’s Panacea: Strategic Air Power, the OSS Enemy
Objectives Unit, and the Origins of ROLLING THUNDER.” Laurie suggested that
Rostow’s views on airpower stemmed from his wartime experience in linking enemy
targets to their war sustaining capacity or economic value. If these objectives were
destroyed by a maximum effort against North Vietnam, they would lead to the desired
diplomatic actions by the communist government. Like other believers in strategic
bombing, Rostow looked past the data that indicated he was wrong and he “remained
convinced of airpower ’s potential to affect the war’s outcome” if it were only used
aggressively.53 In 1984, Richard H. Kohn and Joseph Harahan conducted a series of
interviews with the men, including General Curtis LeMay, who helped develop and refine
American strategic bombing concepts. Published in “International Security” in 1988, the
excerpts from those interviews clearly indicated that in the minds of these originators of
postwar strategic bombing, airpower remained unchallenged in its ability to win wars.
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Smaller conflicts like the Korean War were seen as anomalies because the United States
never actually “used strategic concepts” during that war. It remained their goal to make
sure more of the Air Force than just Strategic Air Command would also be able “operate
across a much larger portion of the warfare spectrum” in any conflict with the Soviet
Union.54
Tactical airpower in World War II is also debated among many scholars and
proponents. Two books, contradictory in subjects, display the merits of airpower to help
win battles and lay the groundwork to win wars. Joel S. A. Hayward’s case study
Stopped at Stalingrad, (1998) addresses the goals and ambitions of the German armed
forces in their attack against the Soviet Union. Lacking true strategic bombers like the
western allies, the Germans were forced to use smaller bombers in an attempt to win the
day. However, lack of support from the government, an inability to attain desperately
needed oil supplies, and material shortages doomed the efforts of the Luftwaffe to win
the war against the Soviet Union. From an American perspective, the most important
practitioner of tactical airpower was General Elwood “Pete” Quesada, the commander of
the IX Fighter Command in Europe. In Thomas Alexander Hughes’ Overlord: General
Pete Quesada and the Triumph of Tactical Air Power in World War II (1995).
Throughout this work, Hughes places Quesada at the feet of the great thinkers and
strategists of American power, from Dwight D. Eisenhower to James Doolittle. In this
interpretation, the Americans have many of the same problems that afflicted the German
war effort, however, there were some clear differences. The American high command
valued the role of aircraft in paving the way into France in 1944, defending the troops on
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the ground, and assaulting the enemy’s means of support around the battlefield. Even
more, while the Germans struggled to coordinate the goals of the war between the army
and the Luftwaffe, the Americans were able to overcome very strong differences of
tactics to develop priorities that all could work with. Hughes and Quesada’s views of
tactical airpower are essential to understanding the counterpoints against strategic air
warfare.
James S. Corum and Wray R. Johnson further examine the role of Airpower in
Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists, (2003). Through careful examinations
of wars and battles from U.S. interventions in Latin America prior to the Great War to the
Soviet war in Afghanistan, Corum and Johnson carefully lay out the promise and
problems of airpower in small wars. In particular, they contend that it is too often
virtually impossible to merge political goals and bombs on target. For example, while
discussing the French in Algeria in the late 1950s and early 1960s, it was apparent that
French interdiction campaigns had been successful in preventing weapons and supplies
from reaching Algerian rebels. However, despite limited casualties on French forces and
massive losses of indigenous Algerians, it is apparent that “a determined people
motivated by nationalism and armed with little more than patience and a willingness to
die in large numbers can win a war against a well-led and well-armed modern military
force supported by the latest technology and plenty of airpower.55
Craig C. Hannah’s Striving for Air Superiority: The Tactical Air Command,
(2002) is an overview of the second largest command in the United States Air Force.
Hannah used a variety of sources, oral histories, and interviews to flesh out the growth of
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the tactical air command from its primary mission of air supremacy, to the tactical
delivery of nuclear weapons, and finally back to air superiority. Hannah argues that
many in TAC understood that funding was available for nuclear bombers, both large and
small, and therefore, the TAC leaders pursued aircraft that were ill suited to their mission.
They rationalized that you could achieve air superiority by nuking your enemy’s aircraft
out of existence. However, this did not work in conventional wars and it left TAC and
the United States vulnerable during conventional confrontations, particularly in Vietnam.
Michael Sherry’s The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon,
(1987) is a critical examination of the role of airpower in American history concluding
with the immediate post WWII years. Sherry argued that the atomic bomb “lacked
reality as a weapon of war and as an instrument of international relations.”56 Richard P.
Hallion’s expertise in airpower is evident in two works, Strike from the Sky: The History
of Battlefield Air Attack, 1911-1945, (1989) and Storm over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf
War, (1992). In Strike from the Sky, Hallion charts the rise of tactical airpower from the
Great War through the Soviet air experience on the eastern front of the Great Patriotic
War. While Hallion does not focus on strategic air warfare in this book, he took great
lengths to highlight how tactical airpower wins wars. The primary focus of Storm over
Iraq is the first Gulf War, however, within its pages Hallion developed the role of
strategic and tactical airpower from its humble beginnings throughout the World Wars,
Korea, and Vietnam. In a concise series of arguments, Hallion described how
technologies evolved to match new doctrines that developed out of previous wartime
experiences.
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The use of strategic bombing as a weapon is directly related to the thesis of John
R. Carter’s Airpower and the Cult of the Offensive, (1998). Carter argued that this
terminology reflected “the condition that occurs when an organization believes so
strongly in the supremacy of offense that it no longer develops and evaluates its doctrine
rationally.”57 This cult of the offensive can be attributed to airpower in that when
utilized in a strategic manner, it is inherently offensive by definition. Robert A. Pape’s
Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (1996) addresses the limitations of
bombing on attaining national goals in wars. Touted as the first major book on the
political effects of war published since the Vietnam War, Pape’s book is instrumental to
understanding that airpower usually does not attain national goals by “raising the costs
and risks to civilians. When coercion does work, it is by denying the opponent the ability
to achieve its goals on the battlefield.”58
Mark Clodfelter wrote what is arguably the best synthesis of airpower in his
classic The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam, (1989).
Strongly critical of the advocates of Armageddon, Clodfelter takes issue with Air Force
planners who blamed politicians for the shortcomings of conventional strategic air
warfare that was conducted over North Vietnam. He argued that it was not solely the
political limitations that doomed the war nor was it alone a failure of tactics. Clodfelter
argued that airpower was unsuccessful because the Air Force had focused primarily on
nuclear weapons delivery and inter-service rivalries during the years prior to Vietnam. In
addition, Clodfelter contended that for most of the war, the United States was never able
to translate political goals in Southeast Asia through the application of airpower. This
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failure combined with the instability of the South Vietnamese government virtually
doomed any air campaign over Southeast Asia almost before the first American aircraft
dropped its weapons. Unlike my dissertation, Clodfelter focuses primarily on the Air
Force rather than the entirety of the American defense system.
Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen also looked at battlefield circumstances
and the application of airpower in their Revolution in Warfare? Air Power in the Persian
Gulf, (1995). Using reams of official reports and published data, Cohen and Keaney
attempted to frame the success of airpower in Operation Desert Storm against the reality
of the circumstances that it faced. While it does not cover the era of my dissertation, it
does apply some of the lessons and limitations of airpower that are a cornerstone of my
project. Keaney and Cohen see in modern airpower what the advocates of nuclear
strategic air warfare saw a generation earlier. That is, airpower “is an unusually
seductive form of military strength because, like modern courtship, it appears to off the
pleasures of gratification without the burdens of commitment.”59 Benjamin S. Lambeth
also focused on The Transformation of American Air Power, published in 2000. Like
many other volumes that were written after the first Gulf War, Lambeth attempted to
frame the success in Desert Storm, as well as NATO operations over Serbia in the late
1990s, with the growing pains of airpower. Not only does Lambeth chart the role of
airpower in previous wars, he also cited how technology altered doctrine, rather than
doctrine being the driving force of technological change. Moreover, Lambeth also
argued that while the airpower advocates believed that strategic bombing could win the
war and certainly it was instrumental in achieving American goals, it did not “weaken
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Saddam Hussein’s control over his people.”60 Therefore, if airpower had limitations
during one of the brightest examples of its success, one must question how strategic air
warfare, as developed in the 1940s and 1950s, could possibly coerce the Soviet Union
into submission to American national goals or objectives.
John Gooch edited a series of papers and published them with the title, Airpower
Theory and Practice, (1995). Of particular importance in this book is the chapter written
by Peter J. Roman on strategic bombers and missiles. While Roman’s chapter deals with
1957 and beyond, he does still address the limitations of manned bombers and their
chances of success. Even more, Roman argued that the Eisenhower administration’s
move to economize the military at the expense of bombers was because “bombers would
be a less effective and economical way of delivering nuclear weapons than missiles.”61
Plotting a True Course: Reflections on USAF Strategic Attack Theory and Doctrine, the
Post-World War II Experience, (2003) edited by David R. Mets and William P. Head is
an extremely important interpretation of airpower and its application from the earliest
hours of the atomic age through combat operations in Kosovo in the 1990s. In particular,
an essay on deterrence raised important questions about the role of nuclear weapons in
the American defense plans. In particular, Lt. Col. Mark J. Conversino raised the
question about how the use of nuclear weapons stops the Soviets from striking towards
the English Channel. In that contingency, was the United States fully prepared to use
nuclear weapons on French, Spanish, or even German soil to stop the prospective Soviet
invasion? Even more, the question that remained was, did the United States have enough
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bombs to hurt the Soviet war effort and the ability to deliver them rapidly enough to
weaken the Red Army?
Robert Coram wrote one of the most interesting books on airpower and its
limitations. Entitled Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War, (2002), this
book reveals a maverick pilot who challenged the status quo of the United States Air
Force and the concepts of strategic air warfare. Always critical of the “bigger, higher,
faster, farther” belief in USAF weapons procurement, Coram’s Boyd was consistently
fighting for simplicity in doctrine, training and application of weapons. Boyd fought
against the older “Bomber Barons” who controlled the USAF through the Strategic Air
Command. Even more, Boyd’s “fighter mafia” disciples helped redirect the USAF into
weapons that were indeed instrumental in winning the Gulf War. Boyd was also credited
with developing the concept of a time based strategy called the OODA Loop, for the
“Observe-Orient-Decide-Act” cycle that is important within military decisions, and even
in business.62
The role of the aviation industry itself in the decisions to pursue a virtual nuclear
first strategy was premise of Donald R. Mrozek’s 1974 article entitled “The Truman
Administration and the Enlistment of the Aviation Industry in Postwar Defense.”
Mrozek concluded that the administration was persistent in its efforts to militarize the
economy and it placed the aviation industry in a position that they sought government
contracts “as insurance against their own economic failure.”63 Certainly, this was
reflected in the testimony presented to the President’s Air Policy Commission in 1947.
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Mrozek also examined the force structure and balance of the United States military in the
years between Truman and Eisenhower. He argued that the Truman and Eisenhower
administrations believed that “Air Force might offer an inexpensive means to achieve
national security objectives” even as costs for men, machines, and weapons continued to
rise. More importantly, Truman’s defense policies were not extensively altered by the
Eisenhower administration. Furthermore, Ike did not believe that nuclear weapons had a
deterrent effect for smaller, regional conflicts.64
Finally, it is understood that I do not attempt to take the issue of strategic air
warfare lightly or for granted. I am reminded of what General Omar Bradley argued in
1949. In an address before the Third National Industry Army Day Conference in Boston,
Bradley argued that he was a supporter of airpower in the modern age and he understood
that great limitations affected its use. Bradley also stated that while an air campaign
could cripple an enemy, however, the United States would be forced to gain victory “over
our dead bodies—those of our soldiers on the ground.” 65 Unfortunately, it was a lesson
that was missed after the carnage of World War II, the uneasy peace of Korea, and the
painful losses of Vietnam. From condemnation to embracement, the Americans would
transform the idea of air warfare in less than a decade and create the inevitable
bureaucratic infighting over missions and funding. Rather than cooperation or a
synthesis over strategy and costs, a critical battle for survival was about to begin.

64

Donald J. Mrozek, "A New Look at "Balanced Forces": Defense Continuities From Truman to
Eisenhower," Military Affairs, December 1974: 145-151.
65
Address by General Omar N. Bradley, Chief of Staff, United States Army, at the Third National Industry
Army Day Conference, Boston Massachusetts, February 4, 1948. Papers of Stuart Symington 1946-1950, B
General (Folder 2), Harry S. Truman Library.

54
CHAPTER ONE
THE BACKGROUND OF UNITED STATES STRATEGIC AIR WARFARE

A well organized, well planned and well executed bomber attack, once launched, can not
be stopped.66 Major General Haywood S. Hansell, Jr. USAF
What was criminal in Coventry, Rotterdam, Warsaw, and London has now become heroic
first in Dresden and now in Tokyo.67 Oswald G. Villard, member of America First.

On April 12, 1945, Harry S. Truman took the oath of office and assumed the
presidency of the United States at an extremely difficult point in history. The Second
World War was in the final stages in Europe and it was already apparent that there were
going to be substantive diplomatic and possibly even military problems between the
United States and the Soviet Union. Even more, while the war against the Empire of
Japan had inflicted significant casualties on the Americans during the previous three
years of war, it appeared to many that the losses would continue throughout 1945. While
the new President was briefed on the war and current progress on the new atomic bomb,
the strategic bombing campaigns against Germany and Japan continued unabated. It was
the latter, however, that modeled direction of post war military spending and strategy
because to accept a nuclear strategy premised upon the mass destruction of enemy
populations, the United States first had to accept the same with conventional weapons.
The war against Japan ended after months of aggressive incendiary attacks on
Japanese cities, virtual strangulation from an aggressive unrestricted submarine campaign
against Japanese shipping, and two atomic bombs. Despite the long years of war since
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Pearl Harbor, many viewed the Japanese capitulation without an invasion as
unprecedented in warfare and a vision of the future. Unlike the war against Germany,
where the Nazi government surrendered only after invading armies from the Soviet
Union, the United States, the United Kingdom and France had crushed the last remnants
of German power, the magic elixir of strategic bombing had forced the Japanese out of
the war without the use of ground troops fighting for every square inch of Japanese soil.
This decisive use of airpower ended the war before a major intrusion in the theater by the
Soviets. The use of American strategic bombers linked the goal of unconditional
surrender of all Japanese forces to the threat made by Truman when he warned them that
if they continued to prosecute the war, they would face “sheer and utter destruction” as
targets of American power. It was believed that airpower now had the ability, through
the massive application of force, to compel or coerce an enemy state to abandon
resistance and submit.
In the summer of 1945 General Henry H. “Hap” Arnold, chief of the United
States Army Air Forces (USAAF), estimated that under current operations, Imperial
Japan would be completely stripped of all targets within eighteen-months. Air attacks
combined with an effective naval blockade would bring about the total annihilation of
Japanese cities and its industrial capacity “until all of Japan was completely destroyed.”
To further emphasize this point, Arnold confirmed reports that the Japanese capital of
Tokyo was no longer considered a priority target because most of the capital’s industrial
infrastructure was already destroyed.68 Arnold’s assertion was later corroborated by the

68

Lindesay Parrott, "Arnold Sees Japan Razed in 18 Months," The New York Times, June 19, 1945.

56
post war United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS).69 Indiscriminate air attacks
on the major urban areas of Japan marked a shift in tactics for the Americans and also
represented the type of indiscriminate terror bombing that Arnold had once decried as
“abhorrent to our humanity, our sense of decency.”70 Yet, the time and pressures of total
war against Japan allowed for these types of attacks to continue. Together, the Boeing B29 Superfortress, its incendiary weapons, and the strategic air campaign led to a level of
destruction in Japan that signified a major change of American war making potential, and
paved the way for postwar nuclear strategy. Arnold’s announcement was an ominous
warning for not only the Japanese, but the rest of the world as he made it clear that
American airpower had reached a point where it could, virtually single handedly, wipe a
major power off the face of the earth with a sustained strategic air campaign.
It was presumed that the major production centers were the Achilles heel of Japan
and they were attacked without remorse. The Americans did not suspend or alter their
attacks on the Japanese infrastructure to allow for bilateral discussions that would lead to
a negotiated settlement. Rather, it was implicit that in the age of total war, the bombing
would not stop until the Japanese agreed to end hostilities on American terms. American
policy was overtly linked to military action and it was plainly evident what it would take
to end the war.
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THE RISE OF THE STRATEGIC BOMBER

The decision by the Americans to exploit strategic bombers as the primary
offensive agent against the Japanese was directly linked to the rise of the airplane as the
new offensive weapon. Many of the earliest airpower advocates, including the Italian
Guilio Douhet, American General William “Billy” Mitchell, and Soviet émigré
Alexander de Servesky, went so far as to advocate that bombers that primarily targeted
cities and civilians alone could win the next war. Airpower brought the war to the home
front directly through an attack or, even the fear of attack, and was systemic of the new
age of total war in a “physically destructive sense.” 71 The use of strategic bombing as a
weapon is directly related to what Major John R. Carter, USAF, called the “cult of the
offensive.” Carter argued that this terminology reflected “the condition that occurs when
an organization believes so strongly in the supremacy of offense that it no longer
develops and evaluates its doctrine rationally.72 This cult of the offensive can be
attributed to airpower when utilized in a strategic manner because it is inherently
offensive by definition.
Prior attempts at strategic bombing in World War One, the Spanish Civil War,
and the Japanese war against China in the late 1930s, had clearly demonstrated both the
destructive power of the bomber, as well as its limitations. Bombers could destroy
sections of cities and annihilate or intimidate populations, but they were also vulnerable
to attacks by defending fighters and anti-aircraft fire. When attacking an urban center
that was not well defended, it was believed that the bombers could inflict material and
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psychological damage upon the inhabitants greater than the effort expended. In other
words, it took relatively few bombers with a light payload to break the morale of the
targeted citizenry. In 1932, former British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin argued that
the horror of aerial warfare was enough to abolish military aviation. He urged those who
would listen to him in the House of Commons that: “for the man on the street…there is
no power on earth that can protect him from bombing…The bomber will always get
through… The only defense is in offense, which means you have got to kill more women
and children quicker than the enemy if you want to save yourselves.”73 In many ways,
this last chilling statement was the gospel that airpower disciples from all nations began
to preach.
During the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) the Germans dispatched the Condor
Legion, an experienced group of Luftwaffe airmen who conducted the first post-World
War One use of strategic bombing to demoralize a population. The Legion launched its
first terror bombing in April 1937 against the Spanish city of Guernica. The Germans
attempted to assist General Francisco Franco’s fascist forces when for almost three hours,
German aircraft dropped bombs and strafed “enemy” civilians as they tried to flee the
destruction. So horrific was the destruction and subsequent international condemnation
that the German government denied that it had anything to do with the attack. That
remained their official stance until the Nuremberg trials of 1946.74 An editorial in the
New York Times in May 1937 entitled Death over Valencia, argued that the bombardment
of Guernica was not conducted within “the accepted rules of warfare” and this type of
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warfare was universally condemned and considered illegal under international law. For a
belligerent not “to accept this interpretation would be in effect to wipe out the centuriesold distinction between combatants and non-combatants and to justify indiscriminate
slaughter.”75 The total casualties at Guernica were initially estimated at over eight
hundred men, women, and children killed.76 It should be noted that the German bombers
that inflicted this damage were much smaller in size, payload, and capabilities than the
bombers that would be used in the Second World War, in particular, the B-29s that would
later raze Japan. The number of casualties also greatly paled in comparison to the
casualties that were inflicted in the latter campaign.
One of the first Americans to condemn the attacks in Spain was Newton D. Baker,
the former US Secretary of War in the Wilson administration. Baker had argued as early
as 1918 that the United States should not participate in this type of bombardment and
described strategic bombing as synonymous with the policy of German aggressors during
the Great War.77 He also lent his name, along with many other prominent Americans
including Senator William E. Borah of Idaho, distinguished historian Dr. Charles A.
Beard, celebrated attorney Clarence Darrow, and renowned physicist Dr. Albert Einstein,
to an international appeal drafted in the aftermath of Guernica that condemned the
destruction of the old city.78 However, despite the irate rhetoric aimed at airpower from
those that opposed it, in reality, Guernica was bombed by merely forty three aircraft
which released an estimated fifty tons of bombs over the city and officially killed over
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1600 and wounded upwards of 800 more.79 These numbers, while horrific, paled in
comparison to bombing raids conducted a few years later during the Second World War.
During their extensive war with China, which began in 1937, the Japanese Army
Air Force and Japanese naval aviators also resorted to terror bombing. This position
angered many Americans and at the 1938 national convention of Disabled American
Veterans of the World War, the Assistant Secretary of the Army and former head of the
American Legion, Louis A. Johnson, reminded his audience that in the United States,
mankind is not considered “as cannon fodder” and that we embrace human life with the
“utmost respect.”80 In spite of the American position, the Japanese made it clear to the
world that Japan would indiscriminately bomb the provisional Chinese capital at
Chunking until “its spirit of resistance is broken.”81 Secretary of State Cordell Hull
unilaterally condemned the attacks aimed at Chunking without reservation. Hull further
suggested that the American people and government were opposed to the “ruthless
bombings” of civilians. 82 Clearly and very publically, President Franklin D. Roosevelt
used Hull and Johnson to highlight the value of human life in the mind of the
administration. What was not evident at the time, however, was how rapidly the
Americans and the administration would change their views on strategic bombing. One
decade hence Johnson himself would accept an American strategy premised on the
destruction of civilian targets inside the USSR as the most expeditious manner to win a
war.
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PRESIDENT FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND STRATEGIC BOMBING
In the opening hours of the Second World War, Roosevelt echoed the critics of
strategic bombing as he demanded that all the belligerents show restraint. He argued that
the targeting of civilians resulted in “the maiming and death of thousands of defenseless
men, women, and children” and, that this form of “inhuman barbarism” would cause
hundreds of thousands of innocent bystanders to pay the ultimate price in a war for which
they were not the least bit responsible. Roosevelt appealed that all nations agree that “in
no event, and under no circumstances, undertake the bombardment from the air of
civilian populations or unfortified cities” and requested multilateral support and
observation of this limit.83 To clarify his position to the American population, FDR used
the opportunity of a Fireside Chat two days later to remind his listeners that they were a
neutral nation, and that even a “neutral cannot be asked to close his mind or close his
conscience.”84 The President, however, was in a quandary as he overtly condemned the
type of warfare that he privately believed was fully capable of destroying an enemy’s will
to resist. As early as September 1938, FDR discussed the possibility of war at a Cabinet
meeting shortly before the Munich Agreement was reached. Roosevelt argued that he
would make the war against Germany primarily an air war because the German
population would break before the allies under a relentless bombing campaign. He
thought that this solution would be more cost effective, inflict fewer American casualties,
and was “more likely to succeed than a traditional war by land and sea.85 Roosevelt also
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assumed that American airpower might actually deter or limit war because it could
dominate an enemy without inflicting horrific collateral damage.86
In public Roosevelt’s true feelings on strategic bombing were clouded behind
obfuscation and uncertainty. Clearly FDR did not want his position on bombing to blur
the line of distinction between the heartless attacks of civilians by despotic nations as
opposed to the high altitude “precision bombing” embraced by western democracies. He
pursued a balanced approach for a defense strategy that was divided into three main
components: deterrence, effective organization of existing facilities, and the ability to
meet rapid expansion.87 Yet Roosevelt struggled to define American international goals
or national policy through the application of strategic bombing of targets for morale,
material, or retribution. It should be noted that at the time there was not a proven link
between the destruction of an enemy’s war production and their respective political will
that was necessary to win a war. In February 1938, the New York Times reported that
American strategists would not target civilians because the evidence of contemporary
bombing campaigns indicated that the results were not worth the risks. Moreover, there
were no reported advantages for attackers in comparison to the costs associated.88
As the Roosevelt administration attempted to maintain American neutrality, the
War Department continued to attempt to define the strategy and purpose for airpower. At
the same time, the American people, politicians, and the press continued to condemn the
indiscriminate bombing of civilians by the Japanese, Italians, and Germans. Yet, the
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United States Army Air Corps (USAAC, 1926-1941), the precursor of the United States
Army Air Forces (USAAF, 1941-1947) and the United States Air Force (USAF, 1947Present), continued to prepare for a strategic bombing campaign in the event of an
American entry into the Second World War. Even more ominous, in October 1939,
Alexander Sachs presented FDR a letter ostensibly from Albert Einstein that informed the
President that it was possible to create a new form of energy from the fission of atoms. A
number of scientists and physicists now believed they could create a new generation of
high yield weapons that could be used in war.89 According to Einstein’s letter it was
possible that a bomb created from this effort could be large enough to destroy an entire
shipping port and the surrounding area although it might be too big to carry by air.90
Roosevelt listened carefully and then made a decision that began the long road to
Hiroshima. He created an Advisory Committee on Uranium that met in Washington only
ten days after Sach’s meeting with FDR.91 The idea of nuclear energy presented to
Roosevelt would lead directly to the creation of the Manhattan Project and the atomic
bomb.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN STRATEGIC AIRPOWER

While FDR’s intrinsic view on strategic bombing was ambiguous at best in 1940,
the challenges and horrors of war dramatically changed the American public’s attitude of
bombing from condemnation to the acceptance by 1944. For many of the senior airmen,
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strategic bombing was seen not only as an avenue to winning the war, its success could
also open the path to an independent United States Air Force. Dating back to the days of
Billy Mitchell in the 1920s, aviation factions in the Army had lobbied for sovereignty
from the Army.92
Mitchell, not always politically popular or even tactful, advocated using bombers
in roles that had been the domain of the other Services. For example, Mitchell
envisioned that large bombers would become the first line of American defenses because
they could strike at enemy shipping that threatened American shores, a role that had
always been the priority of the United States Navy. Mitchell truly believed in the
offensive capabilities that larger bombers offered and in “attacking the vital centers with
fire, high explosives, and chemical weapons” as this was a more cost effective way of
winning a war.93 General Curtis E. LeMay, arguably the most influential advocate of
postwar strategic bombing, contended that Mitchell rightly believed in strategic airpower
and “the idea that air power could be used to strike an enemy’s heartland and destroy his
means and willingness to wage war.”94 Unfortunately for the outspoken Mitchell, he lost
his career because of his convictions and actions. His views on strategic air warfare were
vindicated in World War II, and to many he remains a patron saint of the Air Force.
During the 1930s, the Air Corps Tactical School defined the major roles for
strategic airpower during a sustained campaign. Properly executed airpower destroyed
the enemy’s industrial and logistical support structure and crippled its framework of
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political and social life. This included attacks on electrical grids, transportation
networks, fuel and food distribution, and critical manufacturing. Civilians might
eventually be targeted, however, because it was implicit that attacking the enemy’s
population could paralyze their war capacity. This was to be, however, a last resort rather
than a first strike. The final role for airpower identified was the defense of the United
States and its own communications and transportation system.95 The oceans surrounding
the continental United States provided an additional defense from air assault and it was
felt that the United States had time to overcome its perceived military weaknesses.96
On the eve of the World War II, the Navy and War Departments endeavored to
strengthen their respective service’s air assets through purchases of additional aircraft and
the training of a new generation of aviators. In November 1938, FDR articulated the
need for a greatly expanded annual production of aircraft and the necessary factories to
maintain the higher level of production.97 Contracts were signed for a newer generation
of fighters, bombers, patrol aircraft and other weapons that the administration felt was
necessary in order to be prepared for the pending war against the Axis powers. Included
in the purchases were long-range bombers that theoretically could fly unescorted to strike
targets with impunity. These new weapons, including the B-17 Flying Fortress, gave the
United States the ability to project American power on distant shores within our own
hemisphere or also abroad. This created a confidence that enemy nations would not
infringe on American sovereignty because any bases built within range of the United
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States would be targeted and destroyed by long-range bombers. In other words, the
deterrence factor of the bombers meant that the United States could weather any military
threat to the Panama Canal Zone, the Caribbean, Puerto Rico and Cuba through the direct
application of force from the air.98 Perhaps the greatest summation of this conviction was
James L.H. Peck’s 1940 book entitled, Armies with Wings, in which the author argued
that “retaliation, or the threat of it, is the best known air raid precaution” and that the new
strategic bombers are “America’s peace insurance. Long may they fly.”99 In an effort to
support this idea of “hemisphere defense,” a balanced approach to bombers and fighters
was required, as were additional air bases outside the continental United States.
In June 1941, the Assistant Secretary of War for Air, Robert A. Lovett oversaw
the reorganization of the USAAC and the Air Force Combat Command into the new
USAAF under the command of General Henry H. “Hap” Arnold. Arnold was an aviator
who was now at the top of the USAAF command structure and reported to the Army
Chief of Staff. This allowed the practitioners of strategic air warfare in the USAAF to
develop the policies and strategies outside of direct Army control. This new structure
would dominate the aerial planning before the American entry into World War II.100 It is
evident that the leadership in the USAAF implemented a strategy that emphasized the
annihilation of industrial targets. If the manufacturing base was targeted along with other
sites that supported the enemy military, the enemy’s “will and capability” to wage war
would be undermined.101 In theory, this plan worked to undermine an enemy’s war
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effort, however, it does not take into consideration many other intangibles such as
civilian morale.
At the request of the Roosevelt administration in July 1941, the command of the
USAAF’s new Air War Plans Division (AWPD) began work on a strategic plan, AWPD1, that was completed just before the attack on Pearl Harbor. The plan was driven by the
growing crisis across the globe, including the invasion of the Soviet Union by Germany,
and represented an amalgamation of strategic air warfare and national defense policies
that were in fact a blueprint for a strategic air campaign against Germany.102 According
to Kenneth Werrell, author of Blankets of Fire: U.S. Bombers over Japan in World War
II, the major focus of AWPD-1 was the destruction of Germany’s “electric power
grid…transportation and oil.” This was to be followed by a bombing campaign aimed
against Berlin, the capital of Germany and the symbol of German power and prestige.
Included within the plan was the destruction of the Luftwaffe’s air bases and means of
production and an underlying belief that the war could be won through strategic
bombing.103 This aerial assault could force a German surrender through the application
of bombs on valuable targets and then allow the American war effort to reallocate against
Japan.104 The total force requirement needed for the implementation of AWPD-1 was
estimated at almost 62,000 aircraft formed into 251 combat groups supported by more
than two million personnel.105 Included in this optimistic plan were 47 groups of B-17
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and B-24 heavy bombers, 24 groups of B-29 and B-32 very heavy bombers, and 44
groups of B-36 very long-range bombers.106
Unfortunately for the Americans, at the time the plan was adopted there were no
very heavy or very long-range bombers in production. It would not be until several years
after World War II ended that the B-36 would finally be produced. With the mass
production of the B-17 Flying Fortress and the B-24 Liberator in place before the
bombing of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the USAAF had the core of the strategic
bombing fleet that would punish Germany and Italy from 1942 until 1945. Yet, the
Flying Fortress and the Liberator would not have the range or bomb capacity to hit the
Japanese home islands until American air bases were secured much closer to Japan. The
long-range Boeing B-29 Superfortress did, and, eventually it became the main battery of
the American assault upon Japan. More than any other weapon or developed during the
war, it was the firebombing of Japan by B-29s that modeled the concept of post-war
strategic nuclear plans and morals.

THE REVOLUTIONARY B-29 SUPERFORTRESS

The term “revolution” has often been overused or misused to describe various
aircraft or weapons that in reality were more evolutionary in performance or capabilities.
As the firearm revolutionized infantry tactics in the Middle Ages or as HMS
Dreadnought altered naval design and strategy in the early twentieth century, the B-29
completely changed air strategist’s ideas of what a bomber could actually accomplish.
The Boeing B-29 was indeed radical in almost every category that gauged aircraft
performance. It was faster, could fly higher, and carry a much heavier bomb load than all
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previous generations of bombers and allowed it to surpass most contemporary World War
II fighters. So successful was the basic design that variations of it remained in USAF
service well into the latter years of the Cold War.107 Later generations of bombers were
designed around jet engines that gave them performance far in excess of the B-29, but
arguably, none ever entered into service with such an incredible advantage over known
enemy defenses as did the Superfortress.108 Its design and construction revolutionized
the aviation industry in the United States as well as the Soviet Union where the B-29 was
reverse engineered into the Tupolev TU-4. Most importantly, the Superfortress would be
the first airborne weapon system that lived up to the prophesies of the air advocates.
With the proper tactics, weapons, and expert crews, the B-29/TU-4 was the first airplane
that could dramatically enforce national policy not only during the waning days of the
Second World War, but in the fledgling years of the Cold War.
The B-29 program began in 1937 and before its first combat missions in 1944,
more than six million man-hours of engineering went into the development of the basic
design.109 Unlike the B-17 or B-24, the Superfortress’ cockpit and crew compartments
were pressurized to allow greater crew comfort and extremely high altitudes. The B-29
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could carry an impressively large bomb load, usually, around twenty thousand pounds
and could deliver it within a range of almost four thousand miles at an altitude of over
thirty five thousand feet. The bombs could be delivered either by visual contact, through
the Norden bombsight, or by radar.110 By any definition, the B-29 was the largest,
fastest, and most technologically advanced four-engine bomber of World War II.
Although it was not designed originally to go to war against Japan, as the USAAF had
only presumed a war with Germany in 1937, the B-29 Superfortess would bring a rain of
ruin upon Japanese cities that was almost unprecedented in modern warfare.
In September 1940, Boeing was ordered to begin construction on a pair of
prototypes that would test the basic B-29 design. After the attack on Pearl Harbor thrust
the United States into the war, contracts for aircraft figuratively exploded in Washington
D.C. Orders for the B-29 were accelerated and in February 1942 Boeing was notified
that two other manufacturers, specifically the Bell Aircraft Corporation and the Glen L.
Martin Company, would be responsible for the production of more than 4,000 B-29s that
were manufactured by the end of the war.111 To coordinate the mass production of the
largest bomber that the United States had made up to this time, a B-29 Liaison
Committee was created with the objective of managing and directing the production of
the Superfortress. In October 1943 the existence of the B-29 was formally acknowledged
to the American press. Eddie Rickenbacker, an American World War One ace and noted
aviation expert, commented that once the B-29 was operational, no nation could “survive
the pounding a fleet of these planes” could deliver. Even more, Hap Arnold stated that
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this new plane would make the B-17s and B-24s “the last of the small bombers.”112 He
later referred to the B-29 as a “battleship of the air” and contended that once they were in
use, “today’s long range will become medium range and today’s heavy bombers will
consequently become light-heavies.”113
The first B-29s had scores of problems to work out although none was more
serious than the engine fires that plagued the Superfortress and threatened the entire
program. Months into the flight-testing program, the second XB-29 took to the skies.
Minutes into the flight, a fire broke out in the number one engine and in spite of the best
efforts of the crew, the fire could not be extinguished. Pieces of metal began to fall off
the aircraft as flames began to eat through the wing spar. Three of the crewmembers
bailed out, however, they were killed when their parachutes did not open in time.
Meanwhile, three miles short of Boeing Field, the XB-29 crashed into a meat packing
plant and killed pilot and the remaining crew in addition to twenty employees of the
plant. This accident put the entire B-29 program in jeopardy.114 LeMay later wrote about
the substantive problems that plagued the B-29 and he lamented that the B-29 “had as
many bugs as the entomological department of the Smithsonian Institution.”115 However,
most of the problems associated with the Superfortress had been worked out before the
first B-29s went into combat.116
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THE EVOLUTION OF AMERCAN STRATEGIC BOMBING PLANS

The Japanese attack on December 7, 1941 changed the direction and speed of the
B-29 program. AWPD-1 was changed in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor to reflect a new
long-range air plan against the three Axis powers. According to the newly developed
AWPD-42, B-29s and B-32s were projected to bomb Germany until the collapse of the
Nazi government. Once that was accomplished, and in conjunction with the capture of
bases closer to Japan, the Very Long Range bombers would be transferred to the Pacific
to strike at Japan.117 Against Japan, the primary directive of AWPD-42 was the
destruction of the Japanese “will to wage war by destroying the war-supporting industries
and the systems upon which the war industries and the civilian economy of Japan
depended.”118 With this objective, AWPD-42 targeted Japanese aircraft engine plants,
submarine yards, command and control centers, as well as steel, chemical, and rubber
factories. Furthermore, the strategic air campaign targeted about one hundred twenty
three objectives to be bombed over a six-month period. B-17s and B-29s would be the
primary aircraft assigned to these missions.119
One problem with AWPD-42 was the lack of a sustained campaign against the
electric power system, transportation facilities, repair centers, sea routes, and railroads.120
It also, along with AWPD-1, did not envision a fundamental role for escort fighters for
bombers.121 The lack of friendly fighters protecting the bombers had created grievous
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problems for the B-17 and the B-24 during their first combat operations over Europe.
German fighters were able to exploit weaknesses in the American bomber formations and
shoot down the attackers at an alarming rate.122 In contrast, the B-29’s performance
created the illusion that the Superfortress would not be as dependent upon escort fighters
during the bombing raids over enemy homelands. There was also an underlying belief
within the command structure of the USAAF that the bombers would always get through.
This core belief in the bomber became well entrenched among American strategists.
Despite the deficiencies of AWPD-42 and the problems associated with the B-29, the
USAAF had, by early 1943, a bomber and a strategic plan. It now needed a weapon that
could destroy the Japanese war effort.
In contrast to the air war against the Axis in Europe where the USAAF publicly
embraced “precision bombing” against specific targets rather than general “area
bombing,” the war against Japan would be radically different. The reality of the air
campaign against Germany had displayed the limitations of precision bombing to the
leadership of the Army Air Force, and its main strategic bombing force, the Eighth Air
Force. In the days before guided munitions, accuracy was measured in hundreds of yards
rather than in inches and all too often, bombs that were aimed at particular targets missed
by wide margins and struck the surrounding areas with high explosive bombs. This
required aircraft to return to the target in an effort to finally minimize its strategic value
or destroy it. The lack of accuracy in precision bombing increased the cost of the
campaign in weapons expended, aircraft losses, and casualties among the airmen. In
contrast to this, Royal Air Force’s Bomber Command had already made the transition to
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area bombing at night in an effort to destroy target areas and reduce allied casualties.
The British also embraced the use of incendiary bombs to burn down the main production
or cultural centers of Germany. In Europe, the Americans were reluctant to embrace this
new strategy and did not appear to be that willing to sacrifice accuracy for expediency.
That attitude changed after the introduction of the Superfortress into combat when greater
results were required to offset the tremendous cost of the B-29 program.

TAKING THE SUPERFORTRESS TO WAR

The unit tasked with bringing the B-29 into the war against Japan was the brand
new Twentieth Air Force, established in April 1944. Unlike other USAAF commands,
the Twentieth was under the direct control of General Henry Arnold at the War
Department rather than at the front. Therefore, overall command of the B-29s and the
strategic air campaign was in the hands of the senior air strategists, and not the theater
commanders including General Douglas MacArthur or Admiral Chester A. Nimitz. This
created a level of autonomy for the Twentieth Air Force that was not allowed in any other
USAAF command.123 The Twentieth was divided into two major units, the XX Bomber
Command based originally in India and China, and the XXI Bomber Command stationed
in the Pacific.124 The XX Bomber Command and its 58th Bomb Wing would introduce
the early B-29 into combat. Many of the problems that had plagued the early B-29s still
had to be worked out, including in-flight engine fires. Yet the war could not wait until
the B-29 and its systems were perfect and, consequently, the early bombing results were
less than stellar. However, Secretary of War Henry Stimson ominously noted that the
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“blow from the air just struck against Japan is the beginning of a new phase of our war in
the Pacific. The new long-range bombers have overcome the tremendous barriers of
distance to bring the heart of Japan under the guns and bombs of the Army Air
Forces.”125
The XX’s B-29s were located on primitive airstrips in China where supplies were
a constant problem because all gasoline, bombs, spare parts, and replacement crews had
to be flown from India to China after a long, dangerous flight over the Himalayas. It was
a logistical nightmare that required additional aircraft to ferry materials into China.126
Despite these difficulties, the Superfortress raids were important to FDR and his overall
strategy for winning the war. The President also saw the raids as having a twofold
purpose: the first to punish Japan and the second, to improve the morale of the Nationalist
Chinese who had been fighting the Japanese since 1937.127 Retribution against the
Japanese might be a tangible goal, however, the success of the latter goal is much harder
to assess.128 More importantly, it was evident that bombing missions originating in China
were hard to sustain and airbases needed to be secured closer to the main American
supply lines that stretched across the Pacific. This was accomplished through the valor of
the American Army, Marines Corps, USAAF and the Navy who liberated islands in the
central Pacific from the Japanese. After extensive work by naval construction battalions,
new air bases capable of operating B-29s were opened on Saipan, Tinian, and Guam in
the Mariana Islands. The B-29s and their crews would garner the press coverage as the
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war progressed, but it was the dedication and sacrifice of the sailors, soldiers and Marines
that made it possible.
While the XX Bomber Command brought the B-29 into the war with strikes
against the Japanese in China as well as some targets on the Home Islands, it would be
the XXI that would become the most famous and feared operators of the Superfortress.
General Haywood Hansell, a long time promoter of precision bombing, and one of the
architects of the strategic air warfare plan, had been given control of the XXI Bomber
Command based in the Mariana Islands, much closer to Japan. Hansell and his staff
wanted to use precision bombing of Japan, but there were problems with this goal
including the weather. Clouds or storms often obscured targets and the high operating
altitude of the B-29 subjected bombers to the previously unknown jet stream. This
wreaked havoc on high explosive bombs that were dropped from over thirty thousand
feet and resulted in collateral damage in adjacent areas that was often far worse than
damage inflicted upon the target. Therefore the first strikes on Japan had caused very
little real damage to Japan’s industrial base and had done very little to inspire fear in the
Japanese because the B-29s were not yet being utilized in an effective manner.129
Despite the setbacks, the B-29s continued to practice precision bombing on
Japanese targets. The goal was to destroy the Japanese fuel supplies that would starve the
Japanese war machine of needed petroleum. British and American carrier-based aircraft
periodically joined the B-29s in strikes on the Japanese mainland during this campaign of
interdiction. However, it was perceptible that precision bombing was not garnering the
necessary results and a new direction in tactics was required.130 There was too much
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invested in the B-29 program for it to have only marginal successes against Japan. It was
the aircraft that the USAAF wanted, their reputation was at stake, and Superfortresses
were under the direction of the airmen in Washington. If they could not achieve dramatic
results with the greatest plane ever produced, how could they possibly make the case for
an independent United States Air Force?
In an effort to increase the pressure and outcome of the bombings, raids were
increased in size and frequency. Targets included the capital of Japan which was bombed
on November 24, 1944 by over one hundred B-29s which attacked Tokyo with little
opposition. Notwithstanding their best efforts to destroy the American bombers, the
Japanese lost five fighters destroyed and nine damaged for one B-29 destroyed and one
damaged.131 It appeared that the Japanese pilots were not aggressive and bombing Tokyo
was, in the words of the lead bombardier Captain Vincent Evans, “like bombing in
Kansas.”132 The B-29s were starting to justify their cost as the most expensive and
highest performing bomber to date, but much better results were still needed.
With the first B-29 strike on Tokyo now recorded, it was up the USAAF and the
press to report and promote what happened and what the results of the raid had been. The
first strike used over 270 tons of ground piercing and incendiary bombs, small by the
standards of the war in Europe, but much larger than had previously been used in the
Pacific War. The main target of the mission was the Nakajima aircraft engine factory in
Tokyo, and the secondary targets were the docks. The USAAF quickly assessed the
results of the raid and was disappointed because only 27 bombers were able to hit the
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primary target and effected only limited physical damage to the engine plant.133 Despite
the limited damage to the targets, the American press coverage resounded with stories of
the success of the mission. George Horne, a reporter for the New York Times wrote that
the air campaign that just started would probably be the last battle of the war against
Japan and “those who have planned it accept the first flights of the B-29’s for what they
are—the first blow.”134 The tone of the statements coming out of USAAF indicated that
they were still practicing precision bombing rather than the more inhumane area
bombing. Lieutenant General Millard Harmon stated to the press that the USAAF now
had all of Japan in “our bombsights now…We want to emphasize that we are not
bombing people. We are bombing the Japanese war machine.”135 Harmon’s comments
reflected the strategic goal of the United States in general and Hap Arnold’s Twentieth
Air Force in particular. They were formally committed to daylight precision strategic
bombing, with the destruction of industry and shipping as the principal function of
existing B-29 raids. Collateral damage to “flimsily built worker’s settlements near the
plants” was to be expected.136

RAZING SHOWA: Burning the Reign of Enlightened Peace

As the conventional B-29 raids increased in tempo, however, it soon became
apparent that the strategy of precision bombing was going to be replaced by the type of
terror bombing that had been soundly condemned when previously done by the Germans
or the Japanese. The decision to change the air campaign to fire bombing reflected a
133
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growing change of direction within the USAAF and its leadership. As early as 1939 a
course offered by the Air Corps Tactical School informed its students that Japanese cities
were extremely vulnerable to fire bombs. Two years later in the aftermath of the Pearl
Harbor attack, George C. Marshall rhetorically threatened to unleash American bombers
to start the Japanese cities on fire.137 Proponents of the change from precision to area
bombing, like General Curtis LeMay, saw the value of firebombing as more than just the
terrorization of the enemy. They believed that if properly executed, the incendiary raids
would compel the Japanese to surrender by destroying the means of production, the
workers, and their will to resist. This could be accomplished at an extremely low cost to
the Americans in lives, machinery, and weapons. It was reported that roughly 1,700 tons
of bombs carefully put on target in the most inflammable areas of Japan could effectively
destroy basic, communal services, disrupt war production by as much as 30%, and would
cause roughly 12 million Japanese in 20 cities to abandon their homes.138 All of this
would accelerate the end of the war on American terms. Once again, strategic bombing
was linked to national goals, but this time the bombing was linked to rapid destruction of
the enemy’s homeland as the quickest avenue to peace on American terms. The strategic
bomber in general, and the B-29 in particular, became the symbol of an expedited victory
and American policy in action.
There was a concern, however, that the Japanese might be able to upset the
bombing by challenging the United States for control of the air over Japan. The first B29 raids had been conducted without American fighter escort because there were no
aircraft with the range to shepherd the B-29s to and from the target. However, if the
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Japanese made a concerted effort to attack the B-29s, the American ability to bomb
unmolested would be compromised. It was not until Allies gained airbases closer to the
Home Islands that the USAAF fighters would get into the battle over Japan. It was
apparent that fighter aircraft from land bases as well as carrier air groups would be
necessary to protect the B-29s as the Japanese gained experience in attacking them.139
These new air bases also allowed the B-29s to carry more bombs instead of additional
fuel and there was the possibility of adding groups of shorter ranged B-17s and B-24s to
join the attack on Japan if they became available or were needed.
American control of the air over Japan and increased numbers of bombers with
greater bomb loads created the path to a rapid victory. In an effort to increase the
pressure on the Japanese government to surrender, the USAAF made the decision to use
firebombs against Japanese cities as they had done to a much smaller degree against the
Germans. Once the Americans made the decision to use incendiary bombs to burn out
the fighting spirit of the Japanese, the link between airpower and American policy was
forged. From 1944 until at least 1991 when Strategic Air Command (SAC) stood down,
the overriding United States goal in a total war was to destroy the heart and soul of an
enemy state by bombing their cities and cultural centers into oblivion. This was a far cry
from the American condemnation of strategic bombing only a few years earlier.
The USAAF had conducted secret tests of incendiary bombs against models of
Japanese urban centers and concluded by October 1943 that Japanese cities burn
extremely well. Fire bombing them could be effective because Japanese industrial targets
were often located in and around residential sections that were more vulnerable to

139

Hanson W. Baldwin, "The Tokyo Raids—II: Fighter Protection for Big Bombers Attacking Japan May
Become Problem," The New York Times, November 28, 1944.

81
extensive fires. Furthermore, it would only take about 2,000 tons of incendiaries to
reduce the production of war materials in the factories and homes of Japan.140 The
concept of firebombing Japan was not a well kept secret and eventually Hanson Baldwin,
a noted military expert for the New York Times, suggested to his readers that Japan was
far more vulnerable to air attacks than Germany had been. It had a densely packed
population base with “concentrated industry, inflammable cities, bottlenecked
communications and dependence on the Asiatic mainland for most raw materials.”141
Between November 1944 and January 1945, the XXI Bomber Command continued to hit
targets across Japan from altitudes around thirty thousand feet and the results were not
spectacular. The New York Times reported on December 14, 1944 that estimates of
serious damage inflicted by the strategic air campaign tended to be overoptimistic and
that the Japanese industrial base would “not be knocked out in a week or a month and
may never be bombed out of operation.”142 Even a raid on the Mitsubishi Aircraft Engine
Works in Nagoya destroyed only the industrial sector of the city but not the production of
crucial war materials as the Japanese moved these efforts underground.143 For the
investment made into the B-29 program, results like these were not sufficient or
definitive enough to justify Arnold’s pet bomber project. In an effort to achieve the
promise of strategic airpower, a decision was made to make General Curtis LeMay, an
expert in strategic air warfare, the field commander of the B-29s. His ascension was the
result of a shift in strategic doctrine and political pressures on the entire B-29 program.144
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He assumed command of the XXI Bomber Command on January 21, 1945 and answered
only to Arnold back in Washington D.C.145 LeMay was one of the most inventive air
strategists of his generation and continued to use the tactics worked out over the previous
months. However, he also began to prepare for a new strategy based on the belief that
Japan was extremely vulnerable to fire and area bombing.
In early 1942, Arnold was briefed by his staff on targets in the Tokyo area that
were “particularly susceptible to fire” which created a schism between those that wanted
to continue precision bombing and those that argued for area bombing.146 While the
traditional proponents of strategic airpower advocated for the continued destruction of the
Japanese heavy industries, those in favor of area bombing contended that targeting the
producers of war material was more beneficial. Airpower advocate Alexander de
Seversky argued that the United States had an opportunity for experimentation on a
“perfectly good ‘guinea pig.’”147 LeMay stated that he had an idea for the
implementation of firebombing. It called for multiple types of incendiaries, including
phosphorus and napalm. These weapons had been extensively tested to determine how
effective they were against Japanese style structures. In addition, the Allies had seen first
hand how effective firebombing had been against the German cities of Hamburg and
Nuremberg in 1943 as well as Dresden in 1945. In the latter attack, official reports
estimated that between 25,000 and 35,000 Germans were killed in the firestorms that
completely destroyed the city and its remaining infrastructure.148
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With these results in hand by early 1945, LeMay’s planners argued that the area
bombing of Japan would be even more effective because the 158 tons of bombs dropped
by the RAF against 31 Germany cities “gave 8.4 percent loss of one year’s production
and dehousing of 5,136,000 persons; 6,000 tons on six Japanese cities is estimated to give
15 percent loss of one year’s production and dehousing of about 9 million persons.”149 If
the old German stone urban centers had burned, the paper cities of Japan would be turned
to ash. In addition to the firebombs themselves, LeMay wanted to bring the B-29s “all
the way down from thirty thousand to about nine or even five thousand.”150 One of the
XXI’s bomb wing commanders, General Thomas Power, argued that the Superfortresses
would need less fuel to fly at a lower altitude, and the weight saved in fuel could be
replaced by bombs.151 Also, bombing at night could minimize the risk to the bombers
and crews by flying at lower altitudes.
The first firebombing mission was flown against Japan was on the night of March
9/10, 1945 when a total of 2,000 tons of bombs were delivered by over 330 B-29s in this
devastating attack on the Japanese capital of Tokyo.152 The first B-29s were armed with
napalm to start the fires, and later aircraft dropped magnesium cluster bombs that would
expand the conflagration. As the bombs fell, an inferno was quickly spread by wind
gusts. Updrafts from the fires rose into the sky to buffet the bombers that were still over
the target area and for two and one half hours, the B-29s ignited so many fires that some
areas were still burning four days later. Many Japanese on the ground were killed from
the fire, smoke inhalation, lack of oxygen or were drowned in rivers and canals as they
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tried to escape the flames.153 After sixty minutes of trying to combat the blaze, the Tokyo
fire department had been decimated. They lost almost 100 fire engines, 128 fire fighters
and 500 civil guards who had attempted to help put out the firestorm.154 It was estimated
that the raids killed more than 100,000, and left a further one million without homes or
shelter.155 Bruce Rae of the New York Times reported the day after the raid that a
“blanket of fire was thrown over an area of fifteen square miles in the heart of Tokyo” by
more than 300 B-29’s “in the largest and most intensified raid on that city to date.”156
Throughout this report and others that followed, there was no moral
condemnation for the firebombing and targeting of civilians. Instead, many press
releases and newspaper accounts praised the actions of the B-29 crews and their aircraft.
Furthermore, the Times editorialized that less than twenty five percent of Tokyo had
actually been burned and history had indicated that it would only take a little time for the
Japanese to reorganize and recover from this loss and that the United States would
“certainly send our flying fleets again and again over Tokyo and Nagoya. These great
cities may become no more than holes in the ground.”157 Another article commented that
the “incendiaries we are scattering by the tens of thousands are burning up not only
Japan’s war material resources but Japanese energy, resolution and hope. All are heavy
losses.”158
The use of firebombing spread quickly to other industrial centers as LeMay stated
that it would continue until the total destruction of the Japanese industrial capacity and
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war effort was achieved. Despite the evidence to the contrary, LeMay argued that
precision bombing had not been abandoned.159 But it had, and the Americans would only
try precision bombing again in good weather or when the supply of incendiaries was
limited. It became clear that LeMay intended to use the B-29s to inflict maximum
damage on the Japanese as rapidly as possible in spite of his claims that the Americans
were not purposely targeting civilians. Unfortunately, the strategic targets that were
being bombed with precision were “concentrated in the urban areas.”160 In other words,
the massive loss of life among the Japanese was euphemistically reduced to terms like
collateral damage. Murmurs of remorse or concern were squelched under the demands
for rapid results and a greater return in the investment of the B-29 program. Simply
destroying the means of production of the Japanese economy did not seem to be the
fastest way to end the war. The USAAF command decided therefore to continue to go
after the heart of that production, the people themselves. This was a major step in the
evolution of airpower as American policy eventually transitioned into the single weapons
system approach that would dominate the formative years of the Cold War.
To keep up the efficiency of the attacks, and expedite a quick surrender, all B-29
combat units were dispatched to Pacific bases and joined in the fire bombing raids. More
ominous for the Japanese, the United States Eighth Air Force, the primary strategic
bombing force in the European Theater, prepared to transfer units to the Pacific in the
summer of 1945. Precedence was placed on the bomb wings of B-17s and B-24s that
were to be transferred from England back to the United States and then on to the Pacific
Theater. By August 1945 two bomb groups of the Eighth had been converted to B-29s
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and were equipped to join the raids against Japan.161 It was estimated that with the Eighth
joining the attacks on Japan sometime in August, the USAAF could double the tonnage
of bombs that had been dropped on Japan to that point, and hasten the end of the war as
Japanese defenses would quickly be overwhelmed.162
The situation for the Japanese could get dramatically worse as the British Royal
Air Force’s (RAF) Bomber Command anticipated the transfer of a large number of Avro
Lancaster bombers, the largest available to the RAF, to participate in the war against
Japan under the code name “Tiger Force.”163 The RAF planned for operations in the
Pacific theater since October 1943 and the commanding officer of Bomber Command, Sir
Arthur Harris, envisioned the development of a larger bomber that would join the
Americans in the aerial assault on Japan. Harris had supported the idea of area bombing
during the air war against Germany, and had no reservations about attacking civilian
targets. An organization staff was put together to begin the plans of sending modified
Lancasters to the Pacific once the war with Germany was completed. However, the war
ended before the RAF could place their first bombs on Japanese soil. 164 If these new
units were added to the raids against Japan, the Allies would soon engulf the skies over
Japan. With so many bombers attacking, the Japanese would not have been able to
disrupt allied control of the air and the remaining Japanese cities would be pummeled
with no avenue for Japanese recourse.
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ATTACKING THE ACHILLES HEEL OF JAPAN

In addition to striking at Japanese war production, American aircraft also targeted
its transportation network. Rail lines were severed after strikes from B-29s, carrier-based
planes, or shellfire from American surface and submarine fleets. Japanese shipping was
being decimated at such a prodigious rate, that of the 6.4 million tons of vessels that
Japan had at the beginning of the war, roughly 4.5 million tons had already been sunk by
the American submarine campaign by the summer of 1945. Attacks on the Japanese
shipping industry meant that it was only able to make up less than half of the losses.165
With more American aircraft coming into the theater on a daily basis, it would be almost
impossible for Japan to maintain even that level of production. The immediate lack of
shipping dramatically impacted food supplies for the military and the civilian population
at home and abroad. American attacks also dramatically disrupted the critical supply of
petroleum as Japanese fuel production was being targeted at its source, as well as the
refineries. Japanese production of other critical materials was further hampered because
many workers were killed and others abandoned their posts because of the fear imposed
by the firebombing.
In an effort to further reduce Japanese war production, the Americans began to
drop leaflets that warned the citizens of a targeted city of their impending doom. The
flyers stated that the United States was not at war with the Japanese people but with their
obstinate government. Since military targets were going to be attacked, it was in the best
interest of residents to vacate the area. General LeMay also felt that this propaganda
caused the Japanese to despair in their war effort once they realized the Japanese armed
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forces could not stop a B-29 raid even when the Americans told them when and where it
was coming. LeMay made it clear to all who would listen that it was his ultimate goal to
end the war as rapidly as possible. If it cost the lives of several hundred thousand, it was
a small price for the millions of lives that would be lost if the war continued. 166

THE BEGINNING OF THE END AND THE RISE OF HARRY S. TRUMAN

By the spring of 1945 it had been determined that the fastest way to defeat Japan
was through firebombing and the interdiction of Japanese supplies on the ocean through
air and naval attacks. These would continue throughout 1945 and would help pave the
way for the final invasion of Japan sometime in the fall of the same year. It was believed
that this course of action would minimize American casualties and maximize the
Japanese vulnerabilities. They also represented the final line of attack on Japan agreed to
by the Roosevelt administration. It now appeared in mid-1945 that it was now only a
matter of time before Japan would be vanquished. Roosevelt, however, would not live to
see the strategic air warfare plan that had evolved since 1941 bring about peace.
Vice-President Harry Truman was meeting with some Senate colleagues on April
12, 1945, when he received an urgent phone call. In a few moments, Truman’s life and
legacy was changed when he heard the words, “Harry, the President is dead.” Truman
later wrote that while he had been concerned about this possibility for weeks, he was
unprepared and a bit overwhelmed.167 Unlike Roosevelt, Truman could not be accused of
being duplicitous with his public statements on the war in general, or the strategic
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bombing campaigns in particular. He was plainspoken to the point of being blunt,
considered himself well read on most subjects, and appeared to be as stunned as anybody
that he was now the President. Truman was extremely confident in his ability to make
decisions that he felt were correct, regardless of popular opinion or political pressure. He
reinvigorated the Cabinet and came to rely on those officials for framing the critical
decisions of his administration with the understanding that his was the final judgment.168
For the time being, it did not appear likely that the new President would make
dramatic alterations to the American wartime strategy. Despite this, he was subjected to
a preview of the post war defense struggles as each of the armed forces attempted to
persuade the incoming President of their approach to win the war and keep the peace in
the aftermath.169 This proved to be a preview of the postwar defense struggles. Truman
spent the first days of his presidency absorbed in familiarizing himself with existing war
plans, international agreements, as well as being briefed on a new type of weapon of
immense power. Specifics about the atomic bomb project were brought to the President’s
attention at later meetings. Of a more immediate concern was the battle for Okinawa that
began eleven days before Roosevelt’s death.
Located roughly 400 miles from Japan, Okinawa became a symbol of increased
Japanese resistance and tenacity the closer that the Allies progressed to the Home
Islands.170 It was apparent to the Americans on the ground and in command that the
Japanese fought, not like a defeated nation whose homeland was under relentless
incendiary attacks, but like an army with nothing to lose. The Japanese fought the
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Americans in creative ways including Kamikaze attacks on American shipping, tactics
that would inflict massive casualties on the numerically superior Americans. They were
also prepared to use civilians as human shields. By dispersing Japanese soldiers among
the civilians it triggered an American response that is estimated to have killed more than
160,000 Okinawans out of an estimated population of 450,000 when the battle began.171
The Japanese military casualties were estimated to have been in excess of 107,000 known
killed and another 27,000 believed to have been buried inside defensive fortifications and
caves. The Americans also took 10,000 Japanese military personnel as prisoner.172 Even
more disturbing, countless civilians committed suicide rather than face an occupation by
the unknown Americans. For the United States, the numbers from Okinawa were
staggering as well. More than 12,000 Americans were killed or were classified as
missing, 50,000 wounded, 32 ships sunk, 368 vessels damaged, and 763 aircraft
destroyed.173 Secretary of War Henry Stimson later maintained that the War Department
believed that the Imperial Japanese forces could still muster over 5 million armed men,
and the United States could still suffer dramatic casualties in a final effort to crush the
Japanese Empire and get to the gates of Japan itself.174
The sobering statistics of the Okinawa campaign reflect one of the greatest flaws
in early strategic air warfare efforts, the inability to translate destruction on the enemy
home front to the defeat of his armies in the field. At the same time that the firebombing
of Japanese cities increased in missions and efficiency, Japanese military forces on
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Okinawa were able to inflict heavier casualties on the Americans than any previous battle
in the Pacific. The Japanese did not surrender because their cities were being destroyed
at an unprecedented level in modern warfare, a violation of the dogma of strategic
bombing advocates. Rather, the garrison at Okinawa fought until it was no longer
feasible for them to continue, and it became obvious to many of the American
commanders that casualties would continue to increase the closer they got to Japan. It
was assumed, therefore, that any operations on the Home Islands would increase
casualties dramatically, and many in the administration believed that it was imperative to
get Soviet cooperation against the Japanese. The Soviets would be able to engage large
numbers of Japanese troops in Asia and prevent their return to Japan.
Against this backdrop, however, Truman took a hard line with Soviet foreign
minister Vyacheslav Molotov when he visited the new President on April 23, 1945. In a
preview of Cold War hostilities, Truman raised concerns regarding the failure of the
Soviets to implement all of agreements from the Yalta conference and he bluntly
informed Molotov that he believed the Soviets had intentionally breached the accords
reached in February 1945. The President wanted these concerns relayed to Soviet
Premier Josef Stalin.175 It is remarkable that Truman took this position at this time
because it was still hoped that the Soviets would assist the Americans in defeating Japan.
There was also hope that the Soviets would consider the possibility of basing B-29s in
Siberia for missions against Japan.176 Perhaps Truman felt that the bombing campaign,
as well as ongoing unrestricted submarine warfare would burn or starve Japan out of the
war before the Soviets would enter. It is clear, however, that Truman did not confront
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Molotov by threatening or using atomic diplomacy because the President had yet to be
fully informed of the bomb and its potential. On April 24, 1945, the day after the
meeting with Molotov, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) canceled all plans to base B-29s on
Soviet territory.177 It is not obvious whether this was a result of the meeting, or the
realization that Siberian bases were no longer necessary to successfully conclude the war.
On April 25, 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff adopted a course of action that
included the use of ground troops in addition to the existing air and naval campaigns to
finally crush Japan. This was a tacit indication that the JCS did not believe that airpower
alone could win the war and that they were willing to risk a potentially catastrophic
ground invasion.178 An assault on the island of Kyushu, 350 miles from Okinawa, was
projected to be the first step in the final defeat of Japan. Islands captured in earlier
campaigns would provide bases for air and naval assets that were to support the invading
forces. Planning continued throughout April for this operation, but there were
considerable disagreements about whether or not an invasion was even necessary. Fleet
Admiral William D. Leahy, the Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, later
acknowledged that the destruction of the Japanese naval and air forces made “early
surrender inevitable,” but he was clearly opposed to an invasion of the Home Islands. In
his memoirs, Leahy stated that in the end, the JCS authorized the planning of the
invasion, but approval of an actual landing was not yet given.179\
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A WEAPON OF UNPRECEDENTED POWER

In another critical step towards the formation of the postwar single weapon
defense plan, the atomic bomb was formally explained to President Truman. Secretary of
War Stimson sent a letter to Truman on April 24, 1945 that requested a time to meet with
the President to discuss a critical top-secret issue. Stimson reminded the President that he
had mentioned this to him shortly after Truman took office, but now it was clear that it
would have “such a bearing on our present foreign relations and has such an important
effect upon all my thinking in this field that I think you ought to know about it without
much further delay.”180 The following day, Stimson and General Leslie R. Groves, the
head of the Manhattan Project, formally briefed Truman on the progress and the impact
of the atomic bomb on the current war as well as in the future. They presented the bomb
as another weapon to be expended in the war, and did not question whether or not it
should even be used. The President was also informed that nuclear weapons would also
impact postwar diplomacy and there would also be pressure to have some form of
international control of the bomb.181 Truman later wrote that the information given to
him had indicated that atomic bombs could shorten the war but it would involve “wiping
out entire cities and killing people on an unprecedented scale.” The impact on Truman
was unmistakable. He commented to others that he would “have to make a decision
which no man in history has ever made” and it was terrifying to consider that he was the
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one who would ultimately make the horrific choice.182 His conclusion ultimately placed
a higher importance on preventing American casualties than on preserving Japanese lives.
Stimson also recommended to Truman that the President put an advisory
committee together to consider how the bomb would be used, and what were the longterm ramifications of its use.183 This Interim Committee met for the first time in May
1945, and was chaired by Stimson. All relevant information and requests would be
relayed through Stimson’s office directly to Truman.184 Joining the Secretary of War on
this committee was the Undersecretary of the Navy Ralph Bard, the Director of the
Office of Scientific Research and Development, Dr. Vannevar Bush, Truman’s
representative James F. Byrnes, Assistant Secretary of State, William L. Clayton, Chief
of the Office of Field Service Dr. Karl T. Compton, Chairman of the National Defense
Research Committee Dr. James B. Conant, and the alternate chairman, George L.
Harrison, who was also Stimson’s special consultant.185
The committee was presented with an introductory explanation to the specificity
of their role concerning the bomb, existing international agreements, and wartime control,
and what the President would officially declare about the project once the bomb was
revealed. It was also tasked with looking at post-war research and development of
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atomic power.186 The committee also discussed the creation of three specific panels. A
Scientific Panel was agreed to on May 14, 1945 and was tasked with providing feedback
on the technical aspects of the bomb as well as to “present the Committee their views
concerning the political aspects of the problem.” Members of the panel included Dr. J.
Robert Oppenheimer and Dr. Enrico Fermi, two of the masterminds behind the bomb. A
Military Panel was debated and it was agreed that input from the top echelons of the
military, including Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall and Fleet Admiral
Ernest J. King, would be essential to the decision to use the bomb. An Industrial Panel
was also discussed, but it was not created at that time.187
Over the next several months the Interim Committee discussed the use of the
bomb, as well as the implications it would have on American diplomacy, vis-à-vis the
Soviet Union. Some consideration was given to how information about a test of the first
weapon would be presented to the President and how he would relay the information to
the Allies. On June 26, 1945 the Interim Committee recommended that the news about a
test of the bomb should be accessible to Truman at the Potsdam Conference and it was
expected that the weapon would be used against Japan. More importantly, the committee
felt that Truman should not entertain consideration about international control of the
weapon at present.188 It was recommended that the bomb be used without warning to
maximize the impact and to display its overwhelming power and any other course would
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compromise the American goal of unconditional surrender. The suggestion was made
that the bomb was “likely to bring an end to the war” and “we see no acceptable
alternative to direct military use.189
As the Interim Committee was examining the role of the atomic bomb, Secretary
of War Henry Stimson still oversaw the continued bombing of Japan throughout the early
summer 1945. Stimson had previously been an outspoken critic of the terror bombing of
civilians, and had been concerned about how this would affect America’s image in the
postwar world. With that in mind he met with Truman again in June 1945, and reminded
the President that he had always demanded precision bombing of targets in populated
areas, however, now some in the USAAF had informed the Secretary of War that
bombing for accuracy was no longer possible. The Japanese had successfully scattered
their war production among the houses of their workers and that the American incendiary
bombing campaign could match the Nazis in atrocities committed if not restrained.
Stimson also suggested that if the firebomb raids were completely successful and the vast
majority of Japanese cities were reduced to ash heaps, there would be no accurate gauge
to assess the impact of the atomic bomb.190
His recommendation to use the bomb was also based on his concern that the
American home front might grow weary of the war and that would have a negative
impact on the ability of the War Department to successfully finish the war. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff were also concerned about the potential unrest in the United States about
the length of the war or the realization that throughout history, the Japanese had never
capitulated in a war. There was general agreement and hope that the war could be
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brought to a quick end without undue American casualties. By mid summer 1945, it was
apparent that the war could end because of several scenarios. These included the United
States destroying scores of cities through firebombs or through a single bomb, starvation
of the native population through a naval blockade, or finally, a bloody invasion.
Arguably, the priority for Truman and the military was the preservation of American lives
and as such, enemy fatalities were not as much of a concern.191
After looking at the options, Stimson echoed those who advocated using the
atomic bomb against Japan because it could compel Emperor Hirohito to accept
unconditional surrender and enforce it over his armed forces and his people. Hirohito, as
a political and spiritual deity, was essential to the framing of a long-term peace, and he
was the only one who could push Japan towards a final capitulation. Stimson further
contended that the bomb was the unique instrument that could accomplish the goal of
ending the war as soon as possible. Most importantly, this would end hostilities with the
“least possible cost in the lives of the men in the armies which I had helped to raise.”
Finally, Stimson came to the conclusion that “no man, in our position and subject to our
responsibilities, holding in his hands a weapon of such possibilities for accomplishing
this purpose and saving those lives, could have failed to use it and thereafter looked his
countrymen in the face.”192 After listening to many in the military and scientific
community, Stimson’s Interim Committee recommended using the bomb as soon as
possible, without an advanced warning.
There was some level of resistance from within the Manhattan Project itself about
the use of the bomb, as a number of resistors within the program argued that the bomb
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had been created on the order of President Franklin Roosevelt to use against Germany,
not Japan. Moreover, it was apparent to some that despite the very heavy casualties
inflicted upon the Americans at Iwo Jima in February 1945, and Okinawa the following
April that the Japanese were already on the verge of defeat, so its use would be
considered superfluous. They argued that there were other options besides the bomb or
direct invasion including negotiations with Japan, and that use of the bomb could trigger
an arms race with the Soviet Union that would destroy the peace that had been so
painstakingly attained during the war.193 Yet Truman made the decision to use the bomb
because of his understanding that its use could prevent the continuation of the war, stop
the incendiary attacks, and lift the blockade that was destroying Japan.194 The question
that remains is, why not warn the Japanese of the bomb and its consequences? James
Byrnes, Truman’s pick to replace Edward R. Stettinius as Secretary of State, was a
member of the Interim Committee and argued after the war what could have happened if
a warning had been given.195 It would have been possible for the Japanese to use
American and allied prisoners of war as human shields to protect their cities knowing that
Truman would be reluctant to authorize a strike that would kill scores of Americans. If a
test bomb were detonated with Japanese representatives present, they might not be
convinced that it was fully weaponized and capable of being dropped from a B-29 or
even worse, the bomb might misfire, and convince them that the Americans were bluffing
about the atomic bomb. This would encourage them to disregard any American threats in
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the future and continue to fight on indefinitely.196 For the Truman administration, this
could be a worst-case scenario, a weapon that did not work and a hollow threat that cost
billions to produce. If the bomb was dropped without warning and did not work, it
might make a big hole in the ground, but the only ones who would have known about it
were the Americans.
Throughout the spring and summer months of 1945, Truman attempted to
maintain the American policy that was in place since the Atlantic Charter of 1941, the
defeat of Germany first, and then Japan. Truman was also obligated to follow what had
been the overriding goal for both major theaters since the Casablanca conference January
1943. At the conclusion of that summit, Truman’s predecessor Franklin D. Roosevelt
announced that the war would not end until unconditional surrender of the Axis powers
had been achieved. This did not “mean the destruction of the population of Germany,
Italy, or Japan” but did mean the destruction of the philosophies that drove those nations
to aggressive war. 197 Notwithstanding Truman’s commitment to following FDR’s war
policies, there was considerable debate in the War, Navy and State Departments about the
feasibility of unconditional surrender. Several prominent Americans disagreed with
Roosevelt and Truman about this demand because they feared it would cause the
Japanese to fight to the bitter end. This could close off any discussion of a negotiated
settlement that would prevent a bloody invasion of Japan.198 Secretary of the Navy
James V. Forrestal believed that a completely prostrate Germany and Japan would benefit

196

Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, 261.
Frank Freidel, Franklin Roosevelt: A Rendezvous with Destiny (Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
1990), 463.
198
McCoy Donald R., The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, American Presidency Series, ed. Donald R.
McCoy, Clifford S. Griffin and Homer E. Socolofsky (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1984), 22.

197

100
fledgling Soviet international domination.199 Truman was not oblivious of these
concerns, but he would not abandon the goal he inherited from Roosevelt. This would
cause Truman to permanently link American strategic air warfare with its national policy
of unconditional surrender. The application of airpower as policy to achieve this goal in
total war would become the foundation of American postwar strategy.

THE DEMAND FOR UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER

Unconditional surrender of Japan was the overriding goal of the Truman
administration during the waning weeks of July 1945. The continued firebombing of
Japanese urban centers was directly linked to the goal of expediting an end of the war and
pushing the Japanese government to accept capitulation on American terms. This did not
mirror Roosevelt’s original public statements about sparing the populace from
annihilation. Instead, it reflected what many within the American civilian and military
command came to see as a reality of modern warfare. The civilian population of any
nation was considered to be a legitimate target to be destroyed in order to win a war.
Therefore, Truman authorized raids against non-military targets spread across Japan
including a further 33 cities that were considered to be vulnerable to firebombing.200 But
there was growing concern within the administration about the obliteration of Japanese
cities and the brutalities inflicted upon the Japanese. Truman was advised that with the
increases in American casualties the closer the Americans came to Japan, many more
could be expected with an assault on Japan itself and that the Americans could expect
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about a million casualties.201 It must be noted that this did not necessarily mean a million
fatalities, but it was still a daunting figure. There is considerable historical debate about
how many casualties were actually predicted, however, regardless of the number, Truman
made it clear that his first priority was with the American military personnel who were
scheduled to embark on an invasion of Japan in late 1945.
The potential losses had to weigh on Truman’s mind in July 1945 as he prepared
to head to Europe for the Potsdam Conference, the last wartime meeting of the Big Three.
The evidence that was presented allowed Truman to come to the conclusion that the only
option that remained to end the war on American terms was to use the atomic bomb. The
decision was contingent upon a successful test of the bomb that was scheduled to take
place while Truman was in Germany. If it worked, the atomic bomb would strengthen
the American bargaining position with the other Allies as Truman sought a way to end
the war.202 On the way, the President was informed that U.S. intelligence had intercepted
a plea from the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow to the Soviet government. The
Japanese, who now stood alone, were open to the idea of ending the war, but not on the
principles of unconditional surrender, and the Ambassador hoped that the Soviets would
be willing to mediate a solution with the United States. The Soviets, however, would not
reciprocate and the Japanese government in Tokyo indicated that they would continue to
fight on.203
Upon his arrival in Berlin, Truman briefly addressed the press, and stated that the
United States had gone to war with every intention of creating a lasting peace free from
the hatred and recrimination that had followed the last World War. In a discourse that
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lasted just under two minutes, Truman stated that the people of the United States longed
for a world in which “all people will have the opportunity to enjoy the good things of life,
and not just the few at the top. Let us not forget that we are fighting for peace and for the
welfare of mankind. We are not fighting for conquest . . . We want peace and prosperity
for the world as a whole.”204 Some wondered if the President would pursue peace at any
price, and the end of the war be expedited to that objective, or if he was prepared to see
the war end on his terms to create that lasting peace. It was reported in the press that the
destiny of Truman and the other allied leaders was to keep the peace because the
“alternative is staring them in the face here in Berlin.”205
Truman surveyed the wreckage of the capital of Germany and to some he
personified the noble ideals and principles that had propelled the Americans from their
isolationist past to the verge of an internationalist future. It was a long way from
Independence, Missouri, to Potsdam, and of all the Americans who traveled with him,
none represented the indomitable spirit of Middle America better than Truman. The last
time he had been to Europe was as an artillery captain in the Missouri National Guard
after his unit had been activated into the American Expeditionary Force. Truman was
one of the millions of Americans mobilized to make the world safe for democracy, and he
had seen war and destruction first hand, and did not relish the perpetuation of the current
war any longer than necessary. He also understood how ending the Great War
prematurely had created the dynamics that allowed Adolf Hitler to assume dictatorial
control of Germany by 1933, and so it was incumbent upon the American delegation to
present the goal of unconditional surrender of Japan as part of the greater war effort and
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the best avenue towards long-term peace. It was also clear that Truman wanted the war
to end before he had to take drastic measures, and he also hoped the Japanese would
surrender quickly. If this were the case, Truman could prevent the Soviets from playing a
large part in the final defeat of Japan, and making territorial or other reparations claims at
the expense of the Japanese. This would also give the United States a greater role and
responsibility in the occupation and restructuring of postwar Japan. All of this was
contingent on Japan agreeing to cease hostilities.206
The issue of unconditional surrender was discussed with the British during a
meeting of the Combined Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral William D. Leahy, the Chief of
Staff to the Commander in Chief, later wrote that it was advisable to let the Japanese
know that unconditional surrender did not necessarily mean the complete destruction of
their government or the emperor. It was even hoped that eventually Hirohito would
understand this and agree in order to prevent a great loss of life for both the Japanese and
the Americans.207 It was evident to the Allied command that the attacks on the Japanese
were wearing them down, and, that the end of the Japanese military was forecast with
mathematical certainty. In the political arena, it was less certain that the Japanese
government was willing to bow to the demand for unconditional surrender.208
After consultation with the Allies at Potsdam, Truman again articulated the terms
of surrender for Japan. The peace terms did not mention the possibility of the atomic
bomb or Soviet intervention on the Allies’ behalf, but it did make it clear that there was
no intent to enslave the Japanese or destroy Japan after the surrender.209 On July 21,
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1945, an Allied radio broadcast clearly stated the Allied demands to the Imperial
government. The spokesman who presented the requirement on behalf of the United
States was an expert on the Japanese, USN Captain E.M. Zacharias. He stated that the
options for Japan were: accept the terms of unconditional surrender “with it attendant
benefits as laid down by the Atlantic Charter” or face “the virtual destruction of Japan
followed by a dictated peace.” The United States was running out of patience, and was
prepared to hold the Japanese leaders “responsible for the criminal prolongation of the
war.” Joseph C. Grew, former US ambassador to Japan and the Acting Secretary of State
also warned that there would be no modification of unconditional surrender demand but
President Truman may redefine American objectives in the Pacific Theater at the expense
of the Japanese.210
Already expecting an allied invasion within months and suffering from the
firebombing campaign, the obstinate Japanese government continued to spurn the efforts
of the Americans to force the capitulation of Japan. Word continued to filter back to the
United States that Japan would never accept unconditional surrender and that the only
way the war would end would be through a ground war fought on Japanese soil. In a
broadcast that was made over the air in Tokyo and intercepted by the Americans in June
1945, the announcer contended that “I do not know what course the people of Germany
may take, but as for us, the Japanese people, there is no choice but to take death” and the
final battle had just begun. The Japanese were willing to fight across the home islands
after making the Americans bleed all across the Pacific. Finally, in another broadcast, it
was assumed that the Americans would attack after a period of bombing that would give
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the Japanese “time—precious time—to prepare for the decisive battle.”211 On July 21,
1945, Kusuo Oya, a commentator on the Japanese Broadcasting Company declared that
he believed that Truman would be forced to modify his position on unconditional
surrender because of the pressure applied by the American people. He added the Soviets
were not about to enter the war against Japan, and the British were looking for a way out
of the war that made Truman’s position untenable.212
Clearly, it appeared that it would take a cataclysmic event to force a change in the
Japanese position and end the war. It would be the dropping of the atomic bombs that
appeared to trigger the desired response from the Japanese. Subsequently, the United
States became devoted to the idea of atomic warfare and the intrinsic belief in its efficacy
to win all wars.
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CHAPTER TWO
STRATEGIC BOMBING AS NATIONAL POLICY IN THE ATOMIC AGE

The decision to use the atomic bomb was a decision that brought death to over a hundred
thousand Japanese . . . But this deliberate, premeditated destruction was our least
abhorrent choice. Secretary of War Henry Lewis Stimson
If they do not now accept our terms, they may expect a rain of ruin from the air, the like
of which has never been seen before on this earth. President Harry S. Truman

The decision to drop the atomic bomb on Japan has been endlessly debated since
the moment that it was announced to the world. Critics of President Harry Truman
suggest that because the atomic bomb was used after many considered the Japanese to be
already beaten, therefore, vengeance or racial prejudice was the prime motivation for its
use.213 Another contention is that Truman faced incredible pressure from the military to
use the bomb to ward off Soviet interest in the region and/or to justify the cost of the
Manhattan Project. It has also been argued that the nuclear attacks were viewed as an
extension of the existing firebomb raids that were already killing thousands of Japanese
on a regular basis. The impact of that cannot be underestimated even as the Americans
attempted to assuage the severity of it. It was rationalized that firebombing had become
an accepted and proven tactic and the tens of thousands of lives lost were not out of scale
with other major sieges or urban ground fighting that had taken place during the Second
World War.214
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In the end, we will never know for certain the real reason why Truman allowed
the bomb to be dropped. We do know that he claimed that he never regretted the decision
to use the bomb. As evidence, within 48 hours of the bombing of Nagasaki, Truman
responded to strong criticism from the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in
America, who had characterized the bombing as an “extremely dangerous precedent” and
indiscriminate. In his rebuttal, Truman contended that he was more distressed by the
delivery of the atomic bombs than anybody, however, he was also “greatly disturbed over
the unwarranted attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor and their murder of our prisoners
of war.” The President concluded by stating that when “you have to deal with a beast
you have to treat him as a beast. It is most regrettable but nevertheless true.”215 In a
message to Congress two months after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Truman
stated that he believed that the bomb had shortened the war and saved the lives of “untold
thousands of American and Allied soldiers who would have otherwise have been killed in
battle.”216 But this did not mean that Truman relished this role. In a letter to Senator
Richard Russell of Georgia, the President wrote that the Japanese were cruel and barbaric
in warfare, however, that did not mean that the United States should adopt the same
approach to war. Truman lamented “the necessity of wiping out whole populations” of
Japanese, however, he placed the blame squarely in the lap of the government who
refused to surrender. Truman reminded Russell that his “objective was to save as many
American lives as possible but I also have a humane feeling for the women and children
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in Japan.”217 Even as late as 1958 Truman was criticized by the City Council of
Hiroshima for his lack of public remorse for the decision to drop the bomb as well as his
support for the hydrogen bomb project. The former President replied it was the Japanese
who instigated the war and that “thousands of young American sailors and civilians were
killed in this unwarranted and unheralded attack” which brought animosity between the
two nations. He also made it clear that the Japanese had rebutted the ultimatum to
surrender with a “very curt and discourteous reply” and in the end, the sacrifice of
“Hiroshima and Nagasaki was urgent and necessary for the prospective welfare of both
Japan and the Allies.”218
If we cannot know for certain why Truman authorized the atomic strikes, perhaps
there should be a greater focus on how it was used and what was its result. After all, a
generation of strategic bombing proponents would claim that the bombs ended the war.
If nuclear weapons could crush the will to resist in a “fanatical” nation like Japan, how
much more likely was it that other nations, like the Soviet Union, would collapse under
the weight of the atomic bomb? It is further alleged that the atomic bombs killed fewer
people than the ongoing incendiary raids and despite the horrific implications of radiation
poisoning; it was merely a more powerful bomb rather than a revolutionary weapon now
in the arsenal of democracy. Far more had died in the conventional incendiary raids than
the two atomic bomb strikes. More cities were destroyed by non-nuclear B-29s and it
appeared that the United States had the ability to destroy Japan one bomb at a time or
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through thousands of bombs at one time. It was now accepted that the atomic bombs
were the ultimate expression of American power linked to its national wartime policy.
It was apparent that the atomic bomb represented a world-shattering step in
weaponry, capability, and intimidation. Not only was it the definitive weapon of the type
of Armageddon envisioned by airpower pioneers dating back to the 1920s, but it was also
the type of weapon that on its own could be used to coerce enemy nations to comply with
political goals or initiatives. Their use required several committees and Presidential
approval to determine how, when and where they would be used as Japanese targets were
becoming extremely scarce in the fading days of July 1945. It was hoped that through
the massive, instantaneous destruction of a city, the morale of the Japanese would
collapse and they would be obliged to surrender. Moreover it was presumed that the use
of the bomb would not interfere with existing air, ground, or naval operations that
continued to grind down the Japanese war effort.219 General Henry “Hap” Arnold was
one of the few in the USAAF who was opposed to the growing pressures to use the
atomic bomb because he believed that the use of the bomb, or even an invasion of Japan,
was excessive. Arnold assumed that General Curtis LeMay’s B-29s were in the process
of burning the Japanese out of the war and all he needed was more time. This was
morally justified because many believed that it would end the war on American terms.220
Yet, the question remains, why did the United States, a nation that had
condemned indiscriminate bombing in the past, become a practitioner of it by 1945?
Perhaps this answer can be seen in the complexity of the positions taken by Secretary of
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War Henry Stimson. He had struggled with the acceptance of indiscriminate
firebombing. Still, he rationalized it as a form of precision bombing against legitimate
military and political targets. He also accepted it because the goal of the war was a total
victory, and this outweighed his personal revulsion toward such tactics.221 In other
words, those tactics were expedient. In times of peace, it is very easy to denounce
actions that were not vital for American national security. When Spain, China, or
England was being bombed, it did not directly affect American national interests. After
Pearl Harbor, the United States had fought a long war to get close enough to Japan to
attack it. The strategic air campaign did not appear initially to either weaken Japanese
morale, or their industrial capacity. Therefore a new strategy had to be put in place to
quickly bring about an end to the war. The answer was a fire bombing campaign that
targeted the Japanese people themselves, in addition to the war production centers of
Japan. It would be this strategy that would pave the way for the implementation of
nuclear weapons in the American arsenal and strategy after the war even though there
was ample evidence, in the form of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, that the
Japanese did not surrender solely because of the firebombing or atomic bombs.
The razing of Japan also helped to establish the belief in the supremacy of the
bomber. This helped create a need for newer and larger bombers with greater combat
ranges, and eventually an independent United States Air Force. The war with Japan
marked a critical change in the use of airpower and the role of civilians as a legitimate
target in a total war. It was estimated that more than 330,000 civilians were killed in
Japan, the vast majority a result of the incendiary attacks, in a war that came to view
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civilians as important to an enemy’s war machine as oil, electricity, ships, or even rifles.
Clearly, the post-war American strategic planning was built upon the ashes of Japan and
the complete belief in the efficacy of atomic weapons to bring about an American victory
in any war, against any enemy. Therefore, the future would require new aircraft to
release the bombs and in those heady days of the mid-1940s, the USAAF and the Navy
saw their respective service as the one most capable of delivering nuclear ordinance. It
became more than just a fight for funding, but a true belief in the theory of atomic
warfare.

THE ANOMALY OF HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI

One critical aspect of the atomic strikes that is extremely important to understand
is that they had only limited connection to the previous conventional military actions
against Japan. This does not mean that LeMay did not attempt to bring the bomb under
the control of his command. Previously he endeavored to have the atomic bomb and the
crews that trained to deliver it brought directly under his control, but was unsuccessful.222
Instead, the atomic missions remained unique in their operational planning and execution
and were the ultimate expression of strategic bombing. They had the ability to destroy
whole cities in a single attack without exposing thousands of American airmen to the
risks of aerial combat. In post war nuclear planning, these types of missions would
become the norm.
Inside the bowels of the Manhattan Project lurked the Target Committee that
made many of the key recommendations about where the bomb was to be used. The
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committee was briefed on the types of bombs that were in production and the expected
differences in results.223 Their primary responsibility was to determine which cities were
to be bombed and they ultimately recommended that the bomb should be used where it
would capitalize on the psychological impact of the new type of explosion. It was
expected that the detonation would be “spectacular for the importance of the weapon to
be internationally recognized” once the details were released. It was further established
that the bomb should be targeted against a military objective that was located “in a much
larger area subject to blast damage in order to avoid undue risks of the weapon being
lost” because of a “bad placing of the bomb.” Shockingly, there was serious discussion
about following up the atomic strikes with incendiary bombs because the impact would
be greater because the Japanese firefighting capacity would be severed. Eventually this
was ruled out because time was needed to determine the full impact of the atomic strike
and the follow-up incendiary strike was to be avoided.224
A special unit, the 509th Composite Squadron had trained exclusively for nuclear
delivery and conducted the atomic bomb missions in August 1945. The B-29s used by
the 509th were specially adapted to carry the large size of the atomic bomb. Under the
program named Silverplate, an estimated $76 million was spent to convert 46 standard B29s into nuclear bombers and to provide crew training and logistical support.225 The
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modifications included removing defensive turrets to lighten the airframe, special
propellers to keep the troublesome engines from overheating, fuel injection, and
alterations to the bomb bay that allowed both types of atomic bombs to be carried. This
made these specific B-29s the only aircraft in the world that had the ability to carry out
nuclear attacks for the next several years.226 The 509th developed the tactics for dropping
the bomb beginning in September 1944 and had begun practice missions over Japan in
July 1945. These sorties familiarized the crews with the weather over Japan, and
arguably, lulled the Japanese into complacency about these small raids.227
General Henry “Hap” Arnold was informed of the four main Japanese targets for
the atomic bomb on July 24, 1945. In a memo about the “Groves Project,” Arnold read
that the first bomb was scheduled to be dropped on “the first day of good weather”
between August 1 and 10, 1945, and the first target on the list was Hiroshima. It was a
city with a population estimated at 350,000, was considered to be a major hub of Imperial
Army activity, and it had many industries, minor shipyards, and was considered a port of
entry into the Home Islands. Nagasaki, population 210,000 was also chosen because it
was important to shipping and industry on the island of Kyushu. Kokura was targeted
because it had substantive army supplies, armories, and the greatest concentration of
railroad shops on the island. The final city on the list was Niigata, a major supplier of
diesel engines and machine tools and was considered a major seaport. All four cities also
were considered to be havens for “key Japanese industrialists and political figures who
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have sought refuge from major destroyed cities.”228 One other city had been considered,
the old capital of Kyoto, but Secretary of War Stimson, with Truman’s approval,
removed the latter from the target list because its value to the heritage of Japan
superseded its importance as a military target.229
The following day, General Carl Spaatz, Commanding General of the United
States Army Strategic Air Forces was ordered to get the bomb operationally deployed.
Spaatz had come to the Pacific after commanding strategic bombing operations in
Europe, where he had attempted to keep precision bombing as the chief American air
mission. These types of daylight raids, however, might have produced greater results, but
exposed Spaatz’s forces to tremendous losses. Spaatz insisted that the American
bombers used legitimate targets as their objective, and understood that there would be
collateral damage to outlying areas. He maintained that the damage was justified in the
context of the greater war and not an attempt by the Americans to use the same terror
bombing that had been condemned at the beginning of the war.230 Upon his arrival in the
Pacific, after a brief stop in Washington, Spaatz assumed overall command of the
Strategic Air Forces in the theater. Curtis LeMay was also promoted at this time to be his
chief of staff.
Spaatz was disturbed about the escalating destruction that was burning Japan to
the ground, yet he had been ordered to keep up the pressure on the Japanese until they
surrendered. Spaatz supposed that the Japanese had two courses of action, surrender
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quickly or pursue a policy of national suicide. Truman would not allow any suspension
in the campaign that would be misinterpreted as a change in American strategy because
strategic bombing was still the national policy.231

DROPPING THE BOMB

On August 6, 1945, the bombing of Japan took a dramatic and revolutionary step
after months of planning, development, and scientific discovery culminated in a new era.
The atomic age was ushered in at 9:15 AM with the flashing of a brilliant light that was
the ultimate expression of the American effort to end the war. It was evident to anyone
who saw the mushroom cloud that was visible more that 360 miles away from Hiroshima
that the choice remaining for the Japanese was between unconditional surrender and
annihilation.232 The use of the bomb was, of course, a calculated risk because there was
the possibility that it could steel the resolve of the Japanese against the new technology,
and make them more unified behind the emperor than before. The bomb could also have
led to the outcries by America’s allies of excessive force or brutality against a defeated
foe. It could also be the definitive blow to finally end the war.
The explosive power of the bomb practically leveled the built-up areas of
Hiroshima and spawned a firestorm in the aftermath that consumed considerable portions
of the city and caught large numbers of civilians. Because of the relatively flat area of
Hiroshima, and a massive influx of air in the aftermath of the bomb, the fires spread to a
maximum velocity between 30 and 40 miles per hour. The firestorm burned out an area
about 4.4 square miles killing an estimated 70,000 to 80,000. This single bomb
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approximated the destruction of the March firebombing of Tokyo that had ruined at least
16 square miles, and killed roughly the same amount of the inhabitants of the capital
city.233 The atomic blast also completely destroyed the ability of the citizens of
Hiroshima to combat the fires or deal with the casualties. Roughly 30% of the
inhabitants were killed outright, while another 30% were seriously injured. As the
conflagration swept through the remains of the city, many people fled to outlying areas in
an attempt to survive and find food and shelter. Within 24 hours of the blast, people
began to return to the city in an effort to find survivors and this forced the Japanese
authorities to restrict those entering the remains of the city.234 President Truman was
notified aboard USS Augusta on the return trip from the Potsdam Conference, and he told
those around him that this “was the greatest thing in history.”235 Secretary of War Henry
Stimson also informed the President that early indications were that the bomb had
worked better than expected; the results yielded appeared to exceed those of the bomb
tested back in July, and, there had been no enemy resistance or anti-aircraft fire. The
results were evidently “greater than any test,” and the condition within the B-29 after the
explosion was normal.236 As further information became available, the President felt
confident that its use would indeed accelerate the end of the war.237
Truman held a brief press conference aboard the ship and authorized the release
of the statement that had been revised over the previous months. Fleet Admiral William
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Leahy, traveling with the President’s entourage, later argued that the use of the bomb and
its consequences had weighed on the minds of those who knew of its imminent use.
When a reporter asked Leahy if the atomic bomb would revolutionize warfare, he
ominously replied that “defensive ordnance had always been developed to meet new
offensive weapons” and the “threat of this new bomb would be met as other threats had
been in the past.”238 The formal announcement that came through the White House press
release in which Truman took the opportunity to again reiterate the American goal of
unconditional surrender, and stated that the bomb was dropped because the Japanese
government rejected the Potsdam Declaration.239 In a very clear warning about future
bombings, the President stated that the United States was “now prepared to obliterate
more rapidly and completely every productive enterprise the Japanese have above ground
in any city. We shall destroy their docks, their factories, and their communications. Let
there be no mistake; we shall completely destroy Japan’s power to make war.”240
Secretary of War Stimson added that the atomic bomb “should prove a tremendous aid in
the shortening of the war” which many understood to be an extreme understatement.241
American propaganda leaflets were also dropped upon Japan in the aftermath of
the first atomic mission that stated the intransigence of the Japanese government caused
“two momentous events” to occur. The first was the Soviet declaration of war that was
relayed to the government via the Japanese ambassador to the Soviet Union that meant
that Japan was now standing alone against the two most powerful nations in the world.
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The second event was the virtual destruction of Hiroshima by a single bomber. What had
taken 2000 B-29s in the past could now be accomplished in a single sortie. The leaflet
encouraged the people of Japan to petition the Emperor to end the war before another
bomb was used. The final warning was clear, “Act at once or we shall resolutely employ
this bomb and all our other superior weapons to promptly and forcefully end the war.
EVACUATE YOUR CITIES.”242 Another leaflet was also dropped which stated that the
United States was in possession of the most powerful bomb “ever devised by man” and
we “have just begun to use this weapon against your homeland.” It also mentioned that
once the Japanese had surrendered, they “could begin the work of building a new, better,
and peace-loving Japan.”243
Nagasaki was almost as ill prepared for an atomic bomb as had been Hiroshima
days earlier. Few details had reached the city before the second bomb was dropped, and
it is estimated that only about 400 people had sought shelter in the city’s tunnel shelters.
The area immediately below the bomb’s detonation was effectively destroyed, but a
firestorm did not develop in Nagasaki because of the relatively uneven terrain on which
the city was built. The area of destruction was much less than the first bomb as only
about 1.8 square miles was destroyed, and the numbers of casualties numbered between
35,000 and 40,000.244 Medical facilities in Nagasaki were particularly hard hit as more
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than 80% of the hospital beds as well as a medical college were located in close
proximity to ground zero. However, it should be noted that despite the damage to the
city, shipping was virtually unaffected by the bomb. Railroad transportation into and out
of the city was disrupted for approximately two days while repairs were made.245
Truman later wrote that the three days between atomic strikes was time granted to
the Japanese government to agree to end hostilities. When no formal movement in that
direction was offered, the second attack was unleashed. Truman believed that this final
nuclear bomb “apparently threw Tokyo into a panic, for the next morning brought the
first indication that the Japanese Empire was ready to surrender.”246 The following
morning, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal recorded in his diary that the Japanese
had indeed indicated that they were ready to conditionally accept the terms of surrender
that were issued at Potsdam. The Truman administration felt that it was in the best
interest of the American war effort to wait until they received the surrender from Japan
before they addressed whether or not it fully complied with the unconditional surrender
demands that had been in place since late July. Secretary of War Stimson suggested that
the bombing campaigns be suspended for fear of a backlash at home as well as among the
defeated Japanese. Forrestal reminded his colleagues that the United States alone would
bear the brunt of Japanese hatred and animosity during occupation and therefore he also
supported an end to the bombing. President Truman disagreed, however, and wanted to
sustain the war effort at current levels until the Japanese agreed to American terms.247
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On August 14, 1945, moments before the Japanese announced their intentions; the
last conventional strike on Tokyo was recorded. As the planes were hitting their targets,
word filtered down that the Japanese had agreed to surrender, and the war came to an
abrupt end. Subsequent raids were recalled but not before American aircraft shot down
nine Japanese planes for the last aerial victories of the war. 248 The Americans had won
the war and had done so, to paraphrase Baldwin’s 1932 quote, by killing more Japanese
women and children quicker than the Japanese could do to the Americans because the
bomber had gotten through. As Truman would later say, the goal was not “Peace in our
Time, but Peace for All Time.”249

THE IMMEDIATE IMPACT OF HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI

Eighteen months before the end of World War II, airpower proponent Alexander
deServesky wrote a prophetic article for the New York Times that suggested that the
world was on the verge of seeing aircraft assume the ability of defeating nations virtually
single-handed. He argued that the allied victory at the island of Pantelleria, near Sicily,
was achieved solely through airpower, and that it was essential in the defeat of Italy, and
the collapse of Benito Mussolini’s regime. Without examining other reasons why Italy
surrendered, deServesky claimed that it was because of a raid on July 19, 1943, when
about 500 aircraft bombed Rome, that the morale and fighting spirit of the Italian armed
forces was finally destroyed. This forced the Germans to assume the responsibility of
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defending Italian territory as the Fascist armed forces dissipated.250 While this story
seems irrelevant to postwar strategic planning, there is one major correlation, the
assumption that the airpower alone could force an enemy to surrender. For some, it was
assumed that airpower was the primary cause of the defeat of Germany, and more
importantly, many believed that the atomic bombs caused the final capitulation of Japan.
LaMotte T. Cohn, the president of the Aircraft Industries Association suggested that the
use of airpower that emerged from World War II is “one of the great motivating
influences on civilization.” He argued that airpower was more important than even the
atomic bomb because it was a weapon in the arsenal of airpower, and the airplane had a
greater “influence on the commerce and intercourse of the world.”251 The impact of the
nuclear arsenal on American military strategy and foreign policy was immediate, and it
allowed the Americans to maintain a significant presence in the postwar world. In the
hands of an enemy, atomic weapons could place the United States in the same position as
Japan at the end of the war, alone and undefended. This thought weighed on the minds of
those conducting the United States Strategic Bombing Survey in Japan.
Team members raised the question about what would happen if the same weapons
were used against American cities of similar size to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It was
suggested that American residential areas, constructed of materials similar to Japanese
buildings, would share roughly the same fate as their Japanese counterparts that were
destroyed within an area of approximately six square miles. Modern buildings made of
reinforced concrete and steel would have fared better, but relatively few American
buildings at the time were of “blast-resistant construction.” The conclusion was that the
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majority of buildings in the United States in late 1945 and early 1946, would not survive
an atomic blast that detonated within a mile to a mile and one half of them. Casualty
rates would depend upon the density of the population of that city, and even what time of
day a nuclear attack would take place.252 To alleviate the threat of an atomic strike on the
United States, the survey team suggested that the United States mobilize the “economic
and administrative life of the nation that no single or small group of successful attacks
can paralyze the national organism.” Preparations needed to be done to provide safety
for civilians and medical facilities, and the creation of an active civil defense. The survey
team also suggested that atomic bombs were effective as defensive weapons. The threat
of their use in retaliation could prevent an aggressor from using them against the U.S. As
well, dispersing and concealment of American weapons systems would prevent the
destruction of all retaliatory forces in one strike. Defensive measures also needed to be
created to counter the delivery of an enemy’s atomic bombs on American soil.253
British Prime Minister Clement Attlee also raised substantive and fairly insightful
concerns to Truman in a top-secret letter on September 25, 1945. Attlee suggested that
the world was now facing the reality there now existed a weapon that could strike
suddenly, without warning, and completely destroy the “nerve centre of a great nation.”
Existing national borders were out of date since the beginning of air warfare, and there
can be no boundaries that would prevent bombers with atomic weapons or even nuclear
missiles from unleashing catastrophic attacks on distant cities. Attlee added that it was
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evident that ongoing discovery in the field would lead to weapons that were much
stronger than the ones used against Japan, and the only defense against the bomber was
another bomber. This could result in a war of mutual annihilation through atomic
weapons. Attlee hoped the two Allies could mutually agree on which direction to go
before “the fears and suspicions which may be developing elsewhere have such a firm
hold as to make even more difficult any solution we may decide to aim at.”254 Attlee’s
letter raised many of the issues that would confront the United States between 1945 and
1949 when the Soviets attained their first nuclear bomb. It is not clear if the letter had
much of an impact on the President. Truman did pursue a controlling agency for all
aspects of nuclear power under United States jurisdiction, and he also pursued a policy
with nuclear weapons that placed the American military on a perpetual wartime basis and
mindset. For Attlee, this direction with the coming of the Cold War meant that perhaps
he was right when he suggested that he “ought to direct all our people to live like
troglodytes underground as being the only hope for survival, and that by no means
certain.”255

THE FINAL ASSESSMENT: THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMING
SURVEY

A proper assessment of strategic bombing and its impact on the war was
necessary to determine what the impact bombing had on the defeated nations. The
decision to put a committee together had been made in late 1944, when President
Franklin Roosevelt instructed Secretary of War Henry Stimson to create the United States
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Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS). Almost 1,000 military and civilian personnel were
assigned to the group, and the USSBS moved into Europe after the war to inspect the
damage, interrogate key German survivors, and document the results. All aspects of
bombing were investigated, including the types of targets, influence on production, and if
the Americans were able to achieve the “precision bombing” that had been their goal
early in the war.256 Paul Nitze, one of the directors of the USSBS, stated that it was
expected that all who served on the USSBS would be objective and “that the standard of
impartiality was that they should not know nothing about the problem at all.” Nitze went
to Europe to assess all aspects of the Allied bombing effort against Germany while the
European war was in its last throes.257 After the surrender of the Third Reich, members
of the survey teams went into Germany and began to conduct thousands of interviews of
military, civilian, political, industrial and scientific personnel. The USSBS also
investigated the full shock of strategic bombing to a civilized nation in total war. 258 The
information gathered would fill 200 volumes and provided a sobering reflection of
warfare without restriction or conscience. As the work progressed, Nitze, and several
others on the committee, including John Kenneth Galbraith, Orvil Anderson, Henry
Alexander and George Ball were called back to Washington for a meeting with Hap
Arnold. According to Nitze, another committee was established to investigate the war
against Japan in a similar fashion to the one conducted in Europe. Using the information
that was already garnered about the efficacy of strategic bombing against Germany, the
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new survey team would even have the ability to influence strategy as the war advanced
into its final stages.259 However, only Nitze and Galbraith accepted the new assignment.
On August 15, 1945, President Truman formally requested a study to evaluate the
bombing, conventional and atomic, of Japan. The survey team was based in Tokyo by
September 1945, and set up other offices in Nagoya, Osaka, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki.
Other mobile teams were created to assess other areas of Japan, various islands in the
Pacific as well as targets on the Asian mainland. It was believed that this made it
possible to “reconstruct much of wartime Japanese military planning and execution” as
the war progressed. The use of the atomic weapons presented the survey team with a new
sense of urgency to fully assess the value of the bombs because they might “qualify or
even change the conclusions and recommendations of the Survey as to the effectiveness
of air power.” For this report, more than 100 engineers, architects, economists, fire
experts, medical personnel and photographers studied each city for ten weeks between
October and December 1945.260
The USSBS results for Japan indicated that one reason for the success of the
American bombers was that the Japanese themselves “failed to fully appreciate the
strategic revolution brought about by the increased capabilities of airpower.”261 The
conventional B-29 raids had forced the dispersal of Japanese war production facilities and
materials. Limited electricity and supplies necessary for manufacturing caused a decline
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in aircraft engine production and Japanese defenses were overwhelmed.262 When the
firebombing commenced in March 1945, it created greater economic strife within Japan.
The USSBS reported that within 66 urban centers of Japan, about 40 percent of the builtup areas were laid to waste, and about 30 percent of those who lived there had lost their
homes and most of their possessions.263 More than one half of Japan’s oil refining
capacity and wheat production had been destroyed along with 25 percent of the
aluminum and pig iron manufacturing.264 The USSBS survey team also reported that the
bombing did have an effect on the civilian population of Japan, and even concluded that
the firebombs helped to “convince even the most optimistic persons that Japan’s position
was desperate.”265 The former head of the Japanese air command stated after the war that
the “Japanese, to the very end, believed that by spiritual means they could fight on equal
terms with you . . . We believed our spiritual confidence in victory would balance any
scientific advantages.”266 It did not.
The United States Strategic Bombing Survey discovered that the primary reaction
to the atomic bombs in Japan was “fear—uncontrolled terror, strengthened by the sheer
horror of the destruction and suffering witnessed and experienced by the survivors.”
Even more, this dread was not a temporary phenomenon. Part of this stemmed from the
limited attacks that had visited Hiroshima and Nagasaki prior to August 1945. Many
people in both cities believed that they would be secure from catastrophe, very few
believed that they were being spared for “something big.” Statistics indicated that prior
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to the bombing, inhabitants of both cities felt better about the war than did people in other
areas of Japan. It was only after the bombings that a feeling of inevitable loss in the war
began to settle into the populations of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. There was some
indication of hatred expressed at the Americans for the use of the bomb, but the survey
teams found this to be relatively low. Reaction to the bomb tended to be fairly localized
to the areas immediately affected by the bombs. It was suggested that outside of the
targeted cities, the effect was “subordinate to other demoralizing experiences.” The
survey also discovered that the fighting spirit of the Japanese was not equivalently
destroyed, even in the remains of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The report contended that the
bombs “were tremendous personal catastrophes to the survivors, but neither time nor
understanding of the revolutionary threat of the atomic bomb permitted them to see. . . .a
final blow to Japan’s prospects for victory or negotiated peace.” 267
The USSBS discovered that the use of the atomic bombs had a far greater impact
on the government of Japan than on the average citizens. Yet, the survey was quick to
point out that it “cannot be said, however, that the atomic bomb convinced the Japanese
leaders who effected the peace of the necessity to surrender.” Rather, the steps that led to
the decision to terminate the war had been taken months before the bombs were
detonated, although the nuclear weapons certainly accelerated the process. Fear of more
bombings, including the prospect of the remains of Tokyo being targeted, weighed on the
minds of the Emperor’s Cabinet. Still, members of the Japanese military did not believe
that the atomic bombs made the defense of the Home Islands untenable. Voices to
continue the war were heard, but their numbers were diminishing, and by August 10,
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1945, the Emperor indicated that he was willing to accept the terms articulated by
Truman at Potsdam. It was suggested that ‘in the atomic bomb the Japanese found the
opportunity which they had been seeking, to break the existing deadlock within the
government over the acceptance of the Potsdam terms.”268

THE ATOMIC BOMB IN EARLY POSTWAR STRATEGY

President Truman attempted to lay the groundwork for American nuclear policy
in a message to Congress in late 1945 that stated his initial views on atomic weapons
including a belief that the use of the bomb did not end the war with Japan, but merely
hastened its conclusion. Truman wanted to see the science of the bomb be translated into
other uses for atomic energy in the United States, and the development of a policy that
controlled the necessary raw materials regardless of use for war or peace. He added that
atomic force “in ignorant or evil hands could inflict untold disaster upon the nation and
the world.” To combat this, Truman wanted Congress to secure the facilities that had
produced the bombs, and control all aspects of atomic energy. He wanted a commission
to be created to oversee continuing research and the security of resources. Truman
believed that the true hope of the future was that the United Nations organization could
look into the “renunciation of the use and development of the atomic bomb, and directing
and encouraging the use of atomic energy and all future scientific information toward
peaceful and humanitarian ends.269 This does not mean that Truman did not understand
the military value of unharnessed nuclear energy. He made it clear that he considered the
United States to be the “trustees of this new force” and he would not allow the release of
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any scientific or technical information without his authorization.270 His early postwar
American policies had an implicit acceptance of U.S. primacy in nuclear weapons and the
international leverage that it created. Arguably, this allowed the United States to
establish absolute control in the immediate postwar Japan at the same time the he
condemned Soviet control of Eastern Europe.271

THE ATOMIC BOMB IN THEORY

As Truman spoke of the peaceful purposes of nuclear power, the United States
military was about to enter a period of intense and often bitter disputes over the control of
atomic bombs, respective missions, and the future of the Armed Forces. The Truman
administration invested political capital in an effort to streamline the military, excise
wasteful expenditures, and trim the overall budget. While this was important to Truman,
it created greater long-term problems as the Army Air Forces and the Navy began to
publicly wage a war of words and deeds to prove the superiority of their respective
nuclear strategies, and the value of total war in the nuclear age. The use of atomic
weapons against Japan in 1945 did more than hasten the end of the war, it fundamentally
altered the direction of American military expenditures and the overall defense strategy
of the United States. From the White House down to Capitol Hill and the Pentagon, it
appeared that atomic weapons evolved from limited, experimental weapons capable of
the wholesale destruction of an enemy's homeland, to the primary offensive weapon in
the American arsenal. What once took a thousand bombers to destroy, could now be
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demolished literally in the blink of an eye; the fulfillment of nightmarish dreams had
come true. Man had finally obtained the ability to destroy himself. As a result, nuclear
weapons were perceived as an effective tool to enforce U.S. policy in a global context,
and the new strategy of the postwar world was centered upon long-range bombers armed
with nuclear weapons.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) stated that the “relationship of atomic weapons to
other weapons and means of war in the nation's defensive armament, should be the
subject of constant scrutiny in the light of changing conditions and new knowledge.”272
In other words, all other weapon systems were obsolete in the light of an atomic
detonation. Yet, between 1945 and 1949, there were too few atomic bombs to affect the
outcome of a possible war with the Soviets. The first generation of atomic bombs were
too complicated for mass production and too limited in numbers. In fact, the two
weapons expended in Operation Crossroads,273 the 1946 atomic tests at Bikini Atoll, had
been taken from the strategic arsenal. Even as late as February 1947, the JCS reported
that the supply of atomic weapons in the arsenal was "not adequate to meet the security
requirements of the United States.”274 It was estimated that in 1947 there was a total of
thirteen nuclear components and twenty-nine mechanical assemblies that combined made
only thirteen complete atomic weapons. However, each of these weapons could level a
Soviet city, while several could theoretically destroy the Soviet Union’s base of
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production and disrupt their war making capacity in hours, rather than years. Because
nuclear weapons became the cornerstone to the defense of the United States by the late
1940s, the arsenal increased to over six hundred by 1950.275

PEACE IS OUR PROFESSION: THE RISE OF STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

Arguably, the most striking symbol of American power after World War II was
the fabled Strategic Air Command (SAC), and its perceived capability to bomb the Soviet
Union in defense of American policy. Images of SAC’s majestic silver bombers graced
magazines and recruiting posters in the late 1940s and 1950s, and even had a starring role
on the movie screen in Jimmy Stewart’s 1955 film, Strategic Air Command.
Impressively filmed in color, the movie showcased the B-36 Peacemaker, the style of
training missions and patriotic duty of those in SAC to protect the United States from the
Soviet Union.276 In the real SAC, the Air Force envisioned large numbers of bombers
armed with atomic weapons that would either strike deep into the heart of an enemy
nation, or deter the outbreak of World War III. The SAC herald depicted an iron, or
armored fist in the middle of parted clouds against a blue background. In the fist, SAC
held lightning bolts and an olive branch, symbolic of its own view of its mission and
purpose. For almost forty years, this adorned scores of bombers, tankers, fighters and
other assorted aircraft and support vehicles that were part of the organization.
SAC was established by the War Department on March 21, 1946, as a
reorganization of the Army Air Forces under the direction of General Carl Spaatz. In
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addition to SAC, the Air Defense Command and the Tactical Air Command, were also
created as separate combat commands within the USAAF, but it was SAC that would
garner most of the press. Its mission was “to conduct long-range offensive operations in
any part of the world either independently or in cooperation with land and Naval
forces.”277 This included offensive strategic attack, ongoing training of personnel, and
the use of the latest and most advanced weapons, which of course, included the atomic
bomb.278 For some critics, SAC was known as a “$310,000,000-a-year business, a top
priority task force with 1,100 planes, some 60,000 pilots, crewmen, and groundmen.”279
For others, it was the epitome of the weapons and tactics that had burned Japan and
destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. General George Kenney was appointed the first
commander of SAC, and had brought plenty of wartime experience with him. His
headquarters was originally located in the greater Washington D.C. area; however, it
would later be moved to the center of the United States in Nebraska, in an effort to
preserve it in the event of a Soviet strike on the U.S.
During the formative years of Strategic Air Command, three aircraft in particular
were critically important to the mission of SAC, the B-29/B-50 Superfortress, the B-36
Peacemaker, and the B-47 Stratojet. These aircraft developed the tactics and mission
parameters on which the American nuclear strategy was premised. In the beginning, the
main battery of SAC was the fabled and combat tested B-29, already proven capable of
delivering nuclear weapons. The Superfortress was the most advanced bomber in the
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world in 1946, but there were several dramatic changes that would push the B-29 from it
role as an advanced very heavy bomber to being reclassified as an aging, obsolescent
medium bomber. Boeing engineers realized that aviation technology was advancing at a
tremendous rate, and therefore it was in the best interest of the company to redesign the
Superfortress to make it more suitable for atomic delivery in the modern age. The
changes made to the basic bomber resulted in the B-50 Superfortress.
The B-50 featured upgraded engines to provide better range and performance, and
the bomb bay was redesigned to allow all B-50s to carry atomic weapons without
expensive conversions. The new and improved Superfortresses were equipped with airto-air refueling modifications that allowed the B-50 to serve SAC until the early 1950s.
The final design improvement to the Superfortess was the B-54, a design upgrade that
included a longer, single bomb bay for larger atomic bombs, and extended wings for
better performance.280 Despite the promise of this design, the B-54 would not go into
production, and the long bomber lineage of the Superfortress would finally come to an
end in April 1949.281
Of all the aircraft that have served the United States military in the Twentieth
Century, arguably none were as controversial as the B-36, the star of Strategic Air
Command, and truly the icon of the Air Force in the late 1940s. It was a combat aircraft
that was larger than all that came before or since, with a wingspan that was longer than
the length of the first flight of the Wright Brothers in 1903. Its gross weight more than
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doubled the B-29, and its range was almost five times that of the B-24 Liberator. When
fully loaded with fuel, the B-36 was projected to have an unrefueled range of 10,000
miles, and it could stay in the air for almost two days.282 Built by the ConsolidatedVultee Corporation, the B-36 was the epitome of World War II propeller technology
because it had originally been designed to go to war against Germany from bases in the
United States, and thus it was described as the first true intercontinental bomber. The B36 project went through several major revisions before the war ended, and as aircraft
contracts were being cancelled after Germany surrendered, the B-36 remained on the
drawing board. Its mission might now include bombing raids to China or Japan from the
United States. The XB-36 prototype was rolled out in September 1945, and it dwarfed
even the B-29 and was so heavy that there were only three runways in the world that
could handle the immense weight of the Peacemaker.283 Unlike the B-29 that was
revolutionary on so many levels, the B-36 was an evolutionary design, albeit on a much
larger scale. In the formative years of the jet era that promised greater speed and power
than had been seen before, the B-36 was powered by six piston engines, located on the
trailing edge of the wing that turned six extremely large propellers. Like American
bombers built during World War II, the B-36 had multiple defensive turrets throughout
the long fuselage to protect it from enemy aircraft despite the belief that the B-36 would
operate at an altitude which enemy fighters could not operate.
The Peacemaker also had a bomb bay that was larger and longer than any other
bomber ever produced, so it had the potential to carry a variety of atomic bombs, or even
multiple bombs. Unfortunately the overall speed of the B-36 and its operating altitude
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were not significantly greater than the wartime B-29 that some Japanese propeller driven
fighters had intercepted and destroyed. Eventually questions were raised about the B36’s survivability in the postwar world, but it would not reach the public until the after
the Peacemaker became the base of the American strategic bombing strategy in the late
1940s. By then, however, it was too late because the B-36 was in full production at the
expense of other weapon systems.
The Boeing B-47 Stratojet was the antithesis of the lumbering B-36 Peacemaker
because it was small, fast, jet powered and produced in great numbers. The Stratojet
program began back in World War II when the Army Air Forces began a study of the
viability of jet bombers and several companies came up with different designs to meet the
requirements, but it was the B-47 that was put into large-scale production. By the 1950s
the Stratojet had become the most numerous bomber in SAC’s arsenal with 2,042
produced in multiple types, including reconnaissance versions. The top speed of the first
production B-47 was 600 miles per hour and its cruising speed was more than twice that
of the B-36.284 The B-47’s performance was impressive enough that when President
Truman authorized SAC to conduct a reconnaissance overflight of Soviet airbases in
Sibera in 1952, the Stratojet was chosen.285
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THE UNITED STATES NAVY COMES OF AGE

On September 2, 1945, the Second World War came to a close when the Japanese
delegation signed the document of surrender on the deck of the U.S. battleship Missouri.
For the last time in history, a battleship was the center of international attention. Once
the king of the world’s navies, including the American fleet, the battleship’s reign was at
its end. The offensive power of the American Fleet was transformed, and carriers had
replaced the battleship as the primary destroyer of enemy fleets. U.S. carriers played a
key role in the ultimate defeat of Japan. To fully comprehend the role of the Navy in
President Truman’s view of strategic airpower, it is essential to examine the Navy’s role
in World War II, and how the naval strategists attempted to find a new role for the Navy
in the atomic age. The appearance of peace did little to ease the uncertainty about the
future that weighed on the minds of many senior U.S. naval officers, because "peace in
our time" still was not at hand.
The end of the war did not bring about true reconciliation and contentment in
either the world or the American military establishment. Rather, it reaffirmed fears of war
leaders including Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, of a return to “world unrest” and
strategic indecision “in the absence of satisfactory treaties and safeguards.”286
Challenged with demobilization after the war in the face of escalating international
contention with the Soviet Union, many within the Navy believed they still had an active
role in international affairs. Traditionally, the Navy had been the forefront of American
national security, and it was their responsibility to protect American shores from an
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invasion or attack from hostile nations. Atomic weapons appeared to change that
premise, however, as they emerged as the answer to escalating costs in conventional
forces and equipment. This concept clashed with critics, however, including members of
the USAAF who alleged that large bombers and atomic bombs had replaced conventional
naval forces. Nimitz testified that the USN existed for the purpose of “protecting our
national interests” and “supporting our national policies” which forced the Navy to
defend itself against hostile verbal and budgetary attacks that were aimed directly at the
heart and soul of the modern Navy, its carriers.287
Even more critical, the Navy suffered from their appearance as a second tier
service in the final defeat of Japan. After all, it was a United States Army Air Forces B29 that delivered the atomic coup de grace to Japan, not a carrier-based aircraft or naval
bomber. In an effort to address that inadequacy, the leadership within the Navy as well
as its supporters in Congress began to embrace a nuclear strategy that would on the one
hand, provide newer and larger aircraft carriers, and on the other hand, retard the
development of non-nuclear options in the event of a war that fell short of a total nuclear
exchange. Lt. General Ira C. Eaker, Deputy Commander of the Army Air Forces, warned
in April 1946, that the Navy had been approaching demobilized B-29 crews and offering
them regular commissions in the Navy.288 To the proponents of an independent Air
Force, this meant only one thing, that the Navy was intent on achieving a role in strategic
bombing. They were, and naval weapons and tactics began to evolve around the delivery

287

Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Navy Department Appropriations,
Testimony of Secretary Sullivan, June 11, 1948; Navy Department Appropriation Bill for 1948. Hearings,
80th Cong., 2nd Sess,1948, 26.
288
Memorandum for the Assistant Secretary of War for Air from Ira C. Eaker , 18 April 1946, papers of
Stuart Symington 1946-1950, E General- Hold, Memo File, Box 5, Correspondence File, 1946-50, EGeneral, HST.

138
of atomic bombs at the expense of the traditional role played by carrier and land-based
naval aviation.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POSTWAR MARITIME STRATEGY

What follows is not a defense of nuclear weapons or an argument over the merits
of service unification, or a criticism of the postwar maritime strategy. The minutiae of
these issues are well beyond the scope of this chapter, and have been covered extensively
elsewhere. Rather, it is a description of a naval policy that reflected in a naval nuclear
mission. This policy strengthened the institutional perspective of the Navy as officers
defended their service at the expense of a common defense strategy. National security
almost became a secondary interest to the Navy in a partisan conflict with a greater
enemy than the Soviet Union, an independent United States Air Force (USAF).
According to Thomas Hone, in his examination of the Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations (OPNAV), “the Navy found itself in need of officers whom ‘politics’ had
touched. It was not enough for the Navy to be advanced in technology and tactics. The
Navy needed shrewd leaders who could win political support for new programs and
shield the service from partisan attacks.”289
If postwar American strategic plans were to be formulated around the atomic
bomb, the Navy would have to include them to remain both an opponent of the Soviet
Union in the Cold War, and also a key player within the U.S. military structure. As the
Navy moved through the years between 1945 and 1949, the naval bureaucracy became
proactive in defining both a mission for the Navy as well as a reason to exist. The
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protection of the Navy Department and its role in the defense of the United States became
arguably more important to key officers and civilians within the department than
consensus on national security.
Reflective of this new attitude was the decision to establish the Special Weapons
Division (OP-06) in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations in November 1945.290 In
addition, there was a strengthening of the position of the Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations (DCNO) for Air (OP-05) and for Operations (OP-03), and the Strategic Plans
Division (OP-30) gained stature as it mapped out the future of the Navy.291 The
Organizational Research and Policy Division (OP-23) was created in December 1948 to
promote the Navy within the military establishment, and protect the Navy’s missions
from rival branches in the American military, from the national press, and from
congressmen who argued for increased service unification. 292 Captain Charles D.
Griffin, assigned to OPNAV, stated that OP-23 “existed for the principle purpose of
gathering information that could be of value to the case of the Navy in convincing the
Congress and the people of the function of a navy—why we must have a navy, what a
navy does.”293
The Navy was determined not to sail into the future of atomic warfare with
obsolete, conventional technology and, as late as 1948, Secretary of the Navy John L.
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Sullivan testified that the Navy was not “preparing to fight yesterday’s war.”294 Even
before the end of the World War II, plans were developed to restructure the Navy to face
a new enemy, the Soviet Union. In the fall of 1945, Forrestal testified in front of the
House Naval Affairs Committee that the Soviets were devoted to the annihilation of
capitalism.295 As such, the United States prepared for a potential war with the Soviets, a
nation without a large surface navy but with a substantial submarine force. Soviet postwar naval build up had reached almost 300 modern submarines by July 1950, about six
times as many as Germany had at the outbreak of World War II, and Germany had almost
crippled the Allies.296 To deal with these threats, Sullivan stated that the Navy’s mission
included the fight against surface ships, but also against submarines, against aircraft, and
against beach defenses.”297 Each of these was a traditional role for the Navy, and nuclear
weapons would aid in their effects against the Soviet war machine. In order to attack the
Soviets, strategic planners within the US Navy would have to find a mission that could be
conducted from their carriers.

THE PURSUIT OF AN ATOMIC DELIVERY SYSTEM TO SECURE THE FUTURE

Although nuclear warfare appeared to be the wave of the future, some ranking
military officers disagreed with the use of the bomb. Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy,
Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief during World War II, wrote in his
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autobiography: "The lethal possibilities of atomic warfare in the future are frightening.
My own feeling is that in being the first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard
common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make war in that fashion,
and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children..."298 Others added that “the
atomic blitz is a war against the common people…a weapon of indiscriminate destruction
and mass slaughter.”299
Despite the feelings of Leahy and others, the atomic bomb was the foundation of
post-war strategic planning. Control of the atomic bomb, therefore, was a guarantee of
future funding and an important role in the defense of the United States. Although naval
personnel had been involved in the Manhattan Project since the beginning, and had even
armed the two weapons dropped on Japan, the Navy was ill prepared for using the
weapon. They had no carrier-based aircraft large enough to carry the weapons, nor did
they have a carrier that was built to store and arm atomic bombs or even launch large
bombers. However, if the Navy could create these weapons and incorporate the bomb,
the Navy could effectively fight the postwar demobilization and argue that it had a
mission in the atomic age that a conventional navy did not. To senior commanders in the
Navy, this mission, addressed in other strategic plans, would transition their task of
maintaining control of the seas into a sea-based strategic bombing campaign. This would
fuse the mobility of carriers with the weapon of the future, the atomic bomb. The future
mission of the Navy, therefore, was projected to be long-range strategic nuclear strikes
against the Soviet Union.
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In order to accomplish this, the Navy would use an atomic delivery system to
solve several problems of the postwar military. The Navy would first have to survive the
demobilization of forces after the war, and the best way to accomplish this was to make
all of their forces vital to the national security. Large numbers of carriers and aircraft
would be needed in this new role, therefore, the Navy had to maintain a substantial
peacetime fleet. They also had to find a way to defeat the pending unification of the
armed forces, or define a unique mission within the new structure to include a major
restructuring of naval forces to include large aircraft carriers and nuclear bombers. Then,
the Navy had to find a way to alter the prevailing hypothesis in Washington that stated
that the Navy had been superseded as the nation’s first line of defense because only the
USAAF could and should deliver nuclear weapons. Air Force General Hoyt Vandenberg
went as far as to suggest that the United States could not afford to have duplicate
programs “particularly when one involved the use of obsolescing weapons.”300 If the
Navy could bring atomic weapons to sea, they could prove the merit of their sea-based
mission and defend themselves against these internal verbal attacks. Finally, the Navy
had to define and defend their atomic mission as fundamental to the security of the
United States in the Cold War.
Massive reductions in forces, equipment, and funding after the conclusion of a
successful war continued an American military reality that dated back to the
Revolutionary War. During such postwar periods, every dollar spent, and every program
developed by the military came under close scrutiny, and the end of World War II was no
different. President Truman was adamant that the United States could not afford to
maintain the military at wartime levels with peacetime expenditures. The final victory in
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World War II meant that contracts for war material such as aircraft, ships, tanks, etc,
could be cut back or eliminated all together. Admiral Arthur Radford testified to the
Senate subcommittee on Appropriations that the Navy had been “weighing relative
values” in postwar plans. It had discarded periodically “valuable portions,” while
retaining others which appeared “more vital.” Radford added that “the aeronautical
postwar organization …currently being considered, is the best balance we can obtain
under the limited funds available…this organization contains the essential elements
necessary for complete integration of naval aviation as a part of our active fighting
fleet.”301 In other words, the priority within the Navy appeared to be their aviation
branch. If atomic weapons could be sea based, they could preserve this aspect of the
Navy. Atomic weapons introduced cost-effectiveness to the military, and could perhaps
even deter large-scale wars because of their destruction.302

SURVIVING DEMOBILIZATION

American forces were rapidly demobilized soon after Japan surrendered and
peace was finally declared, but there did not seem to be an initial concern about how they
impacted American foreign policy or military action. The cutbacks occurred so fast that
in October 1945, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal argued that if it continued
unabated there would come a time when neither the Army or the Navy would have
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sufficient trained men to operate efficiently.303 Furthermore, additional decreases could
be considered as “evidence of our intention to recede from our international obligations
and commitments abroad.”304 Leadership within the United States Navy grew alarmed
by the cuts to the carrier fleets because the carriers represented the mobile strike force of
the Navy. Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, argued that the
postwar American fleet needed to have “in each ocean a strong carrier-striking group.”305
Carriers had the range to cover vast areas of ocean and could move over six hundred
miles in twenty-four hours to attack geographically dispersed targets well out of the range
of land-based air.306
Against Japan, carrier-based aircraft were used to destroy enemy naval and
commercial shipping, bolster ground forces, support invasions, and disrupt lines of
communication. In the future, carrier-based aircraft would have to counter enemy
submarine offensives, protect shipping, and when applied in large numbers, neutralize
enemy land-based airpower to maintain control of the sea, and would need to have the
ability to deliver nuclear weapons.307 With fewer carriers at its disposal, however, naval
leadership was faced with a potential inability to deliver American airpower to important
regions around the globe; reducing the carrier fleet made the entire naval offensive forces
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weaker and less vital to the overall defense of the United States. Without a sufficient
number of carriers, the Navy's contribution to the national defense was solely in logistics,
submarine and anti-submarine warfare. Therefore, for every carrier that was
decommissioned, the effective power of the Navy was significantly reduced.
Consequently, if carrier reductions continued unabated, the naval nuclear strategy would
become irrelevant because there would be no carriers left to base the bombers aboard.
The Navy would have to devolve from an offensive Navy to a defensive Navy, which
would be nothing more than a floating Maginot Line of outdated ships that an enemy
could simply bypass on its way to defeat or damage the United States.

DELIVERING AN ATOMIC STRIKE FROM THE SEA

To prevent or deter such a fate, the Navy began preliminary long-term studies of a
carrier-based strategic nuclear bomber and a “supercarrier.” These two weapons would
combine to replace the battleship and conventional weapons as the main battery of the
fleet, and help limit the effects of demobilization on the Navy. It was argued that from
locations in the Atlantic, Pacific, and the Mediterranean Sea, carrier-based bombers could
reach many targets inside the Soviet Union. Additionally, because the carriers are
considered sovereign U.S. territory, the inclusion of atomic weapons into the naval
arsenal would not be affected by another nation's anti-nuclear policy. This allowed for
the Navy's nuclear bombers to be forward deployed while the Air Force's bombers were
based in the U.S. or within countries that agreed to allow the storage of nuclear weapons
on their territory. Without a new carrier class and bomber, the Navy would be compelled
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to participate in the postwar world with aircraft and carriers designed and built before and
during World War II.308
Unlike the USAAF that had operated bombers since World War I and had
experience with larger and more powerful bombers, the Navy had been limited in the size
of its attack aircraft because of the inherent limits of a carrier deck. The Air Force could
pursue planes like the B-36 because they could convert air bases across the world to
handle the increased weight of the bomber, provide new facilities for maintenance and
protected areas to store nuclear weapons. It was not as simple to provide the same
amenities aboard an aircraft carrier. Therefore the introduction of atomic weapons into
the fleet forced a radical modification of carrier operations and design. Ideally the Navy
wanted to get a new carrier design into production that would be built around atomic
weapons delivery, but it became extremely unlikely that this would be possible in the
austere military budgets of the Truman administration. It was also doubtful that support
for the naval nuclear mission would have the active support of the President, the
Congress, or even the National Military Establishment.
One of the earliest advocates of a new large deck carrier and a naval nuclear
bomber was Admiral Marc Mitscher, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations. Mitscher had
been one of the guiding forces behind the Navy’s successes against the Japanese fleets,
and had participated in the fabled Doolittle Raid in April 1942. Before the war ended,
Mitscher complained that American carrier forces did not have an adequate bombing
system and the largest weapon they could deliver was a 2,000lb high explosive bomb that
was far inadequate for many fortified targets. It was anecdotally evident that the amount
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of damage inflicted upon Japan by the USN was dramatically less than that of the
USAAF. To counter this in the postwar world, Mitscher began to argue for the creation
of a carrier-based bomber with the ability to carry a payload of 12,000lbs. This idea was
modified after the atomic attacks on Japan to include an ability to carry nuclear weapons.
The rudimentary concept of a naval nuclear bomber was conducted under the heading of
Bureau of Aeronautics (BuAer) Design Research Division Study 42 or simply, ADR42.309
The immense size of the ADR-42 precluded operations from all existing carriers.
The priority placed upon the inclusion of atomic weapons into each of the services forced
the Navy to continue the plans to make the bomber carrier-based, or it would simply be a
redundant system in light of the USAF bombers. Taking the bomb to sea, however,
incorporated more than just physically placing the bomber on a carrier because existing
ships were neither designed nor built with atomic bombs as an option or priority.
Accordingly, none of the extra support facilities that a nuclear arsenal required had been
included in the carriers. Weapons magazines, shops, and assembly areas were obligatory
for up to three dozen specialists who would assemble the bombs aboard the ship, and
there was limited room to add these essential spaces. Even if nuclear weapons could be
brought aboard a carrier, existing weapons elevators could not handle the body and
weight of the atomic bombs, and without modifications they would have to be stored on
the flight deck, or inside the ADR-42. In reality, the larger the weapons and aircraft
grew, the less likely existing carriers could be part of the long-term nuclear delivery
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program and this prompted the need for a new generation of supercarriers to shuttle the
Navy into the nuclear future.
The new generation carriers would reflect the increased size of the atomic
bombers and jet fighters that would operate from its decks. Even more, these new
carriers would be built around nuclear weapons as a foundation, rather than an
afterthought. In early 1946 the Bureau of Ships (BuShips) began to design the
supercarrier, without a superstructure, to allow for aircraft of virtually unlimited
wingspans and weights up to 100,000lbs to operate aboard. Although reluctant at first,
Nimitz, with the support of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air John Sullivan,
approved the study in early February 1947.310 From Mitscher’s initial recommendation
in 1945, until 1948, the Navy’s General Board examined over 75 design proposals for the
new class of carrier, and the Ships Characteristics Board (SCB) worked out the details of
the new carrier. Eventually they selected project SBC-6A to be included in the Fiscal
1949 shipbuilding program. As of June 1947, the proposal was projected to cost over
$127 million with construction spread out over at least four years.311 The lead ship of
this new class of carriers was called United States (CVA-58). It would take time for the
United States-class carriers to come into service, and as a result of this and the possibility
that they would not even be built, the Navy began a program to convert existing carriers
to meet the needs of its nuclear bombers and the first generation of jet fighters. 312
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THE INTERIM NAVAL NUCLEAR BOMBERS

The evolution of the Navy’s Heavy Attack program began in the late 1940s,
concurrent with the advancements in atomic bombs and aircraft carriers. The large
physical size of the first generation of nuclear weapons dictated that nuclear capable
attack aircraft had to be much larger than the standard carrier-based aircraft that had been
in use up until 1945. It would take years, however, for such aircraft to be designed,
tested and introduced into the fleet. The Navy did not have the luxury of time, and
therefore it had to prove that they could deliver the bomb from the sea. To bridge the
gap, two interim naval nuclear bombers, the P2V Neptune and the AJ Savage were
brought into service in the late 1940s. The P2V was an obvious choice for the first naval
nuclear bomber because it had the ability to carry a large bomb load and it had sufficient
range to strike targets deep in the Soviet Union, or others behind the Iron Curtain. The
Navy was impressed enough with the Neptune to continue to make modifications to the
airframe that would allow it to carry atomic weapons resulting in the P2V-3C.313
Because of its large size, the Neptune could only operate off of the new Midway-class
aircraft carriers that were put into service at the very end of World War II. That limited
the naval nuclear strike force to three carriers for use in a first strike role. The P2V,
however, was never cleared for carrier landings which meant that in the event of World
War III, the P2V-3Cs would take off from a carrier, bomb their target and return either to
ditch in the sea along side of the carrier, attempt to land at a friendly air base, or as a last
resort, bail out over enemy territory. It would be a long time-consuming effort to return
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the P2Vs to the carriers, but the Navy ordered 12 P2V-3Cs as the first naval nuclear
attack bomber.314
Continuing the attempt to break the USAF monopoly on nuclear strike missions,
the Navy gave formal approval for the creation of the Navy’s first strategic bombing
squadron, Composite Squadron FIVE (VC-5) and its handpicked crews.315 These men
conducted navigational and bomb training, sent crews out for training on nuclear
weapons, and commenced collecting whatever intelligence they could accumulate on
potential targets.316 By 1948, VC-5 had proven the viability of the P2V-3C as a carrierbased nuclear bomber. They had broken the stranglehold on American nuclear weapons
delivery that the USAAF had controlled since the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki
only three years earlier. During the same time, while the P2V was being modified for its
nuclear role, designers at North American Aviation began work on the AJ Savage.
Unlike the Neptune, the AJ was originally designed to be a carrier-based nuclear
bomber, and was a first step in a sustained naval nuclear role. The Savage could be
launched and recovered on carriers, refueled and rearmed, then launched onto subsequent
missions. Like other aircraft of the immediate postwar years, the AJ was an evolutionary
design caught between the old world of propeller-driven aircraft and the future of jet
technology. The Savage used two prop-driven engines and a single fuselage-mounted jet
engine to provide the extra speed needed to allow the AJ to speed away from the shock
waves that accelerated out of an atomic blast.317 A series of engine fires, wing failures
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and other structural problems, however, haunted the Savage program. It cost the Navy
several crews throughout its limited service life, and it was always hampered by a lack of
spare parts and ongoing maintenance problems.318
The Air Force paid attention to the Navy’s attempts to get into nuclear arms
delivery through the P2V and the AJ Savage. Secretary of the Air Force, Stuart
Symington, sent a memo to Defense Secretary Forrestal on May 21, 1948 that stressed
the accomplishments of the Air Force bombers and belittled the Navy’s effort. He
lamented the Navy’s continued focus on “this type of effort to substantiate its 65,000 ton
carrier” request. Symington further stressed that inaccurate statements “made by high
Navy officials in testimony before Congressional committees to the effect that the Chief
of Staff and the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved this flush deck super carrier” created the
greater problem. He accused the Navy of deliberate deception in an effort to proceed “to
invade the strategic air position” that was the responsibility of the USAF. Symington also
suggested there was a double standard with the Navy in regards to coordination with
Forrestal. He added that “as things now stand this issue will be voted on by the Congress
on the basis of misinformation” and “when John Q. Public eventually learns the truth
about these maneuvers to have him support two Air Forces, he will realize the sucker he
has been played for” The result could be disastrous “to all military appropriations.”319
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THE STRATEGIC TRANSITION FROM THE PACIFIC TO THE MEDITERRANEAN
SEA

In addition to needing carriers and an attack bomber, the Navy had to create a
scenario that would allow it to participate in a war with the Soviet Union and utilize the
mobility of the fleet carriers and carrier-based bombers against land targets deep in
Soviet territory. To advance that strategy, the USN needed to implement a plan that
placed American carriers within striking distance of the Soviets, regardless of the risk to
the carriers and their support ships from preemptive or retaliatory attacks. The logical
location for the Navy to concentrate their postwar operations was the Mediterranean Sea.
Forward deployments to the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf would help the United
States maintain a presence in several different strategic areas. The oil producing nations
of the Middle East would certainly be a primary target of a Soviet attack, and therefore,
they had to be defended. To counter a potential Soviet move, U.S. carrier-based aviation
would have to strike from the sea into a region largely out of the range of land-based
United States bombers.
Naval operations in the Mediterranean Sea also placed an American presence near
several nations in Southern Europe that the Truman administration believed were
threatened with Soviet sponsored revolution, civil war, or other problems. To restrict
Soviet influence in the region, the Navy operated off the coast of a targeted country to
project power ashore in the event of war and display American resolve in the area. It was
thought that a show of U.S. strength could deter direct Soviet aggression against a neutral
or pro-Western state. This became extremely critical because the traditional presence in
the Mediterranean Sea, the British Royal Navy (RN) had been greatly reduced in size,
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scope, and capability. Growing tensions with the Soviets in the area of Turkey and Iran
demanded a stronger American presence. On February 28, 1946, Secretary of the Navy
James V. Forrestal asked for and received support from the State Department and
Secretary of State James F. Byrnes to deploy a larger naval task force to the
Mediterranean.320
The first use of an American carrier to protect U.S. interests in the region was
made from August to October 1946 when a U.S. task force made several port calls in
Greece to illustrate America support for the pro-Western monarchy. This was the first of
several visits to the troubled nation that faced internal civil war and external Soviet
pressure. In 1948 an American carrier, Valley Forge (CV-45), made the first deployment
to the Persian Gulf to promote American power in the region. From here, it was believed
that the Navy could protect the flow of oil and hamper any Soviet move that could
threaten the critical supply of petroleum.321 All of these early operations were conducted
without nuclear weapons, and with only small attack aircraft and fighters aboard. One
carrier air wing against significant portions of the Soviet Red Air Force and Red Army
was really not much of a threat. However, once the Navy was able to provide atomic
weapons to the fleet, the Soviet Union would have to be aware of American intentions
and the threat that it imposed.

TO THE FUTURE: ATOMIC WEAPONS DELIVERY

Within months of the decision to use atomic weapons, the ability to deliver
nuclear weapons became a source of funding and contention between the fledgling Air
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Force and the evolving Navy. Both were committed to the defense of the United States
and truly believed that they were better prepared to accomplish the mission with greater
success than the other. This created a hostile environment between the Services as each
tried to create delivery systems that could outperform the other. The Air Force and the
Navy also battled to achieve dramatic headlines in the press, and funding in an evertightening budget. Between 1945 and 1949, this interservice rivalry and primitive
nuclear strategy became the premise of defense spending and planning for the next
generation. Regardless of the weapons or delivery systems that were eventually funded,
the basic premise of defense spending reflected a growing belief in the targeting of
civilian populations as the most expeditious course to win a war or sustain the peace.
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CHAPTER THREE
UNIFICATION, THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947 AND THE SOVIET
THREAT

This is a critical and disquieting time. Where there had been hope that 1946
would bring an end to military and political conflict, we find an atmosphere of world
tension the outcome of which is obscure. F. Trubee Davison, President of the Air Power
League322
The Navy have been very smart-slick-in their presentation of a basically unsound
idea; whereas we the Army have been blundering and stupid in presenting a sound idea.
W. Stuart Symington, Assistant Secretary of War for Air.323

To completely understand how profound and pervasive the conviction in nuclearbased strategic bombing was by the Air Force and Navy in the immediate post-war era,
one needs to thoroughly examine the battle over service unification and the National
Security Act of 1947. It was during this political battle that leadership within the Air
Force and the Navy defended the foundation for a defense system based primarily on a
“nuclear-first” option with minimal focus on conventional bombing because they truly
believed it would work. In other words, during the formative years of the Cold War, the
USAAF and the Navy prepared to engage and win a war primarily against a single
enemy, the Soviet Union, with only one type of weapon, the atomic bomb. Even more,
the concerns over unification had escalated to the point that the real issue appeared to
have more to do with which service should deliver the bomb at the expense of the other,
instead of achieving the President’s goal of streamlining the federal bureaucracy and
reducing costs for domestic and military programs. Arguably, it was no longer
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acceptable to the command structure to assume that there was an alternative to a global
nuclear war. Therefore, the testimony presented displayed the conviction that their
respective services needed the lion’s share of funding to fulfill the national security
requirements of the United States into the 1950s and beyond.
The hypothesis of a nuclear strategic air warfare as an unrivaled offensive or
defensive strategy occurred despite reams of evidence to the contrary about the efficacy
of bombing, atomic or conventional, to win a war or compel a hostile nation towards
peace. There was minimal consideration by the new National Military Establishment to
the suggestion that the United States might not engage an enemy in total war. If the latter
were the case, it would require training and tactics to deliver conventional weapons with
level precision against smaller targets instead of large bombers simply attacking a city.
Certainly the strategic and tactical bombers that would be developed in the years
following unification would be converted or modified to drop conventional high
explosive weapons, but that would not be their primary purpose.
In the end, the battle over unification had far more to do with securing funding in
the future for the most critical component of the national defense, the strategic strike
force, than anything else. In the past each service could develop their own weapons
programs without much interference by the other services. It was not until Truman’s
attempt to bring all money spent on defense into a single entity that every dollar spent
could be debated by the Army, Air Force or Navy. In a time of budgetary austerity, one
can clearly understand why unification was strongly supported by the Air Force, and so
vehemently opposed by the Navy. If one service reigned supreme in the public’s eye, the
Congressional mind, or the President’s opinion, any attempt at a balanced force structure
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was likely lost. Unification and strategic air warfare had become linked to the military
policy under President Truman, and the service that won the unification battle would
become the vanguard of American defenses against the Soviet Union.
Unlike the United States Navy, which was searching for its soul and its future in
the years after World War II, for the United States Army Air Force, the future was now,
and unification could finally help them achieve independence from the Army. Many
within the USAAF believed that they had been at the forefront of the victory over Italy,
Germany and Japan. Strategic bombing, including atomic strikes, remained their primary
mission and they should be allowed to implement and promote their version of strategic
air warfare centered on long-range atomic strikes into the Soviet Union. It was the belief
that the USAF would deliver American style peace by the kiloton and compel the Soviets
to yield to the overwhelming superiority of the American air assault. This was to be
powered by the B-36 Peacemaker intercontinental bomber, the largest bomber ever
produced in the world. It also presented the USAAF/USAF with a position of political
strength when the fight over Service unification began in earnest.
Clearly, because the USAAF already had the ability to deliver atomic weapons,
they had the advantage in postwar discussions concerning unification. A November 23,
1946 speech by Lt. General James H. Doolittle, the famed leader of the April 1942 raid
on Japan, stated that there had been two major lessons from the Second World War. One
was the need for air superiority, the capability to control the air over the battlefield or the
enemy’s targeted city, and the other was unity of command, the capacity to organize and
mobilize all military elements and get them into battle. Doolittle felt, however, that the
United States was in a weakened position because it had endless duplication of
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“commands, efforts, weapons, and money” and American airpower “must continue to be
revolutionary if we are to keep ahead of any potential enemy.” In order to fully
accomplish this, there had to be a reduction in the number of agencies that were
responsible for developing aircraft and weapons. Research and development had to
continue into new forms of weapons, including the nuclear arsenal, but we “must
consolidate air weapon research under one agency, directed by the airmen who best know
how the medium in which these new weapons will operate.”324

UNIFICATION: Finding the Real Enemy Within

President Harry S. Truman began to move towards unification in the summer of
1945, after a request was made by Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal to increase
the permanent size of the Navy and the Marine Corps after the war. Truman looked into
the matter and instead decided to change the system to make it more cooperative in
understanding future manpower needs. He was open to the idea of unification of the
Services under a single department to streamline the military and make it more efficient.
Prior to unification, the Secretaries of War and the Navy held cabinet-level positions and
maintained autonomous voices inside the administration. The budgets of both the Army
and the Navy were prepared independently, and required separate legislation that kept the
level of direct competition for funding very limited. The President did not like the
system because he felt it was inefficient and political. Truman also remained suspicious
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about budget requests based on his personal experience in the Army.325 If each service
could eliminate unnecessary or redundant programs, Truman believed that the War and
Navy Departments could free up enough capital to live within limited budgets.
It was apparent from the onset of discussions about unification that the senior
leadership in the Navy was opposed to it, and had begun preparations for their own plans
for post-war national security. Navy officials felt they had everything to lose and
interpreted the “calls for unification as a pretense for dismembering the Naval
Establishment—by transferring naval aviation units to the Air Force and the Marines to
the Army.”326 Army General George C. Marshall first introduced the idea of a unified
military command structure in November 1943. In this new unified configuration,
appropriations and command would be streamlined through one department, rather than
two. He further argued that an “enormous saving can be made in the Navy budget if the
duplication of roles and missions” were eliminated.327 Naval leadership opposed this,
fearing that they would lose a voice in decisions regarding the size and scope of the
fleets. Truman disagreed with this opinion because it was in conflict to the long-term
goals of unification. He did agree with the Navy “on the need for some means of more
effectively meshing military planning with our foreign policy” and the need to “provide
long-range plans for industrial mobilization consistent with the civilian economy.”
Truman understood that unification went beyond military reorganization and involved
cooperation between the armed forces, politicians, as well as the economic interests of
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national security.328 In a speech in Chicago in April 1946, Truman called on the senior
leadership in the Navy to get behind unification and he gave “valiant support” to the War
Department’s views on it.329 Truman most likely underestimated how long and hard the
road would be to achieve this complicated merger in principle, let alone actuality.
Animosity between the Army Air Forces and the Navy over missions, weapons,
and funding extended to their respective support organizations. In August 1946,
Congressman Carl Vinson, a Democratic Representative from Georgia, and renowned
advocate of the Navy, threatened an investigation into the Air Power League. It was an
organization created in 1944 to support or preserve American air strength because it was
essential to security of the United States.330 Stuart Symington, the Assistant Secretary of
War for Air, responded that the Air Power League was comparable to the Navy League
and therefore political bias could be cited, and the Air Power League could respond by
asking for an investigation of the Navy League.331 In October 1946, Symington accused
the Navy of successfully lobbying the Veterans of Foreign Wars to reverse its previous
position and now the VFW opposed unification. Symington added, however, that the
Navy failed to prevent the passage of a bill supporting unification by the American
Legion.332
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Early salvoes fired between the Services brought other organizations and
businesses into the fray, including Sears, Roebuck and Company and its politically
conservative Chairman of the Board, Robert E. Wood. The former Army general and
founder of the America First Committee wrote a letter to Symington in December 1946
about a speech that the Assistant Secretary was scheduled to give to the Commercial
Club. Symington’s appearance had created a political showdown within the organization
because several members had been in the Navy and were opposed to speeches presented
on behalf of an independent air force. Some members of the Club were personal friends
of James Forrestal, and did not want arguments over unification brought out into the
public arena, and even attempted to find a pro-Navy speaker to counter the air force
argument. What apparently surprised Wood was “the strength and depth of the Navy
objection” and he was concerned that Symington’s speech would have to be called off.333
The enmity between the two services grew worse and a political battle began in
Washington D.C. that caused far more harm than most could have anticipated or
imagined. In public displays of anger and remorse, the national security of the United
States was debated in congress, the media, and the corridors of the Pentagon.

THE UNITED STATES ARMY AIR FORCE AND UNIFICATION

In an angry letter to President Truman on May 16, 1946, Symington brought to
Truman’s attention the fact that in their latest budget proposal, the Navy had budgeted for
more spending on aircraft than the Army Air Forces did for Fiscal Year 1947. Symington
suggested that he did not believe that “one American in fifty thousand knows any such
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condition exits.” He also added that “General Arnold told us before he left statements of
Navy people showing that they had long range plans to take over the whole show, with
their Air Force, their Marine Army, and their Navy.” Symington facetiously suggested
that because the Navy demanded land-based aircraft to protect their ships, the Army
should demand their own battleships to protect their troop ships.334 Truman replied to
Symington five days later and informed him that these “matters will work out, as they
should, if we ever get to the point where we can actually get a practical result.” The letter
also stated that things were getting better despite statements being made by supporters of
the Navy.335
Symington continued to find ways to point out what he felt were absurd positions
being taken by the Department of the Navy. In a memo to General Curtis LeMay in
September 1946, Symington recommended that “from the standpoint of psychology” that
would lead to independence, the Army Air Forces should include some ships in its Fiscal
Year 1948 budget. It was justified that the Air Force needed ships as much as the Navy
needed aircraft. There was also the possibility of including a submerging “airdrome” as
well as air-sea rescue submarines along with a “land air fixed up” carrier and
destroyer.336 Symington also continued to receive letters that encouraged him to hold the
line on the Navy, and perhaps, push even farther. In August 1947, Symington was
informed that if he really wanted to have peace, the United States should “greatly
strengthen our air force, and divert to you most of the money we are spending for our
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navy. Russia can’t match our navy—we can’t match their manpower or their army—but
we can dominate them in the air.”337
Lt. General James H. Doolittle expounded on his feelings about unification and
what he perceived were the real issues that motivated the Navy’s resistance.
Corresponding with Symington, Doolittle argued that leadership within the Navy argued
against a single service secretary because it would be too taxing for one individual to
govern. Doolittle considered this argument to be specious because the President already
had the ability to oversee the entire federal bureaucracy, and the military was already an
aspect of that responsibility. He also countered the Navy’s contention that they would
lose their service identity in a unified defense structure because the overriding national
goal should be to have the most economical and efficient military in peace and war. The
Navy’s system, according to Doolittle, created redundant expenditures for aircraft. In
essence, they created a rival air force in the United States that was as unacceptable as
having three armies or three navies protecting their own interests as opposed to national
requirements. He asserted that competition can be good in business, but in government,
cooperation and coordination were far more important because the enemy gives the
military enough competition. Uncoordinated competition “in a governmental agency
cannot help but be wasteful and destructive.”338
Criticism of the Navy’s opposition to unification also came from within the Navy
Department. Commander James. M. Peters, former head of Carrier Air Group One and
Twenty-Two, had previously submitted his resignation in October 1945 in protest against
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naval policy. On July 18, 1946, he sent a memorandum to Secretary of the Navy James
Forrestal, Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, the Chief of Operations, and other leaders
within the command structure of the Navy. Peters claimed senior leaders in the Navy
were in favor of keeping control of their fraction of air assets, and this was in
contradiction to some junior officers who anecdotally supported the idea of one unified
air force. The division of airpower between the services was specious and many naval
aviators also agreed with him, and he further argued that he did not believe that aircraft
alone could win a war, nor was the Navy irrelevant or unimportant in future wars.
Airpower had to develop to its fullest, and naval opposition to this was harmful.
Therefore the Navy would be better served by fighting to get their aviators into the Air
Force rather than holding out for more aircraft. He even said that any “decrease in
efficiency of carrier operations caused by unification of our Air Forces will be more than
compensated for by the great increase in efficiency of operations of the air force as a
whole.”339

THE UNITED STATES NAVY AND UNIFICATION

James Forrestal realized that unification could be imposed upon his Service, and
therefore placed himself in the vanguard of the Navy's defense against unification. The
Secretary of the Navy bore the initial burden of arguing the Navy's strategic goals against
an aggressively independent Air Force, because he understood that the Navy had an
essential role for national security. Without a strong Navy, the United States would have
a difficult time confronting international threats and enforcing American policy in
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regions far removed from American air bases. Forrestal had been one of the first to
predict the rise of the Soviet Union as the main threat to a peaceful coexistence and
because of the importance of the Persian Gulf; he ordered a naval presence in the
Mediterranean region. Without Middle Eastern oil, the American military would be
paralyzed and the absence of an American presence in the Middle East would invite the
Soviets to control the region and its oil. Forrestal argued that the best way to maintain
peace was to remain militarily stronger than one's enemies. As a reminder, Forrestal kept
a plaque on the wall in his office that read: "We will never have universal peace until the
strongest army and the strongest navy are in the hand of the most powerful nation.”340
Therefore, to keep the Soviets in check, the United States had to have the ability to
project power far away from North America.
Leadership within the Navy preferred the continuation of the individual Services
and a decentralized form of command, but with more joint committees for defense issues.
In other words, the Navy preferred coordination along with communication rather than
unification. They stressed the need to combine national and military policies through the
institution of high-level agencies that allowed the individual services to retain their
autonomy and permit each service to develop the weapons and strategy that
complemented the best attributes of the Services.341 This position would also let the
Navy develop its own nuclear strategy unrestricted by another Service or a defense
secretary. Senior members of the Navy Department also argued that the establishment of
an independent air force could strip the Navy and the Marine Corps of their air assets and
face the real probability of an Army-Air Force voting bloc versus the Navy on the Joint
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Chiefs of Staff. Naval nuclear strategy could be jeopardized by two Services who did not
believe in the value of carriers, and saw it merely as a duplication of the Air Force's main
task, nuclear bombardment.
The Air Force/Army faction also caused the Navy’s representatives to fear that
the Secretary of Defense would come from either of those two services. If that did
happen, he would likely not appreciate or understand the unique fundamentals of sea
power. Worse, the Secretary could make decisions regarding the role and function of the
Navy independent of a naval rebuttal. If the Navy would not be allowed to introduce a
carrier-based nuclear delivery system with an atomic strategy, it faced the real risk of
being reduced to a simple logistical service in support of the Air Force’s strategic
Armageddon, or a member of smaller military operations including “the protection of
convoys and warfare against submarines.”342
A unified defense system would put the budgetary battles and policy debates that
previously took place in front of Congress into the hands of a single presidential
appointee. Therefore, each weapon system and strategic plans were at the disposal of a
person who might not be prepared or qualified to make a decision that pertained directly
to the defense of the United States. Additionally, if the Secretary of Defense was
promoted from one of the Services, his loyalty might remain with that branch of the
Armed Forces rather than the entire establishment. The President or Congress might not
hear all sides of a strategic debate between the Services because their independent voices
of support or opposition were replaced with a monotonous "unified" opinion, and roles in
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the defense of the nation would be dictated from above rather than developed from
below.
On November 28, 1945, the Navy Department issued a press release about their
position on national security, and expressed that the Americans were victorious in the
World War II because of democracy’s “great outpouring of national power.” There were
deficiencies that the Navy acknowledged in the structure of national defense, because
there had been little integration of foreign and military policies outside of the work that
had been done on the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee. Strategic planning and
decisions had been excellent; unfortunately there were delays in the process, as well as
logistical complications that were exacerbated when it involved Allied cooperation.
During the war, the Navy saw that unified command was usually followed in the Pacific
Theater, except for the separation of the B-29 Superfortresses from other Army Air
Forces units and theater commanders. Gaps in planning and material requirements, and
unnecessary duplication in procurement, were problems that had to be addressed, and in
future wars, the Navy suggested that there had to be better integration of all components
of national security, a central research and development agency, and a central intelligence
service.343
It was also recommended by the Navy that there should be a National Security
Council that combined the key departments tasked with the defense, intelligence, and
foreign policy of the United States. There ought to be a permanent Joint Chiefs of Staff
that would establish unified commands, and would create strategic military programs,
and an independent air force created “with particular reference to their strategic” roles or
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functions. However, the Navy cautioned “a single military department should not be
forced upon the country to establish autonomy for the Army Air Forces” and the Navy
must maintain its integrated air units and control of the “Marine Corps and related
amphibious components.”344 It was critical for the Navy to lay the groundwork to
support the ideas of unification, and prepare a proper defense of its mission, both
traditional and strategic. The Navy had just utilized the epitome of strategic air warfare,
the preemptive strike.
President Truman very publically supported unification for a number of reasons,
including cost and efficiency. He still believed that redundancy in mission and weapons
was a waste of resources, and in peacetime, not even the United States could afford to
squander money. In a message to Congress on December 18, 1945, Truman called for
the unification of the armed forces in “the interest of national security and world peace,”
and he asked them to pass the appropriate legislation to merge the War Department and
Navy Department into a single Department for National Defense. This combined with
the proposed Universal Military Training (UMT) would keep the armed forces prepared
and ready for rapid mobilization, which made for a safer world. The President added that
although the United States had won the last war, it never had a true unified command or
unity of operations. It had, however, poor communications, supply and distribution
systems that “stemmed from the division of leadership in Washington.” Truman further
contended that we had overcome these handicaps in the last war, but now was the time to
eliminate the obsolete defense structure and provide for “the future the soundest, the most
effective, and the most economical kind of structure for our armed forces of which this
most powerful Nation is capable.” It was imperative that this be done as soon as possible
344
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because we “must assume, further, that another war would strike much more suddenly
than the last, and that it would strike directly at the United States.” In the next war, the
United States would not have the time to recover from early setbacks, or overcome
incumbent obsolescence. Truman argued that “strategy, program, and budget are all
aspects of the same basic decisions” and trusting the advice of American scientists and
intelligence personnel, the United States had to clearly understand “the probable nature of
any future attack upon us, determine accordingly how to organize and deploy our military
forces, and allocate the available manpower, material, and financial resources in a
manner consistent with the overall-plan.”345
Truman also addressed airpower, and suggested what many had already known,
that it had developed to the “point where its responsibilities are equal to those of land and
sea power” within the context of overall strategic plans. He preferred to have airpower
contained primarily in one department rather than divided between the War and Navy
Departments or between the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The President argued that it
should not be the Commander-in-Chief’s responsibility to coordinate between the
services, deal with the organizational structure, training, or “the practice of the several
branches of national defense” and instead this would have to come from civilian
leadership of the Armed Forces at the cabinet level. Truman understood this transition
would not be easy; however, the free discussion of ideas would lead to clarification of the
problems already identified despite strong opposition from some senior officers and
civilians. Truman may have understated the depth of the opposition to unification, but he
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also believed that once it had been set as national policy, those opposed would work to
make unification a success.346
Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal and Secretary of War Robert Patterson
sent a joint letter to the President on May 31, 1946, that outlined agreements as well as
substantive differences between the two agencies. The control of aviation assets was one
of the most significant disagreements between Forrestal and Patterson. The War
Department envisioned that the responsibility for “the development, procurement,
maintenance, and operations of the military air resources of the United States” would be
the responsibility of the Air Force, with the exception of “ship, carrier and water-based
aircraft essential to naval operations including those of the U.S. Marine Corps.” The
Navy contended that it had no desire to “compete with, or to dictate to, the Army Air
Forces,” but they remained in opposition to unification because of the “continued efforts
of the Army Air Forces to restrict and limit naval aviation. The Navy believed that if the
USAAF was successful, it “would seriously impair our sea power and jeopardize our
national security” because the Navy would lose its ability to project American power
from the sea. Patterson and Forrestal attested that they had explored all avenues in an
effort to comply with Truman’s wishes, but the inability to “achieve complete unanimity
is due to no reason other than that our respective views on the points of difference are as
sincere as they are divergent.”347
Truman responded to both men and their respective departments on June 15,
1946, when he acknowledged the work that they had done, and admitted while there were
differences of opinions, they were not completely out of line. The President suggested
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that, in reality, after many discussions, the two departments were not that far from
general agreement on most issues. Truman also confirmed what had already been agreed
to in principle, and added that there was no desire to adversely impact the “integrity of
any of the services.” They would be expected to perform their individual missions
“under the unifying direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of National
Defense.” Truman closed the letter by asking for their full cooperation in helping get the
bill through Congress.348
In an effort to build support for his unification initiative, Truman released another
letter and the preliminary report on unification from Patterson and Forrestal to the
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, Elbert D. Thomas. It was also
given to Senator David I. Walsh, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Naval
Affairs, Representative Andrew J. May, Chairman of the House Committee on Military
Affairs, and Carl Vinson, the Chairman of the House Committee on Naval Affairs. In
this letter Truman attempted to define problems within the military structure as he saw it,
and the principles on which unification should be premised. These included a single
military department and three coordinated services that operated in “a common purpose
toward the overall efficiency of the National Defense.” Aviation needs were projected to
be in the Air Force with the exception of carrier and water-based roles for the Navy and
Marine Corps. Those missions should not be restricted as the Navy should “develop its
maximum usefulness” but it would be limited to operations in support of a naval
campaign. A Council of National Defense would integrate foreign and military policies
to allow for better integration of all matters of national security. A national security
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resources board, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a central intelligence agency were also part
of the President’s initiative. Truman made it clear that this form of unification had his
“unqualified endorsement” and it was his hope that the necessary legislation would be
passed as soon as possible.349
Perhaps sensing the growing resentment within the Navy Department, the
President wrote a personal note to Secretary of the Navy Forrestal on January 8, 1947,
that mentioned that Truman was anxious to get unification agreed to so that it could go in
front of Congress with all sides behind it. Truman understood that because of Forrestal’s
gravitas within the Navy, he could contribute more towards unification than anybody
else, and Truman hoped that Forrestal and Patterson would come to an agreement soon
despite the ongoing resistance by the Admirals. Truman reassured Forrestal that he was
just as interested in the Navy as he was in the Army and the Air Force, but he added, “no
single component of the National Defense is as important as the whole picture put
together. I know you can see it just as I can.”350 In a hand written reply, Forrestal
replied that he was “going to do my best.”351
On January 16, 1947, Forrestal and Patterson sent a letter to the President
informing him that they had overcome the impasse that bogged down the unification
process back in June 1946. Their recommendations included; a Council of National
Defense, a War Council, a permanent Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) that would be tasked
with providing the direction of the Armed Forces, the development of strategic plans, and

349

Harry S. Truman, June 15, 1946, Papers of George M. Elsey, Harry S. Truman Administration, Subject
File, Box 82, Folder 3, HST.
350
Harry S. Truman to James Forrestal, January 8, 1947, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President’s
Secretary’s Files, Subject File, Cabinet (Commerce-2) –Defense-1), Box 156, HST.
351
James Forrestal to Harry S. Truman, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President’s Secretary’s Files, Subject
File, Cabinet (Commerce-2) –Defense-1), Box 156, HST.

173
a joint staff that worked below the JCS and implemented their polices and directives.
The Secretary of National Defense would be the nominal head of the armed forces. His
authority was to “establish common policies and common programs for the integrated
operation of the three departments and shall exercise control over and direct their
common efforts to discharge their responsibility for national security.” They further
agreed that it should be through Presidential Executive Order that the roles and missions
of the individual services be defined.352 Truman replied that he was pleased that they
had reached “full and complete agreement on a plan for the unification of the armed
forces.” The President acknowledged that all sides had made compromises to reach the
accord and it was an “admirable compromise between the various views that were
originally held.” Truman thanked the men for their hard work and diligence to reach
unification that would “contribute greatly to the efficiency of our national defense.”353
Although there was an agreement in principle, this did not mean that the Navy would
abandon its position on defense or a naval nuclear strategy without a fight.

JOHN PAUL MAHAN HAS NOT YET BEGUN TO FIGHT…

The day after the agreement was reached, a memo was allegedly sent to the Chief
of Naval Operations Chester Nimitz entitled “How to Beat Unification Despite the
Patterson-Forrestal-Truman Agreement.” The fallacious document had been forwarded
to Symington on January 21, 1947 by USAAF consultant W. Barton Leach, a Law
professor at Harvard University. Leach claimed to have received it “from a source which
I am not at liberty to reveal” and his “delight at the agreement on unification” was
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dampened as a result. In an attempt to cover the real author’s name, or perhaps because
the entire document was actually a USAAF ruse, the memo was signed with the name
“Rear Admiral John Paul Mahan, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Bright Ideas).354
Regardless of the authorship or authenticity of the Mahan document, much of the
document arguably does reflect the attitudes that were prevalent among a large number of
naval officers. The memorandum opened with the idea that the legislative branch was
not committed to this agreement, and it was here that the Navy and its supporters could
continue the fight against a shallow agreement. In a shot at Truman, the agreement was
referred to as one “which that former Artillery officer imposed upon his Cabinet
subordinate and that his Cabinet subordinate secured a reluctant concurrence from
professional Navy men only upon the threat that if they didn’t concur in this they would
get something worse.” The Mahan memo stressed that a watered down and weakened
unification bill was better than no unification. It was hoped the Secretary of National
Defense position would be undermined and weakened to the point that “no man of real
power and prestige” would take the job or be successful in carrying out his
responsibilities because more of the decision making capacity remained in the Congress.
This appeared to be the “only means by which we can really keep the Air Force in its
place” because of increased naval supporters in the legislative branch that “neither the
Army nor the Air Force nor both together can rival or are likely to supersede.”355
To combat a strong unification, the Navy had to push for amendments to the
President’s plan that would allow the Service Secretaries to remain in the Cabinet, and
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allow the budgets of the Army, Navy and Air Force to be submitted individually to the
Congress. The legislators had to be reminded that military policy was “lodged in the
elected representatives of the people” and not in the hands of a single secretary which
would “dilute Congressional control” which was unacceptable. Additionally, the memo
contended that there should be a demand to have the terms of the executive order creating
unification be supported by legislation which could help the Navy since it was evident
that problems could occur because of a “President who has long since shown his
preference for the Army point of view.” The reality of a separate Air Force could not be
fought and few options remained. These included an increase of Congressional
participation in “the formulation of military policy, particularly the budget” and a role in
determining the roles and missions of the services. This could result in “whittling down
the Air Force down to air defense and strategic bombing, we should have no trouble in
keeping them under control particularly as guided missiles gradually supersede strategic
bombardment.” These goals could be attained if the naval officers who testified
maintained their opposition to unification and repeated that in front of allies in Congress.
If the Navy could prevent the New York Times military correspondent Hansen Baldwin
“from spilling over too obviously on the Navy’s side until Congressional hearings take
place, we can put him forward as an impartial expert” and it was presumed that Baldwin
would agree to this plan.356 Whatever the intention of this document it did not
undermine the President’s unification plan. Instead it dramatically displayed the distrust
and animosity that would continue between the services for decades after unification was
achieved.
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THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947

Although it was far from a perfect bill, after months of heated debates in the
House and Senate, Truman signed a final version of the National Security Act of 1947
into law on July 26, 1947. That same day Truman issued Executive Order 9874 that
delineated the functions of the Armed Forces. The common mission between the services
was to support and defend the Constitution from all enemies, provide security for the
United States and its possessions, uphold and advance the national policies and interests
of the nation, and conduct integrated operations on the land, sea and in the air. The Army
was responsible for land warfare, including airborne and joint amphibious operations,
occupation of land areas, and to assist the Air Force and Navy in the accomplishment of
their missions. The Navy maintained control of their aviation assets, but were to be
trained and equipped “primarily for prompt and sustained combat at sea” along with
controlling the sea and suppression of enemy commerce. They were to coordinate
reconnaissance, anti-submarine warfare, and the protection of sea-lanes with the Air
Force. However, there were no restrictions on the types of aircraft controlled by the
Navy for these purposes. They could develop “weapons, tactics, technique, organization
and equipment of naval combat and service elements, coordinating with the Army and the
Air Force in all aspects of joint concern” and maintain the United States Marine Corps
and its missions. The newly created USAF was tasked with “all military aviation forces,
both combat and service, not otherwise specifically assigned” and were to organize and
train their forces to gain and maintain air supremacy, establish air superiority where
required, and conduct strategic reconnaissance missions. Most importantly, they were
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considered to be the strategic air force of the United States. They were to coordinate
weapons development and tactics with the Army and Navy on “all levels of joint concern
and coordinate air defenses among the Services.”357
The National Security Act created a permanent role for the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS) produced the National Security Council (NSC), the National Security Resources
Board (NSRB) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The NSC and the NSRB
were primarily advisory boards for the President. Both organizations had staffs
appointed by the President. The NSC was to assess and appraise U.S. objectives,
commitments, and risks in relation “to our potential military power and with
consideration of policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies
of the Government concerned with national security.” The President was restricted in
who he could name to the Council, but he could invite individuals to meet with the
Council at the President’s discretion, and it was considered a Cabinet-level organization,
but not a replacement for the Cabinet.358
The National Security Act also established an independent United States Air
Force (USAF) as a service equal to the Army and the Navy, but it allowed the Navy to
retain carrier and land-based aviation assets, as well as the Marine Corps with its air units
intact.359 The cries for an independent Air Force were not new, having dated back to the
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days of General Billy Mitchell in the 1920s. Aviation factions in the Army had lobbied
for independence from the senior service, but the strongest arguments for independence,
however, came after World War II, when the Army Air Forces had proven their ability to
perform under war situations. Air Force proponents argued that they had won the war by
dropping the atomic bombs. Because this had made other forms of warfare obsolete, all
air assets retained by the United States should be turned over to the Air Force. In their
minds, the Navy would be used almost exclusively as logistical support for the longrange strategic bombers. The emergence of the United States Air Force created a
multitude of possibilities as well as problems. The Truman administration was adamant
that the overall military budget be reduced, and the Air Force would have to comply.
Previously, personnel within the War department had been responsible for drafting the
budget, and work had been done on the Fiscal 1948-49 budget prior to the passage of the
National Security Act of 1947.360 This was complicated a bit because the Air Force did
not have enough trained personnel to actually prepare the next budget. Therefore, they
hoped to garner enough assistance from the old War Department structure so that they
would be able to fulfill the requirements under the new unification law.361
The critical component of the National Security Act was the institution of the
National Military Establishment (NME) that was tasked with the creation of general
policies and programs for the Armed Forces, to extend control over the military, and take
suitable measures to eliminate unnecessary duplication in procurement, logistics,
transportation, health and research. The NME was to supervise and coordinate budget
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estimates and programs, but the Navy and the Air Force would still be able to control the
procurement of their respective aircraft because of the uniqueness of the requirements of
each service. Congress immediately allocated $2 million to fund the office of the
Secretary of Defense, along with the NSC and the Securities Resources Board. Other
appropriations were to be used from previous budgets that had been agreed to before the
NME assumed its responsibility in September 1947. Orders were also issued to begin the
transfer of personnel, aircraft, and other assets from the Army to the new Department of
the Air Force.362
The NME was to be administered by a Secretary of National Defense, a person
that Army Chief of Staff Dwight D. Eisenhower later described as one who owed no
allegiance to any one Service and was tasked with looking at all aspects of national
security, and would budget, defend, and explain appropriations not “in terms of ground,
air, or sea, or any other factor” but would do so “in terms of security.” The Secretary
would also be responsible for overseeing the strategic plan with the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
now an agency of the Secretary instead of the President.363 In reality, the position
initially did not hold much power at the insistence of the Navy, who did not want the
Secretary to be more than one who unified military policy, integrated budgets, eliminated
wasteful duplications or redundancies, and worked to create harmony within the
Pentagon. As originally structured, the Secretary of Defense would not have real
administrative capabilities to lead the Joint Chiefs of Staff or impose his viewpoint on
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strategy or weapons.364 Secretary of the Navy Forrestal had argued that the size of the
defense bureaucracy was more than what one man could realistically be expected to
handle and the Secretary of Defense would have to function more as a facilitator or
coordinator.365 Forrestal was appointed by Truman to be the first Secretary of Defense
after the Secretary of War, Robert Patterson, turned down the offer in order to return to
the private sector.366 It was more than a bit ironic that Forrestal would assume the office
that he had spent much of his time fighting against.
The National Security Act also created the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
The office was originally staffed with 90 civilian employees and 16 military personnel
who were tasked with the administrative, budgetary, legal, liaison, and public relations
work on behalf of the Secretary of Defense. Forrestal issued a memorandum that
informed the three Service Secretaries that they were not to issue reports or
recommendations to the Bureau of the Budget or the Congress without “interDepartmental coordination.” If this could not be accomplished, then the matter would
have to go to Forrestal to resolve the problem.367 Unfortunately, from a weakened
position, no Secretary of Defense could effectively solve these problems and, as
structured, the National Military Establishment appeared to function like a rudderless
ship, and without substantive changes, Truman’s goal of true unification would not be
possible.
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John L. Sullivan of New Hampshire replaced Forrestal as Secretary of the Navy
and brought with him the aviation perspective that he had from his previous service in the
Navy Department. He was a lawyer and a Navy veteran of the First World War and had
previous governmental service in the Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue
Service. As well, he was sworn in as assistant Secretary of the Navy (Air) onboard the
aircraft carrier Shangri La (CV-38) as it conducted combat operations off of Japan during
the summer of 1945. Joining Sullivan in the Pentagon was Kenneth Royall, who was
appointed as the Secretary of the Army. Royall was originally from North Carolina,
graduated from Harvard, and served in the army during World War I. During World War
II, Royall had been promoted to a temporary rank of Brigadier General and served as the
Deputy Fiscal Director, Army Services. Like Sullivan, he was a lawyer and had previous
government service.368 W. Stuart Symington was promoted to Secretary of the Air Force
after serving as the Assistant Secretary of War for Air. He was the former president and
chairman of the Board of Directors of the Emerson Manufacturing Company. He was
considered an exceptional supervisor, and had great relations with members of Congress,
something that would work to Symington’s favor in the future.369 Of the three Service
Secretaries, Symington was the most visible during the unification battles that predated
the National Security Act and the strategic debates that followed.
Over the next three years these men and their departments laid out the direction of
American defenses for decades to come. In particular, Symington and Sullivan approved
the decisions that moved both the Air Force and the Navy to accept the philosophy of an
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all or nothing war with the Soviet Union. This single-mindedness was the result of
dwindling budgets and a belief in the efficacy of the bomb, but also a confidence and
conviction that their Service was the best equipped in machines and/or doctrine to bomb
the Soviet Union into compliance. The Air Force and the Navy attempted to create a
force in being that would provide deterrence to the Soviet Union, maintain a first strike
capacity, and be able to fly more strategic missions than their sister Service. As nuclear
weapons evolved into smaller and more powerful bombs, both services continued to
develop aircraft that were designed primarily for the delivery of tactical and strategic
bombs. This emphasis was detrimental to all other missions, and created far more
problems for future generations. Jack Broughton, a USAF combat pilot later wrote that it
was this “ironclad party line of stupid and inflexible tactical ignorance” which in part
created “astronomical and unacceptable fighter losses” during the Vietnam War.370

MY ENEMY’S ENEMY . . . THE SOVIET UNION

There had been many indications of a growing chasm between the United States
and the Soviet Union dating back to at least the Yalta Conference in February 1945.
Problems relating to the interpretations of wartime agreements between the Western
Allies and the Soviets included the fate of Soviet occupied Poland, Eastern Europe and
Iran. Together, these placed a chill of uncertainty across the globe, led to the Cold War,
and forced the United States to take a more active role in world affairs for the first time in
its history. At a 1942 address at Princeton, his alma mater, James Forrestal had argued
that in the postwar period the United States would no longer “be permitted to discard its
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arms and to rely upon the protocols of good faith and general statements of goodwill.”371 There was no certainty as to how or why a war could break out between the
United States and the USSR, and if it did, how that war would be fought. It could be
argued that a new war with the Soviets would be waged as the last one had, through the
mobilization of industrial bases that would certainly favor the United States. Another
threat presented by the Soviets was the massive ground forces they could mobilize.
When protected by air units, the Soviets could seek to capture critical areas of production
“with a view of holding the populations of those areas as hostages.”372 Regardless of
how the war began, it was presumed that any war with the Soviet Union would eventually
involve the exchange of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction, including
chemical or biological armaments.
In late November 1946, United States Army Major General Hugh Knerr, the
Secretary General of the Air Board, forwarded a document to Stuart Symington that
addressed war with the Soviet Union and argued that the United States had been at war
with the USSR since May 8, 1945. It was not a war like the World War that had just
concluded, but rather it was a war fought over ideology, and a war that was conducted
while “diplomatic relations continue in a formal fashion.” Knerr contended that the
Soviet Union was using “the façade of this time gaining maneuver” to maximize their
resources and technology to “overtake and surpass” their Western counter-parts. Even
more, once the secrets of the bomb were breached, the Soviets would become much more
confrontational. In the USSR, the ends clearly justified the means, and they were
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prepared to do whatever it took to win the war of ideology. He also believed that the
Soviet people were willing to sacrifice, and were intensely patriotic in comparison to the
average American, whom Knerr saw as “so intensely self-centered.”373
Knerr predicated his arguments on what was assumed to be a basic Soviet
strategy: expansionism with the ultimate goal of world domination. While Knerr’s
predictions might seem to be a bit outlandish, they certainly were not for the time frame
that they were created. One must remember that many inside the Armed Forces were not
willing to let down their guard lest a new type of Pearl Harbor attack drag the United
States into a war that some felt America could not win. It is easy to see the antiCommunist hysteria inside this document and simply disregard it as the work of an
overzealous career officer who was looking after the best interest of his department. But
Knerr did not have the advantage of six decades of hindsight to draft his document nor
the comfort of knowing how wrong it was. It is also doubtful that there were many in the
Pentagon who were willing to risk this type of catastrophe on the assumption that the
danger was not real, nor possible, if the United States did not respond in some fashion.
Concern about the international situation was evident at the first meeting of the
National Security Council in September 1947. A Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
briefing document was circulated that framed the position of the United States in context
with the rest of the world.374 The CIA affirmed the belief of many that the Soviet Union
was the only nation across the globe that was actually capable of threatening the U.S., but
they also contended that the Soviets lacked the “requisite naval and air forces” to be a
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direct threat to the continental United States. As a result, the USSR was currently
incapable of military action outside of Europe or Asia; however their military forces were
such that they could overrun the areas near their own borders without much resistance.
It was believed that the Soviets did have a number of bombers that were capable of
striking the United States, but these were limited to one-way missions that could “be no
more than harassing in effect” but if they eventually attained atomic weapons, these
bombers could be disastrous. It was not known for certain if the Soviets currently had
nuclear weapons, but it was “considered improbable that the USSR has such a bomb or
that it can develop one before 1950.”375
CIA estimates placed Soviet industrial capacity to be approximately what it had
been in 1939 prior to the beginning of the Second World War, and “certainly no greater,”
but there was no longer a balance of power in Europe or Asia to offset Soviet interests.
This presented the USSR with an opportunity to take advantage of their position of power
against their neighbors. The CIA report did not believe at the time that the Soviets would
resort to “overt military aggression in present circumstances” because of the stress that
the occupation of Western Europe would place on the USSR. The report noted that open
aggression would risk a war with the United States that would result in disaster for the
Soviet Union because they would be subject to conventional and atomic strikes, and an
eventual amphibious assault. Soviet industrial resources and capabilities were inferior to
the United States, and they were not in a position to win a short war let alone a sustained,
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protracted war against the U.S.376 If these estimates were correct, it would play to the
strength of the American plans for national defense, the strategic bomber and the atomic
bomb, if that was in fact the direction of U.S. foreign policy.
The real threat from the Soviet Union was not overt military aggression against
American interests, but in the possibility of the Soviets taking advantage of the economic
weakness of Western Europe, that could lead to economic collapse, and the “consequent
ascension to power of elements subservient to the Kremlin.” It was felt that the Soviets
were monitoring the tough economic times that Western Europe was suffering through,
and appeared to be ready to benefit from the situation. The policy of the Soviet Union
was to continue to avoid war with the U.S. by “relying on the disinclination of the United
States to resort to war on its own initiative.” There was the possibility of an accidental
outbreak of war, but it was “probable that the USSR would not intend its provocations to
lead to armed conflict with the U.S. and will avoid that result insofar as its intelligence
provides adequate guidance.” U.S. policy needed then to prioritize the stabilization and
economic recovery of Europe and Asia that would counter and contain Soviet influences
across the globe. Meanwhile, it was presumed that the Soviets would continue to prepare
for war and work to develop an atomic capability along with strategic and naval forces
capable of going to war with the United States.377
These concepts or perceptions about covert Soviet intentions, or the possibility of
overt aggression, created a dilemma for advocates of airpower. One could not use the
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threat of strategic strikes to counter economic problems or political instability in allied,
friendly, or even enemy states. Still, the evidence presented suggested that while there
was not an immediate threat of war, the United States could not sit idly and wait until the
Soviets were fully prepared to launch a war, because then it would be too late.

THE UNITED STATES PREPARES FOR WAR WITH THE USSR

Against this backdrop of fear and uncertainty, the American military had begun to
prepare for the contingency of war with its erstwhile ally as World War II was in its
waning days. On June 10, 1945, a USAAF aircraft flew one of the first
photoreconnaissance missions over western and southern Europe. This was just over a
month after the end of the war.378 Reconnaissance missions like these, coupled with
electronic intelligence gathering by U.S. Navy aircraft in the Baltic Sea or the Pacific
Ocean, were essential to knowing the location of Soviet targets and defenses. It was also
understood that if all of the American bombs were delivered in a massive strike, the
Soviet Union and their satellite states could be crippled. Unlike Germany and Japan, that
had concentrated manufacturing centers easily in range of American aircraft, Soviet
centers were scattered across Europe and Asia. Cities such as Moscow, Leningrad,
Stalingrad, and Kiev included urban, industrial, political, transportation, electrical and
petroleum centers and were included in the target lists.379 Originally there were twenty
Soviet cities targeted for the strategic air campaign, and the defeat of these twenty cities
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would result in the estimated loss of 90 percent of Soviet aircraft production, 88 percent
of truck production, 86 percent of tank production, 67 percent of crude oil, and 65 percent
of refined oil.380 By 1948 the list had grown to 210 cities, seventy of which were
deemed to be the most important, and atomic strikes on these targets combined with
conventional bombing would eliminate or severely restrict the Soviets' ability to wage
war.381 Even if 95 percent of the attacking planes were shot down on the way to the
target, the remaining five percent of the offensive force could still cripple the Soviet’s
military forces, and lead to the erosion of civilian morale as casualties mounted.382 The
destruction of the Soviet will to resist was "the fundamental objective” of this potential
war, and by destroying Soviet means to resist, the United States would force the Soviets
to discover that further pursuit of the conflict would be unprofitable.383
There was a disconnect between American nuclear strategy and the fighting spirit
of the Soviet Union, the primary enemy in the fledgling Cold War. The USSR had been
decimated by the German invasion in 1941, and the subsequent brutal fighting that took
place on its own soil during World War II, but they emerged from the war as the second
most powerful nation in the world. The Soviets had endured vicious fighting and a
medieval style siege around Leningrad for more than 900 days, and as such, support for
Soviet Premier Josef Stalin grew exponentially. Soviet citizens rallied around the
communist leader in an effort to save their nation, and it appeared that the spirit of the
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Soviet people was indomitable. Perhaps the greatest example of Soviet tenacity in the
face of annihilation was the epic battle for Stalingrad in late 1942 and early 1943. In a
battle that raged for five months, more than 99% of the city was physically destroyed and
the civilian population of the city on the Volga River had been decimated. In its darkest
days, the Germans had occupied more than 90% of the city. Nevertheless, from those
meager remains in Stalingrad, the Red Army rallied and launched a series of
counterstrokes that led to the ultimate victory at Stalingrad, but at a very heavy cost. Of
the more than half of a million people who lived in Stalingrad before the battle, only an
estimated 9,700 civilians had survived the epic battle.384 It therefore begs the question, if
this battle did not crush the will of the Soviets to survive when they faced defeat, why
would an atomic bomb, which could do the same amount of damage, albeit in an instant,
have a different result? If the Red Army and the Soviet people could stare down
starvation, constant bombardment, and bitter cold to hold onto Stalingrad, would they not
be as determined to win a war against the United States and its allies?
By the late spring of 1948, the NSC concluded that the best option for the defeat
of “Soviet-directed world communism” was not a defensive policy. Instead it was
believed that the United States had to take a lead in “organizing a world-wide counteroffensive aimed at mobilizing and strengthening our own and anti-communist forces in
the non-Soviet world.” The first steps in this American counter offensive against the
USSR included the strengthening of the NME through conscription of military forces,
conversion of the arms industry, and the maintenance of an “overwhelming US
superiority” in nuclear weapons. The latter idea could be reconsidered if there were an
international agreement on the control of atomic weapons. The priority was to safeguard
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Western Europe economically and militarily, as well as to take the appropriate steps to
conserve other areas that were threatened by the Soviets internationally, and even
domestically. It had to be made clear to the Soviets at the proper time that the United
States was determined to oppose them and their aggression, to avoid an accidental war
“through Soviet miscalculation of how far the Western Powers might be pushed.” Bipartisan support in the United States was essential if these policies were to be put in place
and ultimately be effective.385

THE EVOLUTION AND EXPANSION OF SOVIET DEFENSES

The Soviet military had not sat idly by after the end of the Second World War or
cowered in fear of American nuclear or strategic supremacy; they understood that the
greatest threat to Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe came from the air rather than from
American or Western ground forces. In 1945 the Soviet air defense system was weak and
they had not accumulated the experience of defending their nation against strategic
bombers. The German Luftwaffe, with the exception of Stalingrad, had used small and
medium bombers rather sparingly against Soviet cities, and did not attempt to use
strategic air warfare against the USSR. In the years immediately following the war, the
Soviets lacked high performance interceptors that were capable of challenging American
bombers like the B-29, or their fighter escorts. They also lacked a radar net that allowed
for advanced warning of airborne attacks on the Soviet Union itself. To limit their
vulnerability to an American attack and the U.S. nuclear monopoly, the Soviets
developed their defenses around three major points, new aircraft built with jet engines, an
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expanded radar network that closed the gaps that the Americans hoped to exploit, and
they perfected an air defense system based around Ground Control Interception (GCI) of
enemy aircraft. GCI linked Soviet fighters to ground controllers who monitored radar
screens and vectored Soviet fighters to their targets.386
The Soviets had also taken note of one of the fundamental lessons of strategic
bombing campaigns of World War II; the vulnerability of bombers to fighter interception.
Throughout the war, tens of thousands of allied aircrews were lost when enemy fighters
shot down their bombers. This happened because the Allies could not control the air over
the targets, and it was only after the introduction of long-range fighters that they were
able to wrest control of the air from the enemy and begin to reduce bomber casualties.
The introduction of German jet fighters in late 1944 threatened allied air superiority, but
the jets were too few in number and introduced far too late to have a substantive impact
on the bombing campaigns. The Soviets were determined not to have such a defenseless
position, and began to improve their fighter aircraft to defend the skies of the USSR from
American bombers.
The Soviets had limited experience in defending their airspace against waves of
high altitude bombers, let alone a single bomber with an atomic bomb, because war on
the Eastern Front did not involve high altitude strategic bombing. It appeared that the
most effective manner of Soviet defense against an air assault prior to 1945 was their
ability to destroy the enemy’s aircraft while they sat on the ground.387 The inferiority of
Soviet fighters at high altitudes meant that, as the United States planned their postwar
386

For a description of how GCI works in combat or training, please see: Marshall L. Michel III, Clashes:
Air Combat over North Vietnam, 1965-1972 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997), 40-45, and
Steve Davies, Red Eagles: America's Secret MiGs (Oxford: Osprey Publishing Limited, 2008), 40.
387
Reina Pennington, "Pilot Initiative in the Soviet Air Forces," in The Soviet Air Forces, ed. Paul J.
Murphy (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 1984), 149-156.

192
strategic bombing operations, it was assumed that American bombers were virtually
invulnerable to Soviet interception because it appeared the B-29s could fly higher, faster
and farther than anything that the Soviets operated in 1945. This would not remain the
case, and American bomber invincibility did not keep pace with reality as Soviet jet
technology took a massive leap forward at the end of the war.
When the Red Army pushed through the remains of Nazi Germany in the spring
of 1945, they captured reams of German aviation technology including blueprints for jet
aircraft, crews, weapons, and most importantly, designers and engineers. The Soviets
were able to use this war bounty to bypass the rudimentary development of their own
aircraft designs, and begin producing advanced aircraft and engines based on indigenous
or German designs. Among the materials captured by the Soviets were two different
types of German jet engines that were put into production by the Soviet Union to power
their first generation of jet fighters. Though small in numbers, they had sufficient
performance to intercept any existing American bombers between 1946 and 1947. In
addition to these aircraft, new generations of Soviet fighters were developed with greater
performance than previously imagined.388 Among the new aircraft was arguably the most
famous Soviet jet fighter ever produced, the MiG-15.
The Mikoyan-Gurevich (MiG) Design Bureau began work in 1947 on a new antibomber interceptor with knowledge gleaned from German experiences with swept-wing
aircraft.389 Features for operations at high altitudes, necessary for the interception of
American bombers, were incorporated into the design, including a pressurized cockpit for
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pilot comfort.390 An unlicensed copy of a British jet engine, which had been sent to the
USSR in 1946, and was manufactured in large numbers, powered the new MiG fighter.391
The MiG-15s were assigned to air defense where they were directed to protect specific
regions or potential targets, were well armed, and could take down any known American
aircraft if they strayed into Soviet airspace. By 1950, the Soviet air defense had more
than 1000 MiG-15s in service, with another 500 in different departments of the Soviet
Air Forces.392 American knowledge of the new Soviet fighter was limited at first, but it
was not a complete surprise, as is often reported, to Western personnel when the MiGs
were first encountered over Korea in 1950.393 Photographs and drawings of the basic
shape of the aircraft were in American hands in December of 1948.394
Referred to in early 1950 American reports as the MiG-14, the new fighter was
thought to have a high speed of 587 knots at sea level and 425 knots at an estimated
service ceiling of 47,500 feet.395 Against this, the USAF presumed that the B-36, which
“has a top speed today of more than 350 miles per hour (304 knots) and can fly well
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above 40,000 feet” would still be able to penetrate Soviet defenses.396 Later properly
identified, the MiG was first encountered in large numbers by the air forces of the United
Nations over Korea in 1950, and its performance was better than expected. It outclassed
every American fighter with the exception of the F-86 Sabre and had the ability to disrupt
Allied control of the air over Korea. Soviet flown MiGs were so effective at intercepting
and destroying B-29s over North Korea that, at the directive of the Air Force Chief of
Staff Hoyt S. Vandenberg, the B-29s began night bombing operations to reduce
American casualties.397 One could only imagine how the MiG-15 would have fared
against a naval nuclear bomber or even the B-36, with performance only marginally
better than the B-29, as they attempted to breach Soviet defenses in an actual war.
On the heels of the MiG-15 was an improved design, the MiG-17, one of the most
exported combat jets of all time. The newer MiG featured a different wing, refined
fuselage, and an improved engine for performance far superior to the previous model, as
it could fly at more than 562 knots at an altitude of 45,931 feet with a service ceiling of
more than 54,000 feet.398 In the 1960s, U.S. pilots over North Vietnam who encountered
the MiG-17 learned to respect its abilities as a dogfighter with the capability to repeatedly
interrupt American control of the air. Even against aircraft that were faster and more
sophisticated, a competently flown MiG-17 could hold its own in aerial combat. Against
a slow bomber like the B-36, or the early American naval bombers, it would have had the
ability to make repeated attacks on the lumbering prop-driven aircraft and would have
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disrupted the U.S. attempts to control the air over the target area. Examples of this could
be seen in the Soviet response to Allied overflights of the Soviet Union that dated to the
late 1940s.399 These operations over the coastal and polar regions of the Soviet Union
had gauged Soviet radar equipment and fighter response time. Several flights were done
directly over the Soviet Union and numerous American aircraft suffered various degrees
of damage, and a number of them were shot down, including several RB-29s, RB-50s,
P2V Neptunes, and at least one C-130.400 If these had been first strike bombers, the
chances of successfully winning the war were greatly diminished. Moreover, there were
more advanced MiGs in development in the 1950s as well as several designs from the
Sukhoi Design Bureau that eventually had sufficient speed and performance to intercept
even the famed U-2 spyplane.401

SOVIET RADAR DEFENSES

Concurrent with the rise of Soviet jet fighters and interceptors was the second
plank of the Soviet aerial defense capabilities, the radar net. The large physical size of
the Soviet Union precluded masses of Soviet defenses against all possible routes to
potential Soviet targets. The Soviets, however, could calculate with relative accuracy the
approximate direction that USAF land based bombers, either from the Continental United
States, the United Kingdom, or other allied bases, would have to attack from. Since all of
399
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SAC’s bombers initially lacked an aerial refueling capacity, their range was limited to
direct attacks along the shortest routes to and from the Soviet Union, and therefore, a
large number of Soviet air defenses could concentrate on probable ingress routes of the
American bombers, and ring those areas with radar units and fighter bases. Naval
bombers presented a greater problem to defend against because they could be launched
from almost anywhere on the periphery of the Communist bloc. The Soviets would not
know precisely the exact routes of the Navy’s heavy attack aircraft, so they would have to
expand their radar networks to eliminate all potential routes that could be used by such an
attacker.
The Soviets expanded the range and abilities of their radar net so that by 1951, the
Soviet early-warning radar system began at the western edge of Eastern Europe and ran
around the perimeter of the nation. After the Korean War, the Soviets worked to develop
an airborne early-warning radar system that could detect bombers from high altitudes all
the way down to sea level. Introduced in 1955, this structure was in place, but fairly
primitive in ability. There remained gaps, however, until the Soviet experience with their
space program bolstered the ability of both the radar and the crews that operated them.402
To complement the land and air-based units, Soviet naval forces converted old destroyers
into radar picket ships.403 These could be deployed to cover the expanses of the Pacific
Ocean and the Baltic Sea. By 1962, the Soviets employed more than 5,000 radar sets at
over 2,000 different locations, and this provided the USSR with radar coverage of up to
220 miles around the perimeter of the Soviet Union. If American nuclear bombers
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overflew any of the Soviets’ allies or client states on the way to the USSR, it was
presumed that the Soviet defenses would be alerted and prepared to defend their
homeland by intercepting and destroying the incoming bombers. The Soviets would also
have advance warning about the coming raids and the critical element of surprise would
be lost.
Communist jet fighters would be vectored to the targets by the final plank of the
Soviet defense system, Ground Control Interception (GCI). To prevent the ingress of
hostile bombers to their respective targets, Soviet radar units would send an alert that
would launch interceptor aircraft. Once airborne, a ground controller would direct the
Soviet fighters to the intruder and oversee its eventual destruction. Soviet and Soviettrained pilots were well versed in GCI and North Korean and Chinese pilots proved that
GCI was effective even at night. Over Korea, GCI was used to direct MiG-15 fighters
against formations of B-29s, even those operating under the cover of darkness. So
effective were the interceptions that night fighter escorts were provided to protect the B29s from the communist fighters.404 It was reported that the “sole mission” of Soviet and
Eastern bloc MiG-15 pilots was air defense through GCI interceptions, and they were
well trained. They were able to maximize the limited range of their MiGs to disrupt
American control of the skies over North Korea.405
In Eastern Europe, GCI could be particularly effective because of the integration
and cooperation of the individual air forces into the larger Soviet defense system. The
goal of GCI was to bring as many Soviet defenders against the intruders at a point as far
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away as possible from a Soviet target. If the bombers were quickly brought under attack,
they could be forced to abandon their mission and turn back, drop their bombs before the
actual targets, or they could be destroyed in the air if they pressed on to the target. B-36s
that were forced to drop their bombs prematurely or even abandon the attacks minimized
the effectiveness of the first strike and the chances of winning the war would drop
dramatically.
GCI was not perfect because ground equipment was prone to failure and
electronic counter measures (ECM) could disrupt Soviet radar coverage. The system
could also be saturated if enough bombers hit the radar net at the same time. The efficacy
of GCI could also be minimized if the attackers flew at low level, under the radar
coverage. This tactic could work for fast flying jets, but not unwieldy propeller-driven
bombers. Arguably, the greatest flaw in GCI, however, was the vast expanse of the
Soviet Union that allowed for gaps in the coverage in the early-to-mid 1950s. U.S. or
Allied tactical aircraft could also strike the Soviet air bases or radar units at the beginning
of a war and cripple certain areas of the GCI coverage. An example of this was the
Israeli Air Force’s attacks on Egyptian and Syrian airfields at the beginning of the Six
Day War in 1967, where the Israeli jets destroyed most of the enemy air forces on the
ground and gave them air supremacy for the duration of the war.406 The effectiveness of
the Soviet GCI system could be reduced in the event of a full-scale war that ignited
spontaneously because confusion would encompass the nation in a cloud of war, and this
might allow American planes to sneak through undetected. Aircraft with small radar
signatures might be able to exploit gaps in the radar coverage, but extremely large aircraft
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are easier to pick up on radar. If the Soviets started the war on their own terms, it was
probable that the GCI would be at full strength and ready to take on the B-36.

POSSIBILITIES

Only two years after the end of World War II, the United States was attempting to
gear up for what many considered the probability of war with the Soviet Union. The idea
of unification and the creation of the National Military Establishment forged a new
direction for American defenses. With a monopoly on atomic weapons, and the rise of an
independent Air Force that could take the war to the enemy as the wartime experience
with Japan had demonstrated, the possibilities of imposing American will on the postwar
world seemed limitless. It was understood that the skies over the Soviet Union would be
hard to breach, but certainly, it could be done. The substantive cracks in unification, the
small amount of nuclear bombs in the arsenal, and the growing Soviet defenses created a
much different reality from what was being publicly stated. Unlike the war with Japan,
where the enemy was stretched to its limit and in the final throes of defeat, a war with the
Soviet Union would be much more difficult to win, and it is beyond reason to assume that
they would surrender or sue for peace just because a few targets were hit. Even more, as
the late 1940s turned into the early 1950s, the chances of American bombers winging
their way to victory over the communist state seemed less likely with each passing year.
With President Truman and Congress preparing to open hearings on the role of airpower
in 1947 and Truman’s demand to reduce defense expenditures, the cost savings appeal of
nuclear bombers was clearly understood.
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CHAPTER FOUR
DEFINING THE FUTURE: THE PRESIDENT’S AIR POLICY COMMISSION

We need a much stronger air establishment than we now have. The reason for this is that
we can no longer follow our traditional procedure of relying entirely on the Navy as our
force in being in peacetime. The President’s Air Policy Commission407
On August 6, 1945, an airplane bearing the insignia of the United States Army Air
Forces dropped an atom bomb on Hiroshima. Militarily speaking, at that same hour the
security frontiers of all nations disappeared from the map. Congressional Aviation
Policy Board408

After a year of internal conflict regarding service unification and the U.S. defense
stature in 1947, there was growing pressure on the Truman administration to formulate a
policy for American military and civilian aviation for the future. Grave concerns about
the economic sustainability and health of the American aviation industry had been raised
already in 1945. As late as 1948, it was apparent that aircraft corporations were not
interested in committing scarce resources on new or experimental designs. These might
not be profitable if an insufficient number of aircraft were ordered.409 Truman had
attempted to address the concerns of the industry, and appropriate governmental
authorities, when he ordered the creation of a committee to examine American aviation.
In September 1946 the President issued an executive order to create the Air Coordinating
Committee (ACC) whose members included representatives from the “State, War, Post
Office, Navy, and Commerce Departments and the Civil Aeronautics Board.” This newly
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appointed committee was tasked with the examination of “aviation problems and
development affecting more than one participating agency” and “develop and recommend
integrated policies” that would coordinate the aviation actions of the United States.410
However, the political landscape of the nation changed dramatically in November 1946
when the Republicans regained control of the House and the Senate for the first time
since the Herbert Hoover administration. The Republicans changed President Truman’s
dealings with Congress as he understood that their views of the economy, domestic
concerns, the American presence across the globe, the Containment policy, and defense
spending were at times dramatically different than his. This placed additional pressure on
the President to further define what the American air policy was going to be in the early
years of the Cold War.
Reacting to recommendations from the State, War, Navy and Commerce
Departments and the Air Coordinating Committee, President Harry Truman authorized
another temporary committee in 1947 to examine aviation issues in greater detail.411
Formally called the President’s Air Policy Commission, it held more than 200 formal
meetings between September 8, and December 3, 1947. They were to scrutinize all
aspects of the American aviation industry, defense needs, and ultimately report their
results back to the President. In his letter to the members of the committee, Truman
stated that it was apparent that new aviation technologies had outdated many traditional
assumptions on airpower and additional national security concerns had been raised.
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Another reason for Truman’s decision to further investigate airpower was
political. The Republican controlled congress established the Joint Congressional
Aviation Policy Board to consider air policy from their perspective as well as that of the
districts and industries they represented. The health of the aviation industry was more
than an academic discussion to this board because it was their voters who had been laid
off by the large and small aviation companies following the reduction of defense
spending since the end of the war. Senator Owen Brewster of Maine and California
Representative Carl Hinshaw chaired this congressional investigation. The congressional
committee met concurrently with the President’s commission and issued a separate
report, but it was assumed that both committees would “work in close communication”
with the possibility of “conflicting conclusions.”412 As both committees began their
respective analysis of American air policy, both the Republicans and the Democrats
would work towards a conclusion that would embrace a strong nuclear strategy as the
preeminent American defense policy and a belief in the efficacy of nuclear strategic air
warfare.

THE PRESIDENT’S AIR POLICY COMMISSION

By 1947 it was apparent that the international complexities of the Cold War
would impact many of decisions made concerning the procurement of American strategic
aircraft and their implementation in the advent of war. The Truman administration was
forced to deal with deteriorating relations with the Soviet Union, the rise of communist
parties in previously pro-western states such as France and Italy, and the slow collapse of
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the Nationalist Chinese forces in their civil war with the Chinese Communist Party.
Against this backdrop, the President’s Air Policy Commission was organized to
investigate all aspects of aviation for current and future needs, including commercial air
transportation, and “aircraft utilization by the armed services.” The final
recommendations of the committee were to go “beyond the limits of any one phase of
aviation” and should be so broad in scope and purpose that they “will assist in revising
old policies and in framing new ones, and will serve as a guide for formulating a
carefully considered national air policy.” For five months, hearings were conducted
under the chairmanship of Thomas K. Finletter, a lawyer and former special assistant to
the previous Secretary of State Cordell Hull.413 Years later Finletter stated that he did not
have the “slightest idea” why he was selected for this position, as he had no previous
relationship with aviation or the President. He also added that he assumed that
“somebody suggested my name. I don't know whether I had demonstrated any particular
qualifications for it, I really have no idea. I can't answer the question.”414 One could
speculate that if Truman wanted a committee that would counter the Republican
congressional investigation, but also one that would not have much influence on the
President’s ultimate decisions regarding defense spending, a relative unknown like
Finletter would make perfect sense to chair the President’s Air Policy Commission.
Another assumption could be that Truman hoped that an individual with no
preconceptions about airpower or which service should be primarily responsible for
strategic bombing would make the best choice for the committee.
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The editor of the Denver Post, Palmer Hoyt, joined Finletter on the committee
along with Arthur D. Whiteside, the president of Dunn and Bradstreet, George Baker and
Henry Ford II. Ford resigned from the committee before the work was completed and
was replaced by John C. McCone, who functioned as the committee’s advisor on national
security. He later served as an Assistant Secretary of the Air Force and director of the
Central Intelligence Agency.415 Finletter hoped to get Archibald Cox to serve as the
Executive Director of the Committee, but the future special prosecutor was not available,
and therefore S. Paul Johnson, a Navy captain and former deputy director to the United
States Strategic Bombing Survey, filled the position.416
For the duration of the work, the Finletter Commission held court on the United
State’s aviation policies, inspected factories, aviation facilities, and even an operational
aircraft carrier. They produced thousands of pages of testimony on the future of aviation
in America.417 Commission witnesses were asked to file statements in advance of their
testimony. Other individuals who were not credited with formal testimony provided
background information and assistance to the commission, both in oral or written
testimony. Because civil air transportation and manufacturing are outside the realm of
this dissertation, and have been covered in other works they will not be reexamined here.
Focus instead will be on relevant arguments concerning the link between American
security, international policy and airpower. Testimony from Air Force and Navy
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witnesses confirmed the belief of those Departments in the efficacy of strategic bombing,
and the delivery of atomic weapons, as the most expedient way to win a war.
It should be noted that the Finletter Commission was not the first Presidential
examination of airpower in the United States. The first was conducted two decades
earlier under Dwight Morrow on order of President Calvin Coolidge in 1925. Secretary
of the Navy James Forrestal briefed Truman on the work of the Morrow Board, and
forwarded a copy of the report to the President on April 20, 1945.418 The findings of the
Morrow Board reflected confusion and disagreements between the Army and Navy about
a variety of issues. However the report also stated that “national policy calls for the
establishment of the air strength of our Army primarily as an agency of defense” and
naval air forces were to be on par with other nation’s naval air assets. The Morrow Board
suggested that the air strength of “any particular power should be considered in relation
to its anticipated value in the scheme of national defense of that power and in relation,
likewise, to the remainder of the military establishment.”419 Unfortunately for the
American military in the late 1940s, the belief in the bomb and the ability of each service
to deliver that weapon in support of American national policy trumped a balance of
power within the Pentagon and created a sense of chaos and disunity at a time when the
international situation demanded greater unity of purpose in the name of national
security.

THE ARMY’S POSITION
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The opening days of the President’s Air Policy Commission were focused on air
transportation, manufacturing, research and development and governmental organization.
On Armistice Day, November 11, 1947, the Army Chief of Staff, General Dwight D.
Eisenhower opened hearings that dealt with air policy in relationship to national security.
It is important to understand the position of the Army in regards to airpower because they
represented one third of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and could sway any decision that
resulted from an Air Force versus Navy divide. Eisenhower testified that America was a
force for peace and the strength of the United States is a “defense of stability and of order
and of peace.” Ike suggested that if the U.S. believed in the ability of airpower to deter
war, or in its retaliatory capacity, it needed to be a force in being, not simply one in
blueprints, as it takes time to build such a force. The United States faced an attack with
World War II weapons, although the offensive capability of an enemy was certainly
going to change in the years ahead. Ike argued that it was time to start building the Air
Force that the United States envisioned five years hence.420
Eisenhower did not think that the United States needed to have a tremendous
force to deter an enemy, but a modern, highly trained force that, in conjunction with the
ground and naval forces, supported by a healthy “productive capacity” would be an Air
Force that would be “respected elsewhere in the world.” Ike argued that to have an
effectual Air Force it needed to be supported in three ways, operations, maintenance, and
production, and that the absence of one of those elements meant there was no Air Force.
In Europe during World War II, the Army Air Forces lost 25% of its combat force
monthly, and if that happened again, he argued that the U.S. “must have a great
420
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productive capacity, or the forces with which you start a war are within three months
impotent, and they cannot be used.”421 The remainder of Eisenhower’s testimony
reflected his views on unification, tactical airpower, manufacturing, and overall security.
The Army Chief of Staff did not appear to take a stand one way or another on strategic air
warfare or the control of atomic weapons. He was the epitome of unification and joint
operations; certainly he took an apolitical stand.
The antithesis of congenial Eisenhower was perhaps the most polarizing military
figure in American history, General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander
Allied Powers (SCAP) who was headquartered in Japan. MacArthur did not appear
before the Finletter committee, citing the pressure of his duties in Japan, however, he had
his view forwarded to the commission. A top-secret transcript had been prepared by
MacArthur’s senior air commander, Lt. General Ennis O. Whitehead, and after its
approval by MacArthur, it was sent to Finletter in November 1947.422 While it was not
necessarily MacArthur’s words that were in the statement, it certainly appears to have
captured his feelings on airpower, and what it took to win a war in the modern age. Even
more, the statement referred directly to the Soviet Union as the enemy that the United
States had to be prepared to battle.
Whitehead’s report encouraged the maintenance of an atomic striking force, under
the command of a single individual, that was capable of destroying “at least the fifty most
important targets in the USSR in a single day.” North American bases had to be
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adequately defended so that they could launch their retaliatory strikes within 24 hours.
They had to be located “close enough to the targets to save the crews, though not
necessarily the aircraft, for future missions” and these sites would change as the combat
radius of nuclear armed aircraft increased. Air defenses would have to be strong enough
to grind down or minimize the efficacy of an attacking force. Included in these defenses
would be an early warning network comprised of airborne, naval, and land-based radar
networks with adequate coverage for signal communications to control the protecting
forces. A strong air transportation network that was “trained and equipped in peacetime
for the support of the Striking Force, the Air Defense Force, and for the essential
peacetime military airlift and training of the Army and Navy” was also required. The
aviation and weapons industry needed to be fully integrated to support combat and
transportation units and the long-range procurement and ongoing research and
development of new weapons that included “the maximum development of atomic,
bacteriological, and other weapons of mass destruction.”423 To implement this program
the aircraft industry needed to be properly funded, maintained, and dispersed around the
nation in areas that were “remote for avenues of probable attack” yet within the support
of the available “transportation, materials, electric power, and personnel.” It was
understood that an attack on these areas with “weapons of mass destruction would
paralyze our country” and there would be no mobilization of industry or the military as
confusion “would be the order of the day.” The only choice left would be to deliver a
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“paralyzing blow against our enemy” that would limit its initial success or the United
States would be conquered.424
As it was evident that the only nation that could be considered a major enemy was
the Soviet Union, at a minimum, the U.S. needed to have an atomic strike force that could
cripple the USSR in one retaliatory strike. The United States needed to have the best
nuclear weapons that it could produce, and it must be ready to move for a strike “within a
space of a few hours to prevent further attacks on the U.S.” It was noted that the United
States could not rely on its overseas bases in the United Kingdom, Western Europe, and
North Africa for its immediate retaliatory attacks, and although the U.S. could capture
bases in Iceland, it would be problematic. This meant that the American response would
be centered from bases in Okinawa, Alaska, Northern Canada and Greenland. The
Americans would have to move key technicians and equipment needed for nuclear
delivery so the transportation network, including commercial air transportation, had to be
secured. The United States had to maintain a vital aircraft industry and ample
intelligence of the enemy to provide estimates on their numbers and capabilities. It was
further argued that the most “economical means of defense” and greatest deterrent to war
was a strong USAF that would have to be supported by all means necessary as rapidly as
possible.425
The Soviets were not believed to have the ability or desire to start a war with the
U.S. until they were prepared; however, the report warned that it was entirely probable
that the two nations could stumble into a war, and, as the United States could not match
the Soviets in a ground war, the only avenue to victory against the USSR was through
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airpower. The defense of the United States depended upon the Army and the Navy with
their respective missions. These included defending bases from ground assault and
preserving the sea lanes that were “vital to our National Defense and to our National
Economy” as well as being able to drive the Soviet fleet from the high seas. It was
recognized that there was not enough money to meet all the needs of the Armed Forces to
provide “everything considered by them to be desirable” but victory would remain in the
hands of the Air Force to deliver nuclear weapons, and the “maximum effort, insofar as
National Defense is concerned, should be concentrated on the creation of Air Power in
Being.”426

THE AIR FORCE’S POSITION

For the United States Air Force, the testimony before the President’s Air Policy
Commission presented a great opportunity to lay the foundation for the future of the
USAF. By emphasizing the limited success of unification, the inadequate amount of
dollars available in peacetime, the threats again the U.S., and the value of strategic
bombers, the Air Force could position themselves as the only agency that could truly
defend the United States in the developing Cold War years. The Chief of Staff of the
United States Air Force, General Carl Spaatz, testified to the Commission in midNovember 1947. From the very beginning he made it clear that the Air Force would use
their opportunities in front of Finletter’s committee to address “the role of air power as a
power for peace,” the direct needs of the USAF, and the necessity of a 70 group Air
Force. This program was a goal of the USAAF in the months that followed the
conclusion of the war and was reflected in the first peacetime budget request and its
426
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justification before Congress.427 Spaatz stated that it was definitely possible for an
enemy nation to develop long-range bombers with atomic bombs. Because the most
likely route to attack the United States from Europe was over the Arctic frontier, it was
apparent where the strength of American defenses needed to be.428 This could be seen as
an attack on the Navy’s position for the defense of the United States, as the Canadian
landmass prevented American aircraft carriers from cruising into the area that would
likely be filled with Soviet bombers in World War III. Although Spaatz would not name
the Soviet Union as the primary enemy of the United States in his opening statement, his
inference was understood and later confirmed in the very first question he fielded from
the Committee that dealt directly with Soviet war production.429
Spaatz argued that the United States could not afford to reduce or dismantle its
defenses and after “the most painstaking study and careful consideration of our current
position in this unsettled world,” the Air Force concluded that “the barest minimum
necessary for our national security as far as the Air Force is concerned, is our 70 Group
Program.” Each group consisted of bomber or fighter squadrons, and support units that
were part of the Air Force command structure. The 70 Groups were to be “reinforced by
22 separate and specialized squadrons” and to accomplish this program, the Air Force
needed the cooperation of civilian elements, the Air National Guard, Air Reserve and
training commands. There would have to be plans and installations for air defenses and
an unrivalled program of research and development. Manufacturers would have to be
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included as well as other necessary industries that would be part of a plan into which “has
been put the highest order of wisdom and intelligence of which the country is capable.”430
Spaatz testified that the 70 Groups should be have the best equipment and training
that could be provided, and ought to be maintained up to their peace time strength.
Because the next war could start with a surprise attack with little or no warning, Spaatz
felt that if the United States was to survive, it needed to be able to defend itself through
its ability to launch a “quick and paralyzing” strike against her enemy.431 The Air Force
Chief of Staff then moved on to the last important plank of the Air Force’s total defense
program, industrial planning, because it was essential to have “a closer communion of the
military and the civil” along with the Air Force and the aviation industry. Good planning
and cost reductions, through the agencies created by the National Security Act of 1947,
would be able to help the Air Force grow from its current plan of 55 combat groups to be
active by January 1, 1948, to the 70 groups as soon as possible. In summary, Spaatz
reiterated the need for 6,869 combat and training aircraft for the Air Force, 3,212 for the
ANG, and the Air Reserve would need a further 2,360. To keep this up to date,
manufacturers would need to annually produce roughly 3,200 aircraft and, finally, more
than 8,000 aircraft were to be held in reserve. This force, adequately manned and trained,
would allow the USAF to contribute to a joint effort to win the next war. Spaatz said that
the Air Force did not believe that a single component of the Armed Forces could win a
war, but that victory could be accomplished through a well-balanced approach that
included land, sea, and air, under the leadership of a single commander.432
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In the line of questions that followed, the Committee displayed, arguably, their
pro-Air Force bias in sensing a crisis within Spaatz’s testimony. The committee focused
on a comparison between the numbers that the Soviets were estimated on hand, versus
what the USAF currently had under its existing structure or might have if the 70 Group
Program were adopted. Spaatz had testified that the Soviets had nearly 14,000 modern
frontline aircraft compared to the total of 12,441 aircraft planned under the 70 Group
Program, a deficit that appeared worse when it was revealed that many of the American
aircraft on inventory were training planes. The total combat aircraft of the Air Force,
including the aircraft of the Air National Guard, was closer to 7,000 or 8,000.433
If appropriations were secured in the next budget, it was possible that the
additional groups necessary to fulfill the program could be available by January 1, 1949
and the gap in aircraft could be bridged. Anything less, according to Spaatz, would leave
the nation vulnerable. Spaatz further testified that the United States had a year or two
before it was possible for an enemy to launch a devastating attack on the United States,
but the stronger the United States was militarily, the less likely it was that there would be
war. Spaatz also acknowledged something that was not widely known outside of the
Soviet Union. The United States had evidence that the Soviets had a couple of interned
American B-29s and they were now building their own strategic bombers. The threat of
the Soviets having B-29s was evident to all on the Committee.434 Not only did the
Superfortress have the ability to carry a large bomb load great distances, but, it was the
airframe that dropped the atomic bombs. If the Soviets had the bomber and were capable
of getting the bomb, the ramifications were potentially ghastly. If mated with atomic

433
434

Ibid, 2367-2371.
Ibid, 2367-2371.

214
bombs, the U.S.S.R would have the ability to strike the continental United States on a
one-way mission.

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE W. STUART SYMINGTON

Nine days after Spaatz appeared before Finletter’s committee, Air Force Secretary
W. Stuart Symington took his turn. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, an unrepentant
defender of the value of strategic bombing and nuclear weapons, accompanied him.
Symington had previously testified before the commission September 9, 1947, and
opened his November appearance before Finletter’s committee by stating his agreement
with Spaatz. As a civilian, Symington did not feel restrained in any capacity during his
appearance before the President’s Air Policy Commission. He stated that the first priority
for the Air Force was to overcome the desperate need for aircraft, and the importance of
the 70 Group Program for national security. Symington stressed that he did not want to
be considered an alarmist or a warmonger, but he did believe that the “world was too
small to hold two strong nations in peaceful, if not static equilibrium” and it was up to the
strength of the United States to preserve the delicate balance of power.435
Symington confirmed that there were true risks in the world, but the Air Force
had done the best job that it could to appraise the risks, and it planned to expand to the
maximum force level that the economy could support “on the strictest austerity basis.”
Because the Air Force was operating under a cost-conscious premise, it was necessary to
save money through cooperation, and “by maximum joint use of facilities and by
avoidance of duplication.” They also needed to institute procedures that would provide
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the “the essential element of security at the cheapest possible price to the American
taxpayer.”436 The USAF had to be prepared to immediately launch an authoritative
retaliatory strike, which Symington believed was the greatest deterrent to an enemy
attack, and be prepared to “provide for the air forces of various types required in
conjunction with the Army and Navy ultimately to achieve the objectives of United
States national policy.” It was not possible, Symington acknowledged, to maintain
absolute strength to accomplish all of these goals during peacetime, therefore it was
necessary to assess the risks in the world so that the forces maintained reflected the
proper balance between the force in being, and the mobilization capacity of the nation. It
was essential that the aviation industry be healthy enough to support the entirety of the
mission of airpower in the United States and, as such, sufficient incentives needed to be
present to continue progress on greater aircraft. If the minimum force levels were
compromised, the Air Force’s ability to protect the United States and simultaneously
retaliate would be minimized and he believed that it would seriously endanger the last
best hope for peace in the world.437
Symington, as Spaatz had alleged in his earlier testimony, contended that the 70
Group Program was developed to be the minimum force necessary to meet the demands
of the Air Force, however, under the current budget projections the Air Force would only
have 55 groups in service by January 1, 1948. This was an “unacceptable risk” which
could manifest itself in an imbalance in “over-all programs which must provide for our
security not only this month and this year, but next year and the years to come.” The
solution was the 70 Group Program because it meshed all phases of military aviation,
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including the aviation industries and civilian air assets. For Symington, this did not mean
that the Air Force acted alone, and the estimates of force requirements were based upon
“the best thought of the Services and the State Department as to the nature and of the
risks and obligations attendant upon United States policy” as well as U.S. leadership in
the world.438
The Secretary of the Air Force replied that the Air Force could not accomplish
this goal under current budgetary constraints, even though the USAF had attempted to
economize and “utilize our money to the maximum efficiency.” More funds would have
to be made available in the future to even stay at the 55 groups, or the Air Force would
have to drop down to 40 groups by the fall of 1948, and reductions would start before the
end of the current fiscal year. Symington further argued that if the Air Force believed
that it could fulfill its missions with 55 groups, that is what they would have asked for,
but he did not believe that the USAF could provide “adequate security to the United
States based on the assigned mission of the Air Force by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.” If
money were no object, it would take upwards of twelve months to get to 70 groups
because of the current poor state of the aircraft industry, and the new units would not be
fully trained until the fall of 1948. Symington also testified that because of the shrinking
defense budgets, the Air Force felt that it had fallen into disrepair in consideration to
personnel and modern aircraft. Symington spoke relatively highly about the cost savings
of unification and concluded his testimony after roughly an hour and one half in front of
the President’s Commission on Air Policy.439 From the Air Force’s perspective, enlarged
funding equaled a greater bomber force that increased American national security.

438
439

Ibid, 2517-2519.
Ibid, 2550-2559.

217
On Monday December 1, 1947, the President’s Air Policy Commission heard
from Alexander De Seversky, the author of Victory through Air Power, and the founder
of an aviation company that bore his name. He had published articles in the New York
Times during World War II and was one of the most visible public supporters of strategic
bombing. De Seversky was convinced that air warfare had progressed into a science and
developed much farther than land or naval warfare. The last thirty years and two world
wars had altered the technology and aeronautical fields and the knowledge gained was far
more valuable than what centuries of development had given the Army or the Navy.
Failure to properly prepare an Air Force created a risk that was far greater than in
previous types of warfare, and this was proven with the events that transpired in the last
war. He argued that scientific data led to his conclusions, not lucky guesses or an artistic
flight of the imagination, and this same approach was needed to maximize the money
available. If not, the United States would find itself in a weakened position because it
could not afford to accumulate all “conceivable weapons for all conceivable strategies”
and there was not enough willpower in “high places to use the knowledge acquired at
vast cost in life and substance to reduce our strategy to a definite, concrete plan
implemented by specific weapons.” The failure to do this effectively scattered our
“limited resources on multiple strategies and irrelevant weapons.”440
De Seversky was confident of his views because, according to his testimony, he
had devoted his life to the study of airpower. He had practical experience in the design of
aircraft and their use in projecting power against an enemy state. He was also convinced
that if he and his fellow airpower advocates were listened to, they could make the United
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States “secure and invincible under the shield of adequate and realistic Air Power.”
Unlike the end of World War I, the impact of airpower in World War II was clearly
evident and its successful conclusion was brought about because of contributions of
conventional aircraft that traced their roots back to the Wright Brothers. All of the
belligerents “were on the threshold of revolutionary new conditions of flight and
propulsion” and these new jet and rocket technologies had even created the prospect of
supersonic flight.441 This meant that aircraft had transitioned from an auxiliary weapon
of an army or navy, to “a new military force of strategic character” and had developed
into the most proficient weapon to destroy an enemy’s industrial and resource base, and
brought the war to an end. Rapid technological changes meant that the surplus
equipment from World War II was antiquated, the Air Force did not want to use it as
current equipment and that the United States presently did not have the “Air-Power-inBeing” at all. If the 70 Group Program was implemented, it would complete this goal in
a strategic sense, however, the strategic forces needed to be self-sustained. They had to
have the assumption of freedom of action that would be capable of denying an enemy its
war making ability through the direct application of force.442
In a direct assault upon the Navy’s perceived role in the postwar world, De
Seversky informed the commission that airpower had now transcended to become
America’s primary force to carry war to an enemy state and it had displaced the Navy as
the first line of defense. This subjugated the Navy to an “important but secondary role in
supporting our Air Force” and in the modern age, land and naval forces had become mere
441
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auxiliaries to airpower. Although this went against tradition and “sentimental loyalties”
for the older Services, only the Air Force had the capability of guaranteeing victory in a
war, and the more independent it was from reliance on the Army or Navy combined with
the “maximum autonomy of action,” the greater was the Air Force’s capability to win the
war. De Seversky argued that appropriations for the Navy and its programs did not create
a “Sea-Power-in-Being” but rather was being spent on superficial improvements that
brought the Navy up to date while the Air Force, unlike the Army or Navy, had to be
built from scratch and it would take a national effort to achieve the goal.443
To survive in this age, the United States had to have an Air Force in being, not
one in planning, and to be the front line of defense, the Air Force had to accomplish this
in five years as opposed to the centuries that the Navy had to develop the modern fleet.
The time was now to build this force as rapidly as possible. It was also imperative that
two main elements, an intercontinental long-range striking force and continental air
defenses, had to be maintained. The American strike force needed would be determined
by the size of an enemy’s industrial infrastructure and capacity to replace losses. Bases
inside the United States were needed because it was not probable that overseas air bases
could be defended or supported in the event of war. Any American air base within range
of an enemy’s strike force had to be protected or it would be demolished. It would be far
too expensive to build a force to defend these bases, so, De Seversky recommended that
American airpower should be “independent of reliance on overseas bases and geared for
direct attack on the enemy’s industrial set-up from continental United States.444 Without
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directly saying it, De Seversky was staking the ground for the continued development and
purchase of the B-36 Peacemaker.
De Seversky stated that he supported unification, however, he further contended
that he felt that it was unfortunate it did not completely merge all aviation assets into the
Air Force. The Navy should only retain those aircraft that were necessary for the support
of the surface fleet. If any aircraft flew a strategic mission and was “capable of
sustaining an air battle,” it belonged to the Air Force. If it was designed to “enhance the
efficiency of ships and naval task forces” then it belonged to the Navy. The Navy’s plan
to get into strategic bombing created such bewilderment that it would “make the
confusion at Pearl Harbor seem minor by contrast.” Unlike the Navy, which apparently
focused upon three equal components of national defense, De Serversky believed that in
the future, it would rest “primarily on a single pillar—Air Power—with the Army and the
Navy as supporting elements of its base. He did not believe in the team approach to
defense, because not everybody on a football team is capable of scoring a touchdown,
and real teamwork “means that the player best able to do a certain job be given a clear
field to do it.”445
The aforementioned Air Force testimony, as well as other witnesses on their
behalf, continued to link national security to the idea of strategic bombing. In 1947, this
was reflected in the power and size of aircraft like the B-36 and nuclear weapons. What
the Air Force testimony lacked, however, was the concept of flexibility in weapon
systems or strategy and equipment for a limited war. It did not seem important at the
time to focus on anything less than a total war with the Soviet Union. The Air Force
clearly displayed a bias toward nuclear weapons first and foremost as the solution to
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virtually any crisis that threatened the United States. It was this concept and strategy that
did not change in the immediate future that led to other aircraft purchases in the 1950s
based on their ability to primarily deliver atomic ordnance against Soviet targets. Older
aircraft that did not fit the modern concept of strategic air warfare were scrapped or
transferred to other air forces across the globe. For example, after Truman’s decision to
supply military aid to the Greeks and Turks as part of his containment policy, the Air
Force transferred almost 200 obsolete aircraft to Turkey in 1948. There was also strong
encouragement from the Air Force and the State Department for the Turks to build
airbases that could handle B-29s and allow air strikes at Soviet petroleum production
centers in Southern Europe.446
The Air Force approach to strategic air warfare also reflected the political realities
of the Cold War on the domestic front, which meant reduced funding for all military
branches, especially in regards to conventional forces. The National Military
Establishment believed that a war with the Soviet Union would become cost-prohibitive
the longer the war lasted. Therefore, the Air Force embraced a strategy that would target
and destroy Soviet cities in an effort to create a paralyzing blow to the communist
government and its defense apparatus. To be fully effective, the bombs had to be
dropped immediately instead of during a long, drawn out campaign that would give the
Soviets any form of respite from the atomic assault.447 However, it needs to be noted that
this strategy was only effective if the bombers could actually reach their targets and
successfully drop their bombs. If they could not, then the strategy that was being pushed
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so aggressively by the Air Force would not work and the United States would be forced
to fight World War III in a far different manner than what they had planned, trained and
equipped for.

THE NAVY’S POSITION

Unlike the USAF witnesses who had made the case for the Air Force’s priority in
any strategic bombing campaign and American air policy, the Navy had a more difficult
time explaining their strategic view of the world and the uniqueness of their mission. If
the future of the Navy was in nuclear delivery, they had to be able to sell that mission
without sounding like they advocated an inferior or redundant system. Naval experts
could not use the Finletter committee as a sounding board against unification, or they
would seem obstructionist at the time when Service unity was critical to the President and
his view of national security. Instead, they had to define their mission as exceeding
traditional operations and link aviation to all aspects of the modern Navy. In an effort to
accomplish this goal, the Navy witnesses also came to see nuclear weapons delivery as
essential for the health of their Service and the overall security of the nation, and the
Navy would make many of the same mistakes regarding policy that they accused the Air
Force of doing.
The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air, John Nicholas Brown, went before
the President’s Air Policy Commission on September 9, 1947, and reiterated the
importance of the commission’s work. He reminded the committee of the Navy’s
commitment to offer key personnel to testify and the great interest that the Navy had in
its work. Brown linked the importance of naval aviation with the victory in World War
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II. The overall mission of the Navy that now extended beyond just fleet operations and
American airpower was composed of all branches of civil and military aviation. Brown
maintained that airpower was the primary feature of national defense, and therefore, all
aspects of aviation needed to be funded or subsidized for the overall health of American
national security.448 Brown contended that the budgeting requests of the National
Military Establishment were made with austerity as a goal, and not national defense or a
strong Navy. Under the terms of unification, the Secretary of Defense would prepare the
overall military budget which was supposed to reflect the requirements of all three
services, and their strategic needs, instead of the individual departments making
appropriations requirements on their own. There was, however, a silver lining to this
change. Under a new principle from the Bureau of the Budget, the individual services
would get a figure for its budget, and then be able to allocate those dollars as the Services
saw fit.449 This meant that the Navy technically had the discretion to spend their
allocated money on strategic plans outside the influence of the other Services. As we will
note later, this was not the case.
Brown also testified that the Navy’s mission included the portion of airpower that
had “to do with the sea, and the use by the Navy of its mobile airfields, the aircraft
carriers, in the quick retaliation of an attack” that Brown considered “one of the greatest
roles and missions of the Navy.” He further elaborated that this concept of naval power
included the “part of air power which operates over the sea, and from the sea over the
land for a reasonable distance.” This meant that many other ships needed to be available
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to support and protect the carriers, support amphibious operations, anti-submarine
warfare and ground support for invading ground troops. For Brown, sea power was
“intimately bound up with air power.” Brown also contended that the national security of
the United States could be greatly improved if the Navy could secure more funds for
aircraft that would also support the manufacturing base of the aviation industry.450 As
succinctly as could be done, Brown testified that the present and future of naval aviation
was premised on retaliatory strikes that included missions and weapons systems founded
upon the belief in the atomic bomb’s ability to alter or end wars.

FLEET ADMIRAL CHESTER W. NIMITZ, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

On November 13, 1947, Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, the Chief of Naval
Operations, took his turn before Finletter’s commission. Nimitz believed in the offensive
capabilities of naval aviation, and that the “self-contained strength inherent in a carrier
task force makes it the foremost example of a highly mobile air force capable of prompt
utilization when required.” The CNO contended that it did not matter if enemies of the
United States did not have fleets with which it could challenge American control of the
seas, because the size and scope of the oceans require the United States Navy to be able
to protect shipping, provide military support, and ensure economic aid in times of crisis
across the globe. If aviation was removed from the Navy, Nimitz warned that they would
become a defensive force, and the war that could develop would merely be a war where
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both sides exchanged long ranged attacks on cities and vital installations that would be
indecisive.451
Nimitz argued that it was essential that the Navy maintain aviation assets to
protect the seas from submarines, and have carrier task forces that were necessary to
provide the offensive firepower that had been proven in World War II. New aircraft and
missile designs made the postwar carriers far more capable than the ones that had ground
down the Japanese navy in the early 1940s. In the future, carrier-based naval aviation
assaults would begin at “ranges and speeds greatly in excess of those of the past,
unhampered by past limitations of their striking power” and that because the Navy
operated in international waters, it did so “without infringement of the rights and interests
of other nations.” The CNO testified that he was committed to see that all naval aviation
units, both carrier or land-based, were “equipped and trained to make the best use of all
new weapon developments of the future, which are adaptable to the aviation arm of the
naval service.”452
Chairman Finletter asked Nimitz if he envisioned elements of naval aviation
being part of the total strike force that would be launching counter attacks against an
enemy in the event of war. Nimitz reminded the chair that all aspects of naval aviation
were vital to the mission of the Navy, and not a separate entity, and he could not
distinguish nor accept the idea that naval aviation was part of the Air Force in any
capacity. Previous testimony had raised that issue and Nimitz clearly stated that he
considered naval aviation “as a part of the Navy.” He regarded the Navy, the Air Force,
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and the Army as separate legs on a stool, “each one has a definite and distinct mission to
perform, definite and distinct responsibilities that have been prescribed in the National
Security Act of 1947,” and each service needed to be capable of carrying out its
respective missions. Later, Nimitz was questioned about the danger that faced the United
States at that time and whether or not it justified greater expenditures of federal dollars in
peacetime. Nimitz replied that he felt that, in the short term, the United States was safe
from attack by a foreign power for a period of four or five years. He also felt that with
the passage of time, the danger would be lessened as “common sense will pervade the
world” and although we might be safe from an immediate attack, there was still the
possibility that sabotage constituted “a greater danger at the present time than any attack
from without.” Nimitz had faith in the future, “but I would want to pack my gun.” 453

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JOHN L. SULLIVAN

The Secretary of the Navy had his opportunity to speak to the Commission
December 2, 1947. Sullivan recognized the gravity of the work that Finletter’s
committee was tasked with, and its importance to national security could not be
exaggerated. National security, health of the aircraft industry and improvements in
aviation across the nation were important to Sullivan, but the defense of the United States
was the most vital. Because the commission focused on the international situation,
Sullivan stressed the enormity of the Navy’s role in defending the nation in the past, and
stated that “we now owe to ourselves and to the world, the assurance beyond all
reasonable doubt that we will never again let our defenses deteriorate to the point of
inviting a third global war.” To face the challenges to peace in the world, Sullivan
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reminded them that no one could put a price on how much American security was worth.
If there were serious concerns about the “prospect of ensuring peace with the measures
we have adopted, we do not have enough security.” Sullivan argued that the scope of the
Navy’s function in providing defense ‘in the event of any miscalculation of the balance
between risk and security” should prevent a further draw down of the air and sea power
provided by the Navy. Any economic savings at the expense of the operating strength of
the Navy would only be a “minor economy when measured against our total cost of
government.”454
Sullivan testified that the current composition of the Navy was designed for
peace, and it was prepared to be a force for stability in an anxious world. It had the
capability of providing surveillance across the oceans, protect the sea lines of
communication, and guarantee the historically important control of the sea that was vital
to the survival of the United States. The Secretary of the Navy did not consider control
of the sea to be an anachronism in the modern world, nor would it be irrelevant in the
future. The Navy needed to be a strong force in being to prevent or deter any
premeditated attack upon the United States. It could then prevent any invasion or, in
conjunction with the rest of the armed forces, discourage an “inadvertent act of war.”
Properly constituted, a strong Navy meant that the future war would be fought on foreign
waters and over the enemy’s land and air, rather than over the United States455
Sullivan believed that the future of the Navy depended upon a national
understanding of its traditional, yet vital role in protecting the seas. To continue into the
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future, the USN needed adequate training, enhanced technological skills of sailors,
improved aviation and shipping industries, as well as ongoing research and development.
This required the Navy to avoid “reliance upon old techniques and old weapons to the
exclusion of new ideas and weapons” and the “abandonment of all of the old ideas and
weapons in behalf of new and untried ones.” With this statement, Sullivan began to take
aim at the strategic bombing myth that was being perpetuated by others in the press, the
military, and by politicians enamored with the atomic bomb. Sullivan attacked the belief
that the Navy was obsolete in light of new developments by arguing that, throughout its
history, the Navy had developed new defensive techniques, weapons and strategies that
had “offset and neutralized’ new factors of offense, including kamikaze suicide attacks
on naval ships.456
The postwar reductions of naval strength had been conducted to reflect the
minimum forces necessary for peacetime operations, but Sullivan cautioned the
committee that further reductions were being done to cut defense costs at a time when the
international situation was deteriorating along with the strength of the Navy. Sullivan
made it clear that the “major striking force of a modern Navy” was represented by carrier
aviation. If the Navy did not maintain any aviation assets or deemphasized its airpower
role, Sullivan believed that the nation would be lulled into a “false sense of security that
might be calamitous since land based air alone cannot exercise the necessary continuous
surveillance of the sea lanes.” To cement his point Sullivan cited the role of naval
aviation within the British Royal Navy and the lack of an equivalent force for the German
Navy, that handicapped Germany’s ability to win the Battle of the Atlantic. On the other
hand the Japanese naval air forces had allowed the Japanese fleet to remain dangerous
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and effectual until its air element was eliminated. Postwar interrogation of surviving
Japanese naval officers indicated that when they were forced to rely on surveillance
information provided by their army, the information was “entirely misleading, and
consequently worse than none.” For the Secretary of the Navy, it was evident that a navy
“without naval aviation under its own control is really no Navy at all.”457 Since the
USAF believed that it should be responsible for reconnaissance of the approaches to the
United States, Sullivan’s point cemented the concern that the Navy had about relying
upon another service for critical information in a time of war.
Sullivan stressed that with carrier sorties, the United States did not need to resort
to diplomatic channels to begin missions that were requisite for land-based aircraft,
because all the materials necessary for combat operations were carried by the aircraft
carriers. These could move at will, off an enemy coast, in any weather, and conduct
operations without having to assault or conquer enemy territory to establish an air base.
This allowed the Navy operate with secrecy and surprise against an enemy. Then
Sullivan focused on the Cold War and stated to Finletter’s committee that the United
States had occupation forces in both Europe and Asia. If war should come, it would be
necessary to “evacuate, reinforce, or abandon them.” If they were to be withdrawn, only
naval forces were in a position to do this as they could provide their own air superiority
over the contested area. Sullivan argued that the time was now to adequately “support
our overseas forces” or the United States would be “obliged to write them off” as had
been done to some American forces at the beginning of World War II. If the United
States waited until war came, it would be too late.458
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Sullivan did not believe that the American people would support a long war of
attrition and if the enemy used guided missiles or atomic bombs in the future, it was
incumbent upon the Navy to capture the enemy airbases or missile sites, and put them out
of service. This would not be possible, however, if the Navy did not have “highly
developed carrier task forces” or the ability to support amphibious operations as they had
done in the Pacific during the Second World War. When asked if he agreed with the idea
that “defense which is necessary is not only the usual technique of defense but also the
counter-offensive which should be as immediate and violent as possible” Sullivan replied
in the affirmative.459 He did not directly address the issue of naval control of nuclear
weapons, nor was he asked about it. As well, he did not appear to be a critic of the Air
Force or its idea of strategic air warfare. Instead, Sullivan presented the need for a
modern navy and the tools that made that service effective in these early years of the
Cold War.

ARTEMUS L. GATES

Artemus L. Gates, the former Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air, and the
Under Secretary of the Navy for the last six months of World War II, had his time before
the Finletter committee on December 3, 1947. Gates attempted to frame his testimony as
an individual who had been sitting on the sidelines during the previous years’ battles over
unification and strategy. He immediately addressed his concern over previous testimony
that emphasis on the Air Force, and its needs, overshadowed or minimized the
requirements of naval aviation. As Nimitz had done before, Gates stressed the need to
strengthen all three branches of the National Military Establishment and not weaken
459
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carrier-based aviation because it was important to the nation and was the backbone of the
Navy. Gates also added that he could not support a program benefited the Navy at the
expense of the Air Force, or created an imbalance.460
It was imperative to Gates that he brought attention to the Navy’s concern over a
single weapons system and strategy. He pointed out “that the adoption of a single
weapon or type of weapon restricts our own freedom of action and greatly simplifies the
enemy’s problem of countermeasures.” Gates believed that it was most beneficial to
have the Air Force and the Navy coordinate in areas of common interest, which would
lead to mutual benefits. It was up to the Secretary of Defense, therefore, to determine if
there was redundancy and to develop a plan to eliminate the duplication. Gates
cautioned, however, that there should not be an attempt to consolidate all or most aircraft
into the USAF “just because it happens to be the official air arm of the military
establishment.” Gates then alleged that it was unsafe to restrict any of the Armed Forces
on “how it should perform its mission or to arbitrarily limit it in its use of the weapons it
feels it needs.461
Under cross-examination by the commission, Gates was asked specifically about
the offensive role of the Navy beyond anti-submarine warfare. Gates replied to the
loaded question that he felt that the striking power of a carrier task force was “one of the
strongest offensive roles we have in air power today.” He also hoped that the American
public and the Congress would not come to the conclusion that the “Air Force is
completely responsible for the development of aviation. The Navy has its problem and it
must be recognized, and there must be some balance” between the two services.
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Previously, Gates had testified that the single weapon theory that the United States
appeared to pursue was the equivalent of the Maginot Line kind of thinking that had had
doomed the French war effort in 1940. Asked to clarify what he meant, Gates responded
that if too much pressure “is brought on any one arm of the service and it is developed to
the detriment of some other part of the service, we might get out of balance” in regards to
the responsibilities of the Air Force and the Navy.462
After answering a few more questions about land-based planes for the Navy and
the possibility of duplication, Gates’ time with the committee was over. He had stated
very clearly that he believed in the offensive capacity of the Navy, not just for the good
of the service, but in the overall defense of the nation. Unfortunately for the immediate
future of the Navy, they would become caught in the belief in the efficacy of nuclear
strikes, and saw their future in the wings of carrier-based strategic and tactical nuclear
bombers that would strike unannounced from the sea.

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The Secretary of Defense, James Vincent Forrestal, began his turn with the
President’s Air Policy Commission at 3:10 p.m. on Wednesday, December 3, 1947. For
the Commission, Forrestal’s testimony was important because he was the face of
unification, as well as the former Secretary of the Navy. Forrestal’s opening statement
addressed the link between foreign and domestic policy with national security. In light of
the changes in the world around him, Forrestal suggested that the United States was in a
difficult position because as “a democracy we do not start wars and therefore can never
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be in a complete state of readiness” in the event of war. This meant that the United States
is “energetically engaged” in seeking all avenues for peace and prosperity across the
globe, including leadership within the United Nations, and funding for the World Bank to
help reconstruct the war-torn nations of the world as well as occupation of the former
Axis nations of Germany and Japan. Forrestal contended that because of the importance
of the UN as the “keystone in the edifice of peace which the world is trying to construct”
he hoped that one day they would be able to have “not only universal control of atomic
power but also world-wide control of arms.” Forrestal also understood that this was not
immediately possible because it was premature to discuss disarmament or “to take steps
which would reveal the secrets of atomic power, on the part of this country.” Forrestal
then transitioned into the composition of the United States military. He believed that the
best way to avoid war was to have all enemies understand that the risks of war with the
United States outweighed any of their advantages. Strength, not disarmament, offered
the greatest prospect of peace, for one does not “eliminate criminals and crime by
disarming the police force.” In the past, the United States had invited aggression through
neglect of the Armed Forces and therefore it now had to use its military strength “as a
force for peace.”463
Forrestal next tackled the issue of unification by reminding the committee that he
had only been in office as Secretary of Defense for approximately two months, and it was
too early to gauge the full impact of unification on all aspects of the military, as it would
take years for that to be accomplished. The creation of a permanent Joint Chiefs of Staff
greatly enhanced the ability of the Armed Forces to coordinate strategic plans throughout
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the National Military Establishment, and promote greater teamwork and balance among
the military departments. The NME would have to continue to have this benefit as it
examined the ever-changing trends in the future of warfare. Forrestal argued that the
United States had to avoid a singular weapon approach to national defense, even if it
played a tremendous part in the last war.464 Forrestal toed the administration line on
unification, but in a somewhat convoluted manner, the Secretary of Defense defended the
Navy’s position against a single weapon defense system.
When Forrestal transitioned into airpower, he felt obligated to mention the clarity
of his view that the United States needed to have “air forces sufficiently powerful to
protect its own security and territory and sufficiently powerful and versatile to be capable
of making swift and effective counterattacks in the event of war.” This would take years
to develop, and needed to be under constant revisions about the numbers of aircraft that
were needed. Forrestal stated that he believed that the United States needed to prevent
the decay of its aircraft industry, and in turn, its airpower assets. Forrestal noted that the
early jet engines created many problems including with fuel, limited payload, power, and
strategic uses. The evolution of jet-powered aircraft would take some time before they
would eventually eclipse piston engines. Forrestal cautioned that the United States could
not “go all out for jets and scrap our existing piston engines for the simple reason that we
do not have production available yet for manufacturing jets on a quantity basis.”
Forrestal also informed Finletter’s committee that geographically, “the task of the air
components has of course increased since the close of World War II” and that while air
operations in the former war were conducted across the globe, the “future conflict might
extend over an even greater scale, such as operations in colder regions.” Forrestal most
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likely referred to planned strategic flights over the Polar Regions to strike at the heart of
the Soviet Union, as it was the shortest distance from the United States to the USSR. He
further contended that unlike in past, the United States had to address the defense of its
land “in view of the development of guided missiles and jet propulsion, and therefore the
defense of our shore does and must play an important role in planning.” 465
After a brief discussion about the aviation industry and the impact of aircraft
procurements on it and ongoing research and development, the Secretary of Defense
moved onto national security. Forrestal testified that national defense did not solely
mean the protection of the United States, or “even the Western Hemisphere alone,
because the prerequisite for world peace is world stability” which directly impacted U.S.
national security. American interests were at stake in Western Europe, the Middle East,
and on the high seas. The administration and Congress had made commitments to
Turkey and Greece, and continued their ongoing support for the “faltering government of
China” and the “restoration of Germany and Japan to the status of nations.” 466
Finletter later asked the Secretary of Defense for an explanation about the level of
consolidation in the Armed Forces and whether or not this would happen in the distant
future. He further queried Forrestal about what would eventually result from the National
Security Act of 1947. Forrestal corrected Finletter by stating that what he meant was
actually integration in “terms of procurement, the common use of services, elimination of
unnecessary plants, and equipment in the interests of getting more for your money.” He
also reminded the committee that it was difficult in these times to have adequate security
of the United States and he felt that it was the greatest disservice for the U.S. to “be under
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the impression that new weapons, whether they are atomic bombs, long-range airplanes
or new types of submarines, can give us an impervious and permanently unassailable
security. There is no such thing.”467

DRAWING TO A CLOSE: THE END OF THE WORK

At the conclusion of the testimony on December 3, 1947 the committee began its
work on drafting the final report. What was evident from the testimony presented was
the focus of the USAF witnesses on the 70 Group Program and the value of strategic
bombers. Supporters of the Navy, on the other hand, appeared to be a bit disjointed in
their approach to the committee and what was truly needed for national security. Many
appeared to focus on what had been the role of the Navy versus what the role should be
in the immediate and long-term future. To some, it appeared that the Navy’s position
was to prevent a drawdown that benefited the Air Force. The approach of the USAF, on
the other hand, involved a polite denigration of the other services’ view of warfare as
relics of the past or a mere attempt at duplication of the superior strategic air warfare
model pursued by the USAF. In the age of cost consciousness, the Air Force successfully
portrayed their view as a fulfillment of unification, cost-effective, and the only true
offensive and defensive service in the Atomic Age. The Air Force was far more
successful in creating the demand and need for a new direction of national security in the
future. It was a future built upon the stately bomber and its inherent ability to bomb an
enemy state not back to the Stone Age, but out of existence.
Perhaps a greater concern for the long-term national security of the United States
was the coverage of the committee hearings. While not all testimony was presented
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under the lights of public scrutiny, much was, and the final report carried much of the
ideas, if not the practice, of American defense plans for the immediate future. The
administration, the Congress, and the American public, along with potential allies and
enemies, were well apprised of the numbers of aircraft currently on inventory, and the
contemporary manufacturing capacity of the U.S. Still, the media coverage of the
committee hearings was favorable to the work of the Committee and the thoroughness of
their investigation.

SURVIVAL IN THE AIR AGE

Published on January 1, 1948, the President’s Air Policy Commission’s report,
entitled Survival in the Air Age, was released to the press and the public at the cost of 75
cents per copy. Recommendations listed in the first section of the 166-page document
dealt with the priority of Truman’s charge, and the committee’s primary responsibility,
namely airpower and national security. It should be noted that while the President
requested this work to be completed, there was no obligation that he would follow its
advice. The report also did not provide for the substantive funding needed to fulfill the
recommendations in the era of Truman’s austere budgets, nor did it make allowances for
the traditional defense of the United States, or the refuge of isolationism. It boldly
suggested that world peace and the safekeeping of American interests at home and abroad
were one and the same.
The committee made the assumption that America could not count on the United
Nations to secure lasting peace except as the basis of “free communications throughout
the world.” The Commission challenged the premise that disarmament was an avenue to
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peace, and suggested that it was only through maximum force that America could prevent
an attack on its interests at home or abroad. The ability to launch an overwhelming
counter-strike at the “earliest possible moment” would be the basis of American defenses.
This required the United States to be prepared to fight World War III and not the last war.
The report added that it was not the arsenal of weapons or military strength that created a
lasting peace, but military superiority that allowed the United States to defend itself
against aggressors.468
To prepare for the difficulties of the immediate postwar years, the Committee
recommended that the United States be prepared to win an arms race with any potential
enemies, and American defenses were to highlight strong naval, ground, and air forces.
Special emphasis was reserved for the USAF and naval aviation resources because the
nation could not afford to have second-rate air forces that in the event of war were
“almost as bad as none.” To the chagrin of the President, the committee acknowledged
that for this plan to succeed it required substantial funding immediately, and into the
future. In fact, it stated “self preservation comes ahead of economy.” There was
evidence presented that between 80 to 85% of the federal budget was used to pay off past
wars and provide for contemporary defense. Supplementary funding was needed, and the
committee felt that it was not extravagant, as they had scrutinized the military’s
testimony and concluded that the additional dollars were necessary for national
security.469
The committee concluded that overwhelming airpower was the basis for national
defense. It needed to be stronger than it currently was and the commission felt that there
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would be insufficient time to build up forces necessary to win the next war. Naval
supremacy could no longer guarantee American security because enemy airpower could
bypass the seas and attack over the polar ice caps to strike the American heartland. It was
realized that the United States could not maintain its monopoly on nuclear weapons, and
therefore the potential danger of these strikes could not be underestimated. There was no
way to accurately determine when an enemy would have nuclear weapons although it
was possible that could be accomplished by the end of 1952. This required that the
United States have maximum forces, at this time, to prevent an atomic or even biological
attack on the U.S. The military should be prepared to use not only weapons of mass
destruction but also more powerful conventional weapons that were still effective as “the
cities of German and Japan testify.” 470
Finletter’s committee recognized in the short term that no nation had the weapons
necessary to impose air supremacy over the United States, and the most dangerous
weapons that the enemy had were bombers that were reduced to one-way missions
against the United States.471 The report suggested that currently the enemy planes were
“relatively slow compared with the supersonic planes of the future and were subject to
interception by the faster moving jet fighters and in other ways.”472 This is an incredibly
ironic statement at this juncture, because the same time as Survival in the Air Age was
being released, the USAF was preparing to purchase large numbers of piston-engined B36 bombers that had a performance envelope that was not much greater than the B-29s.
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It was only two years later, during the Korean War, that the folly of slow, prop-driven
bombers attempting to attack enemy targets in the face of jet fighters became evident.
The commission acknowledged that there was currently little concern about
enemy use of sabotage, or preplaced weapons in the event of war, but guided missiles
were a threat because they could not be intercepted. The committee assumed that by
January 1, 1953, an enemy would be able to attack the United States with atomic
weapons from supersonic and subsonic bombers and long-range missiles that would
come over the Arctic. This reality compelled the committee to recommend that the U.S.
be fully prepared to defend itself against this contingency by 1953. There was a sense of
urgency because the National Military Establishment could not count on a long build up
to the war as had happened during both World Wars. While there was the possibility of
blundering into a war, it was understood that previous wars had been started because of
aggression, and once the U.S. monopoly was abridged, an enemy would take advantage
of this and begin the next war.473
Knowing this possibility, the President’s Air Policy Commission recommended
that the U.S. maintain sufficient force not only for defense, but to also take the war to the
enemy. The current composition of the Air Force, 55 groups, was considered insufficient
to accomplish all the missions assigned to the USAF, and it was recommended that the 70
Group Program be adopted. This would provide at least 700 strategic bombers, a
minimum number of interceptors, an effective early warning radar network, and support
from an active Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve system. The United States
could not simply rely solely on radar as a defense, because it could create a mentality that
was defensive in nature and not offensive. To counter this, the committee stated that the
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best defense against atomic attack was “the counteroffensive striking force in being.” It
was noted that the number of bombers to accomplish this was fairly small compared to
the roughly 14,000 conventional bombers of the USAAF and the Royal Air Force in the
European theater of World War II but the new bombers would use “the best equipment
and the latest techniques” to succeed. The Air Force would have to have substantial
expenditures to build up its forces to the necessary levels by the beginning of 1953,
although they would be able to use the surplus equipment remaining from the last war to
accelerate the process.474
The Finletter committee saw the USAF as the main striking force of the United
States, and truly the only force in being, that was truly necessary to both prevent and win
a war. The Navy, according to the report, would face a far different future than its
traditional missions of the past, because enemy states did not maintain large surface
fleets, the Navy would have to transition into a department that provided the means to
take and occupy bases near enemy shores with which ground and air operations could
commence. Carrier aviation was necessary until sufficient bases were secured that would
provide land-based air support. The Navy would also have to keep the sea lines of
communication open, and needed adequate air assets to accomplish that mission. New
aircraft types would need to be procured and funding needed to build the required
aircraft, or the United States would “face the danger of seeing our great carriers tied to
the docks because of lack of planes.” The report did not address the role of the Navy in
strategic or other air based offensive operations against an enemy state.475 Survival in the
Air Age did not list new aircraft carriers as a priority or, in fact, at all and this oversight
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would be amplified in the two years that followed the release of the report. With
recommendations on aircraft manufacturing, research and development, the President’s
Air Policy Commission clearly downgraded the overall mission of the Navy, and much to
the fear of the Navy Department, funding would become problematic as more defense
dollars were allocated to fulfill the 70 Group Program that had been endorsed by the
committee. This would be another reason for the Navy to continue to develop a strategic
air mission that would provide for a portion of overall defense funding.

NATIONAL AVIATION POLICY: A REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL
AVIATION POLICY BOARD

Two months after the release of Survival in the Air Age, the Congressional
Aviation Policy Board released their report. Much smaller than the former document, the
Congressional report was based off much of the same testimony that was given before the
Finletter commission to save “time and expense by Government and witnesses alike.” It
had been created in July 1947, and had its first meeting in September of the same year.
Senator Owen Brewster of Maine who had famously taken on Howard Hughes over
government contracts during World War II chaired it. California Representative Carl
Hinshaw served as Vice Chairman and was the highest-ranking House member on the
board. Both men were Republicans and theoretically could counter the work of the
Democratic President’s commission, and come to separate conclusions concerning
airpower and its application in the defense of the United States. But the Board also took
a decidedly pro-Air Force approach to their work and acknowledged that there were
extensive differences in policy between the Navy and the Air Force over future
procurements and missions. While this seems at first to be a statement of minimal
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substance, the truth was that it was a major fracture in the unified defense that Truman
wanted and would lead to far great problems in the immediate future. Unfortunately, it
appeared that the answer to these problems was a force structure that was based upon the
application of nuclear weapons delivered by the respective services.
As had been stated in Survival in the Air Age, there was a belief in Washington,
from the White House to the Pentagon, and even Capitol Hill, that the next war would
begin without warning. This would be catastrophic to the cities and production centers
across the United States. Traditional defenses would no longer be sufficient to protect
America, and therefore, vast changes needed to be made immediately to begin preparing
for World War III. Stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction “in quantity, and the
means to deliver them in overwhelming force, if attack comes, is judged the best and
surest protection against defeat and slavery.” Effective air policy for the United States
dictated a massive effort of civilian and military agencies to prepare for war, because it
was folly “to pretend that this world does not live under a sense of impending tragedy.”
New weapons in the hands of American enemies made the next war “an open invitation
to annihilation.” The report suggested that that answer to this quandary was “a Magna
Carta of world defense, a ringing declaration of moral challenge to match the danger.
This should come from the united voice of the major powers implementing their joint will
through the United Nations.” It did not appear that the Congressional board believed that
the U.N. would actually be able to accomplish this goal. Because the Brewster Board
was only interested in securing American freedoms, “the United States has no other
course to follow but to maintain such a military air force and civil air effort that no
sudden attack upon American people can succeed” and the American response would
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result in “swift and awful retribution in overwhelming volume with effective and
devastating weapons.”476
The recommendations of the Congressional Aviation Policy Board virtually
mirrored the counsel of the President’s commission, but the Brewster committee took the
Joint Chiefs of Staff to task for not supplying a unified defense plan at the request of the
committee. It was understood that it took time for missions, aircraft, procurement, and
target assignments to be created and it was essential that this work be accomplished as
expeditiously as possible. Frustration was expressed that this type of study had not been
conducted since the end of World War II, and the committee was “at a loss to
understand” why this was the case. It was also evident that service representatives of the
JCS were not working for unification, but for their own service missions, but this was
detrimental to the overall security of the United States. The JCS, the Secretary of
Defense, and even the administration, shared the blame for this. In particular, the
strategic differences between the Air Force and the Navy were the result of conflicting
legislation, Executive Orders, and the National Security Act of 1947, over service
missions. The committee suggested that the USN appeared to interpret the laws in such a
way as to allow the Navy to develop any weapon and delivery system that it wanted,
including atomic weapons. The Air Force countered the Navy’s interpretation of the laws
and orders to see their exclusivity to the nuclear role at the expense of the Navy. The
Brewster Board recommended that clarification on roles and missions was essential to
make the National Military Establishment far more efficient.477
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Because there was not a unified plan of action, the committee attempted to view
airpower under recommendations made separately by the Air Force and the Navy under
the idea of “Plan A “ and “Plan B.” The former included the 70 Group Program
recommended by the leadership in the Air Force, and more than 14,000 aircraft for the
Navy. Production and procurement would level off in 1953, and a more moderate
program that would follow this point. Plan B was essentially the same idea of
preparation without the maintenance of the reserve aircraft, and would take one more
year than Plan A to be implemented, before the United States had a force ample enough
to withstand a crippling attack on the U.S. It would also provide a “strong Territorial
defense” as well as an immediate, but not sustained, offensive retaliation. Without
mincing words, the Brewster board also stated the “primary objective of modern warfare
is no longer the armed forces of the enemy” but rather the industrial capacity and
resources of an enemy state. The Board also believed that any nation that developed the
atomic bomb would not use it against the United States until it felt that it could “cripple
us beyond early recovery by a surprise attack.”478
In a critical recommendation, the Brewster board suggested that the Secretary of
Defense should “revise the public relations policies of the armed services in the interest
of national security” because it was evident that the USAF and the Navy inflated the
performance of their aircraft and missions. This was a conscious effort to win the support
of the administration and congressional leaders, as well as the American public, and there
was concern that misleading information could create a false impression of the quality or
quantity of U.S. defenses. Publically stated accurate information would also be
extremely beneficial to American enemies. The Board focused on reports of an
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American bomber, which could only be the B-36 that had the capacity to fly 10,000
miles, which was roughly five times greater than the range of the B-29. This seemed
impressive, but the Board was quick to point out that it was not a combat ready aircraft,
and in fact, had been stripped down for the flight. Its actual range on a real mission
would not be half of what was publicized. It was even acknowledged that the radius of
action of a bomber is approximately “one-third of its range” unless the aircraft was on a
one-way mission or conducting a shuttle operation where it would stop at another base
for fuel. There was also the problem of escorting bombers with extreme range because
they could outdistance any known fighter. Unless airbases were secured much closer to
the enemy targets, the bombers would have to fly to their targets alone. Another issue of
concern was the published high-speed performance of aircraft that were often deceptive.
The Board suggested that it was fine for the “services to have pride in their
accomplishments but security and public faith must not be violated.”479 This warning
would go unheeded as both the USAF and the USN would attempt to outmaneuver their
service rivals through tales of their superior aircraft, and the inferiority of their
opposition, both in the United States and abroad.
Upon their publications and release, there appeared to be clear support for their
respective recommendations. Acclaim for Survival in the Air Age came from inside and
out of the aviation and defense industries. The chairman of the Aircraft Industries
Association, Eugene E. Wilson, sent a telegram to the New York Times in which he
commented that the current “foreign problems make the public aware of the soundness of
the report’s military recommendations. The Air Force which demonstrated its decisive
character in war now looms as an equally decisive factor in keeping the peace.” William
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M. Allen, the president of Boeing, added that the “best way to preserve peace is to be
strong—in the air” and that he agreed with the committee’s recommendation that support
for the aircraft industry “is sound economics to put us completely secure in the air.” The
chairman of the board for Lockheed stated that his company could “serve the public
interest best in peace as in war when we know what the people want. The report provides
the basis for reflection by the public on what may well be its greatest future problem.”
Leon Swirbul, of the Grumman Aircraft company, added that the “Finletter report is a
forceful document. Our military air power is the best insurance that our freedom, our
prosperity, and our security shall be preserved.”480
Many of those who praised both reports had a vested interest in their respective
conclusions because the aircraft and aviation component manufacturers had been gravely
concerned about the decline in purchases since World War II began to wind down. In
June 1947, Thomas Mullaney reported that the aircraft industry was approaching the
worst crisis in history. He warned that government action was necessary to establish a
“long-term plane-procurement program” and support for the development of new types of
aircraft. The manufacturers had been bleeding red ink since 1945 and were no longer in a
position to underwrite the costs of newer projects. Experts in the field contended that
there was a “90 percent shrinkage in their industry since 1944” and they feared a return of
the dark days that followed the demobilization from World War I.481 Air Force officials
fanned the fear of the collapse of the aviation industry and the striking capacity of the
USAF because of the limited number of aircraft that were being procured. They
suggested that the deficit in attack capabilities could be alleviated through long-range

480
481

The New York Times, "Air Policy Report Commended Here," January 5, 1948.
Thomas E. Mullaney, "Aircraft Industry Nears Crisis Fast," The New York Times, June 29, 1949.

248
strategic bombers that were “strengthening rather than weakening our current hitting
power.”482 It was also confirmed in December 1947, that the previous twelve months had
seen a record decline in aircraft production and financial losses for the industry. These
were two trends that could be reversed if the recommendations of both reports were
followed and the nation moved to adopt a policy that would “halt the discouraging
deterioration of air power” witnessed in the previous two years.483
The transcendence of airpower as the cutting edge of American foreign policy
was dependent upon new aircraft and a healthy aviation industry, but simply purchasing
new aircraft does not necessarily mean that a nation can impose its will over others, or
that national goals can solely be attained through the air. Perhaps the greatest
disappointment in both the Finletter and the Brewster reports was the limited view and
scope of airpower and its applications in war. Neither committee appeared to have seen a
role for airpower beyond continental defense, transportation, or strategic counterstrikes.
Unlike the multiple roles that airpower played in the Second World War, it emerged that
atomic strikes remained the only option for the United States to pursue in the event of
war. There were limited allowances made for tactical strikes in support of ground forces,
or the establishment of air superiority over enemy territory. Airpower was again seen as
it was during the atomic strikes on Japan, the ultimate arbiter of war.
The administration, Congress, the aviation industries, and military personnel all
played critical parts in the process that created a military policy that was extremely
inflexible in a changing world. The Truman and Eisenhower administrations certainly
followed many of the concepts of airpower that were presented to both committees in
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1947. Even during the difficult years of the Korean War, both administrations continued
to fund an overall defense strategy premised almost solely upon nuclear weapons. This
was not only because of cost savings compared to conventional forces, but also because
of the belief that they would work to deter or ultimately win a war with the Soviet Union.
The Kennedy administration eventually began to look for other alternatives to this
version of strategic air warfare after the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962. However,
it would take time for equipment and strategy to be developed that would match
Kennedy’s goal of flexible response. Unfortunately, the first American airstrikes of the
war in Vietnam would begin less than two years later, in the late summer of 1964.
Therefore, the aircraft, pilots, and tactics that were used during these first strikes also
reflected the limited possibilities offered in the hypothesis of strategic air warfare that
was presented before the Finletter committee in 1947. The results of this policy would
not be evident to the world until the failure of Operation Rolling Thunder to bring North
Vietnam to its knees between 1965 and 1968, two decades after the President’s Air
Policy Commission concluded its work.
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CHAPTER FIVE
SURVIVAL IN THE AGE OF TRUMAN AND THE BATTLE OF THE BUDGET

Boys, we are going to be peaceful on the earth here, or we are going to blow your
goddamn capitol city up there to pieces. Then if you still don’t get peaceful, we are going
to blow a few more of them to pieces until you get peaceful. Then we will start having a
working relationship on this, but no one else but us is going to have these damn bombs
here. We are going to maintain peace. Peace is going to be on this earth. We could
afford this.
Lt. General Archie Old, Jr.484
It is improbable that bomber fleets will be capable, for several years to come of
making two-way trips between continents, even over the polar routes, with heavy loads of
bombs. It is apparent then that in the event of war within this period, if we are to project
our power against the vital areas of any enemy across the ocean before beachheads on
enemy territory are captured, it must be air-sea power; by aircraft launched from
carriers.
Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz485

The publication of two air policy reports in early 1948 ushered in a new year that,
for President Harry Truman, would become arguably the most a critical year of his
presidency. The long-term prospects of peace in Europe were being forged in
multilateral discussions that would lead to the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) in early 1949. The American commitment to the Berlin Airlift
signaled Truman’s anti-communist resolve during the first major confrontation with the
Soviet Union over wartime agreements. The President also risked the wrath of the Arab
world and signaled a commitment to the Middle East with the formal diplomatic
recognition of the state of Israel and despite the risks to his political future, Truman
addressed these issues head on. At the same time, his re-election hopes appeared to be
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disappearing as fast as defense dollars were being cut from the federal budget in the name
of fiscal responsibility. Each of these decisions would have a dramatic impact on the
posterity of the nation and the role of the United States across the globe.
It was the future of airpower in the U.S. that perhaps vexed the President the most
because the release of the complementary reports on air policy had done little to clarify
mission roles and promote a greater sense of unification in the military. The United
States Air Force continued to push for the 70 Group Program and the Navy continued to
press for a sea-based nuclear mission but both services were in for a relative shock when
briefed about the President’s budget for Fiscal Year 1949. Truman had attempted to
solve budgetary problems through unification and implementing cuts to force levels that
he believed would provide adequate security at a reduced cost. However, Truman also
increased U.S. military and diplomatic commitments across the globe at the same time
and this ultimately placed more pressure on the already strained budget. The President
believed that there was national strength in a healthy economy and he and Secretary of
Defense James Forrestal did not want to squander this in the pursuit of exorbitant weapon
systems that the nation could ill afford.486 Yet this would be a difficult task for the
President as his attention was rapidly being turned to a campaign he was not likely to
win. In this vacuum of leadership, the battle for airpower was being waged in the press;
both houses of the Republican controlled 80th Congress, and corridors of the Pentagon.
Witnesses to this very public debate were Representatives John F. Kennedy of
Massachusetts, Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas, Richard M. Nixon from California, and
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. of Massachusetts.
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AUSTERITY AND DEFENSE

The battle over the FY 1949 budget had everything to do with strategy as much as
it did dwindling military budgets. Since 1945, when the United States had roughly 12
million men and women in uniform, the numbers of conventional forces had been
condensed dramatically, down to 1.5 million by 1947. Annual military spending had also
been reduced from approximately $90.9 billion in 1945 down to about $10.3 billion in the
same time frame.487 The reductions occurred at the same time that American
commitments abroad were significantly increasing. President Truman became
increasingly dedicated to containing the expansion of communism across the globe. He
announced to Congress and the world in March 1947 that the United States was going to
fill the void left by the decline of the United Kingdom in the Mediterranean and provide
substantial military aid to nations like Greece and Turkey who were being pressured by
internal insurgencies or external threats originating in the Soviet Union. Granted, much
of the military aid that was dispatched was World War II surplus rather than new
equipment, but it still remained a substantial American outlay.488 This was in addition to
the resources invested in the European Recovery Program that had also been announced
by Secretary of State George Marshall that same month. This linked American military
and diplomatic policies with economic containment aimed at curbing or rebuffing Soviet
behavior towards its neighboring states.489 With containment and reduced budgets as

487

Robert J. Donovan, Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1945-1948, The Give 'Em
Hell Series, ed. Robert H. Ferrell (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1996), 285.
488
Gary W. Reichard, Politics as Usual: The Age of Truman and Eisenhower, The American History
Series, ed. John Hope Franklin and Abraham S. Eisenstadt (Arlington Heights, IL: Harlan Davidson, 1988),
19.
489
Sara L. Sale, The Shaping of Containment: Harry S. Truman, The National Security Council, and the
Cold War (St. James, NY: Brandywine Press, 1998), 6-7.

253
chief goals for the Truman administration in 1947, one can better understand the pressure
on each of the services to be not only relevant, but be absolutely necessary for national
security.
It was evident in late 1947 that even before the report of the President’s Air
Policy Commission was released that Truman had disagreed with the proposal for the 70
Group Program. Supported by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, James Webb,
Truman’s fiscal conservatism over the next budget created a dilemma for the Services in
this era of austere government spending. Each dollar that was budgeted had to be spent
wisely and the economic value and supposed efficacy of strategic bombing and nuclear
delivery seemed to trump common sense from the military as the budget was being
prepared. On December 16, 1947, Secretary of the Air Force Stuart Symington took his
concerns to Webb and Forrestal and he claimed that the Air Force proposal for the 70
Group Program was actually a minimum force requirement that was “imposed by the
position of the United States in the modern world.” The projected level of 55 groups
would be attained by the first of the year, but “it falls far short of meeting the
requirements of our National Security.” This trend would continue into the next year and
in the end this would have “grave implications which should be thoroughly understood
before the estimate is submitted to the Congress.” He maintained that the Air Force
wanted a balanced military but he felt that “the Air Force ultimately prescribed must be
completely manned and operational and the entire Air Force structure balanced to provide
the greatest possible effectiveness.” Without the additional funding necessary to attain
the 70 Group Program, Symington warned that in reality the Air Force would only have
enough for 40 Groups that would be fully operational “plus the maintenance of a
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structure for potential mobilization.” If it was decided to continue to pursue the funding
for a 55 Group Air Force, then the USAF would be forced to submit a request for
supplemental funding in an effort to provided the minimum requirements for national
security.490
The Secretary of the Air Force forwarded a copy of the previous letter to the
Secretary of Defense along with another note asking for Forrestal’s position on the 70
Group Program and funding the minimum defensive stature for the United States. This
had been supported in a study conducted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Symington
argued that this could not be accomplished with the projected appropriations for the next
fiscal year. He also acknowledged that there were other pressing and expensive foreign
policy issues but with the rising favorability of the Republican Congress, “the press and
the people with respect to the position of air power, and any common sense strategic
concept as to how to get at Russia, we are more shocked at this decision” than anything
since Symington came into federal service.491 Clearly agitated over the limited funding,
Symington would pressure the President and the Bureau of the Budget for more funding
and refused to be a team player when it came time to defend the budget to Congress. In
addition to attempting to find additional dollars by building a consensus for the direction
the Air Force wanted to go with strategic air warfare, Symington began to look at the
dollars that were spent by the other services and attempted to have redundant programs
cancelled to free up more capital for the Air Force to invest in the future.
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Concerns over defense expenditures led the outgoing Chairman of the Senate
Armed Services Committee, Republican John “Chan” Gurney of South Dakota, to write a
letter to the Secretary of Defense in December 1947. Forrestal’s response clarified his
view of military expenditures and stated that, at the present time, they were “below the
levels which our military leaders must in good conscience estimate as the minimum”
needed for national security. This was being done to free up funds to assist in the
recovery of Europe that was, according to Forrestal, a calculated risk “in order to follow a
course which offers the prospect of eventually achieving national security and also longterm world stability.” Within the uncertainty of the world in 1948, there were only four
things which Forrestal could state as military fact, they were, the preponderance of Soviet
conventional power in Europe, the predominance of American naval power and control
of the seas, exclusivity of American control of the atomic bomb, and the productive
capacity of the United States. As long as the United States could “outproduce the world,
can control the sea, and can strike inland with the atomic bomb, we can assume certain
risks, otherwise unacceptable in an effort to restore world trade, to restore the balance of
power – military power – and to eliminate some the conditions which breed war.”492
Forrestal, either consciously or unwittingly, clarified the position of the atomic bomb on
American foreign policy. He stated that they allowed for a reduction in conventional
forces and freed up capital to combat the Soviet Union in non-military ways. Any
attempt to restrict military expenditures logically created concerns for the Service
secretaries and admonitions of an imminent disaster, which was about to afflict the
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United States. This catastrophe would be a result of the scourge of international
communism or Soviet domination.
Despite the dire warnings coming from the Pentagon, President Truman continued
to push for reduced expenditures and within days of receiving the Finletter Committee’s
report, the President asked the Congress for at least 50% of the Fiscal 1949 defense
budget to be earmarked for the benefit of the United States Air Force. Included in the
monies appropriated was funding for new aircraft including fighters and bombers and
increased training and he continued to pare down the cost of the military and he reduced
appropriations from the other services to increase the funding for the Air Force. While
the Air Force garnered half of the new budget, the Navy was reduced to approximately
1/3rd of the total.493 This meant that the Navy would have to find alternative sources of
funding to pay for their planned supercarrier and naval nuclear bomber. This could
include the cancelling of other shipbuilding projects and diverting that money for the new
projects but unfortunately for the Navy, they would soon learn that they did not control
all the purse strings for the money that was allocated for their department.
As much as the Air Force believed in the strategic bombing, they disagreed with
the concept of supercarrier in principle and carrier-based aviation in general. William
Bradford Huie, an Air Force supporter and anti-naval aviation zealot, contended in The
Reader’s Digest that naval aviation was “short-ranged” and “useful only on the seas” and
it was “comparatively worthless since our enemy has no reason to fear it. Against Russia
what role is there for a carrier-based air force?”494 Others within the Air Force further
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argued that carriers were archaic relics in the vanguard of atomic warfare and that they
could not survive against a land-based power with a superior air force. It was also
questionable whether or not carriers could survive the age of Truman as the expenditures
for the National Military Establishment were cut even as the Berlin Airlift was beginning
and the Truman administration was participating in the negotiations for an expanded U.S.
presence in Europe as a result of NATO. Every dollar that was spent on aviation assets
was a dollar that was going to be fought over with apparently as much vigor as the
difficult political campaign that the President was waging to keep his job.

DEFENDING THE 70 GROUP AIR FORCE

On April 2, 1948, correspondence from Secretary of Defense James Forrestal to
the Senate Armed Services Committee was released to the press and in it, Forrestal
attempted to answer questions that he and the other Service Secretaries were not prepared
to when they appeared before the committee on March 25, 1948. In particular, a question
was raised about the annual cost of the 70 Group Program envisioned in the final report
of the Finletter committee. According to Forrestal it would cost $18 billion more than the
previous year’s budget for the National Military Establishment, but the appropriations
would make the Air Force “fully effective in combat.” It took time to build the necessary
aircraft and he had become alarmed “with the rapid depletion of our war surplus stocks of
airplanes in storage” and to maintain the NME at the current levels proposed for the
Fiscal 1949 budget would require “utilizing stocks of supplies, facilities and equipment
left over from the war.” Forrestal was convinced that the budget estimates prepared by
the NME reflected the requirement to “insure maximum return for the military tax dollar”
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and that this budget had “the interests of national security and with due consideration for
the national economy.”495
Active discussion over Truman’s budget cuts and the 70 Group Program also
carried over into meetings of the National Security Council. On March 23, 1948, the
NSC met for the eighth time to discuss among other things, the authorized strengths of
the Departments within the NME. Secretary of State George Marshall chaired this
meeting in the President’s absence. Forrestal stated that he had received some inquiries
from members of Congress about the cost of adequate funding for the military to create
an “adequate defense” and in light of the President’s address to Congress, what should be
stated by the military in “terms of specific figures.” Forrestal added that during the peak
of the Second World War defense expenditures was estimated at $75 billion, which
represented about “45% of our total annual product” but Marshall made it clear that the
President was not willing to exceed the current authorized strength of the National
Military Establishment. The Secretary of State added that the question that remained was
whether or not the military felt that “they must convince the President to take other
action” although Marshall felt that if political involvements could be avoided, the nation
would be in a stronger position.496
Marshall indicated that Truman’s intent was to convince the Soviets of the
American determination “without entering into an all-out war effort” and it must be
decided which steps to take to prevent or deter the Soviets from making further moves. It
was acknowledged that the United States could not make it impossible for the Soviets to
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move in the coming two to three months and therefore it had to be determined what could
be done to deter the Soviets and “have a maximum of encouraging effect upon the other
countries of Europe.”497
Marshall asked Forrestal what the NME considered to be essential “beyond what
is authorized” to which Forrestal replied that more aircraft were needed. The Secretary
of State cautioned Forrestal that if he asked for too much, they might not get any.
Forrestal, however, felt that one more move by the Soviets would “make Congress
agreeable” to an increase in the military budget for 1949. Then Symington reminded the
Council that the USAF was anxious to attain the 70 Group Program however,
appropriations for additional aircraft were being reduced by the administration over the
last several years. The current 55 groups were being funded at a cost of $3 billion and
the lowest appropriation recommended by the Presidential and Congressional Air Policy
Boards was $5 billion. The Air Force Secretary felt that there was sufficient support in
Congress for additional appropriations. However, the questions for the Air Force
remained whether or not it should ask for what it truly needed and was now the time to
get new aircraft because the only planes in the arsenal that were not obsolete were the B29s. Symington added that the Soviets were qualitatively ahead of the United States in
jets and about equal in bombers and they had a large base across the Bering Sea that was
equipped with the latest Soviet military hardware. From these bases he believed the
Soviets could launch two-way missions that could wipe out all American aircraft
factories except those in Texas.498
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What is not clear is what type of bomber Symington was referring to because the
only strategic bomber in the Soviet air force at this time was the Tupolev TU-4, a
duplicate of the B-29. However, the TU-4 would not go into full service until 1949, a
year after this meeting of the NSC.499 Even if they had been available in large numbers
in 1948, the TU-4s did not have the range to hit targets in the U.S. on two-way missions
any more than the USAF B-29s could do the same to the Soviet Union. What Symington
was talking about is unclear and at best, he was uninformed, at worst, he was lying to the
NSC in an effort to expand the Air Force budget. Yet, one could still find comfort in
Symington’s warning if you believed it, the factory building the B-36 was located in Fort
Worth, Texas and would therefore be out of reach of the Soviet two-way bombers.
In the G.O.P controlled Congress, including Symington’s father-in-law,
Republican James Wadsworth, bipartisan support for the 70 Group Program with an
emphasis on long-range bombers was evident in the House in early April 1948.500 With
a unanimous vote, the House Armed Services Committee recommended full support for
the increase from a 55 groups to a 70 group Air Force, a proposal that was forwarded on
to the President, the Speaker of the House, and the Secretary of the Air Force. Carl
Hinshaw, the Vice Chairman of the Congressional Joint Air Policy Board maintained this
defense concept as he informed his colleagues in the House that if “we are going to have
the air power to preserve the peace of this world, we have got to start now.” Hinshaw
argued that aircraft production had to be doubled if the United States was going to even
get to 55 combat groups in the Air Force. If the United States wanted to be ready for war
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by 1952 or 1953, time was of the essence and decisions needed to be made immediately
in the interest of American national security.501 On April 14, 1948, with the passage of
more than $2 billion for airpower, William Randolph Hearst, Jr. sent a letter to
Symington confirming he and his papers supported the Air Force and Symington’s effort
to keep “the Untied States Air Force the dominant air force of all the world.
Unquestionably, the next war will be fought in the air.”502 Symington had no doubt
about the latter concept and he affirmed his goal of improving the “chance of having an
adequate Air Force by the time the Russians have the bomb” and he pledged that “every
effort will be made to purchase these planes to the very best interest of the Government
and the taxpayer.”503
On April 21, 1948, the Secretary of Defense released to the press a statement that
he had given to the Senate Armed Services Committee that attempted to clarify his
position on the 70 Group Program and the funding of the National Military Establishment
as a whole. He did not promote the Air Force plan or any programs advanced by the
Army or the Navy and instead presented his position as advocating balance between the
services with all of them being in a state of “readiness to accomplish assigned
objectives.” This did not mean that Forrestal perceived equal spending or manpower
evenly divided among the services, but rather each of them would be maintained enough
to allow them to complete their respective missions and it was up to the Joint Chiefs of
Staff to determine and assign appropriate forces to complete them. Forrestal contended
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he would continue to rely on “any recommendations the Joint Chiefs of Staff may make,
with regard to the proper composition of a balanced force” and he was confident that the
“President, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretaries of
Army, Navy, and Air Force—as well as the Senate and the House of Representatives”
were all in agreement on the desirability of a “balanced military establishment” in line
with the 70 Group Program.
Forrestal stated that he understood the fiscal restraints that the program would
place on the American economy and he hoped that arguments made for or against the
budget would be made in a “rational and organized manner, and not on a basis of
emotional reaction” and he cited a recent comment made by Air Force General Spaatz as
an example. Spaatz argued that despite increased funding, the USAF was unable to
“undertake mass bombing of enemy cities from American bases” and the Air Force had
not yet reached a point where it could sustain the necessary long-range attacks that many
thought were necessary to win the next war. While Spaatz was angling for increased Air
Force funding, Forrestal attempted to study all procurements to make sure that they were
in line with the goals of the JCS and the President. Forrestal closed his statement by
suggesting that all of the services understood the value of airpower and it was “likely to
be the decisive element in our national strength.” In order to bring that element of
American policy to bear, the JCS were unanimous “in the opinion that strong ground and
surface forces are necessary in order to enable the Air Force and naval aviation to employ
air power effectively and decisively.”504
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Symington also continued to promote and defend the idea of the 70 Group
Program with all the vigor and tenacity that had been his trademark since he became
Secretary of the Air Force. In late April 1948, Symington clarified the future of the
program in terms of types of aircraft that would be needed to fight a war once the Soviets
had the bomb, the prediction of which varied from 1951-1952. He stated that it was
necessary to convert production facilities and plants to begin to fully modernize the Air
Force to levels that were inline with the 70 Group Program. Symington contended after
all that it “takes just as much Army and Navy to support a 70 group obsolete Air Force probably more – than it does to support a 70 group modern Air Force” and that rather
than trying to “balance the money between the services” there should be an attempt to
“balance the program” between the Armed Forces.505
Symington also understood the value of public relations and standing behind
those who had reciprocated their support for the Air Force and in May 1948 Symington
sent a letter to Lt. General E.R. Quesada requesting that he show every courtesy to
Congressman Lyndon Johnson at Bergstrom Air Force Base in Texas because he “did as
much to weld the success of the Air Force in its recent effort to get the 70-group program
as any man in the United States.”506 In November 1948, the Secretary of the Air Force
dispatched a B-36 bomber to Denver where it was visited by a large number of people.
The display served two purposes, the first to physically display the immense size of the
aircraft and its performance in a manner that newspaper editorials or military
commentators could never accomplish. The B-36 was also sent as a thank you to Palmer
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Hoyt, the editor and publisher of the Denver Post and key Air Force supporter on the
President’s Air Policy Commission. Hoyt stated in a thank you letter to Symington that
“the voters, after they look at a B-36, will unconsciously realize what the score is.” This
sentiment was the very reason that the Peacemaker was sent to Denver in the first
place.507

AMENDING THE BUDGET

Throughout Washington D.C. questions were raised and public debates in
Congress and the press continued about the logic in reducing the military budget at a time
when it appeared the international involvement of the United States was increasing.
Truman was not blind to the debate, and had attempted to allow the Secretary of Defense
to bring his military chiefs in line with administration policy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
had concluded that the 70 Group Program for the Air Force would cost an additional $9
billion beyond what the President had proposed. They were willing to back a
supplemental bill for $3.5 billion which would be directed at the Air Force to allow them
to get to 66 groups, but this was still short of what Symington had argued was needed.
Eventually the supplemental request was reduced to roughly $3 billion, which Truman
agreed to as long as the NME did not attempt to spend it all. The President also let the
military know that he was establishing a limit of $15 billion for the next fiscal year. He
gave each of them a written directive to follow the proposal with “good spirit, and
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without mental reservation” and he expected everyone in the administration to support it
“fully both in public and private.”508
The Secretary of Defense issued a press release on April 8, 1948 that attempted to
address the growing concerns about the budget and national defense, and announced that
the administration called for a supplemental budget of almost $3 billion. This was not to
be seen as unbalancing of the American force structure in favor of the Air Force.
Forrestal added that the President had originally called for an Air Force that consisted of
55 combat groups, and the 70 Group Program had not yet been approved or disapproved
by Forrestal’s office or Truman. National security was dependent upon balanced forces,
and Forrestal added that careful study must be taken to fully understand the impact of
additional military expenditures on an “already practically fully employed and tight
economy” which could result in “explosive inflationary consequences.” Military
demands “must be within the limits of our capacity to produce, or, alternatively, we must
accept those controls that are found necessary to channel manpower and materials
necessary to insure the desired production.” 509
It is evident from such statements about fiscal restraints where the appeal of
nuclear weapons to solve the financial constraints of each of the Services began. The
actual ability to deliver weapons on target is irrelevant to the promise of the capability to
accomplish such a mission better than a sister Service. In other words, this was the
reason for the Air Force to develop strategic and tactical nuclear bombers, the Navy to
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have large carriers and sea-based bombers, and even for the Army to develop an atomic
cannon.

PETULANCE AND PREPAREDNESS

The passage of the National Security Act of 1947 and the completion of
competing investigations into American air policy had done little to stem the debate over
mission roles, atomic weapons, and an overall U.S. Cold War strategy. The disputes
between the Air Force and the Navy arguably appeared to be getting worse in the months
following unification rather than better. As the Navy continued to press for a role in the
atomic missions, the USAF continued its public relations campaign for increased funding
and presence within the National Military Establishment. What followed for several
months were what appeared to be a series of public temper tantrums, as both the USAF,
and the Navy, attempted to have their views heard and responded to at the expense of the
other service. As Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal endeavored to find a
compromise through a series of conferences between 1948 and 1949. Although he had
fought against a strong Secretary of Defense during the unification arguments, Forrestal
came to understand that as structured, the military could not properly function, and the
publicity generated by the mission disputes was detrimental to American national
security.
As more focus was being devoted to the Air Force and the B-36, the Navy
continued to believe that they had a better option under development, and in his farewell
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address as the Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz publically
advocated for the use of carriers to take the next war to the heartland of an enemy state.
He believed it was the responsibility of the Navy to take the war to the enemy “so that it
will not be fought on American soil.” Nimitz contended that the Navy’s most recent
experience during World War II had demonstrated that naval aviation and sea-based
assets function on the cutting edge of an assault. When their initial attacks were
completed, the Navy was able to transition their strike force to one that participated
against the “destruction of those vital centers on Okinawa and the home islands” despite
the concentration of Japanese air assets. If an air attack comes over the polar ice caps,
the Navy had to be prepared with fighters and interceptors for defense, as well as, longrange bombers that are coordinated with “military and naval air power launched from
land and carrier bases, and of guided missiles against important enemy targets.”510
Perhaps intentionally provocative, the outgoing Chief of Naval Operations added
that until long range bombers were developed that had the capability of “spanning our
bordering oceans and returning to the continental North American bases, naval air power
launched from carriers may be the only predictable means of bombing vital enemy
centers in the early stages of a war.” The carrier task force was as complete as any land
base, and carriers had the “unique attributes of secrecy and surprise” which assisted in
both offensive and defensive operations. The Services should be assigned broad
missions, according to Nimitz, and be allowed to develop the weapons needed to
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complete their assignments. The potential of each service should not be neglected in the
overall scheme of national security.511
Nimitz had successfully raised the ire of Air Force Chief of Staff Carl Spaatz,
who responded that the Navy did not appear to be upholding their responsibilities under
the unification agreements and that the American public did not understand that there was
going to be only one Air Force. The Nimitz speech, according to Spaatz, was aimed at
undermining previous agreements because the Navy did not “consider binding the
Executive Order of the President, issued after the passage by the Congress of the National
Security Act.” He further suggested that the Soviet Union was prepared to “meet and
destroy” American carriers that approached the USSR. Spaatz articulated that the
experience in World War II had indicated the necessity of winning control of the air
before successful bombing operations could be completed because you “don’t fight the
air war with something that has to sneak in and out” whether it was carrier aircraft or
USAF bombers. This is particularly interesting, because the idea of the B-36 was just
what Spaatz said would not work.512
The B-36 Peacemaker, with the projected 10,000-mile range that the USAF kept
promoting, would out distance any friendly fighters that could help establish American
control of the air that Spaatz argued was necessary to win the air war. For the United
States to win in the air, Spaatz argued that it required gaining air bases closer to the
targets. Then, with the engagement of American fighters, the Air Force would make sure
that “the enemy’s air is knocked to hell.” Spaatz feared that the Navy’s pursuit of a rival
air force, at a great cost, had watered down the effectiveness of the USAF. These
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ongoing problems with the interpretation of unification, according to Spaatz, presented
naval officers in a bad light, and it compromised U.S. security.513
In an apparent shift in tactics, the Air Force altered their attacks on the naval
nuclear strike program by attacking the vulnerability of aircraft carriers in a modern war.
In a response to an editorial in The Evening Star, Spaatz wrote a letter that was first
forwarded to the Secretary of Defense by Stuart Symington. Symington claimed that he
did not ask Spaatz to write the letter, but Spaatz had his full support.514 In the editorial,
Spaatz raised serious questions about the Navy’s claim that, with a supercarrier and a
nuclear bomber, they would be able to strike targets deep in enemy territory within the
decade. Spaatz contended that air bases within the United States, as well as bases
secured overseas, allowed the Air Force to conduct those missions and destroy the whole
industrial area of an enemy “on a scale greater than could be accomplished by ten or
more such carriers.” Better bombers and guided missiles in the future would also change
the dynamic of an attack, and Spaatz questioned whether or not a carrier-based attack
plan could succeed against a “continental empire which possesses a first-rate air force.”
The Air Force Chief of Staff suggested that the Japanese Air Force that confronted the
USN during World War II was “well below first-rate” and as the Americans moved
against Japan during the Okinawa campaign, heavy losses were inflicted by the
“practically emasculated” Japanese who possessed only a 10th rate air force. Unlike
aircraft carriers, land based airbases could withstand damage and be repaired to operate
again fairly quickly, but a single bomb could put a carrier out of action. It did not even
have to be an expensive atomic bomb, but an ordinary bomb was sufficient. Carriers
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were easy to detect at sea, and with an aircraft operating at modern speeds, the carrier
appears to be not moving at all, “and it sinks when it is hit properly.” Spaatz suggested
that much of the “prevalent misdirection of thought and effort could be eliminated if the
Naval Air Force became a part of the United States Air Force,” an idea that had not gone
away since unification.515
In his letter Spaatz made no mention about the possibility of overseas air bases
being removed from U.S. custody in the event of a war, an enemy attack, or even a shift
of governmental leadership by the host nation. Spaatz made no allowance for nations
that might prohibit the United States from storing nuclear weapons on their soil, nor did
he acknowledge that the 10th rate Japanese Air Force, supported by an effective radar net
that alerted the Japanese air and ground defenders, contributed to the destruction of 360
B-29s that were lost by the USAAF during World War II.516
A further example of the level of petulance between the Services was a request
made by Air Force Secretary Symington. He wanted a rough estimate of converting a B29 into an anti-submarine patrol bomber to counter the Navy’s attempts to adapt the P2V
Neptune to a nuclear bomber.517 This particular Navy plan had been bothering
Symington since at least October 1946, when he had complained to the Secretary of War
Robert Patterson that the Navy had purchased upwards of 100 of them, and this was
“nothing more or less than a long-range patrol bomber.”518 Symington also forwarded a
complaint to James Forrestal that decried Navy press releases about the ability of carrier515
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based naval aircraft to intercept and shoot down enemy aircraft. Others displayed the
fear that the Army and the Air Force were outmaneuvering the Navy because they could
impose a majority rule over naval interests. Another naval press release suggested that
the role of airpower “merits the study of every American who has a part in determining
the composition of our future military establishment” and even more inflammatory, it
also contended that airpower “is not just strategic bombing by huge fleets of B-29s.” It
instead involved the establishment of air supremacy over “any hostile air force at any
point of conflict,” a point of emphasis for the Navy who saw a fundamental role for naval
aviation in this realm. It was also suggested that there were those who were attempting to
gag the Navy, which was a “flagrant violation of the spirit of the unification program.”
Symington replied to these attacks by noting that the Air Force had great admiration and
respect for its sister service, but the USAF regretted the ongoing attacks on the Air Force
by the Navy.519
Some might consider Symington’s ongoing war with the Navy to be a sign of an
obstinate public official, or a tireless advocate for his service. Regardless of the view
posterity has for the first Air Force Secretary, he remained fiercely loyal to the USAF,
and he never deviated from his belief in the role of strategic air warfare. Still, he made
Forrestal’s life miserable with his constant complaints about the Navy and mission roles.
The aforementioned disputes made it apparent to some that unification seemed to
have failed, and the overall goals of national security and the responsibilities of the
National Military Establishment were in apparent tatters. Secretary of Defense Forrestal
faced further difficulties in March 1948, when the Congressional Aviation Policy Board
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released their report that buttressed the belief in airpower as the best avenue for securing
a lasting peace. In that same month, a coup in Czechoslovakia signaled a hardening of
Soviet attitudes towards not only the West, but also its own bloc. If the problems
between the United States and the Soviet Union could not be resolved, the war that would
come was going to bring many proxy nations across the globe. This could stretch the
dwindling American conventional forces beyond their breaking point and the last thing
that Forrestal and the NME needed now was an inconsistent message regarding military
preparedness or missions. In apparent frustration, Forrestal had advised the President that
no substantial progress had been made by the JCS to solve the problems of roles and
missions and the Secretary of Defense gave them until March 8, 1948 to come to a
decision.520 When no solution was reached, Forrestal called for a conference of the JCS
to find a resolution to the problems of unification and mission roles. It would take place
in Key West, Florida from March 11 to March 14, 1948. It was hoped that this would
lead to a resolution on the issues that divided the military, and provide a level of harmony
between the Services.

THE KEY WEST CONFERENCE

At the time of the Key West Conference, the Joint Chiefs of Staff was composed
of Admiral William Leahy, the Chairman of the JCS; the Chief of Naval Operations,
Admiral Louis Denfeld; U.S. Army General Omar Bradley, and Air Force General Carl
Spaatz. Spaatz and Bradley were both previously outspoken in their views of strategic
bombing and the necessity of the Navy to conform to the missions it was assigned, not
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what it wanted. Denfeld was new to the JCS, as he was sworn in on December 15, 1947
to replace Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, who had only served one term. Denfeld did
not bring the years of leadership during the hard times of World War II, or even name
recognition. Instead, he appeared to be the choice for CNO because of his experience in
naval bureaucracy, and his great rapport with influential members of Congress.521 With
their key deputies involved in the conversations and planning, the JCS worked to find a
solution that would be pleasing to most, and publically palatable for both sides to declare
victory.
A press release from Forrestal’s office announced to the world what was
accomplished during the three days of the Key West conference in terms of decisions
regarding the assignment of missions among the three services. A staff paper created at
Key West clarified that each Department was “assigned specific functions in which that
Service has a clear-cut responsibility,” and that would be considered its primary
responsibility. Forrestal contended that there were also collateral responsibilities, and
each branch of the Armed Forces was required to “support and supplement the other
Services, in carrying out their primary function, whenever such participation will result in
increased effectiveness and will contribute to the accomplishment of the over-all military
objective.”522
Strategic air warfare was declared to be the primary responsibility of the Air
Force,
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operations necessary for the accomplishment of objectives in a naval campaign.” There
were provisions for the Navy to participate “in the over-all air effort as directed” by the
JCS, as well as conduct anti-submarine warfare as a primary function. Most importantly,
the Navy was not prohibited from attacking inland targets that might be necessary for the
completion of its assigned missions. The Air Force was also given the collateral duty of
anti-submarine warfare.524 The Key West Agreement declared that because the Air
Force had the responsibility for strategic bombing, the Air Force Chief of Staff would
present the requirements for all forces necessary for the employment of strategic air
warfare before the JCS. It was also determined that the secondary missions would not
“be used as the basis for establishing additional force requirements by any service” and
that “unnecessary duplication or overlapping among the services will be prevented.”525
Interpretation of the preceding clause created many of the problems during the
next several months of 1948. Any issues that could not be solved by this agreement, or
by the JCS, were to be forwarded on to the Secretary of Defense for resolution.
Ironically, this would mean that James Forrestal, the man who had insisted upon a
weakened position for the Secretary of Defense, would not have the ability to solve all of
these problems. This resulted in the Air Force belief that they maintained sole possession
of strategic bombing because it was assigned to them as a primary mission. They were
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currently the only Service that could accomplish the objective, and they had the ability to
state what was, or was not, needed from the other Services to successfully complete
strategic bombing. It was agreed that the Navy would not build a supercarrier “on the
basis of its contribution to strategic air warfare,” but it might still be built if the Navy
could justify the carrier on the basis of its naval function, “plus the contribution which it
could make to the strategic air missions.”526 The problem that remained for the Navy
was the Air Force responsibility of determining what was needed for strategic air warfare.
The USAF had made it clear that there was no need for the supercarrier and a naval
nuclear bomber because they were redundant. Leadership within the Navy maintained
that the supercarrier was not actually forbidden by this agreement and they were
committed to build it because it was a vital part of the Navy’s required missions. The
Navy would also continue to design and test the concept of a naval nuclear bomber even
as Air Force criticism of the idea continued unabated as if there had been no agreements
on roles reached at Key West.
A month after the Key West conference, Senator Owen Brewster, chairman of the
Congressional Aviation Policy Board, gave a speech at a private aviation club that
claimed that unification had not worked to alleviate the conflict between the Air Force
and the Navy. The nation could not afford “the luxury of two air forces” and the Navy
now appeared to be “air minded with a vengeance” and its battles with the Air Force was
troubling. He contended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not appreciative of the
economic implications of their work and he was intrigued by the idea of the naval nuclear
bomber. It was a plan that could be excellent if, Brewster argued, it was economically
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feasible. Congress was entitled to examine the idea, with experts on the cost and
usefulness of the program, keeping in mind that the military expenditures could
“obviously approach the breaking point if care is not exercised.
Brewster’s counterpart on the Congressional Aviation Policy Board, Carl
Hinshaw, aired his concerns about the concept of the supercarrier in June 1948, during
the Congressional debates on the new naval weapon system. He suggested that perhaps it
was time to convene a Congressional subcommittee or a board “composed of relatively
disinterested persons” to make a decision on the feasibility of the project. The overall
cost of the new carrier had to reflect the support ships and aircraft that were necessary to
support the supercarrier. He added that if it was built, the new carrier could only handle a
small number of “strategic-type aircraft” that were limited in size and range although the
range issue could be mitigated by moving the carrier closer to enemy territory, but then it
would be vulnerable to enemy efforts and could be “sunk or rendered uninhabitable” by
radioactive fallout. He contended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not approved the new
carrier because of the opposition from the Air Force on the JCS, and insinuated that the
real reason the Navy wanted this carrier was because the “Navy Department believed that
unless it engages in strategic bombing it may lose its preeminence among the armed
services.” There was the real possibility that the money to be spent on the supercarrier
and support ships could be “entirely too expensive an undertaking.”527 The reality of the
Key West conference was that it really solved nothing regarding unification, and both the
Air Force and the Navy began new assaults on the other’s assumed primary mission.
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THE ONGOING WAR OF WORDS

Stuart Symington went so far to protect the mission of his Service, that he had the
Air Force’s Director of Public Affairs, Steve Leo, monitor the press for indications of a
bias against the Air Force or the B-36. In particular, they paid special interest to the New
York Times military reporter Hanson Baldwin, a former graduate of the Naval
Academy.528 Among the many things highlighted within Leo’s twelve page memo, were
comments made about the MGM movie Command Decision that showed the “high price
of sending bombers beyond the range of fighter support,” something that the B-36 was
going to have to do, and “Congressmen appear in none to favorable light.” There was
also concern that this movie, along with some other items in the media, could lead to a
“press reaction that one-weapon theme of air power is being overplayed as against 3service teamwork” and the “disquieting words ‘air lobby’ appear again.”529 The Air
Force kept prodigious amounts of information on the Navy and they have been included
within the files of the Secretary of the Air Force. These included speeches, testimony,
and even press clippings that were monitored in an effort to keep the USAF informed or
for possible use as political leverage. However, the Air Force denied operating a
particular section of specialists devoted to promoting Air Force propaganda.530
In July 1948, Symington drafted a memo to Forrestal that outlined further
grievances with the Navy, and he boldly claimed that the USAF was under assault from
the Navy in the court of public opinion. The Secretary of the Air Force took exception to
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claims by Rear Admiral Ralph A. Ofstie, a former member of the United States Strategic
Bombing Survey for Japan, and the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air). Ofstie had
suggested that the “carrier task force was the only way we can deliver bombs to targets
overseas,” which Symington took out of context. The speech that so angered Symington
was entitled “The Fast Carrier Task Force” and was presented by Ofstie to the
Metropolitan Section of the Aviation Writer’s Association on June 10, 1948. It
highlighted the performance of carriers and their support ships as they conducted their
missions during World War II and into the postwar period. Ofstie argued against one of
the hallmarks of the Air Force, strategic bombing, in a scathing critique of the raison
d'être of the USAF. He claimed that area bombing was “unquestionably a mistake”
because it “costs more than it pays off.” The bombing did force an enemy to invest time
and effort in aerial defenses and could cause a rise in worker absenteeism, but the
reduction of “war production is not commensurate with the percentage of total war effort
which this bombing represents.” Ofstie maintained that in the future, conventional
bombing “must be directed against target systems to be decisive” and it must be “real
precision bombing and not the prodigious expenditures of explosives of the past if it is to
be within the capabilities of a country’s economy in another war.” Target lists should
include oil, steel, communication, electric power generation, and other items that are
essential to maintain a nation in war, objectives that were easier to strike with smaller
aircraft than bigger bombers.531
Ofstie made a prescient point that would certainly ring true during the mid to late
1960s, when he argued that in gauging the “tactical effectiveness of an air force it is not
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the volume of the effort but the attainment of the objective and the cost of the results that
counts.” Each target has to be measured individually and not treated the same in types
and tonnages of bombs expended, a point sorely missing in the debate over atomic bombs
and missions. He further antagonized the pro-USAF elements involved in the debate
when he suggested that the “Carrier Task Force is on an equal footing with any other air
force” in its ability to conduct conventional attacks against “an enemy target anywhere on
earth within the combined range of the carriers and their aircraft.” He agreed that nuclear
weapons were the main weapon in the American arsenal, and he felt that they could only
be useful if they “could be delivered to the right spot” by Air Force or naval aircraft. The
problem was that in the event of war, both atomic and conventional bombs had to be
delivered to targets that were a great distance from the United States. In mid-1948, the
U.S. did not have a plane in squadron service that could carry atomic weapons “or other
useful bomb weights from the U.S. to many possible targets overseas.” If the United
States was not able to acquire bases closer to the targets, then in these circumstances, the
carriers and naval aircraft were “the only way we can deliver bombs to targets overseas.”
Naval strike aircraft could complement the attacks of land-based long-range bombers,
and could hit targets that were harder to reach for the big bombers. They could also hit
them multiple times and were a major component necessary to win a modern war.532
Despite the logic displayed in Ofstie’s criticism of strategic air warfare,
Symington continued to praise it as the way to win a war, and further argued that the Air
Force did not wish to get into a prolonged and “unprofitable discussion on ‘who won the
last war’” but, apparently he did. He also criticized a memo that the Assistant Chief of
Naval Operations, Admiral Dan V. Gallery, released that proposed that strategic bombing
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was the primary mission of the Navy and not the Air Force. The Vice Chief of Naval
Operations, Admiral Arthur Radford, went one step further, and stated that any target in
the world lies within 1,500 miles of carrier based aircraft. This meant a more rapid
response with fresh naval aircraft and crews instead of waiting for land-based bombers to
cross the ocean, or polar ice caps, to strike a target. Symington felt that these types of
vitriolic statements violated instructions that Forrestal had given to “all Departments
emphasizing the necessity for minimizing public evidence of friction among the services”
and the Navy continued to do this in spite of the Defense Secretary’s order. He also
believed that the Navy’s statements raised questions about the Air Force’s doctrine on
strategy and tactics “which not only reflect unfavorably on Air Force capabilities but
which are designed to justify Navy participation in the strategic bombing function”
despite the agreements reached at the Key West Conference. Symington then pondered
why officers within the Navy were insistent on making these provocative statements that
might seem beneficial to the Navy, but harmful to the nation as a whole. He reiterated
that these arguments were wasteful, and the USAF remained “convinced that a major
deterrent to aggression in the world today is the proven capability of the United States to
deliver an atomic bomb now.” After all, it had “been done in 1945 and can be done again
if necessary.”533
Symington took his concerns, about funding and missions, to the President in a
letter on May 24, 1948. He felt that he needed to respond to the Navy’s accusations that
the Air Force was unbalancing the economy, and the entire military structure. Rather
than defend the USAF from these allegations, Symington attacked the variety of
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proposals that had been presented by the Navy to the Finletter and Brewster committees.
Symington also contended that the Navy had not changed its program since before the
Key West Conference where the JCS was “supposed to have eliminated unnecessary
duplication in roles and missions among the services.” He was also apprehensive about
whether or not the Air Force would be allowed to spend up to the recommendations of
the two Aviation Policy Boards, as the Navy was prepared to do. The United States
found itself in a difficult position of trying to stave off communism across the globe at
the same time it was “staggering under its present debt load.” This allowed the USSR.,
according to Symington, to sit back, and “watch us throw our money around with grim
satisfaction, knowing that the easiest way to get control of America is not through war,
but by keeping the world in a state which will result in a debt structure the capitalistic
system cannot support.” The overriding cost of the Navy’s carriers, aircraft, crews and
support vessels created an unnecessary burden on the American taxpayer who was being
asked to support “without any strategic justification, and because of barnacled heritages”
two air forces instead of “one Air Force and a Naval Air Arm.”534
The sniping between the Air Force and the Navy began to bother others in the
administration, including the Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall. On September 7,
1948, he sent a secret memo to James Forrestal, and forwarded copies on to Sullivan and
Symington, that addressed his concerns about the ongoing public fight between the Air
Force and the Navy. He stated the obvious when he informed the Secretary of Defense
that “it is going to be difficult to reach any satisfactory solution as to military air power”
unless it was “placed under one Department.” For the Air Force, this was exactly what
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they wanted to hear, for the Navy, it was a nightmare. Royall clarified the point when he
informed Forrestal that it could be done by abolishing the Air Force, and assigning all the
missions to the Navy, or to merge naval air into the Air Force as a single Department, and
let the Navy maintain and protect the carriers on “somewhat the same basis that the Army
services and protects the land airfields.” He added that neither solution was agreeable to
the Air Force or the Navy, and the problem “transcends in size and importance” in
regards to “finances, national resources and military planning” in addition to the other
problems already created by unification. Therefore, the Army Secretary suggested that
the matter be placed before the Congress during the next session.535

THE NEWPORT CONFERENCE

Sensing that the Key West agreements had failed to settle the differences between
the Air Force and the Navy, Forrestal convened another conference in August 1948 at the
Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. Joining the Secretary of Defense were
Symington, Sullivan, and Royall. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and their assistants also
participated in the discussions and this included Admiral Louis Denfeld and Vice
Admiral Arthur Radford, General Omar Bradley and Lieutenant General Albert
Wedemeyer, the new Air Force Chief of Staff General Hoyt Vandenberg and Lieutenant
General Lauris Norstad, and finally, Alfred Gruenther, the Director of the Joint Staff. In
Newport, the Key West agreements were “reexamined with regard to certain provisions
which have been subject to different interpretations since its preparation.” It was agreed
at this conference that the Service that had the primary function for a mission “must
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determine the requirements for the performance of that function, but in determining those
requirements must take into account the contributions which may be made by forces from
other services.” A press release announced some of the conclusions reached at the
conference and noted that the responsibilities of each Service did not preclude
participation of other services in conducting those missions. In contrast, the JCS agreed
that it required “the fullest consideration and use of any available forces, regardless of the
service, if they add to the effectiveness and economy of the operations.”

536

Decisions

regarding control of access to the atomic arsenal were deferred until studies could be
completed. It was suggested that a naval nuclear strike mission should be included in
areas that benefited from such missions. In return, the primary mission of strategic
bombing was confirmed in the Air Force, however, the Navy would be allowed to
participate in the offensive. Inferred in the discussions was the supercarrier United States
(CVB-58), which was already budgeted, named, and ordered by the President.537
As a follow-up to the decisions made at Newport the Secretary of Defense, and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, issued statements on August 24, 1948 to clarify their views on
the conference and its results. Forrestal suggested that there were a wide range of topics
that were discussed and there was clarification of “the position of the Air Force in the
field of strategic air warfare and the position of the Navy in that field.” The exchange of
ideas between the Services had given way to an understanding. Forrestal said that the top
levels of command regarded the “exclusive role of the Air Force in the field of strategic
air warfare and conversely the intent of the Air Force not merely to permit but to seek all
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the help it can get from Naval Air in the use of airpower, either strategically or
tactically.” The Navy also understood that it might require the help of the Air Force to
conduct its anti-submarine warfare duty, and it would “invite all the help it can get from
the Air Force in carrying out this mission.” Forrestal claimed that this agreement was
neither a victory, nor a defeat for the USAF or USN, but rather it was a reflection of the
Secretary of Defense’s views and “if followed through with sincerity and tenacity, will
mean a victory for the country.” He cited many of the economic and international
problems that impacted the United States, and that the American military policy was
related to the economy of the United States. Deviations from the agreements previously
reached at Key West or at Newport would “contribute nothing to the country’s welfare,
but actually detract from our world standing.”538
In addition to Forrestal’s comments, members of the JCS also addressed the
issues raised and considered at Newport. The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral
Denfeld, contended that the JCS reiterated that strategic air warfare remained the primary
responsibility of the Air Force. He added that the USAF was responsible to the JCS and
a “higher authority” for creating plans for its implementation. The Air Force also
recognized “that the Navy will be able to make significant contributions to any Strategic
air plan” and that the USAF would “include Naval contributions in all Strategic Air
Plans” and within their overall force requirements.” General Vandenberg, the Air Force
Chief of Staff, added that prior to this “more definitive” agreement, each of the services
has been more or less on the defensive to prevent possible encroachment into its sphere
of interest.” This had led to problems that created an unhealthy and occasionally
538
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unfriendly competition between the Services. The Newport agreement obligated the Air
Force to consider possible contributions from the other Services and seek out
aggressively their contributions “when they will add to the effectiveness of the job that
we are doing.” Vandenberg felt that this agreement must be supported “actively by good
will and a desire to make our armed forces” satisfactory to the responsibility of national
security.539

PUBLIC DISAGREEMENTS ON THE AGREEMENTS

In spite of the apparent good will publically expressed after the Newport
Conference, the bickering and intra-service rivalries continued well into 1949. In
November 1948, Symington again raised the alarm of naval intrusion upon the mission
prerogatives of the Air Force. This time, the Navy was attempting to garner support for
their mission or gain more influence on the press through advertisers, which Symington
felt was “un-American in concept.”540 One of the offenders that so upset Symington was
Navy Captain James Thatch, a well-respected air strategist and a “consummate fighter
pilot.”541 Thatch stated “there were two kinds of air, land-based air and sea-based air;
and that land-based air was like a boxer with his feet embedded in concrete.” What
Thatch meant was aircraft carriers offered mobility what made it difficult for enemy
aircraft to immobilize while conventional air bases were easy to find and disrupt.
Symington also took offense that he was often the target of naval barbs, and that it was
considered unethical for uniformed officers of one branch to attack a civilian secretary of
539
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another service. He argued that Admiral Arthur Radford had made it clear that no
civilian was “going to tell him what he is going to do with respect to the Navy” and that
Radford felt that the Navy’s future depended upon these ongoing attacks upon the Air
Force. Symington informed Forrestal that he had contacted Navy Secretary Sullivan
regarding this impropriety, but Sullivan had not called him back.542
That same month, Symington also sent a letter to Ferdinand Eberstadt, the
Chairman of the Committee on the National Security Organization, in which the
Secretary attempted to defend his institution from naval intrusion. He accused the Navy
of engaging in an “unwarranted attack against the Air Force” in regards to agreements
reached between the Services as well as the “capacity of the Air Force to perform its
assigned mission.” The Navy challenges to the efficacy of Air Force strategic bombing,
in an effort to promote carrier aviation, created the inevitability “of putting all military
airplanes in one service” and Symington claimed that the Air Force was against this
concept and had informed Forrestal of that truth repeatedly.543
In November 1948, speculation arose in Washington that, in light of the President
Truman’s surprise reelection victory, both Forrestal and Symington might be on their
respective ways out of Washington, as Truman prepared for his second term.544 Forrestal
had displayed signs of fatigue and physical deterioration throughout most of the year, and
it appeared that he was becoming paranoid.545 He had also refused to provide campaign
contributions to Truman’s reelection. Louis A. Johnson, the Truman campaign’s finance
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chairman, was not afraid to let people know, including the President, about Forrestal’s
failure to financially aid the President when it mattered the most.546 Conjecture that
Johnson would replace Forrestal as the head of the National Military Establishment,
continued through the remainder of 1948, and into early 1949.547 Symington as well, had
appeared to anger just about everybody outside of the USAF. He had clearly alienated
himself from Forrestal, and more importantly, from Truman.548 In late July 1948,
Forrestal had approached the President to inform Truman that he had decided to ask for
Symington’s resignation, because of very critical and public statements made by the
Secretary of the Air Force that were aimed at Forrestal and the policies of the NME.549
Despite the Air Force Secretary’s verbal war with the Navy, the Secretary of Defense and
the President’s budget requests, Symington would survive and had tremendous impact on
the future of strategic air warfare.

STRATEGIC AIR WARFARE AS U.S. POLICY

It was evident at the close of 1948, that some direction and public statements
needed to be made by the administration regarding the testing of nuclear weapons, and
where they fit in American policy. Stories and editorials had kept the issue alive for most
of the year. The August 16, 1948 issue of Life magazine featured an article by Air Force
General Carl Spaatz. In this second of a two-part series, the former Air Force Chief of
Staff reiterated the Air Force position on atomic weapons and air policy. He argued that
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Soviets were the enemy of the United States and Congress needed to pronounce that
“airpower shall be the hard core of American defense” and the last war had proven that “a
determined air attack always gets through.” The ability of airpower to win wars was also
apparent to the Navy and Spaatz asserted that their pursuit of a nuclear bomber and
supercarrier meant that airpower had “made its final convert.” The quest for the control
of the sky was costly and approximately half of the defense budget was being spent on
aircraft and this created gaps in American defenses that could be exploited by the Soviets.
Spaatz contended new technologies would make dramatic changes to the offensive
capabilities of the United States and even though many have over emphasized the impact
of nuclear weapons, they remained a force multiplier of each bomber “on the order of
hundreds to one.” If a solution was not found to create a lasting peace, the reality of an
atomic war may “end in the most tragic of paradoxes: the good society, in attempting to
destroy evil, may destroy itself.”550
As Truman prepared for his second term, he had to provide direction to the
military, as well as American allies and enemies about the use of the atomic bomb to
attain U.S. international goals. Dr. Vannevar Bush, the former wartime director of the
Office of Scientific Research and Development, was asked by James Forrestal to provide
some insight for the administration about the role of atomic weapons and their impact on
world. Bush responded on December 28, 1948 in a letter directed to the Secretary of
Defense, with a copy going to the Office of the President, which discussed the merits of
releasing information regarding the results of the atomic tests at the Bikini Atoll. He
transitioned into thoughts on nuclear weapons, and suggested that a statement of public
policy regarding the atomic bomb, and other weapons of mass destruction, would be
550
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constructive. He added that a “factual statement about the possibilities and limitations of
these weapons” would replace fear with a “calm determination to face unpleasant facts”
and unlike the military personnel who were hailing the definitive nature of nuclear
weapons, Bush suggested that “none of these weapons is determining in the sense that it
is overwhelming.” If another World War broke out, it would be an awful war, but “I
have no reason to believe that it would be more fearful than the last one in its over-all
consequences.” He did not feel that another war would lead to the end of civilization.
Unlike the fear mongering that was coming from the Pentagon and Capitol Hill, Bush
contended “that if the good people of this country, the sound, common sense people
everywhere, had the reasoned factual basis for understanding this matter they would face
the future with confidence and determination.”551
Bush recommended that a clarification of national policy in regards to the use of
atomic weapons needed to be articulated. He did not doubt for a moment that if the
United States, or her Allies “were attacked by a powerful aggressor” that the U.S. would
use atomic weapons, albeit reluctantly and against military targets. Bush also felt that if
there were hesitation or a decision to only use them in extreme circumstances, it might be
too late for them to have an impact. The United States, therefore, had to have a clear
statement of policy that indicated atomic weapons would be used in an effort to preserve
American freedom. In contrast to what the Air Force was projecting with their city
busting B-36s, or even the firebombing raids of 1944-1945, the U.S. would not
“undertake to use any means of warfare aimed at wiping out the population of an enemy,
but rather we would attack him by means calculated to destroy” their military might.
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This latter view was much more in line with the ideas of strategic air warfare that came
out of the Navy Department. Bush informed Forrestal that the relationship of the
weapons to American policy is clear as evidenced by the “relative positions which they
occupy with respect to the entire military research and development program” and they
were “adjuncts and not central features in the present military program.”

552

An examination of Bush’s letter by the NME indicated that many of the issues he
raised had already been scrutinized or were in the process of being reviewed. In May
1948, the Secretary of the Army had requested that the National Security Council
formally develop the American position on the bomb, and its use in warfare. The NSC
submitted a report entitled (NSC 30) that “argued that the risks of public controversy and
resulting foreign speculation” that followed the “announcement of a decision as to the use
of the atomic bomb in the event of war outweighed the advantages of a present decision.”
NSC 30 concluded that it was recognized and understood that in the event of war, the
NME “must be ready to utilize promptly and effectively all appropriate means available,
including atomic weapons, in the interest of national security and must therefore plan
accordingly.” The report also indicated that the decision to use such weapons would be
made by the President when he considered it necessary.553
What is not clear from this work, or from other comments outside of the
Pentagon, was the reluctance to declare the intentions regarding nuclear weapons in the
event of war. One only needed to look at any of the major papers during the unification
debates, or the ongoing battles over service roles and missions, to discover how all
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branches of the military viewed the new weapons and where they fit within the context of
American military policy. As 1948 came to an end, the debate over nuclear weapons was
not over, and it was about to get much uglier in 1949. Before that next year was over, the
current Secretary of Defense would be dead, the Chief of Naval Operations would be
fired for insubordination, the supercarrier would be canceled, more B-36s would be
ordered, and the Soviet Union would display to the world their atomic bomb and delivery
system. In light of these events, once can clearly see the goal of nuclear weapons and
strategic air warfare, and how they came to dominate American foreign and domestic
policy in the remaining years of the Truman administration and beyond.
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CHAPTER SIX
KILLING THE SUPERCARRIER AND THE BUILDING THE INFERIOR
BOMBER

I am an advocate of air power. It is a dominant force in our military structure. I am also
a proponent of strategic air warfare . . . Furthermore, I maintain that the initial air
offensive is not solely the function of the U.S. Air Force. Admiral Louis E. Denfeld,
Chief of Naval Operations, October 13, 1949554
I’m not begging the question of whether it is our ultimate aim to inflict such destruction,
and I realize that you may win the war, and lose the peace. However, we are all aware of
the awful penalty if we lose the war. Your military planners must plan to win. There is
no second prize for the runner up. General Omar N. Bradley, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff, October 19, 1949.555

Preparations for the Fiscal 1950 budget continued unabated during the
Presidential race in 1948 and President Harry Truman continued to reject the opinions of
both Air Policy commissions. He disregarded the repeated cries of poverty and danger
from the leadership inside the United States Air Force and the Navy, because of his
ongoing effort to streamline the military budget. Truman had lost patience with the
inability of the American military to actually achieve unification as the administration
began to look at the Cold War as a long-term conflict, rather than an immediate threat.
The President did not want the military debate to spill out into the public because it could
anger the American electorate who could demand greater defense expenditures than
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Truman believed were prudent. The administration also believed that the U.S. nuclear
monopoly reduced the Soviet threat to a political menace rather than military one.556
Placed directly in the middle of the political battles over the budget between the
Services, the White House and the Congress was the Secretary of Defense, James
Forrestal. By the middle of 1948 he had fallen out of favor with the President who
publically supported him even as rumors swirled of his imminent departure from the
Pentagon. Forrestal continued to feud with the Secretary of the Air Force Stuart
Symington, was verbally assaulted by some members of the press, and had clearly lost
the confidence of the Navy over his failure to take a firm stand on the responsibility of
nuclear roles and missions. Despite his problems, Forrestal continued to identify issues
that he believed had to be addressed if the United States was going to have an effective
national defense. He remained convinced that “the size and character of our future
Armed Forces depend upon a prior determination of our basic national objectives, and the
roles which the military strength and other non-military activities” would factor in the
achievement of American international goals. The preparation of the budget and final
decisions regarding its size, and the different projects that it would support, should be
based on the recommended analysis. Forrestal urged the President to give this matter the
“highest possible priority” as he considered the overall budget and the force levels that
Truman wanted to maintain to meet American global commitments.557
On July 10, 1948, Forrestal sent a memo to the Executive Secretary of the
National Security Council, Sydney W. Souers, entitled “Appraisal of the Degree and
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Character of Military Preparedness Required by the World Situation.” This document
was forwarded on to the rest of the NSC as Forrestal attempted to grasp the direction of
U.S. policy in relation to the military requirements projected in the next budget. Forrestal
contended that because of the time factor necessary for a military build up, these
estimates would “materially affect our capabilities” until the next budget cycle, which
would begin on July 1, 1950.558 American national security was dependent upon the
proper “size, character, and composition” of military forces that would be set after
“careful analysis of existing and potential dangers to our security and upon decisions that
as to the methods by which such dangers can best be met within the limitations of our
resources.” Threats to U.S. security could be military or non-military in nature, and
therefore the composition of the military and other American responses including foreign
aid, had to fit within the overall framework of national policy. Forrestal added that once
these objectives were determined in addition to the military strength required to achieve
them, then it was time to “consider the share of our national resources which must be
allocated to support military activities” within the confines of such resources. The types
of threats also determined where the allocations of military expenditures would be
directed, including funds for research and development into weapons and strategy,
stockpiling resources, attaining bases overseas, and possibly even joint military planning
and support for American allies.559
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Like many others inside Washington D.C., Forrestal believed that there was no
real threat to the United States, besides the Soviet Union, within the next decade. This
did not mean that there would not be smaller wars of aggression that could require the
United States to “use military force to protect its own security or to prevent a breakdown
in world order.” All contingencies needed to be examined, including the possibility of an
accidental war with the USSR and/or her allies, and continued communist expansion
through military or political means, before an effective assessment of a military force
structure became evident. Forrestal recommended that a “comprehensive statement of
national policy be prepared, particularly as it relates to Soviet Russia, and that this
statement specify and evaluate the risks, state our objectives, and outline the measures to
be followed in achieving them.” This statement would provide the necessary direction
for the NME, the type of budget that it would require, and assist Truman in “determining
the proportion of our resources which should be dedicated to military purposes.” It was
NSC that had the responsibility for such a statement, and Forrestal argued that the State
Department should also contribute by creating the first draft of the statement which
would become the discussion point, and then be “altered or modified to reflect military
considerations” and resources.560
An attempt to create direction for the NME came from a top secret report entitled
“U.S. Objectives with Respect to Russia,” prepared by George Kennan, Chairman of the
Policy Planning Staff of the State Department and presented to the NSC in August 1948.
Within the pages of the 52-page report, Kennan and his staff attempted to clarify
American goals vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in war and peace because the Soviets were
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identified again as the “outstanding problem of U.S. foreign policy” and there were grave
concerns in the United States because of the “aims and methods of the Soviet leaders.”
This required the U.S. government to respond appropriately to change or modify Soviet
policies and “to alter the international situation” which had been created by the USSR561
The United States found itself in a non-traditional position in that it was engaged
in a political war, with “more defiant and militant objectives” towards the Soviet Union
during a time of peace. The U.S. understood the “desirability of gearing our war effort to
a clear and realistic concept of the long-term political objectives which we wish to
achieve.” These goals could be attained in a war, but the requirement of finality, like the
end of World War II, might not be necessary. If the American people were expecting a
demand of unconditional surrender with the idea of a long-term occupation of conquered
territories, they might feel that anything short of that would be a failure or no real victory
at all. In addition, Kennan argued that the U.S. had to understand that Soviet goals
remained constant, and were little affected because of war, or in a time of peace. The
Soviets felt that there was a chasm between themselves and the rest of the world and their
relationship was “one of permanent antagonism and conflict, taking place sometimes
within a framework of formal peace and at other times within the legal framework of
war.”562
Kennan also highlighted some of the problems that democratic states had about
identifying objectives in peace or in war. If there was a smaller gap between “peacetime
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and wartime purposes,” it was far more likely that “a successful military effort will be
politically successful as well.” If the objectives were firmly linked to national interests,
they were worth “consciously formulating and pursuing in war as in peace.” Kennan
added that objectives that were the result of “wartime emotionalism” were not prone to
reflect “a balanced concept of long-term national interest.” For the Policy Planning Staff,
this was the reason to articulate American goals in advance of a prospective war, and to
“define our present peacetime objectives and our hypothetical wartime objectives” in
relation to the Soviet Union, and to reduce the gap between those aims. Kennan’s group
felt that there really were only two real objectives and they were the reduction of the
power and influence of the Soviets so they no longer constituted a threat to the “peace
and stability of international society” and to bring about a change “in the theory and
practice of international relations observed by the government in power in Russia.” In
peace, therefore, it would require the United States to encourage and promote a measured
reduction of Soviet power and influence from their current “satellite area” with all means
short of war. As well, the U.S. had to advance the emergence of independent easternEuropean nations, as well as the “revival of the national life of the Baltic peoples.” The
image of the Soviet military had to be changed to encourage the entire world to “see and
understand the Soviet Union for what it is and adopt a logical and realistic attitude toward
it.”563
In the event of war, Kennan projected that there were several items that needed to
be understood before American objectives in war could be properly identified. It was not
practical for the United States to assume that they would be able to occupy and
administer the entirety of the Soviet Union, nor was it likely that the Soviet government
563
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would surrender to the U.S. unconditionally. There was also no guarantee that even a
concerted military effort would completely eliminate all vestiges of the Soviet
government in the expanses of the Soviet nation. Previous experience, including the
battles between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, indicated the tenacity of the Soviets
and the difficulties of subduing such a large span of territory. There was the possibility,
however, if extreme care were taken “within the limits of military feasibility, not to
antagonize the Soviet people by military policies which would inflict inordinate hardship
and cruelties upon them, there would be extensive disintegration of Soviet power” during
a war with the United States. In the aftermath of the war, it would be difficult to rebuild
the territory along American ideals of democracy in a nation that did not have much
experience with Western thoughts or foundations. It was possible, but it would take time,
however, and “we could not expect to create an authority in the former Soviet territory
that would be “entirely submissive to our will or entirely expressive of our political
ideals.”564
The United States had to recognize that it had to achieve a settlement that was
politically negotiated, and not imposed by military order. Still, the attainable military
goals should be to destroy the influence of the Soviet military in areas outside of the
Soviet Union, as well as to eliminate the “structure of relationships by which the leaders
of the All-Union Communist Party have been able to exert moral and disciplinary
authority over individual citizens, or groups of citizens, in countries not under communist
control” or domination. The U.S. had to make sure that the communist power base was
destroyed, so that the war making capacity of the USSR was incapable of waging war
against enemies inside or outside of Soviet territory. Kennan recommended that it should
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not be the policy of the United States to attempt to reconfigure borders, assure “the
independence of the Ukraine or any other national minority,” or assume the responsibility
of determining the government of the liberated USSR, or to use the American military to
carry out a “large-scale program of de-communization.”565
An additional top-secret paper was also prepared by the Policy Planning Staff and
circulated among the members of the NSC on August 25, 1948. It addressed the factors
that mitigated against “the likelihood at this juncture of international, planned Soviet
armed action” that would trigger an American response. It was suggested that the last
two World Wars had indicated that unless a European power was able deal “a decisive
blow to the North American military-industrial potential” in the initial phases of the war,
they could never be certain of a victory, and currently the Soviets did not have that
capacity. The Soviet Union had not yet recovered from the physical destruction that had
been inflicted upon them during the Second World War, which was much worse than had
previously been considered. The Policy Planning Staff was skeptical that the Soviet
industrial capacity had reached pre-war levels and that large-scale reconstruction
remained an imposing burden on the Soviet economy. Many of the segments of Soviet
industry and transportation suffered not only from war damage, but also were in “a state
of serious backwardness and obsolescence.”566
The population of the USSR was considered to be extremely war-weary, and this
had to be factored into any decision the Soviet government made concerning military
action. Their government had a “traditional preference for political means as opposed to
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military action” to gain control over foreign territories. They were considered to be
extremely cautious in starting military endeavors on their own terms, and Moscow
maintained the principle of a “maximum of power with a minimum of responsibility.”
This doctrine might prevent them from taking action when they could not control the
reaction. Any move against the West would result in occupation of conquered territories,
and it was not clear if the morale of the Red Army could be sufficiently maintained in a
long occupation. Finally, the Soviets believed that time and history were on their side,
and events around the world could shift in their favor. The report indicated that the
Soviets overrated “the political prospects of the (Henry) Wallace movement and the
isolationist wing of the Republican Party, and feel that an accretion of strength on the part
of either one would be to their advantage.”567
The aforementioned information may provide an image of the Soviets remaining
docile, and the Americans were the aggressor, however, the report cited reasons why the
Soviets might begin military action against the United States. It was reported that the
Soviet leadership might feel that they would never be stronger than they were in 1948,
and Western Europe was also relatively weak. This could have been the time to strike
and if the political situation in Europe had moved away from Moscow, the Soviets might
“resort to armed action at this juncture, in order to prevent recovery in the west and to
ensure an immediate extension of communist power in that region, as a means of
defending Soviet power in eastern Europe.” Other reasons for a Soviet move could
include a miscalculation of the Truman administration’s resolve, or “its willingness to
resort to force to protect the integrity of existing international agreements.” There was
also the prospect that the Soviets would be compelled to take military action because of
567
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internal conflicts, or the opportunity of gaining more “military booty” to assist their
recovering economy. The report also suggested that despite these possibilities, the
“evidence points to the conclusion that the Soviet Government is not now planning any
deliberate armed action of this nature and is still seeking to achieve its aims
predominantly by political means” and military intimidation.568
The report also addressed the role of atomic weapons in relation to the Soviet
Union, and immediately pointed out a critically important theory about the Soviet threat.
The Policy Planning Staff suggested that political factors were likely to decide in
opposition to the use of atomic weapons by the USSR against “major urban and industrial
areas in other countries, except by way of retaliation” for strikes on Soviet targets. There
was also evidence from World War II that the Soviets had a level of reluctance “to resort
without provocation to methods of mass destruction aimed against civilian elements” in
other nations. It was also articulated that if the Soviets believed that there was the strong
likelihood of retaliation, it could dissuade them “from taking the initiatives in the use of
atomic weapons against western cities.” The USSR had few cities to lose, and a small
number of atomic bombs could “if properly and effectively directed” destroy their entire
industrialization program. It would also have a devastating consequence on any Soviet
military action and on the Soviet people. These ideas compelled the United States to
build a military with a clearly understood deterrent factor. It was believed that the
Soviets would not risk a conflict with the United States that offered little possibility of a
complete victory for the Soviet Union.569 What became clear through the Policy
Planning Staff’s briefing report to the NSC was that they did not consider the Soviet
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Union to represent a clear and present danger to the continental United States, nor was
there an immediate threat of nuclear strikes against American cities. There was,
however, much uncertainty as to true Soviet intentions, and policy makers attempted to
divine the minds of the leadership inside the Kremlin.
If the previous two reports indicated a level of moderation of the American view
of the USSR, another report entitled “U.S. Objective with Respect to the USSR to
Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security” was endorsed by the JCS, and forwarded to the
President. Truman approved the document a day later, and the policy of the United
States with regards to the Soviet Union became more defined, but not necessarily
understood. The document reverted back to the principle that it was the “will and ability”
of the Soviet leadership that presented the United States with the greatest threat to its
security and the Soviets were still determined to dominate the world. This threat would
not end until the “non-communist nations have been so reduced in strength and numbers”
that the communists dominated the rest of the world. Soviet goals were pursued through
subversion, waging “political, economic, and psychological warfare against all elements
resistant to communist purposes” and a continuing build-up Soviet forces in expectation
of war. The Soviet threat was also considered to be immediate and dangerous to the
United States because of their bombers on one-way missions, and submarines that could
disrupt American control of the sea. Soviet military capabilities would increase
progressively, and by 1955, they would have the capacity to attack the United States with
nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction, including the launching of submarine
based guided missiles.570
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It was not felt that the Soviet Union or its leadership was actively “planning any
deliberate armed action calculated to involve the United States” and instead was
attempting to achieve its goals through “political means, accompanied by military
intimidation.” If the United States showed weakness through “appeasement or
isolationist concepts” in diplomacy, it could lead to the loss of American allies and
authority. It would also provide the Soviets with greater strength or leverage in the
international arena that could lead to the defeat of the United States or “force us into a
war under dangerously unfavorable conditions.” Among the recommendations to
accomplish this objective was the development of a state of “military readiness which can
be maintained as long as necessary as a deterrent to Soviet aggression” and to maximize
“our economic potential, including the strengthening of our peace-time economy and the
establishment of essential reserves readily available in the event of war.” It was also
important to keep the American people aware of the Soviet threat to its national security
so that they would be willing “to support the measures which we must accordingly
adopt.” In the event of war, the United States had to destroy the military power of the
Soviet Union and the political infrastructure of the communist party apparatus. Nations
that had been dominated by the Soviets had to be reassured that in the aftermath of the
war, there would be insufficient military power in the former Soviet Union to wage an
aggressive war or impose “nothing resembling the present iron curtain over contacts with
the outside world.” At the end of the war, the U.S. would create conditions that prevent
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“the development of power relationships dangerous to the security of the United States
and international peace.”571
It is difficult to determine what the role of strategic bombing would be in
achieving the goals listed in these documents but certainly, bombers would have a role in
destroying the military production of the Soviet Union. However, they would not be able
to prevent well-equipped Soviet armies from moving across European nations, unless the
United States was willing to use atomic bombs on friendly or neutral territories in an
effort to curb or destroy the Soviet military. It would be difficult to attain a mood of
liberation within the territory of the Soviet Union, if most of the major cities or
production centers were uninhabitable because of nuclear contamination. In the event of
total war with nuclear exchanges on both sides, however, the role of the bomber would be
to destroy much of the enemy so as to allow the United States to survive in some capacity
by punitively destroying the heart and soul of the Soviet regime. This type of war was
possible, but extremely remote, as both sides understood there was too much to lose in
this type of war. Nevertheless, the American military continued to prepare and obsess
over this latter type of warfare, and were supported by the Congress and many members
of the press during the budget battles of 1948 and 1949. The United States was
beginning to embrace an “all or nothing” strategy designed to destroy the Soviet Union.
It would cost the U.S. taxpayer billions of dollars and virtually destroy any flexibility for
achieving victory in smaller wars, or conflicts that did not involve the USSR. Victory
through airpower came to be identified by stately bombers flying at will against a hapless
enemy to deliver a nuclear strike that would force an enemy to surrender as rapidly as
Japan did in August 1945. The reality, however, would be much different, and it would
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cost so much more in lives expended, because of a national policy that was difficult to
achieve solely through the air.

BURYING THE NME AND CREATING THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Relatively unhappy with the infighting inside the Pentagon, and realizing that the
Secretary of Defense had no substantive authority over the military departments, James
Forrestal recommended changes to the National Security Act of 1947 in late 1948.572
Forrestal was concerned that the position of Secretary of Defense was too weak, and it
needed more power to bring the Pentagon in line. He therefore suggested five revisions
that would make the NME more efficient. They included turning the NME into a single
executive department, increase the authority of the Secretary of Defense over all aspects
of the military departments, create an Under Secretary of Defense, provide a larger and
stronger staff for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and create the position of
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide direction and leadership to the JCS.573
Congress had already begun to scrutinize changes to the Executive Branch in a
committee chaired by former President Herbert Hoover. A subcommittee of the Hoover
Commission, led by Ferdinand Eberstadt, examined the apparatus of American national
security.574 The recommendations made by Hoover and Eberstadt, once adopted under
the National Security Act Amendments of 1949, would have a dramatic impact on the
Pentagon for decades to come. Critically important for unity in the Pentagon, the Service
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Secretaries were removed from Cabinet level positions and from the National Security
Council. This meant that the Secretary of Defense now solely represented the Pentagon
in the Cabinet, rather than the civilian leadership of the military branches. A Deputy
Secretary of Defense position was created along with three Assistant Secretaries that
would assist the Secretary to administer the Pentagon. A permanent position of
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was also created. Effective with the passage of the
appropriate legislation in August 1949, the name of the National Military Establishment
was officially changed to the Department of Defense (DOD). The Secretary of Defense
now had more power over the Services in all matters, including budgeting.575 Truman
would later write in his memoirs that it had been apparent to him, during the first year of
the NME, that more responsibility and power needed to be placed into the hands of the
Secretary of Defense. He had to be the singular representative of the Pentagon in the
NSC.576 One could argue that in many ways, these changes would indeed make the
Secretary the face of the military from 1949 to the present. The Secretary of Defense had
the ability to promote or destroy weapon systems and strategies. As the United States
continued to embrace an evolving nuclear strategy, the Secretary became far more critical
to the future of American aircraft and weapons purchases, and their application in all
wars, including limited or nuclear exchanges.
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THE TRAGEDY OF JAMES FORRESTAL AND THE RISE OF LOUIS JOHNSON

Unfortunately for James Forrestal, he would not be in office long enough to see
the reforms that he had pushed for during the latter months of 1948. The working
relationship between the Secretary of Defense and the President had eroded sufficiently
enough for Truman to replace the workaholic Forrestal. Rumors about Forrestal’s loyalty
to Truman, in light of an alleged attempt to offer his services to the presumed victorious
Thomas Dewey, had many inside the administration calling for his resignation. His
tireless effort to keep a balanced defense strategy, under the budget ceiling that Truman
demanded, and the Service Secretaries fought over, appeared to have overwhelmed
Forrestal. The Secretary of Defense also came under increased criticism from naval
aviators because they believed that Forrestal, in an effort to complete unification, was
prepared to strip the Navy of its air arm.577 Having lost his base support from the Navy,
and disparaged by the Air Force for not eliminating the redundant naval nuclear mission
and the supercarrier, Forrestal succumbed to the pressures of the job.
It is not clear why Truman kept Forrestal on in the very beginning of his second
term once it became apparent that Louis A. Johnson would take over as Secretary of
Defense in late 1948. Truman could have publically announced the change at the same
time he appointed Dean Acheson to take over the State Department for the departing
George Marshall in January 1949. Instead, Truman apparently informed Forrestal behind
closed doors that he was being replaced perhaps in an effort to help transition the NME
into Johnson’s hands.578 Forrestal was asked to resign by Truman in March 1949, and
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encouraged to take a vacation.579 His behavior became so erratic once he left the
Pentagon, that an apparently delusional Forrestal was quietly brought back to Washington
and committed to the Bethesda Naval Hospital. An investigation reported to Truman that
it appeared that Forrestal was “suffering from a slight nervous breakdown and that his
suspicions are the result of this condition.”580 After several weeks of care and
observation, Forrestal fell to his death from the sixteenth floor of the hospital on May 22,
1949.581 Truman acknowledged that Forrestal had suffered from bouts of depression, but
that “after they were passed he was right back to normal” and “had we been able to
prevent this from happening he would have entirely recovered.”582 Either way the best
ally the Navy had in the administration during the postwar years was now gone.
Louis A. Johnson, a member of the board of directors of Consolidated-Vultee
(Convair), the corporation that produced the B-36, as well as the head of Convair’s key
law firm, was now the Secretary of Defense.583 He was the former commander of the
American Legion and had served as the Assistant Secretary of War during World War II
but his main qualification, however, appeared to be his loyalty to Truman. When most
prominent Democrats were ready to abandon the unpopular Truman for another candidate
in the contentious 1948 Presidential race, Johnson became a major fundraiser for the
President’s reelection campaign and Johnson was rewarded with the position for his
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service. Johnson was considered to be “an outspoken advocate of land-based strategic
bombing” and was willing to follow Truman’s mandates on the budget, unification, and
“elimination of duplication wherever possible.”584 One of the first items on the new
Secretary’s agenda was a review of the supercarrier United States and its necessity in the
age of Truman’s defense austerity.

TO BUILD THE SUPERCARRIER

At Key West one year earlier, in March 1948, the Joint Chiefs of Staff apparently
gave the approval for, or perhaps did not officially disapprove a supercarrier for the
Navy. The Secretary of the Navy, John L. Sullivan, testified in front of the House
Subcommittee on Appropriations on May 19, 1948, in an effort to clear the way for the
funding of the new ship, USS United States. Throughout his testimony, Sullivan made
the case that with the cuts in the construction of other ships, the cost of United States
could be absorbed. Congressman Noble Johnson of Indiana asked the Secretary to go on
record about whether or not “the Joint Chiefs of Staff … and the Secretary of War and
the Secretary of National Defense, Mr. Forrestal, have approved this new type carrier?”
Sullivan replied that at Key West, the JCS approved the supercarrier and a letter from the
late Secretary of Defense Forrestal supported his testimony. Forrestal had supported
removing other ships from various stages of construction and redirecting those funds
towards the flush deck supercarrier that had been approved by Truman, Forrestal, and
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James Webb, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget.585 The canceled ships opened up
approximately $57 million to “insure the continuance of the carrier.”586
Sullivan next testified in front of the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on
Appropriations on June 11, 1948. He reiterated that the JCS had, “within the last 10
days…voted 3 to 1 in favor” of the supercarrier. The only dissenting vote was from the
Air Force Chief of Staff, General Hoyt S. Vandenberg. Sullivan believed that this was
part of an ongoing attempt by the Air Force “to stop the money that was appropriated by
the House for starting the flush-deck carrier at once.”587 Sullivan articulated the need for
naval aviation throughout his testimony but he might have hurt the case for the carriers
by trying to soften the importance of the supercarrier by referring to it as a prototype.
Chairman of the subcommittee, Leverett Saltonstall of Massachusetts, asked Sullivan if
the prototypes were to be carried out into a bigger program. Sullivan replied, “We do not
anticipate that. There has been talk about a larger number of these flush-deck carriers.
That is not our objective. We want to build one of these and operate it to find out its
defects…and its potentialities.”588
After months of political wrangling, Sullivan sent a brief letter to the President on
February 1, 1949 to inform him that work had been progressing towards the construction
of the new supercarrier that Sullivan recommended be formally named United States. A
day later, a press release announced that Truman had approved the name for the new
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flush-deck carrier. It further stated that the new carrier was to be the largest and most
advanced carrier of its time and it would “fly from her deck the latest type of carrier
planes available.”589 It was also reported that the design of the new carrier was
“predicated on meeting current and future requirements” which included the ability to
operate “heavier aircraft required to attain higher performance, longer range, and carry
loads of armament and radar equipment necessary to modern air warfare” in addition to
more traditional roles. While it was designed to meet “the foregoing requirements for
purely naval missions,” it was possible that it would “provide a mobile base for highspeed planes capable of carrying atomic bombs.” The United States was in reality the
Navy’s platform to get into the nuclear mission and their piece of strategic bombing and
increasingly scarce funding. The Navy also argued that the cost of the carrier was
favorable in comparison to other military projects, and the ship was not vulnerable, but
rather it was “tough, durable, and effective.” The supercarrier also had a vital role in the
national security of the United States, and the Navy considered it to be “indispensible to
the successful prosecution of any war with Russia” and it would “support our Air Force
particularly in attacks on Soviet oil refineries.” It was considered so critical to the role of
the Navy that abandonment of the United States “is symbolic of acceptance of a
willingness to admit progressive deterioration of American naval superiority.”590
On April 15, 1949, three days before the keel for the United States was to be laid,
Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson queried the JCS and the Service Secretaries,
including Sullivan, for further opinions into the necessity of a supercarrier. The Air
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Force and Army factions discounted the potential capabilities of the United States and a
carrier-based nuclear strategy. They contended that the supercarrier allowed the Navy to
simply duplicate the strategic mission of the Air Force. Sullivan, on the other hand, was
not even given an opportunity to respond because Johnson made himself unavailable for
Sullivan's rebuttal. In the end, Johnson, not surprisingly, agreed with the Air Force
hypothesis. Without consultation of the Congress, the Chief of Naval Operations, Louis
E. Denfeld, or even the Secretary of the Navy, Johnson ordered construction of United
States terminated on April 23, 1949. In the press release issued from Johnson’s office,
the Secretary of Defense claimed that he had reviewed the findings of the JCS and after
discussion of the carrier with President Truman, the decision was made to discontinue
with the construction of United States “at once and at the least possible cost to the
Government.”591
The blow to the Navy was devastating and Sullivan, who was not in Washington
when the cancellation was ordered, resigned in protest of Johnson's decision and
Truman's acceptance of the cancellation. In a blistering resignation letter he accused
Johnson of making the decision to cancel the ship after Truman had twice previously
approved its construction. He added that the funds for the carrier had already been
approved by Congress, and other naval projects canceled to “insure the continuance” of
the supercarrier. Additional funding had also been included in the budget that Truman
had forwarded to Congress, and “were included in the National Military Establishment
Appropriation Bill passed by the House on 13 April 1949.” Sullivan further stated that
the leadership within the Navy believed “that the construction of USS UNITED STATES
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is so indispensable to the continuing development of American sea power that they have
twice sacrificed other substantial construction because of the carrier’s highest naval
priority.” He also claimed that Johnson’s action represented “the first attempt ever made
in this country to prevent the development of a powerful weapon” and Sullivan believed
that this action would result in a renewed effort to transfer naval aviation to the Air Force
and abolish the Marine Corps.592 Joining Sullivan in submitting a resignation was his
Under Secretary of the Navy, John Kenney. Dan Kimball, the former Assistant Secretary
for Air, replaced Kenney.593 Sullivan had also asked Denfeld to resign, but the CNO
remained silent about the fatality of the supercarrier, and the immediate future of the
Navy. To many within naval aviation community, Denfeld’s silence was a sign of selling
out the Navy’s position on aviation to get re-appointed as CNO in December 1949.594
Replacing Sullivan in the Pentagon was Francis P. Matthews, a Nebraska lawyer
and a prominent Midwestern Catholic. The new Secretary was reported to be a “devout
Christian . . . a lawyer of more than thirty-five years’ experience, who has established a
remarkable record of honesty and integrity and ability.”595 A major liability of Matthews
was his gross unfamiliarity with the Navy, its traditions, and a real grasp of the political
infighting that had plagued the military over the last four years. Matthews himself stated
“his naval experience was confined mainly to handling a rowboat at his summer
home.”596 He was also hampered because of his commitment to the Secretary of
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Defense. This forced the command structure within the Navy to find ways to preserve
their mission and prerogatives at the expense of their own Service Secretary and the
CNO.
In response to the continuing Air Force assaults on naval aviation in general, and
the supercarrier in particular, Denfeld agreed to appoint Captain Arleigh A. Burke as the
Assistant Chief of Staff of Naval Operations for Organizational Research and Policy
Section, simply referred to as OP-23. When Burke assumed command in late December
1948, just months before the cancellation of United States, he was tasked with providing
information to the CNO on matters concerning unification and its impact on the Navy.
Burke was very familiar in Navy circles because he previously had been Admiral Marc
Mitscher’s chief of staff during World War II. In his new position, Burke had come to
realize that the future of the Navy was through its airpower, not just its surface fleets.
Burke’s Op-23 was to represent the views of the majority of naval officers, have the
“confidence of the Navy’s senior officers,” and conduct themselves in an ethical
manner.597
Op-23 was to continue the war against further unification, in addition to defining
the role of naval aviation to the future of the Navy. They had to continue to argue that
the separate strategic missions of the Air Force and Navy were not redundant, but
essential to a well-balanced military strategy. They funneled information to Denfeld, and
monitored speeches made across the nation by pro-Navy speakers. Op-23 also assisted
Cedric Worth, a civilian assistant to the Undersecretary of the Navy, to draft a document
that alleged major irregularities in the decision to build the B-36s.598 In the months
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ahead, this document would be leaked to members of Congress and the press. It would
tarnish by association many in the Navy who overtly or unwittingly supported Worth’s
accusations.

THE OXYMORON: THE B-36 PEACEMAKER

Of all the names that could have been chosen for the monstrosity that was the B36, “Peacemaker” was probably the most ill suited. The B-36 was designed for the most
horrific type of war, and it brought nothing but very public dissension, inside and out of
the Pentagon. Even within the Air Force, there was some reluctance to embrace the B-36
as the weapon of the future. The first commanding officer of Strategic Air Command,
General George C. Kenney, suggested that the B-36’s real mission range was below the
10,000 miles that had been advertised. It was also vulnerable to enemy fighters because
of its slow speed, insufficient armament, and lack of self-sealing fuel tanks to prevent
explosions. The SAC commander argued that the B-50 could accomplish the mission of
the B-36, and the Peacemaker should not be ordered until further studies on the plane
were completed.599 Kenney also opposed the B-36 because of the better performance
possibilities offered by jet bombers and he would not be silenced on the inadequacies of
the B-36. These opinions may have led to his eventual replacement at SAC.600 Concerns
over the performance envelope of the B-36 continued even after several of them flew
over the nation’s capital in honor of Truman’s inauguration in January 1949. Perhaps
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more alarming to some, the Air Force began to scale back procurement of newer jet
aircraft to free up more funds for further B-36 purchases.601
In an effort to determine the veracity of the arguments against the B-36, James
Van Zandt, a Republican Representative from Pennsylvania and a Navy veteran, sent
identical letters to Stuart Symington and John Sullivan on April 27, 1949.602 In it, he
asked if the Navy had any aircraft that were “capable of intercepting and shooting down a
B-36” and did the Navy have “any knowledge of a fighter aircraft of any other nation”
that could accomplish this mission.603 In the response from the Navy, under the
temporary leadership of Dan Kimball, Van Zandt was informed that the Navy indeed had
a plane capable of stopping a B-36. The McDonnell Aircraft company was delivering a
new Navy fighter, the F2H Banshee, whose performance allowed it to “accomplish
interception and successful attack against the B-36B throughout the latter’s range of
possible performance” and even more, the Grumman F9F Panther jet had enough
performance to be effective as well. However, the Navy also claimed that its prop-driven
F8F Bearcat and F4U-5 Corsair also had the ability to accomplish the mission depending
upon the “altitude and cruising speed” of the B-36.604
Kimball was so confident that the Navy could track and intercept a B-36 that they
asked the Air Force to test the Peacemaker against the Banshee. As for foreign aircraft,
Kimball stated only that it was his belief that “the fighter airplanes of major foreign
powers can well have performance characteristics in general comparable to those of this
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nation and that, likewise, there is no deterrent known to me which prevents the existence
of the essential radar equipment” that would allow for the interception of the B-36.605
Possibly realizing the folly of their pursuit, the Air Force refused to test a B-36 against
interception.606 That did not mean that unofficial interceptions of the B-36 did not
happen. The Navy’s slowest jet fighter, the F3D, had the ability to catch the Peacemaker
at altitude and could easily outperform the unwieldy bomber. The F3D was slow for a jet
fighter, and was no match for the MiGs that the B-36 would encounter in a war with the
Soviet Union.607
In an effort to increase the performance of the B-36, the Air Force freed up some
funds, within their own budget, to add four jet engines, two on the end of each wing, to
the B-36. This would increase its speed, and gave the updated Peacemakers a total of ten
engines. Rear Admiral Daniel V. Gallery sarcastically responded to this by stating that
apparently if the Air Force says it can add engines to an aircraft and “increase not only its
speed but also its range, the simplest thing to do is just forget what you learned in
engineering school and readjust your ideas to conform to this new concept. After all, this
is the atomic age, so relax and enjoy it.”608 Further skepticism from the Navy was
evident when it was pointed out that if the B-36 was stated to be the primary weapon in
the American arsenal, the Soviets were only required to produce a defense system based
upon the interception and destruction of the B-36. The new generation of Soviet fighters,
and the radar network that they had developed since the end of the Second World War,
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could be formidable in the event of war with the USSR. Instead of broadening the ability
of airpower to confound an enemy with variations in targets and applications of weapons,
the B-36 offered the same premise that had existed since before World War II. That is,
the strategic bomber attacking an urban center in an effort to destroy the morale of the
enemy and win the war with minimal cost to the United States.
The Air Force still continued to argue that the B-36 could effectively operate
beyond the range of escorting fighters and into areas where the Soviets controlled the air.
This completely disregarded the experience of unescorted American bombers that were
decimated over Germany early in the air war.609 This does not mean that the USAF
privately ignored the very same evidence of Soviet defenses that they publically
minimized. A top-secret memo was sent to Symington in January1950 that indicated that
the Air Force acknowledged modern Soviet fighters were the equivalent of their
American counter-parts. There were currently more aircraft in operational and reserve
units in the USSR and it was presumed that they were producing aircraft at a more rapid
rate than the United States. Moreover, it was felt that the Soviet Union was “preparing a
strong defense against strategic bombardment” in addition to an overall strategy that was
premised upon controlling all of Europe. Therefore, the memo suggested that in effort to
“assure that our retaliation will be devastating” work must continue on the development
of “controlled air-to-air weapons in order that our bombers may protect themselves,
accomplish their missions and keep losses to a minimum.610
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Beyond the known inadequacies of the B-36, the strategic application of atomic
weapons would not have the immediate impact in the war that was envisioned. If the
Soviets suddenly moved into western Germany, France, and the Low Countries, B-36s
would be sent to bomb Moscow, Kiev, and other Soviet cities hundreds of miles behind
the front lines. The initial impact of those strikes would not be felt for days, weeks, or
even months to come and if bombs were used against the Red Army in the field, the
United States would potentially be using weapons of mass destruction against targets
inside its own allied nations.
In June 1949, VADM Daniel Gallery suggested that the Air Force's concept of
war with the Soviet Union would result in atomic strikes on seventy of the largest Soviet
cities. If this were the course of action, 30 to 40 percent of Soviet industry would be
temporarily halted, but the Red Army would still occupy all of Europe, and their will to
fight would be intensified. He argued that strategic bombing should be directed against
Soviet fuel production facilities because the Soviet war machine was powered by fuel and
if their access to fuel was eliminated the Soviet offensive capabilities were limited.
Therefore the prime target should be “Baku not Moscow.”611 All the supplies that the
Soviet troops needed to survive would be available from the occupied countries, and
unless the Air Force was prepared to use atomic weapons on allied cities, U.S. ground
forces would be necessary to push the Red Army out of Western Europe. To assist the
ground forces, the United States had to control the air, and if the United Kingdom and
Western Europe fell to the Soviets, the only tactical aircraft that could continue the war
would have to be carrier-based. By the summer of 1949, the Navy continued to press for
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a role in strategic power projection, while the Air Force wanted the entire mission. It
became a battle between supercarriers and the “billion-dollar blunder” of the B-36.612 In
this approach to an all or nothing strategy, unfortunately, neither really fit the overall U.S.
policy towards war or peace with the Soviet Union. If the goal was the complete
annihilation of the Soviet will to fight, the B-36 would have a difficult time
accomplishing the mission because of its performance, and the supercarrier did not yet
exist and carrier-based nuclear bombers were in their infancy.

ATTACKING THE INTEGRITY OF THE B-36 PROGRAM

As part of the effort to change the growing public skepticism of the B-36, the
Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Hoyt S. Vandenberg gave a speech on May 1,
1949, to the American Legion’s 13th National Aerial Roundup Banquet. With an
audience that was interested in the topic of aircraft, Vandenberg began to speak about the
B-36. He suggested that the aircraft was indeed expensive, but it was a “capable
performer” and it would “do a good job.” Vandenberg further contended that the B-36
was not the solution to all of the security problems of the United States, nor could it
perform all of the jobs that the Air Force needed to accomplish, but “the Air Force has
never held that this airplane is a suitable basket for all our eggs.” Later he added that in
the future, all airplanes, including the B-36, “may be outmoded by long-range
uninhabited missiles” however, long before that, the “B-36 will be replaced by a better
airplane, perhaps by a series of better airplanes.” Vandenberg acknowledged that there
were critics of airpower who had referred to the strategic bomber as the “new” Maginot
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Line. He claimed that he did not understand this concept because the fortifications that
the French hoped to hide behind before the breakout of World War II were stationary.
They could not possibly provide the security the French desired. Strategic airpower, on
the other hand, was mobile, and in the United States, it was “primarily a deterrent” to
war. Vandenberg added that airpower alone could not win a complete victory, the other
Services were needed, and the “strategic attack against the enemy’s vulnerable interior”
was not the only Air Force job. Others included aerial defense and air support of land
and sea operations and overall American airpower was “an instrument of democracy. It
is created and maintained because our citizens want it.”613 Despite Vandenberg’s
discussion about a variety of missions, it remained clear that the leadership of the Air
Force was prepared to use the immense bomb bay of the B-36 to bring democracy to the
Soviet Union one megaton at a time.
Challenging the supposition that the B-36 was capable as the instrument of
democracy that Vandenberg had suggested, attacks on the performance of the B-36 and
alleged improprieties in its procurement began to leak from the Navy. Truman later
wrote that the dispute arose “over anonymous charges alleging irregularities in the Air
Force’s procurement of the B-36 and the questioning of its combat effectiveness.”614
This accusation included “rumors, half-truths, and a sprinkling of accurate information”
and had been prepared by the aforementioned special assistant to the Undersecretary of
the Navy, Cedric Worth. Eventually the documents prepared by Worth, with the help of
Op-23, came into the possession of Republican Congressman James E. Van Zandt, a
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member of the House Armed Forces Committee from Pennsylvania. Van Zandt, also a
Naval Reserve officer, had previously questioned the B-36 and he would now bring the
issue to the floor of the House of Representatives.615 His integrity was attacked for
questioning the B-36’s performance because, after all, any “well informed person also
knows that a B-36 at an altitude over forty thousand feet does not even need fighter
protection. Our fastest jet planes are helpless even if they could find the B-36 in this
twilight heighth.”616
Van Zandt opened his address by suggesting that it was the solemn obligation of
Congress to “maintain at all times an adequate National Defense” and that the Armed
Forces of the United States be “equipped with the finest weapons of modern warfare that
dollars and cents can buy.” He asked that a House committee be established to
investigate “all phases of military aircraft; all circumstances and facts involved in the
cancellation of some contracts, the enlargement of others, the connections of Louis
Johnson, Secretary of Defense, and Honorable Stuart Symington, Secretary of the Air
Force, past or present, direct or indirect, with these companies” and the role of
contributions to Truman’s Presidential re-election campaign in 1948. Van Zandt further
suggested that improprieties in the purchases of the B-36 were coupled to political
considerations that were linked to Johnson, Symington, and Floyd Odlum, the chairman
of Convair. Van Zandt further argued that only a full investigation could resolve the
alleged problems with the purchases of the B-36. Because the nation was spending $15
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billion on national defense, the inquiry would answer whether or not the United States
was spending too much of this on an outmoded weapon system.617
In response to the charges leveled by Van Zandt, the House Armed Services
Committee voted to investigate the B-36 project, and “assess the capabilities of the B-36,
examine the roles and missions of the services, and determine whether the decision to
cancel the supercarrier had been sound.”618 Many officers laid their careers on the line to
protest Johnson, the B-36, the cancellation of the supercarrier, and the idea of a single
weapon defense system. They did not argue against strategic air warfare, but rather the
chosen weapon, the B-36. If the Air Force had a more advanced and capable bomber, the
protest from the Navy might have been more tempered, but there still would have been
pressure for a carrier-based nuclear option.
The congressional hearings on the B-36 program took place, under the leadership
of the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee Carl Vinson (D, Georgia), in
August 1949. They involved the testimony of military and civilian personnel both for
and against the Peacemaker as well as strategic air warfare. Key individuals to appear
before Vinson’s committee came from Consolidated-Vultee Aircraft Corporation and
other aircraft manufacturers. In the published report of the investigation, Vinson’s
committee stated unequivocally that the allegations of improprieties in the decisions to
purchase the B-36 were not true. The judgment to acquire the Peacemaker was “based on
the conviction that it is the best available aircraft” for strategic bombing and its role in the
defense of the United States. The Armed Services Committee also cleared Symington
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and Johnson of any wrongdoing and stated that “these men continue to merit the
complete confidence of the American people in their past actions and in the future.” The
report placed the blame for the charges directly on Cedric Worth. It also noted that once
this was made clear, Worth was fired from his position in the Navy. The committee
report maintained that all of the Services were important and essential to the defense of
the United States, and it was disturbed by the ongoing infighting within the Pentagon.
This might have the unfortunate consequence of impairing the basic functions of the
military that would “endanger the national defense.” It was the recommendation of this
committee to follow up the investigation with hearings, scheduled for October, to further
investigate the problems with unification that had stressed the Navy so dramatically.619
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE BATTLE WITHIN THE PENTAGON

I am transmitting herewith the nomination submitted by the Secretary of the Navy, of
Admiral Louis E. Denfeld, U.S. Navy, to be Chief of Naval Operations for a period of two
years
Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson, August 2, 1949.620
Upon receipt of these orders you will stand relieved of your duties as Chief of Naval
Operations Secretary of the Navy Francis P. Matthews to Admiral Louis E. Denfeld,
November 1, 1949.621

THE BATTLE OVER STRATEGIC AIR WARFARE: THE REVOLT OF THE
ADMIRALS

One of the most historically polarizing political battles took place in October
1949, over strategic air warfare and the ability of the United States to actually accomplish
the strategic air warfare mission. Often referred to as “the Revolt of the Admirals,” the
political and military upheaval went beyond simply the Navy. It was a battle for strategy,
funding, and control of the nuclear weapons delivery systems that had come to symbolize
American defenses in these early postwar years. In too many biographies of President
Harry S. Truman, the Congressional hearings are briefly mentioned, and quickly lost
between discussions of containment, re-election, NSC-68, and the Korean War. In
military histories or biographies, however, the Revolt has a much stronger reaction to the
authors and the veracity of its interpretations vary depending upon the author’s bias for or
against the Navy or Air Force. Arguments concerning the B-36, or the supercarrier, miss
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one of the most vital issues that came out of the 1949 hearings, the fact that both the
Navy and the Air Force appeared to fully embrace the ideals of atomic bombing to
support the policies of the United States. In other words, the Revolt had less to do with
cancellation of the United States or the B-36, than it had to do with the underlying belief
in atomic strategic bombing to accomplish the policies of the United States as identified
by the Truman administration, the National Security Council, or even the State
Department.
Historians and contemporaries were quick to blame the Navy for the upheaval,
and for undercutting the Truman administration’s military policy. But this ignores the
role that Symington and the Air Force had in creating the crisis in the first place, through
their attempts to monopolize the budget and all air missions. The testimony that was
presented focused more on which Service could deliver nuclear weapons better than the
other and missed the critical question if the strategy itself was actually sound. Even more
dangerous, the Congress and the military engaged in a very divisive, public debate about
what American strategy and tactics would be in the event of war with the Soviet Union.
This provided the USSR with a valuable insight into American military policy regarding
airpower and the application of nuclear weapons. This unrestricted and unabashed look
at bombing the Soviets also created a level of embarrassment for Secretary of State Dean
Acheson and the State Department as they tried to maintain peace through diplomacy.
By the summer of 1949, it was apparent that naval assets were going to be
reduced to levels that strained its ability to accomplish it missions of protecting the seas
and the nation. The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Louis Denfeld, previously
testified to the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee of the Committee on
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Appropriations, that the Navy was attempting to fit under President Truman’s objective
of building “a foundation of military strength which can be sustained for a period of years
without excessive strain on our productive resources, and which will permit rapid
expansion should the need arise.” The military needed to maintain a proper balance,
according to Denfeld, to support a unified strategic concept that was flexible to “meet and
counter not only the most probable enemy action, but unexpected and unforeseen turns of
events.” He stressed that the military should avoid a single war plan that shaped “our
forces solely to meet that plan, because we recognize that in reality the best war plan you
can have is in effect obsolescent the moment it is completed” and that because the
initiative in war belongs to the aggressor state, the “unpredictable fortunes of war make it
very unwise to be committed in advance to any single plan of action.” Denfeld
articulated that in the current budget the Navy was already functioning at a lower level
that the Congress had previously stated was necessary and that the number of fleet
carriers would be reduced in the next budget from eleven to eight and the air groups that
flew off the carriers from twenty-four to fourteen. This force reduction would have
serious “effect upon our overall balance” and the CNO added that he hoped the funding
would be restored to the levels that were necessary to fulfill the mission of the Navy. The
CNO added that the Navy would attempt to function under the new budget, but reminded
the subcommittee that “failure to obtain these restorations will have a serious, continuing,
and increasing effect upon our overall efficiency and overall readiness.”622 However, the
funding would not be restored and further cuts to the carrier forces were expected.
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Strong concerns about increased defense cuts that appeared to be aimed not only
at the Navy, but at naval aviation in particular, created a crisis within the Navy. Captain
John W. Crommelin, held a press conference, without Navy authorization, on September
10, 1949. He publicly accused the Air Force of trying to take over all aspects of aviation
as well as budgetary control over the armed forces.623 Crommelin further argued that
unification was detrimental to the Navy, and the “Navy cannot support an organization
whose methods and principles violate the Navy concept of a Navy man’s oath.”624 He
also accused Secretary of Defense Johnson of trying to run a totalitarian department.625
He further stated that the Navy in general, and naval aviation in particular, was being
slowly eliminated by the JCS and the Department of Defense. The Secretary of the Navy
Francis Matthews responded by ordering his senior leadership to direct any criticisms
through his office rather than through the press.626 What appalled many within the senior
command of the Navy, was the appearance of acquiescence of Secretary of the Navy
Matthews to Johnson and the Air Force position. True Service unification appeared to be
in position to eliminate naval aviation and destroy the morale within the Navy as a whole.
Many naval officers were willing to continue the fight against further unification,
as well as the dictum of Matthews to run every criticism through “the proper
channels.”627 VADM Gerald F. Bogan wrote a memorandum that the “basic reason
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behind all of it is a genuine fear in the navy for the security of our country if the policies
followed in the Department of Defense since the National Security Act became law are
not drastically changed, and soon.” Bogan also argued that the “morale in the navy is
lower today than at any time since I entered the commission ranks in 1916” and if “the
adequate Military Defense Establishment could be achieved without a navy or naval
aviation, I would gladly advocate using funds now expended to maintain that service, on
the procurement of the best other necessary weapons and equipment.” Bogan then added
perhaps the crux of the Navy’s argument, “there is no cheap victory possible between any
two nations or groups of nations each having strong, if relatively unequal power.”628 The
memorandum, endorsed by the CNO and the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet,
Admiral Arthur Radford, was to be kept within the Navy Department but Crommelin,
who continued to fight what he perceived to be almost a war against unification, leaked
the memo to the press. Johnson and Matthews were livid over this revelation and forced
Bogan into an early retirement while Denfeld suspended Crommelin.629 It was at this
point that Matthews decided to replace Denfeld when his term was up.
In October 1949, Carl Vinson’s committee was again the battlefield for the Air
Force and Navy, as the fight over unification and missions continued. Prior to these
hearings, Matthews ordered “naval officer witnesses to make no mention of the B-36
bomber in testifying before the House Armed Forces Committee.”630 In defiance of
Matthews, many of the Navy’s witnesses maintained that the B-36 “would be useful only
if the strategy was one of saturation bombing with atomic weapons” and they considered
628

Gerald F. Bogan, "Bickering is Still the Rule," in Into the Jet Age: Conflict and Change in Naval
Aviation, 1945-1975, ed. E.T. Wooldrridge (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995), 100-105.
629
Richard P. Hallion, The Naval Air War in Korea (Mount Pleasant, SC: The Nautical & Aviation
Publishing, 1986), 18-19.
630
John G. Norris, "Navy Cramps Admirals in B-36 Inquiry," Washington Post, September 29, 1949.

330
this type of warfare to be “both morally bankrupt and an ineffective deterrent to Soviet
aggression.”631 Senior naval commanders, past and present, had participated in the rise of
the carrier during the war. They had held major fleet commands and were instrumental in
key naval engagements, including the Battles of Midway and the Philippine Sea, and
were the architects of the American fast carrier task forces and had witnessed the rise of
the aircraft carrier as the primary weapon of the postwar Navy. They were considered to
be naval aviation’s leading authorities, and perhaps the most respected men in their
profession. These men were to defend the Navy from what appeared to be an attack on it
not only from the Air Force, but also the Secretary of the Navy. Naval witnesses were
given the first chance to address the Committee and would be followed by a few Air
Force representatives, the Secretary of the Air Force, the Secretary of Defense, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Omar Bradley, and even former President Herbert
Hoover.

THE NAVY’S OPENING SALVO

The first witness to speak in front of the House Armed Forces Committee was the
Secretary of the Navy, Francis P. Matthews. Unlike his counterpart in the Air Force,
Matthews would spend the majority of this testimony railing against many of the officers
within his own department. He opened his October 6, 1949 remarks by suggesting that
the entirety of the Navy, military personnel and civilians, wanted to cooperate with the
committee, and there had been no censorship to date and there “will be none.” Matthews
did not feel that there was a morale problem in the Navy other than a few officers who
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“for reasons sufficient to themselves, in spite of their oath taken as a member of the
Military Establishment of the United States which imposed upon them a solemn
obligation to support the Constitution and the laws of the United States” had chosen to
disseminate classified materials. This was done in a manner that “leave no doubt of their
own consciousness of the impropriety of their action and the disloyal character of their
conduct.” The Navy Secretary considered these actions to be outside the norm for the
majority of the people in the Navy, and it appeared to him that the trouble currently
afflicting his department was coming from those in the naval aviation branch. This
should not have been unexpected, according to Matthews, because the number of carriers
had increased so dramatically during the war, and therefore, would have to be reduced
almost as significantly in the post-war period. Matthews was also clearly vexed at those
naval aviators who had spoken out against unification in defiance of not only Congress,
but also the American people, who supported the legislation and reform. Matthews did
not consider the alleged malcontents to be symbolic of the preponderance of naval
officers.632
The Secretary of the Navy also praised Louis Johnson for his eloquence in
outlining the divisions between the roles and missions of the Services, and for authorizing
the “Navy proposal for the modernization of two aircraft carriers” of the smaller Essexclass. This provided the Navy with eight carriers that could handle “the new and modern
planes which are just coming into use by the fleet.” Matthews next transitioned into a
brief discussion of the B-36, but he did not want to comment on the performance of the
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Peacemaker, because he was “not acquainted with the technical details” or its operational
characteristics. As for the supercarrier, Matthews was non-committal about the decision
to cancel its construction because that determination had been made before Matthews
came into the administration. He did, however, feel that it was “not a denial of the
necessity for aircraft carriers in general.”633
Matthews’ statement did not attempt to explain the concerns among some in the
Navy concerning the B-36, or the emphasis of the strategic bombing as American policy.
He placed his confidence in the unification process and the cooperation of the JCS to
recommend the best weapons and strategies to fit within the budgets requested by the
President. At a critical time when the Navy needed strong leadership from its civilian
leadership, Matthews did not make a strong impression of independence from the
Secretary of Defense, nor did he appear to be a real advocate for his department in the
same manner that John Sullivan had been, or even Stuart Symington was for the Air
Force.
Admiral Arthur W. Radford, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet was
considered by many to be the principal naval aviator and spokesman within the Navy. He
had gone out to Hawaii to assume command of the Pacific Fleet just prior to the
cancellation of the supercarrier in April 1949. He had returned to Washington to
continue the fight for the survival of naval aviation, and against the single weapons
system approach to war. Radford had previously observed the Air Force’s testimony
during the August B-36 hearings and prepared the Navy’s rebuttal. When he took the
stand the day after Matthews, Radford was ready to testify not “speaking for any segment
of the Armed Services” and instead claimed that he was going to “testify as a citizen and
633
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a professional student of warfare – not merely as a naval officer whose career has been
largely devoted to aviation.” Radford was an advocate of airpower and believed that the
entirety of American airpower, the primary feature in American national security, was
both land and sea based. As for the application of airpower in warfare, Radford
suggested that Vinson’s committee would have a “controlling influence upon the kind of
war” the United States would fight, and the type of peace “which would follow such a
conflict.” In Radford’s view, an enemy could choose the time and place of a war, but
only the United States could establish the type of war it wanted to fight, and final victory
meant more than just the annihilation of an enemy state.634
For Radford, these hearings were more than just about the B-36, for he saw the
Peacemaker as “a symbol of a theory of warfare” which he called the atomic blitz. It was
a type of warfare that promised a “cheap and easy victory if war should come” and
therefore the B-36 had “attained an importance out of proportion to the real issues
involved” which could not be ignored. Radford articulated the belief that not only could
enemy aircraft intercept the B-36, it would be destroyed in deplorable numbers if not
escorted by fighters. He added that currently, according the Air Force’s own estimates,
there were American aircraft that could locate, intercept, and engage the B-36, “day or
night and at all speeds and altitudes” so it was “folly to assume that a potential enemy
cannot do as well.” In a shot at the performance of the B-36, Radford hoped that an
enemy state wound not attain a bomber that was any better than the Peacemaker.635
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Radford and other material witnesses who were to be called upon to support him
claimed that the B-36 represented an already antiquated style of warfare that emphasized
slow bombers attacking the cities of American enemies. The prioritization of strategic air
warfare had retarded the numbers of aircraft devoted to ground support missions. He
further contended that the pursuit of the lumbering B-36 had also hampered the
development of smaller jet bombers and “extremely high performance fighters” that
would support the overall strategic air warfare plans by hitting “bridges, canal locks,
tunnels, and transport equipment.”# Radford also denied that the Navy was only
attempting to build the supercarrier in an effort to “usurp a primary role of the Air Force
in atomic bombing” and that each service should “be permitted to bring an experimental
weapon through the development, test and evaluation stages.” He did not believe solely
in the deterrent affect of nuclear weapons, and “we must realize that we cannot gamble
that the atomic blitz of annihilation will even win a war.”636
Several witnesses followed Radford and attempted to raise serious questions
about the B-36 and its strategy. The most damning critique of unification and strategic
air warfare, however, did not come from Op-23, or from the officers that testified on
Radford’s behalf. It came from Admiral Louis E. Denfeld, a non-aviator and the Chief of
Naval Operations. Captain Charles Griffin was tasked with preparing Denfeld’s
statement and, according to Griffin, the last page of the CNO’s statement was completed
at 3:00 a.m., just seven hours before Denfeld testified on October 13, 1949. Secretary
Matthews had attempted to see Denfeld’s prepared statement for several days; however,
#
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he did not get a copy of it until 30 minutes before Denfeld was scheduled to testify.637
Matthews expected Denfeld, as well as his other officers, to not oppose or be critical of
policies that Truman or Johnson appeared to be in favor of. Therefore it was assumed
that Denfeld would come out and support Johnson, Matthews and unification.638 Denfeld
denied that the Navy was not “motivated by a selfish desire for survival in this
presentation” and it was supportive of true unification, and they understood that it
represented “a coordination of America’s armed might for greater efficiency and
corresponding economy.”639
In a dramatic breach of support for Matthews, Denfeld claimed that “the Navy is
not accepted in full partnership in the national defense structure” and this was the
“fundamental reason for the apprehensions you have heard expressed here.” The
trepidation felt by the Navy arose from the “trend to arrest and diminish the Navy’s
ability to meet its responsibilities.” The CNO claimed that he was a supporter of strategic
air warfare that was predicated on accurate bombing of key targets by SAC, however, the
preliminary air offensive was not “solely the function of the U.S. Air Force” and that the
totality of American airpower included the Navy and the Marines. Denfeld did not
criticize atomic bombing or the B-36 as a weapons platform, and instead suggested that
the former was being studied, and the latter should be examined more in depth because it
was “illogical, damaging, and dangerous to proceed directly to mass procurement without
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evaluation to the extent that the Army and Navy may be starved for funds and our
strategic concept of war frozen about an uncertain weapon.” What he felt was the issue
with the B-36 was the exclusion of the Navy from any input on this weapon or the
strategy that it represented.640
Denfeld also reminded his audience that there were agreements regarding roles
and missions that had been adopted by the JCS and approved by President Truman,
however, over the previous eighteen months there had been persistent attempts to change
or alter the agreements that were an “example of improper unification.” An example of
this was the cancellation of the United States that had been consistently approved and
budgeted by the appropriate agencies since 1946, and the reexamination of the
supercarrier program and its ultimate cancelation by the Secretary of Defense was
“neither in accord with the spirit of unification nor the concept of unification.” To
remedy the problems that had afflicted the military since 1947, Denfeld made several
suggestions including a recommendation to expedite the evaluation of the B-36, support
the National Security Act and its amendments and agreements as they were written, allow
each service to develop its own weapons, and to provide the Navy with “adequate and
appropriate representation in key positions within the Department of Defense.”641 About
three-quarters of the way through Denfeld’s statement, Secretary of the Navy Matthews
got up and stormed out of the room.642 Denfeld had indirectly placed the blame for the
revolt on the Secretary of Defense as well as the civilian leadership within the Navy, but
he did not denounce atomic air warfare. He maintained the idea that the Navy had a role
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to play in the destruction of Soviet targets during the atomic blitz that Radford had
apparently condemned.

THE AIR FORCE RESPONDS

The Air Force responded on October 18, 1949, with Secretary Stuart Symington
who denied the veracity of the Navy’s attacks. He skillfully promoted the B-36 and the
Air Force’s version of strategic air warfare. Symington immediately addressed the
criticism, efficacy and morality of the single weapons system and strategy with regards to
the B-36 program and the purchase of more Peacemakers. He defended the original
purchases of the B-36 as well as the acquisition of 36 additional airframes because
President Truman and former Secretary of Defense Forrestal and agreed to this
supplemental program. He denied that the Air Force was “putting all its eggs in one
basket” by reminding the committee that only four of the current 48 groups or the
projected 70 groups in the USAF were equipped with the B-36. This represented only
eight percent of the entire Air Force.643 He argued that the criticism of the USAF seemed
to be aimed at the idea of the B-36 and its capabilities, and not against other Air Force
aircraft that with in-flight refueling had the same range as the B-36. The USAF did not
consider the B-36 to be invulnerable to enemy defenses, and in reality, the Air Force had
only two choices in front of it if it did not purchase B-36s. They were to either “buy an
inferior bomber which would require overseas bases; or air refueling; or missions planned
as one-way strikes” that would result in the loss of the crew and aircraft. The second
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option was to not buy a bomber and if that were the case, “why build bombs, especially
the tremendously expensive atomic bombs?”644
Symington believed that the B-36 was the best weapon available to accomplish
the mission, and that was based on recommendations by “men of recognized military
competence, with battle experience, and that they know far more about the grim business
of strategic bombardment than any other group in the world today.” He challenged the
idea that the USAF believed in the atomic blitz as a “quick and painless war” and instead
viewed the B-36 and the atomic bombs as the best deterrent to war in the world. If war
came, however, “we believe that the atomic bomb, plus the air power to deliver it,
represent the one means of unloosing prompt, crippling destruction upon the enemy, with
absolute minimum combat exposure of American lives.”645 Apparently Symington and
the others still held onto the idea that this type of mission would work against an enemy
in 1949, as easily as it had against the Japanese in 1945, without regard to all the other
reasons that the Japanese agreed to end their war.
Symington also testified that the Air Force did not believe in the mass atomic
bombing of civilians as critics had charged, however, he noted that it was “inevitable that
attacks on civilian targets will kill civilians” but “that was not an exclusive characteristic
of the atomic bomb, but is an unavoidable result of modern total warfare.” Symington
additionally suggested that previous testimony was based on false premises, and by
taking the United States Strategic Bombing Surveys out of context, it made strategic
bombing appear to be far more indecisive than the record indicated. The ongoing naval
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opposition to the B-36, and strategic bombing, had compromised national security by
publicly stating the performance envelope of the Peacemaker. It was considered “bad
enough to have given a possible aggressor technical and operating details of our newest
and latest equipment” but it was far worse to “have opened up to him in such detail the
military doctrine of how this country would be defended.” He believed that it was
obvious that the real issue in these B-36 hearings was “control of the military by
civilians, and therefore the preservation of Constitutional Government.”646
What Symington did not allow for, was the time gap between the present and
when the NSC presumed the Soviets were prepared to strike. The time gap would have
allowed a third option for the Air Force to pursue, wait until a better bomber became
available, or drop the slow B-36s in favor of purchasing more of the much higher
performance B-47s that were being introduced into SAC. No matter what bomber was
acquired, the “all or nothing” military option still did not necessarily fit the containment
policy of the Truman administration, or frankly, offer many alternatives short of total
war.
The Air Force Chief of Staff, General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, confirmed what
Symington had stated concerning the ability of the B-36 to accomplish its mission, when
he appeared before the committee on October 19, 1949. Vandenberg attempted to
reassure the public that strategic plans were decided by all members of the JCS, designed
for the defense of the United States and countered the suggestion that “strategic
bombardment is an Air Force concept” or an Air Force plan. He stated that the idea
evolved from a national plan to an international plan once the United States entered
World War II, and was supported by President Franklin Roosevelt and British Prime
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Minister Winston Churchill, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Anglo-American Combined
Chiefs of Staff. Strategic bombing further progressed, through the bombing of Germany
and Japan, and was now “a significant factor in planning for the troubled period in which
we find ourselves as an aftermath of World War II.” Now that it was considered to be the
national plan, only one Air Force agency was tasked with the delivery of the bomb,
Strategic Air Command. Vandenberg unmistakably disagreed with those who argued that
the United States should abandon the concept of strategic air warfare because to do so
would eliminate “the greatest equalizing factor in the balance of military power between
a potential enemy and the western democracies and could only be received with contempt
or despair by those who have joined together for common defense.”647
Like Symington had previously stated, Vandenberg denied that the Air Force was
prioritizing a single weapon based defense plan because there were less than 1,000
aircraft assigned to SAC. They represented only one-third the total of airplanes currently
in the Air Force, and B-36s were only five percent of the entirety of the USAF.
Vandenberg also rebutted criticism of strategic airpower and those that advocated for
more resources to be used for “tactical aviation – fighters, fighter bombers, and light
bombers” that were limited in range and payload. To embrace the latter, Vandenberg
stated that the United States would have to give up the “deterrent value” of atomic
weapons. This action would inform the Soviets “that they now take no defensive
measure against a possible atomic attack on their heartland.” The mere possibility of
such nuclear strikes forced the Soviet Union to invest in defensive measures and reduced
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their capacity to produce offensive weapons. If the United States did not have a strategic
bombing capability, Vandenberg argued, the Americans would have the power to destroy
the enemy’s weapons and military production at the source.648 He dismissed other
military programs as being reactive and extremely costly to prosecute in a modern war.
Only strategic bombing could eliminate the source of power of an enemy state. He did
not offer an airpower alternative to a war that was less than total, or options other than
nuclear.
Vandenberg saw the criticism of the B-36 program as a challenge to the
professionalism of those that advocated strategic bombing, and without releasing data
related to the operation of the B-36, he stated unequivocally that American strategic
bombers “can do their job.” He reminded Vinson’s committee that during World War II,
American bombers had never been stopped short of their targets by enemy action.
Vandenberg argued that the public should not be surprised that enemy planes are faster
than bombers, and that radar use against bombers was not a novelty nor was it easy to
bomb targets precisely from high altitudes. The Air Force was looking at improving its
“visual and radar bombing methods” and tests indicated that the necessary accuracy could
be attained and he dogmatically maintained the Air Force belief that the bombers would
get through. Vandenberg vented at those who were responsible for the breach in national
security and creating the need to have public hearings on top-secret strategy, weapons,
and policy. He implied that some members of the military had violated the trust placed
upon them. There were “criminal statutes imposing penalties upon the disclosure of
military secrets” and there had to be a balance between freedom of speech and national
security. He closed by suggesting that these hearings would not “diminish the
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determination of the Air Force to cooperate effectively with its two sister services in
providing for this country the greatest possible military security.”649
General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had
his turn before Vinson’s committee on the same day as Vandenberg, October 19, 1949.
Bradley’s prepared testimony reflected the anger that he felt about the entirety of this
fiasco, and the disunity that potentially compromised national security. He insisted that
the people of the United States “have as their national objective, a desire for peace and
security, without the sacrifice of either the basic rights of the individual, or the present
sovereignty that we cherish” but this did not mean that Americans embraced the idea of
“peace at any price.” Americans intended to maintain the political and cultural life that
they had, and the present form of government, with a final objective to sustain and even
raise “our American standard of living.” The Soviet Union and its allies, through
political and military means, currently threatened these core values because the
Communists believed in dominating the world. In an effort to combat this significant
threat, the United States needed to maintain balanced military forces, in numbers and
budgets. In the next war, the United States would hope to defend its territory, and be able
to launch retaliatory strikes from “bases which we hope to have ready at all times.”
He was convinced that the U.S. would have to strike back at the heart of an enemy
through strategic bombing and large-scale land operations. Then, as many historians
have pointed out, Bradley predicted, “large-scale amphibious operations, such as those in
Sicily and Normandy, will never occur again.”650 The United States was not alone in
confronting the Soviet threat as the North Atlantic Treaty and the Mutual Defense Act of
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1949 have pledged the Western democracies to collective defense of Europe, and the
U.S.651
Bradley attempted to clarify the position of the JCS and the new Department of
Defense in regards to strategic bombing, and its application in a modern war. He argued
that the evidence from the Second World War had displayed the deterrent effect of
strategic bombing and the efficacy of airpower to assist in attaining the ultimate victory
in the war. Because the United States did not maintain a large conventional force after
the war, it was up to the strategic bombers to represent the power of American retaliation.
Some had opposed strategic bombing because of the “destruction of civilian lives and
communities.” Bradley stated that the Americans will always try to achieve the
“maximum effectiveness against the enemy’s armed forces, with minimum harm to the
non-participating civilian populace.” He believed that if the Soviets were able to strike
first, “the American people may feel that strategic bombing is both militarily and morally
justifiable.”652
In a direct verbal assault on the testimony of Admiral Radford and the position of
the Navy, Bradley suggested that American war plans were not “based solely on the socalled Atomic Blitz” and that the individuals and agencies tasked with creating the war
plans of the United States did not base it only on atomic bombs and big bombers.
Bradley then addressed the B-36 and stated that in his opinion, “it is the best bomber
available for production that is capable of carrying out the certain required missions in
the case of emergency.” This opinion, he contended, was based on “comparative
651
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statistics as previously presented to the JCS by the Air Force on the various types of
bombers available when they made their selection of the B-36 to fulfill the strategic
bombing role they have been assigned.” This did not mean that better bombers would not
be used when they became available, only that the B-36 was approved based upon the
recommendations of the Air Force, and endorsed by the entire JCS. The B-36’s
intercontinental range was critical to the offensive capacity of the Air Force. It was the
only possible means of reprisal if bases closer to the Soviet Union were not available. He
also suggested that the critics of the B-36 had not flown the plane, were not familiar with
is capacity to bomb at high altitude with acceptable precision, and were complaining
about a weapon that the Air Force, the agency responsible for strategic bombing,
wanted.653
The Chairman of the JCS also vigorously attacked the idea that that the Soviets,
“our only possible opponents for many years to come” had the capacity to inflict
unendurable losses “on any bomber engaged in a mission where the Russians have
adequate defenses.” Detractors of the Peacemaker based its alleged interception liability
on the performance of the F2H Banshee. Bradley added that currently the United States
did not know whether or not the Soviets had a plane that matched the Banshee despite the
fact that American knowledge of the MiG-15, a jet fighter with much greater
performance than the F2H, was already well known inside the Pentagon as early as 1948.
Bradley raised the issue that if the Soviets had the capability to intercept the B-36, would
they not have the same ability to catch and shoot down naval nuclear bombers? Aircraft
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losses were part of the overall cost of the missions, and such setbacks did not “mean that
you cannot still accomplish your mission.”654
Bradley transitioned his testimony to the atomic bomb as a weapon and suggested
that the arguments were not effective or only effectual in a small area, had been “refuted
by every test that has been made.” He added that as “a believer in humanity I deplore its
use, and as a soldier, I respect it.” As for the offensive capabilities of the Navy, Bradley
contended that all of the Services were reduced from what they wanted, and that the “Air
Force might have better grounds for dissatisfaction” based on recommendations from the
President’s Air Policy Commission that were not yet attained. The Navy had been in
constant opposition to unification at the expense of the nation’s best interest, and its
responsibilities did not match with the weapons it requested or wanted.655 By the end of
his statement, Bradley had demonstrated his support for the JCS concept of war, a belief
in the ability of the B-36 and the atomic bomb, to win wars or prevent them.
The Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, testified before the House Armed
Services Committee on October 21, 1949, the last day of the hearings, and opened with a
defense of unification and what had been done up to the present including the agreements
reached at Key West and Newport over role and missions. He argued that national
security was “not a competitive enterprise where one Service can profit at the expense of
another.” It was not the intent of unification to have one service monopolize the
Department of Defense, and one Service should neither control nor be subservient to
another. Johnson also made it clear that because of the cap placed on defense
expenditures, the Navy would not have as many carriers on active duty as it hoped for,
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nor would the Air Force attain the 70 groups that it wished to attain. Johnson’s statement
implied that the Navy was not really arguing over the “vulnerability or invulnerability of
the B-36” but instead “the continuous overtone has been an attack on the theory and the
administration of the unification law.”656
Johnson made it clear that an invulnerable bomber has not yet been made, so
therefore, the B-36 was vulnerable and under “given conditions, a bomber can always be
destroyed. This was true of the B-17s at the onset of the war, just as it was also true with
the B-29s in the latter stages of the war.” So many arguments that were made about the
B-36 were based upon the “oversimplification of the problems of bombing and bomber
interception” that there was no single statement by either side that could not be
questioned. Johnson maintained that the decisions that were reached by his office, were
based upon recommendations made by veteran officers and civilians who were far better
equipped to evaluate all weapons systems. As for the supercarrier, Johnson claimed that
he had followed the proper channels in determining if it should be built, and all of the
members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff took part in the discussions and the final decision.
This was not about strategy, or the B-36, according to Johnson, but instead it was about
the Navy being unhappy with unification and the Secretary of Defense was committed to
maintaining a military that “should and will be run solely in the interests of the American
people and for the furtherance of world peace.”657 It appeared that Johnson saw the
Navy’s role in these hearings a being obstructionist to the Secretary of Defense and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff rather than answering the substantive question of not only whether
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the B-36 successfully bomb Moscow, but whether or not that should the primary response
in a war with the Soviets.
Former President Herbert Hoover also spoke to Vinson’s committee, at their
request, on October 21, 1949, as a key expert on the reforms of the federal government.
Almost immediately, Hoover stated that he did not wish to “add to the bitterness which
has already flooded out of this hearing” nor could he “resolve the technical questions as
to whether the B-36 can, or cannot, do everything that is claimed for it.” Hoover
regretted that the inter-service rivalries had become public and that it impacted our
national defense and morale. The development of new weapons, tactics and dangers, had
always created problems as “some weapons become less effective and others more
effective, the life training of some officers in them is often a reason for their reluctance to
alter them.” It was also possible for officers to “move too quickly into every new field,
no matter how experimental.” Hoover then transitioned into unification and some of the
background to the legislation in addition to the apparatus that was created to determine
“strategic plans, problems of command, and technical questions” that were addressed by
the NSC and other agencies, including the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group and the
JCS. All three Services were adequately represented on this board and Hoover had “no
doubt that among these agencies there is the skill to settle technical and strategic and
command questions.” Any differences that could not be resolved would be placed before
the President through the Secretary of Defense, and Congress had the ability to correct
the President if he made a mistake.658 Hoover recognized that the attempt to eliminate
waste and redundancy were among the primary reasons for unification, and criticism
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came from those groups that were adversely affected. The time for austerity was now,
because the pressures on the American economy had already created a substantial budget
deficit and the prospect of inflation.659
Many historians and pundits have gravitated towards the latter idea as the reason
why the bomb seemed so attractive. They appeared to be inexpensive compared to other
weapon systems. It should now be apparent, however, that the cost of the weapons had to
include the delivery system and crews and this inflated the overall cost of the system. If
the expensive bombers did not have the ability to accomplish their assigned mission, as
was alleged by critics of the B-36, then what would be the cost of losing a war with the
Soviet Union because of the inability to back American policy with American weapons?

THE CONGRESSIONAL REPORT

When the hearings closed, it was clear that there still was no consensus on
unification or strategy, and for both the Navy and the Air Force, the years ahead were
hidden by the shadows of a mushroom cloud. Neither the B-36, nor the proposed carrierbased nuclear bomber, could rapidly project American power against the Soviet Union in
1949. It was also doubtful that they would be able to do so in the immediate future. The
bombers had been designed to destroy Soviet cities and manufacturing centers, which
could only be successful if American policy linked total destruction of the Soviet Union
to victory. Discussions of tactical missions to support ground troops was discussed in the
hearings, but for many officers in the Air Force and the Navy, nuclear weapons could
also be used in these types of missions. Both Services maintained the superiority of their
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airmen to deliver the coup-de-grace against the USSR at the expense of their counterparts
in the Pentagon.
On March 1, 1950 the House Armed Services Committee released their report on
“Unification and Strategy” that reexamined what had happened during the Revolt of the
Admirals and attempted to provide direction for the future. The report affirmed the
dramatic chasm between the Navy and the Air Force on strategy and policy with the USN
in opposition to the strategy of atomic warfare against cities in an effort to win a war
against the Soviet Union and the efficacy of high altitude strategic bombing. The
testimony presented to Carl Vinson’s committee had also made it apparent that the entire
military believed that airpower was indispensible to modern warfare and all branches of
the Armed Forces had a role in the air campaign. The Committee concluded that the B36 was currently the best bomber available but they did not answer the question of
vulnerability to interception or if it provided “the cheapest, surest, and most effective way
of delivering significant bombing attacks and that such attack cane be accurately
delivered.” The committee was not certain if the current defense plans insured “adequate
consideration of all professional views in these basic matters of defense, especially
during this early stage in unification” as weapons and systems were still being worked
out. The committee felt that the “existing national security organization” needed to be
altered to guarantee that decisions “will be reached with due regard for all service
views.”660
The Committee also addressed the issue of the B-36 and the United States in a
fairly unequivocal manner. They recommended that any expensive weapon system
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needed to be fully evaluated before it was acquired in quantity and it did not “pass
judgment in any respect on the many able arguments, pro and con, which the committee
has received” on the B-36 or the supercarrier. The report indicated that the Committee
did not approve of the way Louis Johnson unilaterally canceled the construction of
United States and believed that was an “unsound manner in which to conduct public
business involving the national defense.” This was a concern for the Committee because
the administration disregarded the role of Congress and the American people and their
respective role in national security. It was also noted that they did not consider
intercontinental strategic bombing to be tantamount to airpower and the “Air Force is not
synonymous with the Nation’s military air power” but the USAF retained the “primary
responsibility for conducting strategic bombing.” As for the battle between the B-36 and
the supercarrier, the Committee affirmed their belief in the professionals who
recommended it but they deplored the “the manner of cancellation of the construction” of
United States and would sponsor legislation that would require “within reasonable limits,
consultation by the Secretary of Defense with the Appropriations Committees of the
Senate and House of Representatives before appropriated funds are withheld by
administrative act.”661

WAS IT WORTH IT?

The investigation into weapons and strategies did not end the controversies
surrounding the Peacemaker or the naval nuclear bomber and it was questionable whether
or not either one was capable of completing the assigned mission with the level of
success that was predicted. Both were hopelessly obsolete by 1949 standards and
661
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frankly, so was the United States because it was designed with the technology of World
War II and its operations in the jet age would have been severely limited without
immediate funding to rectify its deficiencies. The Navy would never admit that it was in
its own best interest to actually have the United States canceled. When the time came for
the supercarrier to finally be built, it would be completed with the design and
technologies that are still in use on modern carriers in the 21st century. Instead of arguing
for the supercarrier and the naval nuclear bomber on strategic grounds, the Navy should
have promoted their use in tactical strikes because the advantage that the Navy had over
the Air Force was the ability to launch aircraft much closer to the target. This allowed
troop masses to be struck before they dissipated into a wide-ranging front and naval
aircraft could fly multiple missions while the B-36 was still engaged in its first strike.
The Navy could project American airpower into regions well beyond the range of Air
Force aircraft and maintain a higher offensive presence in critical regions such as the
Mediterranean Sea and the Persian Gulf.
The Navy's defiance of Secretary of Defense Johnson did not persuade Congress
to reverse his cancellation of the supercarrier United States. Even a demonstration of
carrier airpower in September 1949 aboard the Franklin D. Roosevelt could not turn the
tide. The B-36 prevailed and the Navy was forced to reevaluate its long-term strategic
goals. Although Vinson suggested that at some point in the future Congress would
support a supercarrier, the Navy would have to focus on interim carrier-based bombers,
the P2V Neptune and the AJ Savage, and existing carriers. The large ADR-42 and the
supercarrier would have to be scaled down in size and mission capability. Johnson was
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so bold as to declare, “the Navy is on its way out...the Air Force can do anything the
Navy can.”662
It is critical to understand that the entire B-36 investigation and the cancellation of
the supercarrier had far more to do with long-term strategy than these two weapon
systems. The Air Force was already making plans to replace the B-36 with an upgraded
version powered by jet engines or the new Boeing concept that would eventually become
the B-52, a plane that was as arguably the most successful combat aircraft ever designed.
Focus needs to remain on the idea of strategic bombing and nuclear weapons delivery and
the primary manner to win a war. It was these ideas, highlighted in the testimony that
directed appropriations at aircraft that were designed primarily to deliver atomic weapons
from air bases and carriers for the next twenty years. Nuclear-armed bombers were to be
supported by fighter aircraft that could carry atomic bombs. At the same time the
American skies were protected by interceptor aircraft armed with nuclear tipped antiaircraft missiles that would attempt to destroy any incoming Soviet attack. The Air Force
had won the day and their version of strategic air warfare was secure and the Navy
appeared to be formally restrained in their efforts to secure a carrier-based strategic
bomber.
Secretary of the Navy Francis Matthews did not abide by his word that naval
officers would not be censored or punished for their testimony. Only a week after the
highly publicized B-36 hearings concluded, the CNO, Admiral Louis Denfeld, was fired.
To many naval aviators and supporters of the Navy, Denfeld, the non-aviator, became a
martyr in the battle for carrier airpower. In an article that appeared in Collier’s magazine
and read into the Congressional Record by the future Speaker of the House,
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Representative John W. McCormack (D-MA), Denfeld reiterated the Navy’s position
that, “We cannot win a war on foreign soil by remaining at home. A powerful Navy will
be an effective partner of the Army and Air Force, carrying the war to the enemy and
keeping it there.” He added that the “Air Force is tied to a single weapon, the airplane.
The Navy is tied to a function, command of the sea, and its weapons change.” Denfeld
also wrote that the Navy was “in danger of losing one of its greatest assets—its spirit.”663
Replacing Denfeld as the Chief of Naval Operations was Admiral Chester
Nimitz's former Chief of Staff, ADM Forrest P. Sherman. An extremely intelligent man
and well-versed in carrier air tactics, Sherman truly believed in a balanced military that
included a Navy capable of conventional and nuclear strikes. When he was recalled from
command of the SIXTH Task Fleet in the Mediterranean, Sherman came into
Washington as an Admiral untarnished by the Revolt and worked to reestablish
confidence in the Navy and its ability to contribute to the national defense. Although
much of the focus on naval operations was now in the Mediterranean, Sherman insisted
that at least one carrier task group remain in the Pacific.664 When the Korean War broke
out on June 25, 1950, the heart of the SEVENTH Fleet in the Western Pacific was a
single fleet carrier, the Valley Forge.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
AIRPOWER IN RETROSPECT

As a result of these shortcomings in the USAF resources and capabilities, and the
service’s reluctance to reveal them to politicians or the press, American leaders and the
public, as well as some generals, entered the Korean War with inflated expectations of
what airpower could accomplish. Conrad C. Crane, 2000.665
My feeling was then, and still remains, that it would be impossible for the United
States to maintain the military commitments which it now sustains around the world
(without turning to a garrison state) did we not possess atomic weapons and the will to
use them when necessary. Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1963.666

The conclusion of the Congressional investigation into the B-36 and air strategy
in late 1949 had done little to ease the mind of President Harry Truman as he looked
ahead to a peaceful 1950. In addition to the acrimonious interservice battles that plagued
the administration since the end of World War II and the escalating problems with the
Soviet Union since 1946, the President also had to deal with the Berlin Blockade and
collapse of Nationalist China in 1949. More ominous for the administration was the
evidence that the Soviet Union had attained nuclear weapons far sooner than the 1952
timeframe that had been predicted by many scientists and military experts. The Soviet
atomic bomb and their version of the Superfortress, the TU-4 Bull, gave them the ability
to hit most of the continental United States on a one-way mission and neutralized the
American nuclear advantage in an all-or-nothing total war. The President later wrote that
the Soviet bomb and the ongoing American scientific developments spurred his decision
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to pursue the hydrogen bomb and, thus, an arms race was in the making.667 Soon new
thermonuclear weapons of much greater capacity would be made. As well, far more
advanced delivery systems developed that could fly deep into the Soviet Union with
minimum risk to the crews that manned the new generation of bombers or fired the
nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles. In the short-term, Secretary of Defense
Louis Johnson continued to scale back the military budget under the direction of the
President and it was hoped that after the tumult of the previous year, 1950 would be
relatively quiet.
New weapons and the strategy confirmed during the B-36 hearings in late 1949
meant that the American military equipment, tactics, and training now emphasized
nuclear weapons delivery in preparation for a total war with the Soviet Union. Secretary
of the Navy Francis Matthews continued to lead the Navy but his Chief of Naval
Operations Admiral Forrest P. Sherman was tasked with rebuilding the morale of the
Navy after their “loss” during the hearings. Sherman was highly respected inside and
outside of the Navy and even those who had questioned the ethics of many in the USN
were quick to praise the new CNO for his intelligence and ability to keep a keep a low
profile at the same time he attempted to reassert a strategic direction for the Navy.668
After the hearings, the Air Force would also see a change of leadership because
Secretary Stuart Symington made the decision to leave the Pentagon. Perhaps frustrated
at his inability to attain the 70 Group Program under Truman or even the removal of the
Service Secretaries from the National Security Council and other erosions of power to the
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Secretary of Defense, Symington resigned in April 1950. He became the chairman of the
National Security Resources Board before he successfully ran for the Senate in 1952. The
former chairman of the President’s Air Policy Commission, Thomas K. Finletter,
replaced the polarizing Symington as Secretary of the Air Force. Finletter remained
convinced of the ability of airpower to win a war and remained a supporter of the 70
Group Program that his commission recommended to Truman in 1948.669 Like his
predecessor, Finletter would not achieve this goal and it appeared that the prospects for it
coming to fruition in the near future were slight as the President made it clear that he
hoped to continue to scale back defense spending for the next two fiscal years.670
More importantly for the immediate future of American airpower, however, was
the outbreak of war in Korea only three months after the Congressional report on
Unification and Strategy was released in March 1950. Unlike the total war that was
predicted multiple times since the end of the World War II, the Korean War was the
epitome of a limited war and the ability of airpower to win a decisive victory was
restrained. Despite this flaw in airpower, the Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower
administrations were successful in linking American goals and policy to military action
and airpower. An independent South Korea was always Truman’s goal, even after the illfated decision to move United Nations forces north of the 38th Parallel to reunify Korea.
Eisenhower remained committed to ending the war in a manner that preserved the
sovereignty of South Korea and repatriated captured U.N. prisoners. Both
administrations were pressured by some in the military to introduce nuclear weapons into
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the war, but ultimately refrained from turning the conflict into a total war. Eisenhower
was willing to increase the rhetoric and looked at options to end the war on American
terms including expanding the war into Manchuria, to eradicate sanctuaries, expanding
conventional forces, or ultimately the use of nuclear weapons.671
The war in Korea proved to be the antithesis of the view of strategic air warfare
concepts that had been fought over since the end of World War II as the efficacy of
strategic bombing was limited because of the availability of valuable targets and
international concerns over civilian casualties.672 Interdiction and tactical bombing
arguably became more important to protect the United Nation’s ground forces and disrupt
the flow of supplies to the North Korean and Chinese forces that were engaged by the end
of 1950. Strategic air warfare did not provide victory for the American led U.N. forces in
Korea nor did it allow for a rapid conclusion. Instead, American tactical aircraft allowed
the outnumbered allies to hold their ground against numerically superior communist
forces. Well-trained American aviators were also able to establish air superiority over
Korea in 1950, despite being dramatically outnumbered.673 Without this control of the
air, South Korea would have been lost.

THE KOREAN WAR, 1950-1953

Unlike a major war with the Soviet Union, the United States was in a state of war
in Korea with a third world Soviet ally. North Korea received its weapons from other
countries, primarily the USSR and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), rather than
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through indigenous arms production. This created a difficult scenario for the advocates
of airpower because bombing the means of production in North Korea would not destroy
the weapons that its military used. Instead, focus had to be on the transportation network
that funneled weapons from the Soviet Union or the PRC to the frontlines in Korea. This
was extremely difficult because of the sudden outbreak of the war on June 25, 1950. The
rapid advances made by the North Korean Army threatened to overrun South Korea in a
matter of weeks, and it appeared that the North Koreans did not need large logistical
support bases that could be easily bombed by U.N. aircraft.674 Another critical challenge
to the United States Air Force was to complete a strategic bombing campaign against a
nation with limited infrastructure that did not manufacture its own weapons. There had
to also be extensive consideration to avoid errant B-29s from hitting Chinese or Soviet
territory.675
Unfortunately for the advocates of airpower, when the B-29s began to bomb
North Korea, troop concentrations of the communist nation had already advanced further
south and seemed to be little affected by the bombing north of the 38th Parallel. Repeated
precision attacks by B-29s did little to stop the war and eventually the Superfortresses
were chased from the daytime skies by Soviet flown MiG-15s that had been brought in to
defend North Korea.676 Even the introduction of the most advanced American jet fighter,
the F-86 Sabre, could not stem the losses of B-29s because they were too few in number.
The highly skilled F-86 crews did reestablish air superiority over the Korean Peninsula
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and shot down an impressive number of enemy jets. Men who had flown during World
War II populated many of the American air groups that went to Korea and were familiar
with the skills of dogfighting. They were able to pass these skills on to others in their
squadrons and this allowed the U.N. forces to maintain control of the skies over Korea.
However, the allied aircraft would never match the total number of MiGs in the theater
and therefore the MiG-15 remained a threat until after the war officially ended.677
The Korean War validated the arguments that not all future wars would be nuclear
or could be won solely or primarily with strategic bombing. The conflict also proved that
a more balanced force structure was needed for the future including fighter aircraft that
could establish and maintain air superiority. The value of carrier-based aircraft was also
demonstrated to those in the Truman administration who had believed that the Air Force
alone could maintain an American presence in a theater of operations. When American
airbases in Korea were overrun during the summer of 1950 which forced the USAF to
relocate to Japan, it was carrier-based aircraft that maintained a presence over the
peninsula. The interdiction campaign in Korea also displayed the limitations of airpower
to deny enemy supplies when that enemy did not need massive quantities to maintain
their army in the field. Heavy losses were also inflicted upon the U.N. attack aircraft
because the communist forces placed strong anti-aircraft defenses near transportation
networks that were targeted.678 The limited nature of Korean War was also more
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indicative of forthcoming wars as both sides restricted the types of weapons that were
used and excluded the use of nuclear weapons in an effort to win the war. Sanctuaries in
Manchuria for communist forces were technically off limits for the U.N. forces to attack,
however, Allied air bases in South Korea and Japan reciprocally remained free from
communist assaults.679 The conflict also demonstrated that if a war involved one of the
superpowers directly against a proxy state supported by the other, there would be no
decisive victory and the war would end through negotiation.680
Regrettably, lessons about the limitations of airpower that were learned in Korea
were later ignored, particularly by the Air Force, because the conflict was seen an
anomaly and “not a sign of things to come” in the future of warfare. As evidence, more
resources were devoted within the Air Force, an agency founded on strategic bombing,
for nuclear delivery than conventional weapons despite the lessons of Korea. USAF
fighter pilots were trained to drop bombs on targets too small for SAC’s bombers to
engage. Air Force tactical aircraft remained “cocked and locked—sitting on runways,
pilots strapped in the cockpits, with small nuclear bombs” mounted to the fighters. It was
argued that the goal of leadership within the USAF was to turn fighter aviation into a
“mini-SAC.”681 Even into the Eisenhower years, the Air Force continued to prioritize
SAC and its mission because the doctrine of strategic bombing “was seen as immutable,
inflexible, and so basically sound as to demand no further justification, evolution, or
revision.” Discussions about Air Force budgets did not focus on doctrine or strategy but
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rather on the “types and capabilities of airplanes” to meet the Soviet threat.682 Like their
peers in the Air Force, the Navy added nuclear weapons as part of their strike packages
by 1951. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized this change and described the carriers as
“the major striking power of the Navy and are primarily responsible for neutralizing at
the source the enemy’s offensive capabilities to threaten control of the seas.” Focus
remained primarily on the USSR and not on the chance of another limited war with a
Soviet proxy state.683
The election of Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1952 and his emphasis on the economy
of nuclear weapons along with the “most effective means of using them against an
aggressor” allowed the development of weapon systems designed around nuclear
bombs.684 Ike’s Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson, previously the president of
General Motors, was committed to economizing the Pentagon and saw an increased role
in a nuclear arsenal for offense and defense. This included an increase in the
development and deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) by the Air
Force and intermediate range missiles (IRBM) by the Navy and the Army.685 But it was
more than economic issues that drove these decisions. There was still the underlying
belief in the efficacy of strategic bombing and more importantly, nuclear weapons.
These were the same issues that had originally caused the fighting over unification and
the B-36. It was this core doctrine of strategic air warfare and their perceived deterrence
that truly drove the strategy and funding. Arguably, they were indeed cheaper than
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conventional forces, however, there is no cost savings if the weapons and strategy are
ineffective or counter-productive. Still, the Eisenhower administration also oversaw a
dramatic increase in the size of the Air Force, particularly in its combat groups. The
Korean War had already caused a remarkable increase in the USAF, from 48 groups in
1950 to 106 groups by 1953, and plans were approved to further expand the USAF to 143
groups. Ike later trimmed this down to 137 groups, which was achieved in June 1957, a
decade after the battle for the 70 Group Program.686

THE NEW LOOK PROGRAM

The B-36 survived into the Eisenhower era, but the numbers of active duty
Peacemakers were in decline. By early 1959, the last of the B-36s was retired, lasting
only ten years after Admiral Arthur Radford called them “the Billion Dollar Blunder.”687
They were replaced in service by aircraft that were only a few years newer, but
dramatically improved through remarkable technical advances. These included fighters
and bombers that could fly at supersonic speeds, as well as refuel in-flight to extend their
range. Strategic Air Command finally attained a truly global bomber when they
purchased the combination of B-52 Stratofortresses and KC-135 Stratotankers. Both
airframes would be indispensable to sustaining the deterrence factor of the American
nuclear arsenal during the Cold War.
The company that built the B-36, Convair, attempted to bring the Peacemaker into
the jet age. They completely redesigned the wing to a swept-back design and powered
the new plane with eight of the same engines that were used by the B-52. The redesigned
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aircraft was designated the B-60. However, it did not enter production because it was
still too slow compared to the B-52 and the B-60 program was ultimately cancelled in
1952.688 Convair did, nevertheless, succeed in building a new generation of nuclear
bomber, the B-58 Hustler. This was a delta-winged supersonic bomber that was the
complete antithesis of the B-36 because it was sleek and fast. Still, its purpose was
inflexible for any war short of a total war. Air Defense Command also purchased
aircraft from Convair, particularly the F-102 Delta Dagger and the F-106 Delta Dart
interceptors. These were designed primarily to defend NATO nations from Soviet
bombers that would be shot down with American arsenal of nuclear tipped air-to-air
missiles. In an all or nothing war, the United States was willing to use any type of atomic
weapons to attain victory or stave off defeat.
The USAF Tactical Air Command, like the much larger Strategic Air Command,
continued to purchase aircraft based upon their ability to function as nuclear bombers.
Many in SAC believed that the day of air-to-air fighting was over and TAC needed to
continue in its primary mission of atomic weapons delivery in defense of American
policy.689 The Republic F-105 Thunderchief typified this mindset. It was the largest
fighter of the era and it was not particularly maneuverable, but it could carry tactical
nuclear weapons in an internal bomb bay. The F-105 became the workhorse of the Air
Force over Vietnam during the years of Operation Rolling Thunder (1965-1968) and
because it was designed as a low-level tactical nuclear bomber, it was not well suited to
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the war over North Vietnam.690 The F-105 suffered heavy losses during the Vietnam
War because it was not originally designed with adequate armor plating, electronic
counter measures or sufficient back-up flight controls.691 An investigation later reported
that was because it had been designed on the assumption that the Soviet defenses it would
face consisted of surface-to-air missiles. Because one “hit by a large missile warhead
was presumed to mean an automatic kill, the F-105 was built with little emphasis on
system redundancy and resistance to battle damage.”692 In fact, during the Rolling
Thunder campaign, the F-105 flew roughly seventy-five percent of the sorties over North
Vietnam, which led to the loss of approximately half of all F-105s produced.693 It would
also have to be refitted to carry the conventional weapons needed in Southeast Asia.694
Air Force fighter pilots were trained for the primary mission of dropping bombs
on a target rather than defending themselves from enemy fighters. The lack of training in
basic air-to-air skills meant that the USAF struggled to wrest control the air from the
North Vietnamese People’s Air Force (VPAF) during the 1960s. It was an enemy that
was inexperienced in comparison to the USAF and flew only a small number of MiGs
that were a generation behind the designs of aircraft flown by the Americans. The VPAF
came into being in the mid-1950s and within ten years it fought the USAF to a standstill.
The Vietnamese asserted they shot down 262 American aircraft for a loss of 261 of their
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own from all causes.695 During Operation Rolling Thunder (1965-1968) United States
forces destroyed 118 North Vietnamese fighters; in return, 56 American aircraft were lost
to VPAF fighters.696 Perhaps the most striking statistic from the air war was during the
1972 Operation Linebacker raids. The USAF maintained a kill-to-loss proportion of 2:1
while at the same time the USN had a 6:1 ratio for the months of the operation.697 The
Navy had done slightly better in 1972 because of an emphasis on tactics and training in
air superiority for naval aviators, but this was still half of what was achieved in Korea
and it was against an air force that was barely a decade old. If the United States could not
win the war in the air, they could not enforce American policy. It appeared that airpower
had failed.
The Navy also benefited because of the increased appropriations in the aftermath
of the outbreak of war in Korea. The USN was able to bring many aircraft carriers into
service as defense spending rapidly escalated throughout the war. Finally, after years of
reductions, the Navy was increasing in size and mission capability. The Korean War
further proved the Navy was “not on the way out” and the Air Force did not replace the
Navy or its mission. Less than a year after the defeat of United States, the Chief of Naval
Operations Forrest P. Sherman was able to secure congressional and presidential approval
for a new supercarrier. When the carrier was commissioned, it was christened Forrestal
(CVB-59) in honor of James Forrestal, the man who had held the Navy together through
the early years of unification. This first class of supercarriers was fully capable of
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handling nuclear weapons and new types of attack aircraft that were designed to carry
atomic weapons. Forrestal would always be known by its motto, First in Defense, and it
proved the validity of the Navy claims about the offensive capacity of large-deck carriers
and their ability to survive in war. Unfortunately Admiral Sherman would not see the
completion of the supercarrier that he had fought so hard to achieve as he died
unexpectedly in July 1951.
The man most responsible for the attempt to destroy carrier-based aviation,
Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, was fired in September 1950 because of his inability
to get along with other members of the Cabinet, particularly Secretary of State Dean
Acheson. He had also been outspoken in his belief in expanding the Korean War in
pursuit of victory.698 Secretary of the Navy Francis Matthews quietly resigned in June
1951 to become the ambassador to Ireland and was replaced by the Undersecretary of the
Navy Dan Kimball, the former assistant under John Sullivan during the contentious days
of 1949.699 The war and change of leadership in the Pentagon and the Navy also
rehabilitated the careers of several officers who had appeared to be on the losing side of
the 1949 B-36 hearings, including the outspoken Admiral Arthur Radford who went on to
serve as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, the
former director of OP-23 who served three terms as Chief of Naval Operations under
President Eisenhower. These naval officers and their Air Force counterparts would
continue to promote the efficacy of airpower and pressed to have increased options for
nuclear delivery from bombers and fighter aircraft, as well as missiles that were launched
from land or submarines.
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The Navy also pursued strategic and tactical nuclear bombers as their primary
weapon systems during the Truman and Eisenhower years. The Douglas A3D
Skywarrior was designed as the Navy’s first carrier-based strategic nuclear bomber.
While the original proposal for the aircraft was released in 1946, the first A3D did not fly
until 1952, nor did it enter operational fleet squadrons until 1956. By the time of the
Vietnam War, it was relegated to carrier-based refueling, reconnaissance, or an airborne
electronic counter measures aircraft. The Navy’s second-generation strategic jet bomber,
the North American A3J Vigilante had also been converted to reconnaissance aircraft by
the 1960s. The Vigilante served throughout the Vietnam War with 26 of the airframes
lost over Southeast Asia.700 The most produced attack aircraft developed by the Navy
was the Douglas built A4D Skyhawk. Built as a small, tactical nuclear bomber, the A4D
was to “conduct offensive air-to-surface attack operations with emphasis on nuclear
weapons delivery.” 701 They had first been introduced to combat when a number of
Skyhawks squadrons flew missions over Lebanon in 1958.702 Flown by Navy and
Marine Corps squadrons on carriers and from air bases in South Vietnam, Skyhawks
were used from the first missions over Vietnam in 1964 until the last carrier left the South
China Sea in 1975. However, the Skyhawk became the most numerous naval aircraft lost
in Southeast Asia with 266 combat losses because it was not designed to be exposed to
enemy groundfire.703
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Perhaps the greatest deficiency in the Air Force and Navy by the time of the
Vietnam War was the lack of a true air-superiority fighter. The most numerous fighter
used by all three Services during the war the Americans was the McDonnell F-4 Phantom
II. Designed as a carrier-based interceptor for the Navy in the 1950s, the Phantom was
first acquired by the Air Force in 1962.704 This was a result of Secretary of Defense
Robert S. McNamara’s concern about military strategies linking economic efficiency and
aircraft commonality.705 The Phantom was also sold to the Air Force because it was
capable of conducting nuclear strike missions with tactical nuclear weapons.706 Although
the Phantom was a proven airframe and remained in production until the late 1970s, it
was not exactly what the Air Force or the Navy needed for an air-superiority fighter.
Even worse for the Air Force, the Phantom was a Navy design and they were loathe to
accept it. It had limited view to the rear of the aircraft, and engines that left a long black
smoke trail that pointed directly to airborne Phantoms, and was originally armed solely
with air-to-air missiles. These were still in their infancy and tremendously unreliable
which severely restricted American attempts to establish air superiority over North
Vietnam during the war. Despite the inefficiencies of the original Phantom design, the
Air Force eventually bought over 2,600 F-4s. Many of these Phantoms were still in
service at the time of the first Gulf War and several squadrons saw combat over Iraq.

THE TRIUMPH OF RESTRAINT AND THE FAILURE OF FORCE

704

The USMC also purchased F-4 Phantom IIs. Eventually over 5000 Phantoms were produced and many
remain in service today.
705
Glenn E. Burgos, Engineering the Phantom II: Parts into Systems (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute
Press, 1996), 115.
706
David Donald and Jon Lake, Editors, McDonnell F-4 Phantom: Spirit in the Skies, (Norwalk: Aerospace
Publishing, 2002), 54.

369
Throughout history, the most difficult predicament for any air campaign is to link
the capabilities of airpower to national policy. In the decades after World War II,
airpower was viewed as virtually unstoppable in any form. It was presumed
consequently, that if American policy authorized an air campaign against any nation, it
had to be successful. When President Lyndon Johnson ordered American airmen into the
bombing campaign, he did not believe that it could fail. Unfortunately, the Americans
were in a position that they could not realistically win the war for several reasons.
Primarily, there were limitations on the types of aircraft the Americans had on inventory,
their previous training for nuclear rather than conventional delivery, inflexible tactics for
limited warfare, and political goals that restricted effectiveness of airpower during the
war. Another limiting factor during the war in Vietnam was the dispersal of the logistical
support base for the North Vietnamese and the limited amount of supplies needed by the
Viet Cong. As early as 1966, the New York Times editorialized that the effectiveness of
the bombing of North Vietnam was not easy to evaluate. While the bombing may have
made the war more costly for the North Vietnamese, the “Vietcong also continued to get
enough supplies to keep on fighting South Vietnamese and American troops.”707
Consequently, Rolling Thunder extended the war for several years while 20,000
Americans and hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese died and no other substantive goals
were achieved.708 Therefore, when Rolling Thunder ended in November 1968, airpower
failed in Vietnam because of limited effective resources, strategies, and aircraft, as well
as extremely restrictive political objectives. For that, by 1969 the United States had lost
more than 900 aircraft, 382 airmen killed in action, and over 700 listed as missing in
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action.709 Yet, there were a few bright spots in Rolling Thunder. The North Vietnamese
were forced to place large numbers of anti-aircraft guns in and around Hanoi and
Haiphong to protect those assets from attack. If not for the persistent American presence
over North Vietnam between 1965 and 1968, many of those weapons could have been
redeployed south of the Demilitarized Zone and wreaked havoc upon American, RAAF,
and South Vietnamese tactical strikes in South Vietnam. In addition, because the
pressure on North Vietnam was limited, the Soviet Union did not release upgraded antiaircraft missiles to the North Vietnamese prior to 1972.710
Richard M. Nixon was elected President in 1968 partially on the promise to
successfully conclude the Vietnam War with honor. To accomplish this goal, airpower in
Vietnam would have to transition from the gradualism of the Johnson administration to
accomplish a far more decisive conclusion. This would include the main battery of
American defenses, Strategic Air Command B-52s, and a massive application of force.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff had researched this numerous times, but no action had been
taken prior to 1972 because of concerns about how the press would respond, in addition
to apprehension about Soviet or Communist Chinese intentions in Southeast Asia.711 The
Nixon administration, frustrated by their inability to extricate themselves from the war,
ordered massive strikes by B-52s in 1972 under the code names Operation Linebacker I
and II. The strategic missions of the Stratofortresses were coupled with tactical strikes by
fighter aircraft utilizing Precision Guided Munitions (PGM), or smart bombs, as well as
709

Ivan Rendall, Rolling Thunder: Jet Combat from World War II to the Gulf War (New York: The Free
Press, 1997), 158.
710
SA-3 missiles developed in the USSR and transferred to several Arab states were proficient in upsetting
Israeli air superiority during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. One can only wonder what would have happened
had these improved missiles been used against B-52s or F-105s over Hanoi.
711
U.S. Warrior Studies, Air Interdiction in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, An interview with Gen.
Earle E. Partridge, General Jacob E. Smart, and Gen. John W. Vogt, Jr., Office of Air Force History,
Washington DC, 1986, 59.

371
traditional bombs. However, poor mission planning, out-dated tactics, poor weather, and
reluctance on behalf of Strategic Air Command to engage in non-nuclear missions over
North Vietnam cost SAC fifteen B-52s in only eleven days.712 Losses were so high in the
beginning of the campaign that the Commander in Chief of Strategic Air Command
ordered the cancellation of some B-52 missions for fear of further combat losses. This
was the first time in American history that a bomber attack had been recalled for fear of
casualties.713

THE LIMITS OF STRATEGIC AIR WARFARE AND THE FUTURE

The legacy of the air war over Vietnam was the fundamental bureaucratic shift in
the way airpower was viewed from the top down. The traditional strategic and tactical
nuclear strike missions of the Air Force and Navy remained, but were deemphasized as
more flexible concepts of airpower were implanted. New aircraft were designed to
establish air superiority and allow new generations of tactical strike craft to hit their
targets unmolested by enemy fighters. The introduction of precision-guided munitions
during the Vietnam War created greater results with fewer bombs and lower risks to
strike aircraft. Limited numbers of laser-guided bombs were utilized during the Vietnam
War and the First Gulf War, although far more traditional iron “dumb bombs” were
dropped upon the enemy. It was only during the recent operations in Afghanistan and
Iraq that the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps efficiently used precision guided
munitions in great numbers. These included laser-guided bombs and weapons that
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received their targeting information from Global Positioning Satellites. This increased
accuracy and decreased collateral damage. It also reduced the number of aircraft used on
each strike mission, exposed fewer personnel to enemy fire, and hit the target with greater
accuracy. Moreover, increased accuracy reduced the number of times aircraft had to be
exposed destroying important targets. This had been one of the greatest deficiencies of
the Vietnam War. This also allows airpower to finally accomplish the great promise that
had eluded it since the first flight of a military aircraft.
It should be noted that an interesting memory from Vietnam remains. During the
first Persian Gulf War in 1991, Operation Enduring Freedom in 2002, and Operation
Iraqi Freedom in 2003, American B-52 Stratofortresses were once again at war. Capable
of carrying up to fifty-one 750lb high explosive bombs or cluster bomb units, the B-52s
destroyed many well defended Iraqi and Taliban positions. As they had been over the
skies of Vietnam a generation earlier, the B-52s were one of the most enduring images in
these recent conflicts. So commanding was their presence over the battlefield that
propaganda leaflets featuring a B-52 unloading its bombs were used to warn of potential
air strikes in the immediate area. Under the Arabic writing was a photo, not of a recent
B-52, but rather of an aircraft dropping its payload on a different enemy, in a different
war, in an environment that is the antithesis of the deserts of Iraq and Afghanistan. Its
crews knew the particular B-52 on the leaflet as “the Mekong Express.”714 The
photograph, taken during an Arc Light mission over South Vietnam in 1965-1966, is an
icon of war that many had hoped to forget and a legacy that will not be forgotten.
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Finally, the air campaign over North Vietnam is reminiscent of what General
Omar Bradley argued in 1949. In an address before the Third National Industry Army
Day Conference in Boston, Bradley argued that while he was a supporter of airpower in
the modern age, he also understood the great limitations that affected its use. Bradley
stated that while an air campaign could cripple an enemy, the United States would be
forced to gain victory “over our dead bodies—those of our soldiers on the ground.”
Unfortunately, the war in Vietnam did not end in victory despite the sacrifice of more
than 58,000 Americans.715 To whom then do we affix the blame?

CONCLUSION

The Truman administration had ended more than a decade before the first
American combat missions were flown over Vietnam in 1964, but many of the military
policy decisions that were made between 1945 and 1950 were a principal part of the
dilemma. The President was extremely indecisive when it came to how nuclear weapons
and strategic bombing were going to be used by his administration and those that
followed. He accepted recommendations made primarily by the Air Force concerning
funding and weapons types, despite deep reservations that he had about their
effectiveness. He also prioritized reduced military funding at the same time that he was
increasing the role of the United States across the globe. Truman attempted to use
service unification as a means to achieving cost reductions, but instead, it opened a great
chasm between the services. These very public and acrimonious debates revolved around
what types of bombers would be built and how to build a defense strategy around them
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rather than on whether or not the strategy would work. Truman’s inability to completely
control his defense department was a critical problem. The Air Force, and the command
structure of the Strategic Air Command clearly understood how to secure funding in the
Truman administration, be able to deliver the biggest weapons of all. The policies
became so entrenched that even a change of administrations did not alter the core
doctrine of strategic bombing. Under the Eisenhower administration, SAC continued to
dominate the Air Force and defense spending.
Secretary of the Air Force Stuart Symington also shares much of the
responsibility for the inflexibility of American defenses in the post World War II era.
Like others within the USAAF, he saw a successful strategic bombing campaign as a
critical component to achieving an independent Air Force and preeminence in post war
strategic planning and budgeting. Furthermore, Symington used his position to lobby,
cajole, and convince the President and Congress to embrace a strategy that was premised
more upon theory than results. Using his office to promote the Air Force at the expense
of the other Services clearly derailed serious consideration to alternative strategy. The
supremacy of the USAF was certainly embraced by Louis A. Johnson when he became
the Secretary of Defense and within one month in office he had turned the Department of
Defense into a virtual fiefdom of the Air Force’s bomber barons. Ineffective civilian
leadership plagued the Navy for much of this time. James Forrestal appeared to be more
concerned about unification, Johnson and Symington marginalized Jim Sullivan, and
Francis Matthews did not appear to represent the interests of the Navy. There were
strong concerns inside the Navy about their diminished role in the nation’s defense and a
general feeling of hostility from the administration. This forced the Navy to respond to
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the Air Force’s role in strategic bombing by attempting to outdo the upstart Service with
weapons that reflected the promise of strategic bombing as the quickest avenue to victory
in any war. Behind the atomic diplomacy arguments or a simple “more bang for the
buck” approach to viewing nuclear weapons was a true belief in the efficacy of strategic
bombing that was at core of this dilemma.
The military itself also bears much of the blame as well. Instead of attempting to
truly offer a more flexible military program that gave the United States more options
short of war, both the Navy and the Air Force attempted to outdo the other with claims of
supremacy of nuclear delivery systems. In particular, the leadership within the Air Force
continued to focus almost solely upon nuclear weapons delivery as their raison d’etre
until the 1970s, especially after Curtis LeMay was appointed as the Air Force Chief of
Staff in 1961. Even after President Kennedy’s move towards flexible response, which
contradicted many of the beliefs of LeMay, the Air Force continued to invest heavily in
nuclear bombers and missiles to expand its role in the defense triad. They also sustained
an alert status for all bombers and, since the 1950s, maintained a percentage of its armed
B-52s in the air at all times. This was to guarantee that a surprise attack against the
United States would not cripple all of the strategic forces because at least a few of SAC’s
bombers would be able to strike back. It was only after two major crashes involving
hydrogen bomb laden B-52s crashing on international soil that the airborne alert program
was finally suspended. The Air Force continued to believe in the efficacy of strategic
bombing via manned bombers or missiles, even after Korea and the Rolling Thunder
raids had disproven the idea that bombing was the ultimate arbiter in any war.
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The Navy was able to address their strategic imbalance much earlier than the Air
Force, in part out of financial necessity. It was also because of the introduction of the
Polaris ballistic missile submarines in the early 1960s, which secured a role for the Navy
in the American nuclear triad of strategic bombers, land-based and submarine launched
ballistic missiles. The nuclear heavy and light attack bombers developed for the Navy
transitioned to conventional attack roles. New classes of supercarriers became symbols
of the American ability to project power ashore across the globe. The Korean War had
also influenced the Navy to develop a mission that it could successfully accomplish, a
credible sea-based offensive strike that only the Navy could deliver. It emphasized
controlling the air over enemy targets and successfully dropping bombs where necessary.
By the late 1950s, the Navy had moved on to developing planes that would help them
accomplish this tactical mission rather than basing their decisions solely on an aircraft’s
ability to deliver nuclear weapons. In the 1990s, the Navy retired the last of their former
heavy attack bombers, the A-3 Skywarrior, a plane that traced its origins to the troubling
days of the Revolt of the Admirals, and its attack versions of the venerable Skyhawk.
During that same decade, after more than forty years, a new supercarrier named United
States was to patrol the seas and extend American power along with other carriers
including Carl Vinson (CVN-70). Instead, in a compromise between Republicans and
Democrats, United States was renamed in honor of the President who almost killed naval
aviation, Harry S. Truman (CVN-75).
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Appendix A
Model
B-17
Stratofortress
B-24
Liberator
B-29 /TU-4
Super
Fortress
B-36
Peacemaker
B-47
Stratojet
B-50 Super
Fortress

United States Army Air Corps/ United States Air Force

Manufacturer

Introduced
Into Service

Top Speed
(MPH)

Altitude
(Feet)

Cruising
Speed
(MPH)

Boeing

1939

287

35,000

182

Consolidated

1941

290

28,000

215

Boeing/Tupolev

1944

357

36,000

220

Consolidated - Vultee
(Convair)

1947

435

42,000

230

Boeing

1951

630

42,000

557

Boeing

1947

400

40,000

249

United States Navy
Model

Manufacturer

Introduced
Into Service

Top Speed
(MPH)

Altitude
(Feet)

F2H Banshee

McDonnell

1949

590

40,000

AJ Savage

North American Aviation

1949

425

37,000

PV Neptune

Lockheed

1947

303

27,000

A-3
Skywarrior

Douglas Aircraft

1956

610

41,000

Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR)
Model

Manufacturer

Introduced
Into Service

Top Speed
(MpH)

Altitude
(Feet)

MiG-15

Mikoyan-Gurevich

1948

669

51,000

MiG-17

Mikoyan-Gurevich

1952

715

58,000

MiG-19

Mikoyan-Gurevich

1955

902

55,775

Appendix B

B-17 Flying Fortress and B-24 Liberator

Top image was a B-17 and the bottom is a B-24. These were the primary American
heavy bombers during World War II. (Images from the USAF Museum)
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Appendix C

Boeing B-29 Superfortress
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Top: B-29s during production. Note the relative large size of the B-29 compared to the workers
under the wing: two Superfortresses in action over Japan. (Images from the USAF Museum)

Appendix D

The Evolution of Heavy Bombers
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Top: A B-29 is dwarfed by the extraordinary size of the XB-36 Peacemaker. (USAF Museum) Bottom: An
early model B-52 Stratofortress flies off the wing of a late model B-36 (National Archives)

Appendix E

Late model B-36 and B-50 Superfortress
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Top: Late model B-36 Peacemaker with six propeller driven engines and four jet engines
mounted on the outboard of the last conventional engine. These were used on take-offs
and over the target area to make the Peacemaker less vulnerable to attack. Bottom: An
update of the B-29 design, the B-50 had improved internal components, new engines, and
extra fuel tanks mounted on the wing. (Images from the USAF Museum)

Appendix F

B-47 Stratojet
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Top: The XB-47 Stratojet, the prototype of the most produced bomber for Strategic Air
Command. It was fast, maneuverable, and ultimately, the antithesis of the B-36. Its
primary limitation was its combat radius. Bottom: To solve the problem of the shorter
range of the B-47, SAC adopted aerial refueling to extend the range of all its bombers,
except the B-36. The aircraft refueling the Stratojet is a KC-97 Stratotanker. If one looks
carefully at it, you can see the B-29 lineage in the design. (Images from the USAF
Museum)

Appendix G

The North American AJ Savage

406

Top: The P2V Neptune being launched from USS Midway. However, unlike the Savage, the P2V
could recover aboard carriers. Bottom: Like all carrier aircraft built since the end of World War
II, the basic design breaks down for storage on the smaller confines of a carrier at sea. (National
Archives)

Appendix H

Douglas A3D Skywarrior
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Top: An early model A3D from the Naval Air Test Center lands aboard Forrestal (CVA59). Bottom: A3Ds are being hoisted aboard the World War II era Essex-class carrier
Shangri-La (CVA-38). This ability of the A3D to operate off of all fleet carriers and its
superior performance gave the Navy a truly effective nuclear bomber. However, the
Skywarrior reached the fleet only a few years before the primary naval nuclear strike
program transitioned to the Polaris ballistic missile submarine program in the early
1960s. (National Archives)

